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TEE NEGLECTED CREATURE:
THE DOCTRINE OF THE NON-HUNN 	 ±eN-
ND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HUMAN





One of the strongest claims made for Barth's Christo-centric method in
his Dogmatics is that it allows for "pure theology" to emerge saved from
"all corruption from the side of anthropocentric thinking". 1 It should be
expected, therefore, that Barth would offer us the fullest theological
account of the nature and purpose of the non-human creation. For what end
were they created? How did they come to be and how should man relate to
them? When questions are pressed it becomes disconcertingly obvious that
for all the Christological richness of his work, Barth is not free from a
"naive and direct anthropocentricity" against which he earlier protested
(p. 6). More glaringly, his determination to reduce the doctrine of
creation to practical "anthropology" (p. 178) fails to provide the fullest
trinitarian account of God's relationship with the world he has made. God
is "obviously not interested in" the totality of beings which make up the
cosmos (p. 278) and thus the non-human world is strangely otiose from the
standpoint of its Creator. The self-disclosure of the Word is developed in
opposition to the creative Word who causes all things to be and to the
incarnate Word who unites himself with the ousia of created reality. The
missing link in all this is the biblical witness that the divine covenant
extends to all living creatures (see esp. pp. l54f). Barth stresses the
reality of covenant but crucially fails to grasp its inclusivity. And yet
Barth's presuppositions could allow for, arguably even provide, a rich
account of the non-human cosmos. Trinitarian theology can be properly
anthropocentric only if the work of man is seen in terms of the moral
exemplar of Jesus, that is, self-costly obedience to the will of GodS By
skirting the full reality of man's moral relationship with the non-human,
Barth obscures the as yet unfinished nature of creation and the present and
future work of the Spirit in redemption
1. T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931,
The Preacher's Library (London: SCM Press, 1962) p. 143; his italics.
Page references are to the thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE: M1N AND THE CREATED ORDER:
TEE PUZZLE OF ANTEROPOCENTRICITY
-1-
Karl Barth's treatment of Christian doctrine, especially creation,
is the most extensive in this century. "Barth's theology is perhaps
still the single corpus most necessary to understanding twentieth-century
theology". 1
 Although never completed, his magisterial Die Kirchliche
Dogmatik spans four major parts consisting of: (1) The Doctrine of the
Word of God; (2) the Doctrine of God; (3) The Doctrine of Creation, and
(4) The Doctrine of Reconciliation, and these comprise between them twelve
chapter volumes. Quantitatively, as well as qualitatively, his work on
the central themes of Christian theology has never been bettered.
The Doctrine of Creation (Lehre von der Schpfung) comprises the third
part of Barth's scheme and this in four volumes: Chapter IX on 'The Work
of Creation', Chapter X on 'The Creature', Chapter XI on 'The Creator and
His Creature', and Chapter XII on 'The Command of God the Creator'. In
what follows I shall be concerned primarily with the first two
volumes,which set out most clearly in turn the work of creation and the
place of man within it. My concern will be to inquire, describe and
establish how Barth accounts for the non-human creation and its relation-
ship to man, to relate in turn these insights to his overall theology
especially in the Dogmatics, and to assess the theological adequacy of
his treatment in relation to his own theological method. What account
does Barth give of the creation of the non-human? How does non-human
creation stand in relation to human creation? What end and purpose does
non-human creation have? What, if any, is its theological significance
within the created order? And how do we know through Barth's own theo-
logical method what we do know on the basis of revelation? In order to
answer these questions I shall summarise each section of the two forma-
tive chapters, dwelling mainly on those issues which relate to our area of
1. D.F. Ford, 'Conclusion: Assessing Barth' in Karl Barth: Studies of
his Theological Methods, ed. by S.W. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979) p. 200.
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concern, and pause after each section to offer some assessment. 2
 Because
Barth's work is so intricate and intense it is necessary to distinguish
arid keep separate exposition and evaluation. A more detailed analy-
sis will follow after we have looked in turn at the stages of argument
and hopefully reached a clearer understanding of Barth's method and approach.
Creation as an Article of Faith
In his Preface to Chapter IX on 'The Work of Creation', Barth signifi-
cantly enough indicates his unease at embarking upon this task. "A sphere
in which I feel much less confident and sure", he writes. He would have
gladly given over this work to others if only he had felt happier with
their theological presuppositions. The "kernel" of this section, as he
approaches it, consists "in the old-fashioned form of a radical expo-
sition of the contents of the first two chapters of the Bible". Barth
appreciates that this approach (which in turn will mark off and determine
much that is subsequently written) will appear "strange". He had origi-
nally thought that scientific questions were to be encompassed in such
an enquiry, but eventually decided against treating any of them directly.
In the end the method chosen says as much about Barth as his subsequent
analysis and exposition for he judges that "there could be no scientific
problems, objections or aids in relation to what Holy Scripture and the
Christian Church understand ]2y the divine work of creation".3
2. I have omitted discussion of the section 'Man in his Time' in Part Two
(437 - 641); whilst full of interest, it is only marginally relevant
to the non-human creation.
3. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, I, The Doctrine of Creation, Part One
('The Work of Creation'), eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, ET
by J.W. Edwards, 0. Bussey and H. Knight (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark,
1960) p. ix (preface)
On footnotes: To keep notes to the main texts to a minimum, only the
last passage quoted from a given page is footnoted. Thus all preceding
(unacknowledged) quotations since the prece'ding footnote are from the
same page.	 /
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In his first section 'Faith in God the Creator', Barth explains how it
is that creation is a matter of faith and why it is that Christians be-
lieve it. That it is a. matter of faith is clear from the Apostles' Creed:
"I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth". The
word credo in the confession is fundamental: creation is as much an arti-
cle of faith as any other. It is faith which issues in knowledge and
knowledge which in turn relies on faith. Only in the reception of, and
response to, the "divine self-witness" (gttliches Selbstzeugnis)
can we know that God is the Creator (der Schöpfer), and this for
three reasons. In the first place, the article asserts the reality of
the created order. Negatively it distinguishes God from the work and
positively it affirms the reality, the real existence of what is created.
But Barth points out that this has only the status of affirmation: that
the world truly exists is "not demonstrable and can always be disputed".
He continues:
It cannot be shown that God must have created the world,
that it exists necessarily as seen in relation to Him,
and that measured by His reality, it must therefore have
reality, namely, its own special reality. 4
Secondly, the notion of creation is grounded in the existence of God.
"Through Him it came into being and through Him it is", maintains Barth.
But here again that the world exists through the creative activity of God
is not "self-evident". 5
 The created order does not easily provide knowledg
either of its origin or its Creator. An external world-cause is a possi-
ble hypothesis, even a pressing one, but "it is not unavoidable". More-
over, an external world-cause is not itself God. We cannot avoid the
conclusion that the affirmation of God as Creator is a "bold" step of
faith. Thirdly, the Christian confession of God as Creator is determined
4. CD, III, 1, p. 5.
5. CD, III, 1, p. 7.
-4-
by the "linguistic usage of Eoiy Scripture" in which it has its roots.
We cannot rightly speak of Creator and creation outside the context of
the New and Old Testaments, outside the biblical witness which is in turn
an answer to the witness of Christ. The truth of the confession can only
be known from inside. Apart from that "we have not even the faintest
realisation of what it really speaks".
Jesus Christ as the Centre of Divine Creativity
Having established that creation is an article of faith, Barth elaborates
four further facets of the biblical witness to creation. Firstly, to re-
iterate that a distinction must be made between any notion of a world
cause, first cause or prime mover, and God the Creator. Even a "suc-
cessful" postulate of the human mind is simply "not God". 6
 Secondly, the
importance of this distinction becomes apparent when we realise that the
agent to which the confession testifies is understood as incomparably
perfect, It is not just another cause, or starting-point, and nor does
it just exist. The creation of the world by God the Creator is not like
any human act, and there is no other genuine point of comparison except
that of the inner life of God himself. That there is "a correspondence"
between the act of creation and the nature of God in himself is a "secret"
7
revealed only by divine self-witness. Thirdly, it therefore follows that
not only is the subject of the proposition "incomparable", so also is the
act of creation itself. Creation is thus "in respect of its existence
and essence" an "absolute gift of God". 8 No human knowledge can know this
of its own accord. If the act of creation proceeds from a God who is of
his nature only as	 affirmed by the Christian confession, then it can
be known solely through revelation and "can therefore be appropriated only
6. £2 ' III 1, p. 11.
7. CD, III, 1, p. 14.
8. CD, III, 1, p. 15.
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•	 .	 9in faith". Finally, the credal statement refers to the creatioi of
heaven and earth. This affirms that there is nothing that God did not
create and nothing outside him that did not require his authorisation in
order to be. And if we ask why heaven and earth? There is no answer
except that God willed it this way for the self-communication of himself.
Heaven and earth represent the totality, the total sum of all that is
created, but the essential point is that "God's eternal Son and Logos did
not will to be an angel or animal but man", argues Barth. Moreover, "this
and this alone was the content of the eternal divine election of grace")°
It is thus perceived that the confession of God as Creator is inseparable
from the second and third articles of belief. "We believe in Jesus Christ",
concludes Barth, "when we believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of
heaven and earth".11
It is important to see that Barth reaches this conclusion because he per-
ceives that "man is and represents the secret of the creature". 12
 In
order to follow the stages of Barth's argument we need to pay close atten-
tion to his elucidation of the relationship between heaven and earth in
man in his lengthy footnote to this question. 13 He begins by pointing
out that the twofold view of creation, that is with a higher and a lower
order, is incontestably the view of the Old and the New Testaments.
"There is in this sphere of creation both a lower, smaller and visible
and also an upper, larger and invisible reality", he writes. This sphere
is the totality of creation. There "may be pretended but no genuine gods
9. 2• ' III 1, p. 16.
10. £•' III 1, p. 18.
11. ••, III, 1, p. 19.
12. £.' III i 1, p. 18.
13. CD, III, 1, n. pp. 19 - 22.
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or lords", spirits, elements or forces other than those contained in
heaven and earth as created by God. God's power extends to the higher
and the lower; nothing which exists in either realm can do so except by
his creative hand. But Barth goes further and emphasises the unity of
both these spheres, heaven and earth, in man. "And in their centre be-.
tween heaven and earth as their unity is man". Drawing upon the special
creation of man.in Genesis 2 and the anthropology suggested by Isaiah
45:12 and Psalm 8, Barth insists that man is set between heaven and
earth and in a mysterious way represents both, indeed is the indissoluble
link between them. 14
 Man is in this sense the "climax and goal" of the
two Genesis creation sagas. Barth then asks whether Luther was right
when in the Smaller Catechism he opened his elucidation of the first arti-
cle with the words "I believe that God has created me and all creatures
and that he has given me and maintains a body and soul, eyes, ears, and
all members and every sense 	 ,,15 Barth at first recoils at this
"explicitly anthropocentric" view. Ee judges that the biblical pictures
of man in Psalm 8, Isaiah and Job understand him rather as a secret to
be discovered. "In them man has to be found, or find himself, as the
secret of heaven and earth" Barth argues. In other words, man cannot
posit a "naive and direct anthropocentricity" (Anthropozentrismus), assu-
ming that he is as man the centre of the universe. On the other hand,
Luther was half-right. There is an anthropocentricity, a man-centredness,
at-the heart of creation. And this is no less than the self-chosen centre
of God. "It knows of him", writes Barth, "in the light of the person of
the Messiah of Israel, of the Son of Man, in whom the man of God, uniting
14. CD, III, 1, n. p. 20.
15. Luther, Smaller Catechism, cited CD, III, 1, n. p. 21. For further
evidence of Luther's Anthropozentrismus see his commentary on Ram.
8:20 where "the creature" is interpreted to "mean man", Lectures
on Romans, ed. and ET by William Pauck, The Library of Christian
Classics (London: SCM Press, 1961) Vol. xv, p. 237.
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heaven and earth in Himself, appeared as a reality among men". 16 Thus
Jesus Christ is properly the secret of heaven and earth. The Old Testa-
ment pictures of man are "meaningful and practicable" only when viewed
as the "promise or prototype" of this true man)7
Barth now turns to the "positive exposition" of this thesis that creation
is an article of faith. How do we know that God is the Creator of heaven
and earth and that they therefore have a reality distinct from him? The
issue is not what rational grounds, arguments, feelings or justifications
we have for positing God as Creator, or indeed what good it may do us if
we do, but rather "How do we arrive at the position where we can simply
say that we know that it is so?" Barth unravels the significance of this
question with care. The issue is not how can we arrive at the notion of
God independently, as it were, of the other articles of faith, but rther
how this article makes sense or coheres with "every constituent element"
of the Christian confession. How, in other words, do we know that this
doctrine is "of the Word of God Himself"?18
Barth begins by indicating that it is not sufficient to point to the fact
that the creation sagas can be found at the beginning of the Bible, or
that a significant number of scriptural passages speak of God's creative
activity. For the authority of the Bible rests in turn upon the fact that
it "gives us God's own witness to Himself, that it gives us the witness
to Jesus Christ". And Barth continues in a crucial step of argument:
16. CD, III, 1, n. p. 21. Barth also considered this article of Luther's
Catechism at an earlier point. "Most decidedly the knowledge of God
as the Creator and of man as his creature ... would not be subserved
if man was going with excessive forwardness to look upon himself as
the creature and the partner of God", Credo: A Presentation of
the Chief Problems of Dogmatics with Reference to the Apostle's Creed,
ET by J.S. McNab (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936) pp. 29 - 30.
Whether Barth maintains this perspective will shortly be seen.
17. CD, III, 1, n. p. 22.
18. CD, III, 1, p. 22.
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Its word in all words is this Word. And it is this
Word, its witness to Jesus Christ, which makes all
words the infallible Word of God.19
We cannot, that is, understand the biblical witness to God the Creator
without understanding the centre of that witness, namely God's disclosure
of himself in the person of Jesus Christ. All hinges here on Barth's
principle of interpreting Christian doctrine in terms bf its centre, which
is also for Barth the only sure ground of theological knowledge. All else
is "confused myth" or "wild metaphysic" when viewed in this light. The
"basis, norm and meaning" of creation are here revealed or we have no
knowledge at all.20
From this standpoint, Barth deduces a number of points which are funda-
mental to his understanding of the Christian confession of which the doc-
trine of creation is only one part. Because the centre of knowledge is
God's revealing of himself, what he reveals and how he reveals it are of
the utmost significance. We learn that God "does not live His divine life
only in His own space" precisely because of the unity effected with man
in Jesus Christ. It is only because God acts apart from his own sphere
that we know creation is distinct from him in its reality. Moreover, we
learn that man is also not alone, that he is the object of divine activity
and also the subject of divine communication. Again, it is only in Jesus
that we learn to predicate "Father" and "Creator" of God himself. Thus
Barth returns to his ever-pressing theme that the doctrine of creation is
a showing forth of that already existing inner relationship between the
Father and the Son. From this Father-Son relationship we also learn that
man is the centre of creation. "Here is humanity at the heart of the
cosmos", argues Barth. "When we have discovered man as God's creature at
19. CD, III, 1, p. 23.
20. CD, III, 1, p. 25.
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this point, we have made direct discovery of heaven and earth as the
object of the divine act of creation".
Barth thus concludes that we know the doctrine of creation "speaks the
truth" because it both exemplifies and is inseparable from the confession
of the unity of God in Jesus Christ. "Where there is a genuine noetic
connection", he argues, "we can always count on the fact that it has an
ontic basis". 21 Barth repeats his insistence upon the primacy of faith
in Jesus Christ from which the creation doctrine proceeds. One is essen-
tial in order to render the other comprehensible: "If I did not believe
the former, I could not perceive and understand the latter".22
It should now be clear that knowledge of the Creator involves a specific
orientation and confession. Not only is Jesus the indispensable link
in understanding creation intellectually, he is truly with God the Creator
himself. In short: "Faith in Jesus Christ is a life in the presence of
the Creator". 23 It follows that the Creator has a right to rule his
creation "not by subsequent acquisition but by original possession".24
Faith in the Creator must recognise the Creator's right. But it must also
recognise, despite appearances to the contrary, the Creator's benevolence.
For "there has entered in Jesus Christ, the Bearer and Proclaimer of the
benevolence of the One who willed and created the world and themselves".25
In sum: creation is grace, and it sets the scene for further grace - a
theme to which Barth shortly returns (see pp. 16 and 48 - 49).
We need to consider some of the implications of this opening section for
our understanding of the relationship between the non-human and the human.
21. £.' III 1, p. 28.
22. £.' III 1, p. 29.
23. £2.' III i 1, p. 32.
24. £2.' III 1, p. 36.
25. £2. ' Ills 1, p. 38.
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Firstly it is important to make clear what is implicit in his metho--
ology. I do not propose to discuss the long-disputed question about the
place of natural theology in the work of Karl Barth. There is already an
enormous amount of literature concerning this area arid to enter into a
discussion of it now would take us beyond our terms of reference. 26 It
is necessary, however, to get our bearings right on what is for Barth the
overridingly crucial question of where to begin. For it is the question
of presupposition which he openly admits in his Preface, that drove him
to enter "a space in which I feel much less confident and sure". And more:
If I were not obliged to do so in the course of my general
exposition of Church dogmatics, I should probably not have
given myself so soon to a detailed treatment of this parti-
cular material.27
And what is this presupposition? It is clearly stated in the summary fore-
word, arid deserves to be read in full:
The insight that man owes his existence and form together
with all the reality distinct from God, to God's creation,
is achieved only in the reception and answer of the divine
self-witness, that is, only in faith in Jesus Christ, i.e.,
in the knowledge of the unity of Creator and creature
actualised in Him, and in the life in the present mediated
by Him, under the right and in the experience of the good-
ness of the Creator towards His creature.28
Thus summarised we see clearly that the issue posed is the question of
knowledge. "How do we know .. that this is so?" This is not a question
about human self-knowledge, exploration, experience or feeling primarily.
The theological task is to begin at the place where God begins, or rather
26. For a vital text see Natural Theology, comprising 'Nature and Grace'
by E. Brimner and the reply 'No!' by K. Barth, ET by P. Fraenkel,
intro, by John Baillie (London: Geoffrey Bles, Centenary Press, 1946),
and for a recent discussion see Paul Avis' 'Does Natural Theology
Exist?', Theology, 87, 720 (November 1984), 431 - 437.
27. CD, III, 1, ix (preface).
28. CD, III, 1, p. 3.
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the point at which he begins for us, or more precisely the point at which
his centre of revealing is the point of our beginning of understanding.
Barth's clear emphasis here and throughout this whole volume is to begin
at the right theological point at which we shall be able to say in faith
and with knowledge that this is where God is. Hence Barth speaks of the
knowledge of creation as an "insight" stemming from the unique self-
disclosure of God in Jesus Christ.
Two questions quickly present themselves. In the first place, does this
mean that no human experience of creaturely existence, no human observa-
tion, experiment, discovery or reflection can lead to the disclosure of
theological knowledge? Secondly, does this mean that theological know-
ledge is independent of human life and experience?
To the first, we may respond generally by saying that whilst human expe-
rience may lead to the positing of theological questions, such experiences
cannot carry in themselves divine revelation. To affirm such would mean
affirming a doctrine of human experience per se as revelation. 29
 It would
mean affirming God as continuous with all human development, experience and
reflection. Moreover, from Barth's point of view, the question would have
to be raised as to whether we have found God at all in this procedure.
All hinges here on God himself being the source of his own self-disclosure
and revelation. We shall not digress here. to explore at this point Barth's
own description of revelation as the three-fold Word, Revealed, Preached
29. A point which even well-intentioned critics of Barth appear to have
enormous difficulty in grasping. I.T. Ramsey, for example, opposes
Barth's work with the statement: "Now let it be granted at once that
for the Christian the created world will always be a revelation of
God the Creator", 'Barth - and still more Barth', The Modern Church-
man, 4, 2 (January 1961) p. 137. But enormous difficulties flow
from such a sweeping doctrine. We need to ask whether a priori the
integrity and independence of the creature is not in fact threatened
by such a doctrine. Can finite creatures (with one exception) become
God's revelation and also remain creatures?
- 12 -
and Written. 30 Suffice it to say, Barth makes a distinction between
revelation and witness. Human experience, especially we may add Biblical
witness, in so far as it includes this, may constitute witness to revela-
tion but not revelation itself. The method in all this is to separate
and distinguish at the outset theological knowledge from human opinion.
Whilst we cannot at this stage say with precision how far in this or that
situation questions of human experience, in so far as they witness or
otherwise to divine disclosure, may be entertained and supported through-
out Barth's whole treatment of creation, we can be sure at the outset
that there is a "twofold boundary" between them. "There is free scope
for natural science", he writes, "beyond what theology describes as the
work of the Creator". Barth is fully aware of the perplexity that his
approach may cause since for many theological and scientific questions
about creation are intertwined. But he insists upon their separation.
To the second question concerning the independence of theological know-
ledge from human life and experience, it should be clear that created,
incarnate humanity has a central place in revelation and therefore in all
theological knowledge. For Barth's main presupposition is that the "in-
sight" of creation "is achieved only in the :reception and answer of the
divine self-witness, that is, only in faith in Jesus Christ, i.e., in the
knowledge of the unity of Creator and creature actualised in Him". Hence
it is the humanity of Jesus in the second person of the Trinity that truly
attests the reality of creation.
30. For summary see Geoffrey W. Bromiley's An Introduction to the Theology
of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1979) 'The Form of the Word ,
pp. 6 - 8. In later years especially the primacy of the revealed Word
was emphasised: "It is not so much a matter of our encountering the
witness of scripture as of our encountering the one to whom the testi-
mony of scripture bears witness", circular letter, May 1964, cited by
Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: his life from letters and autobiographical
texts, ET by John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1976) p. 466.
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For our pirpose, it is this that holds a vital key to grappling with his
work and also for our own consideration of the place of humanity and crea-
tion within it. Here is the all-important centre from which everything
material in the Dogmatics flows. Barth's critics have often overlooked
his conclusion to the early formative work on Anseim. "God gave himself
as the object of his knowledge", he argues, "and God illumined him that we
might know him as object". In a Preface to the second edition Barth makes
this clear: "in this work on Anselm I am working with a vital key, if not
the key, to an understanding of that whole process of thought that has
impressed me more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper
to theology". 31 The relation between creation and Christ is noetic and
ontic. Notionally we know of creation primarily because God has affirmed
the reality of created life in himself, that is, in the incarnation of his
Son, and ontologically, it is the Son who is the agent of creation, sus-
taining, upholding and ruling it. In simpler language, the place of the
humanity of Jesus plays a vital part in (i) establishing the reality of
creation itself; (ii) in giving creation its centre and goal, and (iii)
determining its character and the appropriate response of man. Man is
therefore the "secret of the creature", in standing mid-way between heaven
and earth, in so far as the man spoken of in the credal confession speaks
of the living Word of God himself and in so far as it anticipates and pre-
figures the incarnate life of Jesus Christ.
A Qualified Anthropocentrism?
In the light of this, we are bound to ask to what extent the status of
created humanity so prefigures and determines the centre of Barth's theo-
logical method, that it overshadows the gift of created life to the rest
31. Barth, Anseim: Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anseim's Proof of the
Existence of God in the Context of his Theological Scheme, ed. by
Dikran Y. Hadidian, Pittsburgh Reprint Series, 2 (London: SCM Press,
1960) The Library of Philosophy and Theology (The Pickwick Press,
1975) p. 171 and (Preface to second edition) p. 11 (my italics).
See S.W. Sykes' 'Barth on. the Centre of Theology' in Karl Barth:
Studies of his Theological Method, op.cit.,pp..36 ff. for discussion.
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of creation. Is there not here a naive nthropozentrismus despite Barth's
protests? It is too early to give an adequate answer at this stage. But
the possible accusation of anthropocentricity does worry Barth. It is not
theologically correct, he suggests against Luther, to begin the Smaller
Catechism with an affirmation of human creation first, for it is only with-
in the context of heaven and earth, and then only Christocentrically, that
such an affirmation can be true. Man, therefore, cannot regard himself as
the totality or as the sole object of creation. Man, however, properly
understood as incarnation is "humanity at the heart of the cosmos: with
its upper and lower aspects". 32
 Is this Anthropozentrismus? Only it seems
in the Christologically qualified sense of God's humanity in Jesus. It is
not anthropocentricity per se as though humanity plain and simple constitutes
the key to theological knowledge. We shall see in what follows how far
this central element in Barth's thought is applied and related to the place
and status of non-humanity in creation. We shall examine closely how
Barth draws the line and how far the charge of Anthropozentrismus can be
sustained.
One general question from our perspective should be raised at this point.
To what extent, on the basis of faith in God the Creator Christologically
centred, is the place of creation, understood as heaven and earth, inci-
dental or insignificant? Of course there is no attempt in Barth to deny
the reality of created heaven and earth, or to suggest that the incarna-
tional secret of created life precludes consideration of other aspects of
creation, but as expounded so far, the question may be raised as to the
significance of the created life, that is the range of beings, animate,
inanimate, sensitive or otherwise, that constitute the cosmos thus created.
It is instructive that in a discussion of the noetic connection between
32. CD, III, 1, p. 28.
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Christ and. creation he offers no statement concerning the theological
significance of creation itself. Whilst he discusses in detail the failure
of previous theologians to consider the Johannine text of "all things" (1:2)
coming to be in Christ, he offers no explanation of what purpose "all
things" may have or why their creation was necessary at all. 33 Again we
must not prejudge what he will subsequently posit as the goal and meaning
of creation, but from our perspective we shall be eager to ask. what part
does the created world play in the purpose of God disclosed? Why does
the sun shine and the grass grow and the rain fall? When Barth writes
that belief in Jesus Christ "contains within itself the knowledge of crea-
tion, the Creator and the creature" 34 we shall be concerned to ask in what
follows what precise knowledge in fact can be known? What can be known
about the place and status of the created world from the Christocentric
theology which Barth advances?
The second major section is entitled 'Creation and Covenant', and the
first subsection 'Creation, History and Creation History'-. It is here
that Barth seeks to explain the themes that are to be his basis for inter-
preting the two creation sagas.
Creation is the first in the series of divine works. It is the work that
foreshadows and prefigures the rest. All the later acts are to be under-
stood from this starting point, that God does not begrudge reality distinct
from himself, that in his freedom and beneficence he gives of himself. The
work of creation stands in "an indissolubly real connection" with these
later works. Moreover, all these divine works and their history are a
manifestation of the "eternal decision of God's will" to which they
33. Barth does not completely overlook such an important text, however.
Later he treats it in detail with the help of Luther's Exposition
of John (pp. 115 - 117) but his exegesis says nothing of the status
of the non-human, the text is used rather to emphasise the priority
of the Word.
34. 2. ' lii i 1, p. 31.
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correspond. 35 Creation, we have seen, is best characterised as grace,
,,36but it is also the stage for the story of the "covenant of grace . The
covenant (Bund) is the main interpretive theme of this second major section.
The recognition that lies behind the indissolubility of the notions of
creation and covenant is the triune nature of God himself. God the Crea-
tor is none other than the triune God of Father, Son and Hoiy Spirit.
Only this recognition will allow for the "necessary concretely Christian
37form and meaning" of creation.
	
The article in the Creed that God the
Father is the Creator is proper and right not only because there exists a
likeness between man and God, but also because the Father is himself "the
source of the other eternal modes of existence of the divine essence".
Hence the notion of God the Father in this respect can be understood only
38
as the unity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 	 It is of the greatest im-
portance to Barth's theology that God the Creator should be understood
only from within his own self-disclosed triune nature. He reminds us that
on this view there can be no other agent responsible for the divine work,
no "self-existent first cause".
Barth briefly explores what it must mean for God the Father to be the Crea-
tor of all things through his Son. The Son or Word should be understood
as "the second mode" of God's inner being. One feature, or function, of
the Son is that he should be "Creator ad extra", 39 but that alone would
be an inadequate definition. It must be held together with the realisa-
tion that God the Father willed .through all eternity to give his only be-
gotten Son as an expression of his love for the world. Barth will shortly
explain how it is true in a pre-eminent sense that the creation was made
35. CD, III, 1, p. 43.
36. CD, III, 1, p. 44.
37. CD, III, 1, p. 48.
38. CD, III, 1, p. 49.
39. CD, III, 1, p. 50; his italics.
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for and belongs to the Son. But to develop his trinitarian understanding
of the work of creation, Barth also explores the role of the Hoiy Spirit.
With the Son, the Holy Spirit is the eternal God, indeed he is "the prin-
ciple of their mutual love proceeding from both and equal in essence".4°
The task of the Holy Spirit is to complete the work of creation. He ex-
presses the Fatherly compassion of God and witnesses to the work of Christ.
The creature can only be sure of its existence because of the operation
of the Holy Spirit who reveals and expresses the unity of the Father and
41the Son which makes creation possible and legitimate".
Creation History (Sch6pfungsgeschichte)
Barth is insistent that the "aim" of creation is nothing less
than "history". The action of God belongs to history in the same way that
creation "belongs to history". 42 While it is true that God continues to
create (creatio continua), the converse is also true that creation marks
the very beginning of history. Creation of its very nature cannot be a
"timeless truth" for scripture does not know of such things; it speaks
only of historical events within time. The fact that the creation sagas
seek to relate first and foremost not only the history of the covenant,
but the history of creation is highly significant. But what kind of his-
tory are the first two pages of the Old Testament? Barth rejects two
possible views. The first that they are "meaningless" and the second that
they are a "revealed cosmosophy" of a scientific or metaphysical kind.
To the first, Barth protests that in this case our mental powers and abili-
ties become the criterion for judgement, and to the second that it creates
an entirely false dichotomy between the later historical revelation and
the wholly unhistorical beginnings. He writes that it is "an open secret
40. CD, III, 1, p. 56.
41. CD, III, 1, p. 57.
42. CD, III, 1, p. 60. Schpfungsgeschichte is inclusive of all creatures
though Barth seldom makes this clear, sometimes it is given a specifi-
cally anthropocentric meaning, see discussion pp. 23 and 68 - 74.
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what usually happens to a knowledge of God's works" when the creation
sagas are treated in this way. 43 Barth, therefore, insists that the
creation sagas are "no less history" than the "continuation which bears
this character". 44 There can be no independent answers to the questions
of origins, nothing can be withdrawn from the "sphere of grace' 1
 appro-
piated by faith.
Barth then proceeds to answer the central question. How can man know this
creation history? He confronts the problems that have led many to reinter-
pretation of the biblical witness with these further questions:
How can this history be related? How can this history be
an object of hunian knowledge at all? How can anyone know
and say what took place there where all occurrence had its
origin? How cart anyone have seen and comprehended this
event?45
Barth acknowledges that the sagas are not history in the "historicist
sense". Because creation history is not just one other form of history,
and because it cannot be compared in principle to other types of histori-
cal events, it must follow that it is "non-historical'" history. This
must also be true of all biblical history to the extent that they relate
God's activity in creation. Moreover, historical writings can "become
soul-less and intolerable" to the extent that they claim to be pure his-
tory. 46
 But since Barth also accepts that "only occurrences within the
existent reality of nature can be historical", it follows that the crea-
tion sagas are "pre-historical history". 47
 In proximity to God, all his-
tory, suggests Barth, is of this kind. But he will not give up on the
claim that the sagas are still "genuine history". "We must dismiss and
43. CD, III, 1, p. 61.
44. £2.' III 1, p. 62.
45. £2.' III 1, p. 77.
46. CD, III, 1, p. 78.
47. CD, III, 1, p. 80.
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resist to the very last any notion of "the inferiority of untrustworthi-
ness or even worthlessness" of these pre-historical accounts.48
What precisely then is the status and the nature of the biblical witness
to creation? Barth concludes that they are "saga". But what is the status
of saga? They are pre-historica]. narratives in the sense of an "intuitive
and poetical picture" of what happened. Barth further accepts "divinatory
and poetical" elements within these sagas which involve vision of pre-
49history sometimes guessed from what has already emerged.
	 Indeed, "no
picture of true history" is possible without such elements. 5° However,
Barth maintains that a serious distinction must be drawn between saga and
"myth". While creation narratives are best characterised as saga, they
do not contain myth in any form. For myth has never really concerned it-
self with creation as such. In creation saga we are confronted by our
Maker who challenges and commands us and to whom we are responsible, which
is "the direct opposite of myth". 51
 Whilst saga must be distinguished from
"historicist" history on the one hand and myth on the other, it is nevertheless
part of the biblical witness to God's self-disclosure. The sagas are not
"heaven-sent declarations", insists Barth, "but human attestations of re-
52
velati.on".
48. CD, III, 1, n. p. 81. Interestingly enough Friedrich Schleiermacher,
to whom Barth was in some ways indebted, rejects "the fable of a
Golden Age previous to history". This "alleged primordial state of
the world" is in actual "contradiction with the divine commission to
man". This is because "man could only attain to dominion over the
earth by the development of his powers". It is perhaps not surpri-
sing then that Schleiermacher has even less of a doctrine of the non-
human than Barth. His overwhelming concern is for that "God-
consciousness" which "may develop in every state of consciousness
which has risen above the animal confusion";. The Christian Faith # ed.
by H.R. Mackintosh and. J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T,and T.Clark, 1976)
pp.242 and 238. In this last respect Barth may be more indebted to
Schleiermacher than he thinks, see our discussion of Descartes,pp. 262f.
49. CD, III, 1, n. p. 82.
50. .92.' III 1, p. 83.
51. .9_2.' III, 1, p. 87.
52. £2:' III, 1, p. 93.
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Questions concerning the Non-Human Creation
Barth's first few pages (48 - 59) of this section, where he relates the
reality of the creation to the inner life of the Godhead are of enormous
significance and need to be examined more closely. Much here foreshadows
the subsequent discussion of 'Creation and Covenant' to which we shall re-
turn shortly. The vital question is how Christians may affirm that God
the Father is the Creator of all things through his Son. Barth is clear
that the relationship between Christ and all creation cannot be one of
fortuity, arbitrariness or indifference. Here we approach the very centre
of God's creative power and intent. "The fact that God has regard to His
son - the Son of Man, the Word made flesh", writes Barth, "is the true and
genuine basis of creation". This is not to suppose some creation from
necessity, but rather the expression of free love. But "a genuine neces-
sity is constituted", argues Barth, "by the fact that from all eternity
He willed so to love the world, and did so love it, that He gave His only
" 53begotten Son
What is puzzling, therefore, is that Barth omits in his exegesis of John
1:3 any examination of what 'all' (panta, E) may involve and mean. Of
course Barth does not overlook entirely this and other 'cosmic' verses
(also, especially, Col. 1. 16:16; Heb. 1.2 f), but he never confronts
directly the question of how the status of all relates to the person and
work of Christ. Barth argues that "it is not God or the world and their
relation which is the problem of these passages, but the Lordship of Jesus
Christ". 54
 Hence Barth sees in these verses an underpinning of the honour
and power of Christ. That granted, the question remains whether he does
justice to one strand in New Testament thinking that insists upon the
wholly inclusive creative work of Christ. Indeed, more than that, for
53. £2.' III, 1, p. 51.
54. £2.' III, 1, n. p. 53.
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this strand in its various ways affirms the reconciling work of Christ
having as its object "the whole universe" (Col. 1:20), the unity of all
creation to be completed in Christ (Eph. 1:10) and the liberating hope of
transformation for all creation (Rom. 8:21 f). This strand within the
New Testament is varied, but a1so , consistent that it requires explana-
tion. 55 Invoking as it does the notion of Christ as the Creator and Recon-
ciler of all that is, it cannot be held that the New Testament bears wit-
ness to God's redeeming purposes for man alone. "it is a great mistake",
writes George Hendry, "to treat these passages, which are relatively few
in number, as marginal speculations. It was central to the testimony of
the New Testament that the particular event which occurred in Jesus Christ
is co-extensive with the work of God in creation and consummation".56
We need to explore further the nature of "flesh" as envisaged by John
(1:14). Whilst there is no doubt that flesh is understood in this context
to be the flesh of man, it cannot be overlooked that flesh, that is flesh
and blood, is not a uniquely human possession. If God is understood at
this point to be expressing his solidarity with the creature, may we not
55. Barth gives special attention to two "cosmic" verses in the context
of the reconciling work of the Son, 'The Fulfilment of the Broken
Covenant', The Doctrine of Reconciliation, IV, I, ET by G.W. Bromiley
(Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1956) pp. 70 - 78. Concerning Jn. 3:16,
Barth sharply distinguishes between the nature and love of God in
Christ for man and the world. The Word is not "bound to it" because
it does not share "His nature" and therefore there can be "no ques-
tion of any claim of the cosmos to be loved" (p. 71). Concerning 2.
Cor. 15:10, the reconciliation effected for the world is necessarily
limited because "Atonement takes place only where there has been
strife" (p. 74). In these ways Barth is freed from having to grapple
with the prima facie meaning of these texts. In private corres-
pondence years later in offering exegesis of seven "world" passages
Barth makes his view clear: "In the Bible the world is all humanity",
'To N.N. Denmark', 1 March 1966 in Karl Barth Letters 1961 - 1968,
ed. by J. Fangmeier and H. Stoevesandt, ET and ed. by G.W. Bromiley
(Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1981) pp. 199/200; his italics.
56. Hendry, Theology of Nature (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1980) p. 118. He also writes: "If faith in God the creator of the
world does not carry with it some understanding of creation that
contains at least the possibility of an answer to the question Why?
the confession is vacuous"(p. 119).
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ask whether the flesh under consideration is not also at one and the same
time symbolic of the fleshly bond that exists between man and all other
flesh and blood within the cosmos that God has loved? It is Tertullian
who most clearly grasps this when he writes of "the universe" as a "para-
ble of the resurrection". There can be different kinds of flesh and
therefore different kinds of glory but it is the same substance that will
be resurrected. God says 'thou shalt flourish like a phoenix (Ps. 92:12),
that is, out of death, out of burial" in order that "you may believe that
the substance of the body can be exacted of the flames as well" with the
obvious question "shall men die once for all, while birds of Arabia are
assured of their resurrection?". 57
 The same needs to be asked of the
suggestion in John 1:4 that "all that came to be was alive with his life".
The sense of bondage and unity here with Christ and creation is uninistak-
able. This in no way detracts from the thrust of the Prologue to the
effect that within the human condition did the glory of God reveal itself
to a unique degree. But this affirmation would not be complete without
a corresponding unity between Christ and all creation. For how do we
understand the life "that enlivens all creation" but as a genuine gift of
God bestowed on all creation by virtue of God's eternal decree in Christ?
In principle this general point appears to be accepted at the outset when
defining the nature of creation:
57. Tertullian, Treatise on the Resurrection, ed., ET and comm. by Ernest
Evans (London: SPCK, 1960) p. 35; (para 13) on universe; pp. 156/7
(para 52) on different kinds of flesh, and p. 35; (para 13) on the
phoenix. Elsewhere Barth does consider what is meant by the assumpio
carnis. "It is not merely that God willed not to be alone, but to
co-exist as the Creator with the creature". But "the creature"
thus assumed is solely "man - human being" and no other implication
is considered. Church Dogmatics, IV, 2, The Doctrine of Reconcilia-
tion, Part Two, ET by G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1958)
pp. 42 and 43.
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in the Christian concept of the creation of all things,
the question is concretely one of man and his whole universe
as the theatre of the history of the covenant of grace; of
the totality of earthly and heavenly things as they are to
be comprehended in Christ.58
But the question remains whether Barth gives full weight to the reality,
existence and purpose of the non-human in creation. The problem is com-
pounded by Barth's habit of using the term "the creature" (das Geschopf)
59in a way that suggests a wholly anthropocentric reference. 	 For example,
when discussing the important place of the Spirit in the work of creation,
Barth acknowledges on one hand that both man and animal exist by the gift
of the breath of life within them (Gen. 7:15). "In this way" he writes,
"the Hoiy Spirit is the inner divine guarantee (though not the Creator)
of the creature". He continues, "If its existence were intolerable to
God, how could it be loved and willed and made by Him?".. But what "crea-
ture" are we here talking of? All his references here point to the total
work of the life-guaranteeing Spirit, but these points are not examined by
themselves but eventually subordinated to a wholly anthropocentric line
of enquiry. Hence he can begin his dicussion of creation history by
positing "God wills and creates the creature for the sake of His Son or
Word and therefore in harmony with Himself; and therefore for His supreme
glory and therefore in the Hoiy Spirit". But againwhatis das Geschpf
here described? Later on Barth elaborates: "What is meant is the history
60
of the covenant of grace instituted by God between Himself and man".
58. CD, III, 1, p. 44; my italics.
59. In general Barth uses three words das Geschopf (any living being);
das Geschaffene (anything that has been created and includes rocks,
plants, etc.) and die Kreatur (animals only in normal German usage).
It is the first two words that he uses most consistently, and there-
fore when the translators use the term "the creature" they are pick-
ing up the generally inclusive use of this phrase. This is all the
more striking in the light of Barth's consistent anthropocentric
meaning.
60. CD, III, 1, n. and p. 59; my italics.
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This Anthrpozentrismus is problematic in several ways. Does it follow,
for example, that what is claimed for "the creature" can be only said of
human-kind? Does it follow that the work. of creation and covenant
	 -
can have this sole point of reference without including at the same time
the totality of creation and "the creature" in the wider sense? With these
questions in mind we approach Barth's discussion of the first creation saga.
The First Saga: Surveying the Ground
The second sub-section of the second major section Is entitled 'Creation
as the External Basis of the Covenant' and it begins with a discussion of
the necessary dependency of creation. "The creature is not self-existent",
begins Barth. 61
 It neither exists for itself, nor has it meaning for it-
self, nor can it understand by itself its own purpose and destiny. The
ontology of creation consists in its radical dependency on God: there can
be no self-sufficiency, no complete autonomy and no intrinsic teleology.
But if the divine creation does not therefore exist for itself, the ques-
tion is raised: what is God's will in creating it? What was God's purpose
in creation? To posit that creation was made because God "does not will
to be alone in His glory", cannot mean that creation is therefore purpose-
less or that God creates in response to some kind of need. It is impos-
sible to conceive of God creating as it were by necessity or by force of
some external constraint. How is it then that God creates something of
which he has no need? Barth is clear that the only recollection open to
us is that God is free in love. He wills creation not out of "caprice
or necessity" but simply because:
He has loved it from eternity, because he wills to demon-
strate His love for it, and because He wills, not to limit
His glory by its existence and being, but to reveal and
manifest it in His own co-existence with it.62
61. £.' Ills 1, p. 94.
62. 2. ' III, 1, p. 95.
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This Christological basis for the justification of creation will become
increasingly apparent as Barth unfolds the meaning of creation and cove-
nant. He insists that the divine purpose as here perceived cannot be
content with the mere being or existence of creation. Divine love "wills
something with and for that it loves", and hence the existence of creation
when viewed aright always points beyond itself to the further acts of ful-
filment and completion. Scripture asks of us to consider this divine
purpose within creation and to see it as the external basis of the cove-
nant relationship. It is important to bear in mind that creation "is not
itself the covenant" (die Schpfung ist nicht selbst der Bund). 63 The
inner basis of creation, as Barth will expound it, is the inner life of
God himself. Creation is indeed grace, but in the light of the purposes
of God it must also be seen as preparing for the fullness of grace to
come.
The first saga (Gen. 1:1 - 2:4a) begins by asserting the priority and sove-
reignty of God which stands at the beginning of all existence (Gen. 1:1).
There is no possibility of dualism here. The world is not an accident or
a result of pre-existent random forces. Dualism, even in a limited form
as "chaos", cannot be allowed from the concept of "darkness" found in
verse two. While creation is not divine, God did not create it as a. rival
force, it is riot"ungodly or antigodly". 64 The separation of light from
darkness (Gen. 1:3 - 5) is the first work of his Word, but only in this
separation is darkness also created. God's work takes place on the day
which is the sign of light, and this light once it has refuted darkness
"cannot be reversed but only continued". 65
 Moreover, light is not an in-
dependent principle, it is a creature of God. Barth sees in the concept
63. CD, III, 1, p. 97.
64. CD, EII, 1, p. 102.
65. CD, III, 1, p. 118.
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of light a "prototype" of God's revelation, a sign of the knowledge of
God. The light of day enables the living space of man to be created
(Gen. 1:6 - 8). The existence of water, which Barth sees as the "enemy"
of all life, 66 is bound and separated by the firmaments of heaven and
earth. The separation of sea from land now follows (Gen. 1:9 - 13) which
corresponds to the separation of light and darkness. Barth emphasises
that the "dry and habitable land" which emerges is a positive act of God's
will, but the sea remains as a sign of "averted threat" and the ever
67present possibility of chaos.	 The third day sees the vegetable kingdom
emerging in obedience to the Word of God (Gen. 1:llf). The backcloth to
the creation of man is now accomplished. When man emerges it will be
seen that all has been made ready for him. He is the "most necessitous
68
of all creatures , adds Barth.
The fourth day sees the creation of the vital elements within the cosmos
(Gen. 1:14 - 19). The lights in the firmament are not mere decoration or
incidental to the heavenly purpose. Barth views them as sources for the
objective mediation of God's message and this especially for man. Not
only do they help man to orientate his life, showing him the boundaries
of his existence, but they are also signs of the enlightening grace of God
to come. The fifth work concerns the creation of living creatures and
their receipt of blessing (Gen. 1:20 - 23). "These things seem to be
blessed by being what they are", Barth surmises on his understanding that
a blessing is an authorisation to follow one particular action rather than
another. 69
 In the case of creatures their principal purpose is the gene-
ration of new lives.
66. CD, III, 1, p. 133.
67. CD, III, 1, p. 142.
68. CD, III, 1, p. 143.
69. CD, III, 1, p. 170.
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We now move to the climax of the narrative in the creation of man (Gen.
1:24 - 31). The beasts created will be inferior, yet also his companions
and even forerunners (Vor1ufer). Moreover, "man's salvation and perdi-
tion, his joy and sorrow, will be reflected in the weal and woe of this
animal environment and company". 7° There are important similarities and
dissimilarities between the creation of animals and man. Both take place
on the same day, both exist by divine intention, both are blessed with
man's blessing, but hence "burdened" with the same "curse man has to
carry".7 ' Everything in the creation of animal.s points beyond them to the
place of man. All other creatures have only a copy or character of the
divine likeness (Gleichnis) which is God's special "image" in man. Crea-
tion apart from man is something other than God, but not a counterpart of
God.
The notion of God's image in man requires some amplification. This image
is 'not a. human quality, or in any way an attribute consisting in man's
capacities or activities. Rather "It consists as man consists as the
creature of God". 72
 The fact that he is man means that he is made in the
image of God; without this image, he could not be what he essentially is.
Man therefore is a "repetition" of the divine life; "its copy and ref lec-
tion". If we ask why this is so, Barth answers that nothing less could
satisfy the desire of God to have a true partner and counterpart, to have
"a genuine but harmonious self-encounter and self-discovery". Because of
this, there exists an analogy between God and man. An analogy not of
being but of "tertium comparationis, of free differentiation and relation".73
In this respect Barth emphasises the sexual differentiation in the making
of man male and female. Human beings exist in plurality and.in relation-
ship with others. This relationship of differentiation is the true humanum
70. CD, III, 1, p. 178.
71. CD, III, 1, n. p. 181.
72. CD, III, 1, p. 184.
73. CD, III, I, p. 185,
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of their divine image. 74
 This characteristic which man shares with ani-
mals has in his case a special significance of witness to God's own form
of being.
Integral to the divine life within their creaturely being, God has given
man an "exalted" position of dominion over the plant and animal king-
doms. 75
 This superiority is exercised by "a higher dignity and might",
and "by a greater power of disposal and control". But creatures by virtue
of their comradeship with man are also "witnesses and to that extent par-
takers" of the special divine image given to man. Barth is clear that no
more than this an be read into the notion of man's dOminion over the
earth. Man has not created them and he cannot exercise an absolute lord-
ship over them. The limitations ("internal and external") on man's lord-
ship involve him being as a representative to them (als Vertreter) as
well as a prinius inter pares in relation to them. Man does not have the
"right of capital punishment", that is, the power of life and death over
them. 76
 Apart from the grace of the image of God, man and animals are
not radically different.
Gen. 1:29 - 31 concerns the juridical declaration by God regarding nourish-
ment for man and beast. "Behold I have given you every plant yielding
seed ... ". A diet which appears to exclude flesh. "Whether or not we
find it practicable or desirable", writes Barth, "the diet assigned-to man and
74. CD, Ill, 1, p. 186.
75. Barth makes no mention of the other apparent references to man's domi-
nion in the "nature Psalms", 8 and 104. Earlier discussion in the
Dogmatics shows that he regards these as speaking directly of Christ.
"If this Jesus is actually the man in the cosmos of Ps. 8, the esti-
mate is true, which otherwise could only be described honestly as
false." It is a pity that Barth does not develop in this present
volume the insight of Jesus as "man in the cosmos" and with it the
notion of creation as "the theatre of revelation", Church Dogmatics,
II, I, The Doctrine of God, Part One, ET by T.H.L. Parker, W.B.
Johnston, H. Knight and J.L.M. Haire (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1957)
pp. 113 and n. p. 118.
76. CD, III, ., p. 187.
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beasts by God the Creator is vegetarian". 77 The superiority of man does
not extend to taking life for food. But Barth is keen to stress that the
sense in which the saga speaks of this decree is in terms of the peace
(Friede) of creation. 78 The first original order between man and animals
did not envisage the survival of one life at the expense of another. Only
the later order, itself dependent upon the old, sanctions a "new regula-
tion of relationship" whereby the sacrifice of animals becomes a sign of
reconciliation. On this presupposition, "but only this", the later sacri-
ficial tradition and "therefore carnivorousness" is justifiable.79
The completion of the sixth day ends with the statement that God saw that
his creation was "very good" (Gen. 1:31). But in what sense? The precise
significance of this is discussed at length in Barth's later treatment of
creation "as benefit" (300ff.), but here he simply points to the "unmis-
takable" answer, namely that in the making of the cosmos God fulfilled
his purposes in the actualisation of man in relationship with him. Man is
the "proper inhabitant" of the world and a "partner who knows light as
80light and can have dealings with God'.
Barth now turns to the final verses where God is seen as resting after the
work of creation (Gen. 2:1 - 2). This, he maintains, is a "special divine
act" on the seventh day. For what we have revealed here is not merely a
finishing piece or a superfluous act, but theology of the greatest signi-
ficance. On God's side it means positively that he was pleased with his
creation:
77. CD, ill, 1, p. 208. Cf. Robin Attfield: "Only after the Fall and the
Flood were human beings authorised to eat flesh, as if the society
which transmitted and edited the Genesis narratives was uneasy about
meat-eating and sensed.that a special justification was needed", The
Ethics of Environmental Concern (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) p.
25. For Barth again on vegetarianism, see pp. 274-6 and discussion p.305f.
78. CD, III, 1, p. 209.
79. CD, III, 1, p. 210.
80. CD, III, 1, p. 212/3.
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He was really satisfied to enter into this relation-
ship with this reality distinct from Himself, to be the
Creator of this creature, to find these works of His Word
the external sphere of His power and grace and the place
of His revealed glory.81
On man's side, the seventh day represents an invitation to share in the
"freedom", "rest" and "joy" of the Sabbath. 82
 In this way we see how the
final act of the history of creation gives way to the first 'act of cove-
nant history. Before man had begun the work assigned to him, he is sum-
moned by God to share with hini in the goal of creation's existence "which
cannot be attained by toil and conflict". At this point man is left com-
pletely in the hands of God's grace. Here begins the "history of man with
God" 83
From this brief survey of the ground before us we need now to isolate and
explore those areas concerning the status of creation and its relation-
ship with man in further detail.
(i) God's love for creation
From the outset Barth seeks to get his bearings right. "What was and is
the will of God" in creating? The only inner necessity that can be satis-
factorily posited is that of love. But that alone would be insufficient
definition. God loves to a purpose; he wills not only to love creation,
but also "to demonstrate His love for it" and to reveal his own "co-
existence" (zusanmien sein) with it. 84 The glory (Herrlichkeit) of crea-
tion then is the glory that God wills and executes within it. Divine love,
maintains Barth, creates its own presupposition. Without understanding
the will of God in loving his creation, the notion of divine love is vacuous.
81. CD, III, 1, pp. 214/5; his italics.
82. CD, III, 1, p. 217.
83. CD, III, 1, p. 95.
84. CD, III, 1, p. 95.
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What we have to hold before ourselves therefore is the eternal will of
God which determines and prefigures the act of creation. How far does
this providence extend? To man? To animals? To every living creature?
All creation in principle points to the purpose of God. "There is no
peculiarity in man and the world", he writes, "which does not as such aim
at this covenant."
(ii) God's covenant relationship
It is vital to remember that Barth-distinguishes between creation
and covenant at:the outset -(but see later, especially pp. 112-- 113). "The
existence and being of the creature willed and constituted by God are the
object and the presupposition of His love", but the creature is not itself
the covenant. The inner basis of the covenant is God's free choice and
eternal decree to manifest himself within creation. God's Son is "the
85
Representative" (Vertreter) of all creation. 	 Creation is thus only the
"external basis" of the fullness of grace to come. How far and to what
extent non-human creation is included in this covenant relationship is yet
to be defined. But we shall be interested to learn how far the activity
of God in his Son is "representative", as Barth suggests, of all creation.
(iii) The creation of the light (1:3)
The first command of God was to create light and separate it from dark-
ness. For Barth this has particular Christological significance. The Word
of God in creation is manifested at the very beginning: "the creature in
its totality was allied to this living divine purpose being wholly referred
85. CD, III, 1, p. 97. Barth uses this term to describe both Christ and
man in relationship to creation (see pp.. 6, 166, 254f., 293).-
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to it for its existence and essence,. its survival and sustenance".86
Here Barth gives some definition to those opening verses from John's Pro-
logue (John l:3f) for God "wills to draw us to Himself, to reconcile us
to Himself and finally to redeem us (making a new heaven and a new earth
and ourselves its inhabitants)" and this is "promised.in creating heaven
87
and earth and ourselves by His Word".	 Natural light is a creature of
God and is full of symbolic power. Light, its increase and its drawing
88
towards new and fuller light, is "the symbol of the revelation of grace".
(iv) The separation of the waters (1:6 - 8)
This second act is essential to allow for the "actual establishment of
order proclaimed by the creation of light". Water, unless held back, can
become like the forces of darkness which will not allow life to breathe
and multiply. "It is this power as such", writes Barth, "which is radi-
89
cally broken by the creative work of the second day". 	 The waters thus
separated create the possibility of dry land and the habitation of the
earth.
(v) The creation of vegetation (1:11 - 13)
With the creation of plants and trees which in turn are given authority
to live and reproduce themselves, the narrative moves towards the fullness
of God's creative work. But what is the purpose of vegetable life? For
what reason do plants bear seed, fruit trees bear fruit and the earth pro-
duce fresh growth? Barth's answer appears to take a threefold form: (1)
God's purposes; (2) man's purposes, and (3) their own purposes.
86. £.' III, 1, p. 110.
87. £P.' III, 1, p. 116.
88. , III, 1, p. 119.
89. £2.' III, 1, p. 113.
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(1) Created life is made for God's glory (Herrlichkeit). This is both
its telos and function - to serve the purposes of the Lord. When he
writes "creation in itself and as such did not and does not take place for
its own sake" the wider purposes of God himself are presupposed. But
since "God does not will to be alone in his glory" it must follow that he
seeks the creation of beings who can share and reflect that Herrlichkeit
in their creaturely being. 9° It must also follow that nothing in the
creation can be arbitrary, indifferent or incidental to God's intention.
Barth appears to grasp this even when considering the later injunction to
man and beast to use vegetables as food (Gem. 1:29). "What is proclaimed
in this teleology of creation", he writes, " is not the glory of man but
the glory of the God who has turned to him in His mercy". It is "the table
of the Lord" to which man is invited and admitted. The sovereignt of man
involves gratitude for their existence "as the indispensable presupposition
of his own" but also in a strange way involves the humility of the "highest"
over the "lowest" creation. Precisely because man is dependent upon vege-
table creation we see "prefigured in nature" the order of grace "in which
only the last can be first, but the first must be, and remain, and con-
tinually becomes the very last".91
(2) But Barth is equally, if not more insistent, that vegetable life
exists to serve man and his purposes. Vegetable life "must be presupposed
for the life of man and beast", and again, "the question at stake in the
second half of the third day is this presupposition and with it the mate-
rial foundation of the history of which the earth is destined to be the
theatre". 92 Thus Barth writes in his summary of the 'Creation and Cove-
nant' section: " ... the meaning of creation is to make possible the
90. CD, III, 1, p. 95.
91. CD, III, 1, p. 114.
92. CD, III, 1, n. p. 152.
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history of God's covenant with man which has its beginning, its centre
93
and its culmination in Jesus Christ". 	 We shall return to these words for con-
sideration at later point.s (pp.G'a-70 and 128-9) but at this stage we need
to note how anthropocentrically the life of creation is here understood.
The overriding theological intention is to see created non-human life as
subordinate to man's creation and salvation.
(3) But there are hints that Barth is not entirely sure about the appa-
rent exclusiveness of his concerns here. Whilst, when discussing the
establishment of the earthly realm from darkness and chaos, he refers
94
almost casually to the creation of man and "his world", there are later
indications that plant life may have its own purposes. Hence "The plant
is undoubtedly created for its own sake as well", adds Barth in -a crucial
step of elaboration. 95 But he goes no further. He does not examine more
closely the hesitation expressed by his putting terms like "highest" and
"lowest" in quotation marks. Moreover, in a lengthy discussion of vege-
table life he acknowledges that it (and trees) "were there without him
and before him" and thus "they also had and have their own dignity and
justification". But subsequently he sees the allocation of vegetable life
as food for man and beast as confirmation of their original purpose.96
This tension in Barth's examination of the status of non-human life is
shown more clearly in his understanding of the "goodness" (Gen. 1:13) of
this life. In what does the goodness of vegetable life consist? "It is
all good" writes Barth, "because ... it all prepares and prefigures
(vorbilden) the history which is to take place on earth and because as
this preparation and prefiguration it corresponds to the will and the Word
93. CD, III, 1, p. 42; my italics.
94. 2. ' iii 1, p. 109.
95. CD, III, 1, p. 143.
96. CD, III, 1, n. pp. 152 and 193.
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of God". 97 Thus vegetable life is largely seen as a prefiguring of the
covenant of grace. No other understanding of goodness is deduced or ela-
borated.
(vi) The creation of the greater lights (1:14 - 19)
What is their purpose and significance? Do plants and trees need them?
No. Do animals need them? Yes, but in a qualified sense.	 Does man
need them? Undoubtedly.
As a repetition and representation of the divine creation
of light, they prepare the cosmos not merely for the
presence of man but for his activity as the earth
subject of the history appointed for him by God. 99
The central thrust, once again, is that the cosmos revealed serves the
dual purpose of man with God and man for God.
(vii) The creation of fish and birds (1:20 - 23)
These are the "first autonomous living creature", argues Barth. We have
here "a first intimation" of the all important creation of man in God's
image. 10° These creatures belong to the outer circle of grace and re-
ceive God's blessing. Divine blessing is necessary "especially if it is
to continue and multiply in new individuals". 101 Barth's definition here
strikes	 an odd note especially in relation to the vegetable kingdom
which also had the authorisation to reproduce themselves "according to
its kind" (1:11). What is certainly clear, however, is that birds and
fish have "authorisation and promise". That is, they have explicit
98
97. CD, III, 1, n. p. 156.
98. CD, III, 1, p. 157.
99. CD, III, 1, n. p. 162; my italics.
100. CD, III, 1, p. 168.
101. CD, III, 1, p. 170.
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approval and power to be what in their own terms they can be. Barth
acknowledges that, from his perspective, the prefigurings of the covenant
of grace begin "in fact at the very point we should least expect them".102
In a further explanatory section, Barth lbcates the need for blessing in
"independent creaturely movements". 103
 Fish and birds have not only the
capacity to reproduce themselves, but also to move and realise themselves
in movement and significantly to give praise to the Creator. 104
 But he
insists that the creation of blessed creatures provides for the "possthi-
lity and reality of natural history", and therefore "the preservation
of the earth as a dwelling place for man". 105 Thus once again the
purpose of this creation must be seen primarily in relation to man. For
God "has really blessed the beasts as a prelude and prefiguration of his
special dealings with man". Barth also limits the notion of divine address
to animals. Against Calvin, he maintains that this would be an impossibi-
lity since animals cannot make a decision and are therefore incapable of
disobedience. They cannot be summoned because they cannot decide. But
it must also follow that animals are to that extent obedient to the Word
of God. If disobedience cannot take the completion of God's will within
them, it must follow that their existence per se is a sign of triumph and
goodness. (Barth, incidentally, sees no scriptural support for preaching
to the birds after the example of St. Francis and St. Anthony. Animals
can only be "a passive and not an actively participating witness to God's
grace" 106)
102. CD, HI, 1, p. 170/1.
103. CD, III, 1, p. 174.
104. CD, III, 1, p. 172.
105. CD, III, 1, p. 174; my italics.
106. CD, III, 1, p. 175; my italics.
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(viii)The creation of animals (24 - 26)
The creation of "living creatures according to their kind" with the crea-
tion of man himself on the sixth day marks the inner circle of creation.
We draw near to the "climax" of the saga, though not yet its conclusion
which marks the seventh day. What has Barth to say about the creation of
animals? Firstly, they are man's companions. Man needs the animals
"whereas they for their part have no need of him whatever". Secondly,
they offer to man "the spectacle of submission" to God in his word. In
that sense:
The creature precedes mart in a self-evident praise of its
Creator, in.. the natural fulfilment of the destiny given
to it at its creation, in the actual humble recognition
of its creatureliness.
Thirdly, animals maintain their own animal nature "with its dignity and
also its limitation". 07
(ix)The image of God in man (26 - 28)
The whole of creation is seen as a prefiguring of and a preparation for
this creature who is understood "as the true occupant of the house founded
and prepared by God". 108
 Man, unlike all creation, is the true counter-
part of God. We may glimpse in treation signs and symbols of this possi-
bility, "But not until the creation of man does it find a genuine and
clearly visible form". From this it follows that a genuine "I - Thou"
relationship with God is possible. There actually exists with man a divine
relationship and encounter.109
 This is not a human quality, attribute or
107.. CD, :1:11, 1, p. 177.
108. £P.' III, 1, p. 181.
109. £' III, 1, p. 184.
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discovery; it is the ground of man's very being itself. Man has to be
defined as the being with whom God has determined to relate, copy and
bind himself within his very self. Barth finds support for this in the
creation of man as male and female (V 28) and we shall examine this shortly
in our final summary of this section.
(x) Man's dominion over animals (28 - 29)
Barth does not see any direct theological relation between man made in
•	 I'	 .	 •	 •	 II	 .110God's image and his exalted position of lordship (Herrschaft).
	 There
is some evidence for supposing a relationship of this kind and certainly
man's dominion is in some way a consequence of his divine likeness. But
man's divine likeness does not consist, nor can it be described, in terms
of his dominion. Barth here flies in the face of considerable agreement
among Old Testament scholars who insist upon a fundamental relationship
between the image and the work of dominion. "It is precisely in his func-
tion as ruler", argues Hans Walter Wolff, "that he is God's image". "In
the ancient East the setting up of the king's statue was the equivalent
to the proclamation of his domination" and accordingly man is seen as "God's
statue" exercising authority and "fulfilling his task not in arbitrary des-
potism but as a responsible agent") 11
 This setting of the dominion con-
cept within the limits of kingship theology has vital implications for
our understanding of our place in nature. "Man would fail in his royal
office of dominion over the earth", writes Claus Westermann, "were he to
exploit the earth's resources to the detriment of the land, plant life,
112
animals, rivers and seas." 	 "In both the Old Testament creation stories",
110. CD, III, 1, p. 187.
111.. Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament, ET by Margaret Kohl (London:
SCM Press, 1974) p. 160/1; my italics. See also Barth's discussion of
Delitzsch and Jacob, CD, III, 1, pp. 194 - 197.
112. Westermann, Creation, ET by John J. Scullion (London: SPCK, 1974) p.
52. Westermann insists that the subjection spoken of in saga one
"in no wise implies exploitation" (p. 52).
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summarises John Austin Baker, "we have the picture of man, the ideal king,
God's perfect vice-regent, under whom nature is fertile and peaceful and
all she was meant to be". 113 Barth insists, however, that non-human
creation is not excluded from the mystery and promise of creation by this
intended relationship with man. Rather it "describes the manner of its
(the non-human) inclusion".
In this way, in basic subordination to man, and as his coin-
radely followers and environment, they too are witnesses
and to that extent partakers of the divine image and the
history promised to him with his special creation.
And further:
More than this must not be read, into man's dominion over
beasts. Man is not their creator; hence he cannot be
their absolute lord, a second God)14
Barth thus delineates man's prerogatives with care. Man is "God's creature-
ly witness and representative to them". He can "carry out a commission"
but his rights do not extend to the taking of life and thus man's lordship
has "internal and external limitations". Man may well be inferior to
animals in some aspects of life held in common.. Moreover rationality is
113.Baker, 'Biblical Attitudes to Nature' in Man and Nature, ed. Hugh
Montefiore (London: Collins, 1975) pp.93'4. Cf. Gustaf Wingren:
"The imposition of these limits on man is implied in the terms
'dominion' or 'lordship', which state the nature of man's relation
to Creation and show him his proper place within this Creation.
Whatever freedom man may have in the exercise of his dominion, he
is at the same time a servant of the Creator. The more he exercises
dominion, the more he obeys", Creation and Law, ET by Ross Mackenzie
(Edinburgh and London: Oliver Boyd, 1961) p. 106; my italics. For
supporting discussions see James Barr, 'Man and Nature: The Ecologi-
cal Controversy in the Old Testament', Bulletin of the John Rylands
Library, 55 (1972) 9 - 23, and F.B. Welbourne's 'Man's Dominion',
Theology, 78 (1975) 561 - 8. In the light of all this, perhaps
Keith Ward's paraphrase of Genesis 1, namely that man is made a "god"
in creation and that creatures "should serve him" needs rewriting,
The Promise (London: SPCK, 1980) p. 2. Perhaps it should be that
man given lordship or god-like power should serve creation.
114.CD, III, 1, p. 87.
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not the central distinguishing factor.115
What distinguishes him and gi;es him authority and power
is the fact that, although he is not radically different
from the other creatures with independent life, he has
been honoured by the grace of God to be the image of God
in the uniqueness of his plurality as male and female.116
Barth finds support for this view in the fact that even afler the giving
of dominion, man still requires "the special blessing of God for the
exercise of his lordship". Man's very proximity to God at this point,
that is the exercise of power over creation, would be "insolent" without
117divine authorisation. 	 Barth develops this point in a lengthy footnote
where in seeming contrast to Calvin he resists the conclusion that ani-
mals belong to man:
115. "Nor is any mention made in this connexion of his (man's) rationa-
lity as a feature which distinguishes him from them", CD, III, :i,
p. 188 - a significant statement in the light of subsequent empha-
ses, see pp. 260f.
116. James Barr appears to reject absolutely any "referential meaning"
of the phrase "image of God" (selem 'elohim). "From this opera-
tion, which from its effects in this instance might be termed the
blood-out-of-a-stone process, it comes to be decided that the image
of God in man consists in his reason and intellectual capacity, or
in his upright physical posture ... or in his bisexual nature as
man and woman ... ". Barr's own answer, however, appears to con-
firm the puzzle. "To these profound questions" there is "no answer",
because there is "no reason to believe that this writer(P) has in
his mind any definite idea about the content or the location of the
image of God", 'The Image of God in the Book of Genesis - A Study
in Terminology', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 51, 1,
(Autumn 1968) pp. 12/3.
117. £2 ' III I, p. 188.
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It is not said, and cannot be said, that the beasts belong
to man, for 'the earth is the Lord's and the fulness there-
of, the world and they that dwell therein'.118
what then is given to man? " ... divine destiny and promise of this lord-
ship", writes Barth. The crux of the question is not what man has been
given but what God has given to man. The order and priority of this gift
is crucial for Barth. Even the very highest that man wishes to claim for
himself has the status of gift and with it profound responsibilities. He
writes:
In the history of this covenant it becomes true that man
was created, not to be the lord of creation, but to be
a lord in creation and in token of this to be lord over
the beasts.	 -
Interestingly enough the Herrschaft of Christ, which is the true subject
of the discussion here, discloses itself in self-costly love, and it is
precisely this lordship (so the inevitable conclusion must run) that man
is enjoined to exercise. Barth recognises this in principle for he writes
that the "biblical creation saga had no occasion to speak of any other
lordship of man over animals than the one actualised along this line".119
But he fails to spell out at this vital juncture the nature of the lord-
ship he envisages. For if the Herrschaft entrusted to man is derived from
the Herrschaft of Christ in creation, then it must consist in the same
moral exemplar as that of Christ. The unique and special function of man
within the cosmos, as bearer of the divine likeness, is to share the costly
118. cD, III, 1, n. p. 205. Calvin clearly thought that the universe
was made for man's sake, as is illustrated by this line from his
discussion of divine providence: "But because we know that the uni-
verse was established especially for the sake of humankind, we
ought to look for this purpose in his governance also". Institutes
of the Christian Religion, ed. by J.T. McNeill, ET by F.L. Battles, The
Library of ChristianClassics, Vol. III (London: SCM Press, 1961) Book I,
ch. Xvi p. 204.	 view which Barth appeared to endorse in 1936:
"No doubt it is scriptual to say that the world was created for
man's sake", Credo, ET by J.S. McNab (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
1936) p. 33.
119. CD, III, 1, n. p.- 206; my italics.
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loving of Christ so as to realise within the created world the divine
purpose. It is strange that Barth for all his Christologically centred
theology, should fail to articulate at this point the vital moral content
of man's dominion in Christological terms. He recognises that man's lord-
ship is not and cannot be absolute; it is set within limits and boundaries
and requires explicit authorisation. The final reference in this section
to Hebrews 2:5 rightly linking the vicarious suffering of Christ to his
crowning and honour, offers an unmistakable pointer to how man's own lord-
ship should be exercised and the responsibility and cost of exercising it.
(xi) Nourishment for man and beast (29 - 31)
The juridical divine command that man and animals should eat vegetation
(and only the superfluity of it at that) raises difficulties for Barth.
He grants its authority, and as a sign of the generous hand of God
in supplying sustenance for-'all . that'lives. But as for the
restriction on the exercise of dominion he sees here only
an affirmation of the original peace (Friede) of creation as made by God.
"We must not be scandalised if we find it difficult or impossible to ima-
gine the execution of this decree given to men and beasts", argues Barth,
S
"the only important thing is to ask in what sense the saga speaks of this
120decree .	 We may fail to understand Barth's reticence here. Of all
the commands given and described this alone merits heavy qualification.
Is it the obvious sense of these verses that they wish to speak of "peace
between the Creator and creatures, and peace among the creatures them-
selves"?121 Or is Barth here involved in gloss? One implication with
which he does not wrestle is that the possibility of killing, denied in
the exercise of lordship, affirms the value of each independent animal
120. CD, III, 1, p. 208.
121. CD, III, 1, p. 209.
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life over and above that of plants nd trees. It underlines their value
even within the circle of man's special value. Far from simply indicating
some original or initial harmony of creation, these verses speak of divine-
iy appointed limits within the already granted authorisation to man. Barth
should not avoid the possibility that these verses testify to the closeness of
- animal and human-kind and to their distinct, yet complementary, value to
God.
Barth, however, understands this command primarily in relation to the
further command which explicitly gives man the right to kill animals for
food:
It thus presupposes (the second command) an original order
from which this divine arrangement stands out as an extra-
ordinary new regulation of the relationship; a rule which
is certainly broken but also confirmed by this arrangement.
But Barth' s view here is only tenable if his understanding of animal
sacrifice is also right. His section needs to be read in full:
The new order of relationship commencing with the dawn of
this period, the introduction of capital jurisdiction be-
tween creature and creature, will not in any sense signify
a kind of divine submission to creaturely degeneration. It
will receive at once a very definite, positive meaning.
The content and supreme fulfilment of the covenant of grace
will consist in the reconciliation of man by capital juris-
diction. It is with a view to this that the animal is now
sacrificed, i.e. that the surrender of its life is demanded
and accepted by God as the substitutionary sign for the for-
feited life of man, and therefore as a sign of his reconci-
liation accomplished by God; that the animal is smitten and
slain; that the life - not of beasts of prey but of "innocent"
domestic animals which have no part in the mutual slaughter,
and not of these indiscriminately but only certain "clean"
animals - is offered up by man for man at the command of God,
and their flesh is then eaten in this context ... It pre-
supposes, therefore, that God demands and will accept the
surrender of the life of an animal for that of man as a
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substitutory sign, and man's participation in the re-
conciliation thereby signified. 122
But has Barth at this point a sufficiently adequate conception of animal
sacrifice? The theology of sacrifice is a notoriously difficult subject
123
and a variety of interpretations abourd.	 Observers of the debate often
remark how difficult and seemingly inconsistent it is to harmonise the
value and goodness of God's creation with the divine command to destroy
it albeit for sacrificial purposes. But such an inconsistency is only
possible if sacrifice is understood wholly and exclusively in terms of the
slaying death of animal life. Barth's emphasis too upon the "surrender"
and thereby "substitutory sign" of animal life is arguably in the same
vein. "The actual issue in the dispute", writes Frances Young, "is whether
the essential act of sacrifice was the death of the victim or the ofer-
ing of lifeblood" and she concludes that much evidence shows how "the idea
that the animal died in the offerer's stead is unfounded".
	 For we have
to reckon here with the possibility that animal sacrifice for all its seem-
ing contradictions actually affirmed the value of animal creation, that is,
instead of requiring the simple death of created life actually liberated
122 CD, III, 1, p. 210; my italics. There may be hints of Luther in
Barth's line here. Adam "would not have used the creatures as we
do today" writes Luther. The descendents of Adam would have exer-
cised their power over animals principally "for the admiration of
God and a holy joy which is unknown to us in this corrupt state of
nature". But after the Fall and the Flood "the animals are sub-
jected to man as to a tyrant who has absolute power over life and
death". This is an "extraordinary gift" from God which shows how
he is "favourably inclined and friendly toward man", Luther's Works, ed.
by Janoslav Pelikan (St Louis: Concordia Publishing Eouse, 1958)
Vol I, p. 71 and Vol II, pp. 132 - 133. Barth follows Luther espe-
cially in seeing "the new arrangement" as a sign of God's generosity
towards man.
123. For a concise summary see 'The Forms and Meaning of Sacrifice', ch
4 of H.H. Rowley's Worship in Ancient Israel: Its Forms and Meaning
(London: SPCK, 1967) pp. 110 - 143 and for useful background to the
cults, Helmer Ringgren's Israelite Religion, ET by David Green
(London: SPCK, 1969) pp. 166 - 178.
124. Young, The Use of Sacrificial Ideas in Greek Christian Writers from
the New Testament to John Chrysostom, Patristic Monograph Series, 5
(Philadelphia: The Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979) pp. 54
and 56.
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it for new life with God. 125
 Such a view, paradoxical as it appears to
some, is arguably the most plausible account of animal sacrifice as prac-
tised in Hebrew society. Now if this interpretation stands, then a far
more radical recasting of the material needs to be offered. Far from sug-
gesting the expendability of animal life for human penitence, the practice
actually affirms the value and enduring life of animals themselves. It
means that God's first prefiguring work of reconciliation begins not with
man, but with the animal creation. It is not just that they become a sign
of reconciliation within the human sphere, but that God. uses them to become
the efficacious agents of his reconciling work. This point is underlined
when one appreciates the Christological climax to this sacrificial system.
As with animal sacrifice it is not simply the death of Christ, but also
his life,obedience and witness that constitute the reconciling work of
God. The idea that God delights in the death of his creatures, human or
animal, fundamentally misunderstands the system of animal sacrifice and,
more importantly, the death of Christ.126
Does Barth avoid this crude understanding of animal sacrifice? Perhaps
not. In the first place, he nowhere indicates the value of animal crea-
tion directly in this process. Secondly, and more importantly, he does
not draw out the significance of the reconciling work of God as prefigured
in animal sacrifice for the animals themselves. To be fair, he points in
125. Cf. "(T)he basic meaning of sacrifice is not the destruction of the
creature but its offering to God for his acceptance in joyful
homage", E.L. Mascall reviewing work by Eugene Masure (also R.K.
Yerkes), Corpus Christi: Essays on the Church and the Eucharist
(London: Longmans, 1965) p. 89.
126. It also ignores the developing tradition of moral criticism reflected
in Deuteronomy, the Psalms, the Wisdom Literature and of course the
Prophets (for a masterful analysis see Young, op. cit., pp. 57 - 66)
which suggests at the very least divergent interpretations of the
practice. "So it was that Judaism was able to develop from a reli-
gion in which sacrifice played a most important part to a religion
in which sacrifice had no place", op. cit., p. 69. For a brief but
illuminating exchange see Robert Dobbie's 'Sacrifice and Morality in
the Old Testament', The Expository Times, 17 (October 1958) pp. 297
- 300 and H.H. Rowley's reply 'Sacrifice and Morality: A Rejoinder',
The Expository Times,17 (March 1959) pp. 341 - 342.
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his footnote to the "final era" which will bring "redemption and perfec-
tion and also general peace" for all creation. 127
 But there is here a
whole unexplored realm of the status of animal life used for the reconci-
ling purposes of God. For to follow Barth's earlier point that animals
do not belong to man but to God, it must also follow that God's preroga-
tive and purposes for the animal world are higher and more determined than
Barth's exegesis would admit. It means that while on one hand, man is
denied rights to animal life for his own food, such rights may be allowed
if they cohere with God's positive work of reconciliation with which man
is commanded to co-operate. In this sense Barth does not need to posit
one command breaking another, or a "new regulation" of relationship, since
what is essential to the sacrificial system is not the death of the ani-
mals concerned but new life as is ultimately mirrored in the reconciling
work of God in Christ.
(xii) The Seventh Day (Gen. 2:1 - 3 )
We reach the climax of the narrative. As we have seen it is not the crea-
tion of man, or the making of man male and female, or the giving of the
divine likeness that constitute the climax of the Schpfungsgeschichte,
but the invitation to share with God his Sabbath rest, joy and promise.
Barth concludes his final main paragraph in this way:
Creation took place in order that man's history might com-
mence and take place as the history of the covenant of grace
established between God and himself. According to the first
biblical witness it took place because God's love for man
willed to be incomparably strong in the fact that man and
his whole world and therefore the object of Cod's love should
become God's creation and therefore belong from the very out-
set to God ... It is in this teleology that it is presented
in the first creation narrative of the Bible.128
127. CD, III, 1, p. 211.
128. CD, III, 1, p. 219; my italics.
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What is most puzzling about this final affirmation as well as throughout
this last section as a whole is the consistent anthropocentric fram of
reference. This does not mean that Barth denies that the entire creation
rested on the Sabbath. Indeed it is implicit in some of what he writes,
for example: " ... creation, and supremely man, rested with God on the
129
Sabbath day ... ".	 But what is difficult to understand is why, with-
out any explicit scriptural support, he concentrates almost all his atten-
tion on man and gives no attention at all to what might be the theologi-
cal significance of the Sabbath for the rest of creation. It is precise-
ly at this point where it would be possible, indeed internally consistent,
for Barth to ponder and explore the unity and interdependence of creation
before its Creator, that the thrust of his exposition concerns itself al-
most solely with man. The partiality of Barth's account is shown in his
one sentence " ... (here) begins the history of man with God" 130 It is
difficult to understand why Barth is led to such a statement in the light
of his previous affirmations that non-human life should not be seen as be-
longing to man and that it exists in its own way for its own purposes
given by God. It must then follow that the non-human experience of the
Sabbath is theologically significant.. Perhaps it is best expressed in
terms of messianic prophecy which "can only reflectwhat was God's will in
creation, that all in whom he has placed his life.force should live in
shalom, peace and harmony".131
129. CD, III, 1, p. 211.
130. CD, III, 1, p. 219; my italics.
131. Anthony Phillips, 'Respect for Life in the Old Testament', King's
TheologicaiReview, 6, 2 (Autumn 1983) p. 32. Phillips draws
attention to "the large number of humanitarian and charitable pro-
visions of Hebrew Law" and especially the "number of enactments
concerning animals", e.g. Ex. 23:4 - 5., 10 ; Deut. 22:6 - 7 and
25:4. "While the Old Testament recognises that this is not an
ideal world, and makes concessions until the messianic kingdom
comes, it remains man's duty to do all in his power to reverence
animal life", p. 32.
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SUMMARY AND REVIEW: The Relationship bet'ieen the Human and Non-Human
Standing back to review Barth's treatment of the first creation saga, we
need firstly to remember that we are dealing with the "external basis" of
the covenant relationship. In this part Barth is seeking to isolate and
describe the external order of the divine work. His analysis is con-
cerned to press at every point the theological necessity of each and every
part of the divinely ordered cosmos. For Barth does indeed see order and
purpose within the created world - a view reached not from scientific ex-
periment or empirical discovery, but from the nature of the designs of the
Creator. In the light of this, our opening questions need to be posed
again:
(1) How does non-human creation stand in relation to the human?
and
(2) What end and purpose does non-human creation have?
(1) To answer the first question, let us recapitulate those common ele-
ments which the human and non-human share in the external work of creation:
(i) creation as grace;
(ii) divine blessing;
(iii) independent life and movement;
(iv) common habitation and food, and
(v) co-existence with the Creator.
(i) That creation is grace is obvious and central to Barth's thought; it
is also a matter of immense significance. In. his Dogmatics in Outline
he writes lyrically: "Creation is grace: a statement at which we should
like best to pause in reverence, fear and gratitude".
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God does not grudge the existence of reality distinct from
Himself; He does not grudge its own reality, nature and
freedom. 132
That creation is grace is an insight which belongs to the response of faith
in Jesus Christ. It cannot be deduced from any other source, but that in
Jesus we find revealed the relationship between Creator and created, be-
tween Father and Son. But it must follow from this, whatever the necessity
of positing inner circles of grace, that all existence is grace. No less
the firmaments of earth or heaven, the separation of light and darkness
(as well as darkness itself), the creeping things on dry land or the fish
in the sea or the great lights above - all manifest things in existence
are grounded in the free generosity of God. This alone is their sure onto-
logical fou.ndation. We cannot reckon with them except as willed, ordered
and guaranteed by the surety of God's love.
(ii) Barth understands blessing as authorisation to be. It is worth noting
how similarly both are blessed to multiply, that is, to reproduce, and to
fill the earth. In the case of man, there is the further command to exer-
cise Herrschaft, but it is striking how the authorisation to be in both
cases follows the same pattern and to the same purpose.' Life is given the
power to reproduce life and to sustain itself, within the limits of crea-
turely dependence. This is said not in relation to human needs or wants
or in relation to the fullness of creative life somehow construed as
132. Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, ET by G.T. Thomson, 9th ed. (London:
SCM Press, 1968) p. 54. Some commentators, George Hendry for ex-
ample, have located this idea in the thought of Plato. "According
to Plato, God is good, and the good is ever generous; it seeks to
give, to impart itself to others ... Creation, in a word, is the
result of the overflowing goodness of God" (Theology of Nature, op.
cit., p. 120) and he goes on to cite Barth as one of the theologians
who echo this theory. Such parallels are inevitably misconceived,
however. What distinguishes Barth is not the notion of the gene-
rosity of God, but the generosity of God uniquely disclosed in Jesus
Christ without which we would have no real notion of divine gene-
rosity at all.
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beneficial or desirous to man. "The truth seems to be", argues Robin
Attfield, "that the tradition which holds that in God's eyes the non-human
creation has no value except in its instrumental value for mankind has
133
Greek rather than Hebrew sources".
(iii) Barth relates the gift of blessing to the freedom within the crea-
turely world to move and act. He recognises that the attitude of blessing,
where not rendered explicit, is still implicit by the fact of their being:
We are told of the fecundity, multiplication and expansion
of these aquatic and aerial denizens. At the creation of
light, the firmament, the earth vegetation and the lumina-
ries, there was no question of any such blessing, nor was it
demanded. These things seem to be blessed by being what they
are.l34
But Barth does see the need for explicit blessing for the animal creation
since it belongs to the "inner circle" of grace. This is because:
In God's blessing of the fish and birds we really transcend
the concept of creation and enter the sphere of God's deal-
ings with His creation.135
In other words, prior to the existence of man, God sought a relationship
with the non-human which gave them the gift of independent freedom, that
is, individual life. This granting of life is seen as an activity of the
Spirit in creation, though humankind is touched in a particular and direct
133. Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, op. cit., p. 26.
Cf. John Passmore: "there is a strong Western tradition that man is
free to deal with nature as he pleases, since it exists only for
his sake. But they (critics of Western civilisation) are incorrect
in tracing this attitude back to Genesis. Genesis, and after it the
Old Testament generally, certainly tells man that he is, or has the
right to be, master of the earth and all it contains. But at the
same time it insists that the world was good before man was created,
and that it exists to glorify God rather than to serve man", Man's
Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Tradi-
tions (London: Duckworth, 1974) p. 27.
134. CD, III, 1, pp. 169/70.
135. CD, III, 1, p. 170.
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way. Thus as we move from the inanimate to the animate, from the greater
degree of dependence to the lesser degree of dependence, we see the in-
creasing and developing closeness of the Creator with his creation. Though
all creation is good, some parts of it, in hope and promise at least, are
very good. As we move from the creation of vegetable life to that of ani-
inals and man (on the same day) so we find, as it were on a continuum, a
developing possibility for response, praise and gratitude. It is diff i-
cult to avoid the conclusion that life seen in this sense of derived, but
actual, freedom, is the common possession of all blessed creatures, both
animal and human.
(iv) It must follow that the creation of dry land, that is, the earth,
is made for the habitation of all that live on it, vegetable, animal and
human life. But at this point Barth is over eagerly anthropocentri. He
sees the work on the third day as "the erection of a table in the midst
of this house - which is finally and supremely for man". 136 A lengthy foot-
note confirms this exegesis: "It (the earth) belongs parte priori to
137
man. It is inhabited by the human race and appointed for it". 	 Here
Barth appears to abandon his strong Christological emphasis, for while
previously he held that incarnate humanity is the centre of the creation,
he offers at this point no such Christological qualification. Man as man
is seen as the only rightful possessor of the dry land. This position
also appears inconsistent with the limited and heavily qualified descrip-
tion of man's dominion offered later. In this later piece, Barth draws
back from the claim of man to absolute sovereignty precisely because
animals are not to be seen as man's possession, neither do they belong to
•	 138him.
136. CD, III, 1, p. 144.
137. CD,. III, 1, n. p. 150.
138. CD, III, 1, pp. 205/6.
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There is one further facet to this question, namely that of common food,
as well as habitation. It is odd that Barth should invoke the "table"
image in a way that seemingly supports his contention that food is given
"supremely and finally for man". Later on he has to wrestle with the
opposite direction embedded in the command that both man and animals should
eat vegetable life alone. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in
the first saga at least both habitation and food are given for man and
animals alike, and that even vegetables have dry land allocated to them.
(v) From the common life envisaged between non-human and human life, and
especially that of animals and man, it seems that God intended harmonious
co-existence. Barth's djscussion of the limits of dominion in this
respect makes this quite clear. Materially: Ci) animals and man are crea-
ted on the same day; (ii) both are recipients of special blessings; (iii)
both share the same land and same food source; (iv) both join the same
praise of God - though animals in a limited way 139
 and (v) both share the
hope of a final redemption which will "include peace between man and
beast". 14° Barth appears to go further than this. For such is the com-
panionship, even the possibility of sharing something of the divine like-
ness, that animals have with men that they also share the same burden.
"It is not for nothing that it (animal creation) is blessed with the same
blessing with which man is also blessed", he writes. "This means that it
is also burdened with the same curse man has to carry." 141 But given the
very closeness presupposed, it must then be asked whether the very bondage
that binds them together must not also issue in the same or similar hope
of deliverance? The issue is raised by the invoking of the possibility
of final redemption and peace among all creatures, but here, strangely
139. See later discussion of this especially pp. 229 - 231. 	 -
140. CD, .111, 1, p. 211.
141. CD, III, 1, n. p. 181.
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enough, it lacks a sufficiently Christological dimension. For if animals
are to be seen as part of the inner circle of grace, actually sharing with
humanity something of its affliction, must not the inner circle of crea-
tion be at one and the same time the inner circle of God's reconciling and
redeeming activity? If in the end God has elected man in his companion
relation with fellow beings, then should not the reconciling work of Christ
include them also? If here we speak of genuinely shared companionship and
suffering how can they be left to one side in the work of completion and
redemption?
Having identified those common elements which the human and the non-human
share in the external work of creation, we need now to look again at those
elements which also distinguish them:
(a) sexual differentiation;
(b) man's lordship or dominion;
(c) the Sabbath invitation, and
(d) the divine likeness.
I shall discuss the first three (a-c) together and (d) separately.
Ci) In the case of (a) sexual differentiation and (c) the Sabbath expe-
rience, it is simply not clear why Barth lays such weight upon the special
place of humankind. Everything at this stage that he wishes to assert
about the purpose and value of sexual relations for human beings seems to
apply equally to animal life. But Barth presses this point with vigour.
"What distinguishes him (man) from the beasts?" he asks. "According to
Gen. 1, it is the fact that in the case of man the differentiation of sex
is the only differentiation." He continues:
The only real differentiation and relationship is that of
man to man, and in its original and most concrete form of
man to woman and woman to man.
- .54 -
The argument is vulnerable on three fronts. (1) In the first place, as
he recognises, it is not the fact that there exists male and female in man
that distinguishes him from animals, but the theological significance
which Barth draws from this fact. Barth here moves from the external to
the inner basis of the covenant relationship without sufficient care. It
simply is not true to claim the fact of sexual differentiation is the "only
differentiation' recorded in Genesis 1. Indeed as he recognises the ques-
tion of divine likeness is primary (See (ii) below). (2) Secondly, the
biblical witness in its description of the command to multiply in the
lower parts of creation, makes explicit the fact of sexual differentiation
in this sphere (l:2Off.). (3) Thirdly, Barth's interpretation of the sig-
nificance of sexual differentiation in man is weakened by the implication
that he is not dealing with interpretation at all. "Men are simply male
and female", he writes. Again "Man can and will always be man before God
and among his fellows only as he is man in relationship to woman and woman
in relationship to man." 42 What substantially (as distinct from formally)
Barth wants to claim for man (as distinct from animals) amounts after
examination to a restatement of their formal relation, i.e. that man is
sexually differentiated. A similar problem of emphasis is present in
Barth's discussion of the significance of the Sabbath experience. He
cannot deny that animals and other parts of creation are similarly invited
to share Sabbath rest and joy, but apart from a bare recognition of this
formal relation, he..f ails to indicate its significance. The problem is
compounded by Barth's approach of heavily distinguishing man from the
rest of creation on one hand, but failing consequently, on the other, to
wrestle with the significance of what distinct non-human experience may
signify.
142. £.' III i 1, p. 186.
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In the discussion of man's lordship or dominion over animals, Barth moves
to what appears to be a more substantial statement of distinction:
What distinguishes him (man) and gives him authority and
power is the fact that, although he is not radically diffe-
rent from the other creatures with independent life, he has
been honoured by the grace of God to be the image of God in
the uniqueness of his plurality as male and female.l43
(ii) It can hardly be overlooked that it is the conviction that in Christ God
becomes substantially one with human creation that determines Barthrs
method here. Thus the notion of image is related directly and indirectly
to what Barth subsequently expounds as the inner basis of the covenant
relationship. Man is made of Gad's image because in this sphere God makes
himself real and manifest. As will become fully clear later, the sexual
differentiation acquires significance as an expression of the relationship
between Christ and his Church and in indicating the complexity of relations
within the Godhead itself (see further discussion, pp. 64 - 67).
Is the Non-Human Redundant?
Barth's own assessment of the theological status of creation seen in terms
of its Christological centre is in the form of a prefiguring capacity to
the covenant that belongs exclusively between God and man. The next sec-
tion deals extensively with this theme of covenant and I do not want to
enter into a full discussion of it now. But what Barth fails to make
clear at this stage is how differently significant the place of the non-
human must be. It is not clear how the divine determination to make with-
in man a place of self giving limits or qualifies the status of non-human
creation. of course it is possible so to interpret God's activity in
Christ but it is nowhere clear in Barth that his anthropocentric concern
necessarily follows.from his exposition. From this standpoint Barth is
143. CD. III, I, p. 188.
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open to the charge that the way in which he interprets the doctrine of
creation in terms of its Christological centre fails to give a necessary
and full account of creation itself. This is not to take issue with the
thrust of his Christological interpretation, but it is to question whether
the limits he presupposes as part of his task are essential to it. Whether
Barth's thesis can stand examination of the biblical witness as he expounds
it subsequently is a matter for later discussion. But at this point it
must be questioned whether Barth's affirmation of a Christological centre
in creation precludes offering a fuller account of the value and purpose
of non-human creation itself. For example: it is not obvious from Barth's
analysis of the purpose of man in creation that non-human creation cannot
be seen as directly influenced by the work of God as Reconciler as well as
Redeemer. It is not self evident that the reconciling work of God in Christ
cannot be effective for the entire created order as well as centrally for
man. He is. right to posit an inner circle of divine grace within which
the actuality of God's self-giving is realised and manifest, but it does
not follow that this self-giving is limited in its effects or influence to
human creation alone. Thus Barth in his account of the external covenant
relationship emphasises (rightly) the fundamental distinction between ani-
mals and man, but in a way that fails to take account of the many common
theological elements previously enumerated. This is particularly striking
in the relationship between animals and man. On Barth's own evidence
there is solid ground for accepting a companion relationship between them
even to the extent of affirming that animals are participators to some
degree in the covenant relationship. But that accepted, it requires theo-
logical articulation, that is, its significance needs to be drawn out pre-
cisely and in relation to his major presuppositions.
Does Barth avoid the charge then that creation, and non-human creation in
particular, is seen as incidental to the divine purpose in creation? This
- 57 -
question may perhaps be best answered in the form of another question:
Why is it that God should create a world in which exist forms and kinds
of life, blessed and sustained by his power, which are substantially ex-
cluded from the further act of reconciliation which he affects through
his costly self-revelation? We shall wrestle with this question in the
light of Barth's further exposition of the covenant relationship.
CHAPTER TWO: AN EXCLUSIVE COVENANT: THE REDUNDANCY OF THE NON-HUMAN
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'The Covenant as the Internal Basis of Creation' is the title of the
third sub-section of the second major section of Part One. Here Barth
gives his exposition of the second creation saga. There is no "material
contradiction" between these two accounts. 1
 The second is neither "a sup-
plement to nor a commentary on" the first. 2
 Of course it may be said that
the second is a different Schpfungsgeschichte but the theme remains the
same. They have a theological harmony because the concern of both is
identical, namely creation and covenant, but viewed from different angles.
An Outline of the Second Saga
Barth begins by outlining his main points. Creation is the making of
beings who neither possess nor assume within themselves meaning except in
so far as this is given to them. The central point is that creation does
not only exist, it "exists meaningfully". It is only from the free love
of God that creation acquires meaning and it exists solely to receive this
gift. Secondly, creation because it cannot stand by itself is "one long
preparation" for the intentions of God, namely the history of the covenant.
"Its nature", writes Barth, "is simply its equipment for grace" . Third-
ly , the second creation saga has as its concern the internal basis of the
covenant and while this covenant can be said to be the "goal" of creation
history, it also belongs to the very beginning of its existence. From
this standpoint, his main interest is "not how creation promises, proclaims
and prophesies the covenant, but how it pre-figures and to that extent
anticipates it without being identical with it." Again Barth's Christo-
logical motif emerges clearly. For in this saga we see how creation is
to be a sign "not (of) Jesus Christ as the goal but Jesus Christ as the
beginning (the beginning just because He is the goal) of creation".
1. CD, III, 1, p. 228.
2. CD, III, 1, pp. 229/30.
3. CD, III, 1, p. 231.
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Because the second narrative begins with the goal already established (as will
be seen shortly) we are essentially dealing with the history of creation "from
the inside". 4
 It is in the creation of the first man (and not in the episode of
the Fall) that the whole history that follows isprefigured. Barth now explains
why this is- the case as-he turns to his exposition of the second narrative.
(i) The Christological Presupposition
We learn from the beginning of the second account (Gen. 2:4b - 7) that God
reveals his name (Yahweh Elohim). He is the one who "under this name" has
determined and chosen Israel and to whom he reveals himself. Moreover it
is this God who makes the "earth and the heavens". This inversion of the
order found in the first narrative indicates the centrality of the earth
in this account. For man is to be the being who tills and serves the
created order. Far from being "anthropocentric" this saga places upon
man the concrete duty to look after what God has made as is later empha-
sised in the account of the Garden of Eden. Unlike the first account,
where vegetable life serves man, he is now seen as the "being which had
to be created for the sake of the earth" (Gen. 2:6). In what sense then
is he to be distinguished from the other animals? Only in that God breathes
into his nostrils and he becomes thus a living soul. Only to man does God
give life in this manner. Not by virtue of his gifts or abilities or even
his immediacy to God. Precisely because of his nature and commission,
man's existence stands in contradiction to the "earthiness of the earth".5
Man fulfils the meaning of his existence by holding a dual responsibility
before God and creation for his tilling and keeping of the earth.
Barth probes the meaning and explanation of the origin of man thus given.
Behind these "prefigurative pictures" stands "the whole of Old Testament
anthropology". 6
 It is conceivable that this first man divinely commissioned
4. CD, III, 1, p. 232.
5. CD, III, 1, p. 237.
6. CD, III, 1, p. 238.
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and called to service represents not just individual man, or man in gene-
ral, but Israel as the people of God. This explanation may not be wholly
satisfactory, however. There is a new and decisive interpretation. The
explanation of this "hard but also hopeful eschatological riddle" is to
be found in the "fulfilment in Jesus as the Messiah of Israel". The
similarities once grasped are unmistakable. For Jesus is also the man of
special commission whose humility and service are to be the fulfilment and
goal of all Israel's hopes. "He, Jesus Christ", writes Barth, "is the man
whose existence was necessary for the perfecting of the earth". Thus Jesus is th
answer to the riddle of which the saga writers speak "objectively if not sub-
jectively". No interpretation other than this can be the "final" one.7
(ii) The Garden of Glory 	 -
Barth now turns to the central story of this second saga (Gen. 2:8 - 17),
namely the creation of the Garden of Eden and the divine command and pr&-
hibition concerning it. Unlike the first creation saga, interest is now
focussed on one particular place. There is no further reference to the
creation of heaven and earth. "But what kind of place is it?" asks Barth.
We must not be misled, he argues, into thinking of a classical paradise.
Whilst in the Greek translation "Eden" means "paradise", the garden is
"not described as an Elysium, an island of the blessed, a garden of Hes-
perides, or even a Lubberland". 8 What makes the garden special is simply
that God planted it and that it is especially pleasing to him. Barth
further asks: "Where is this place?". Whilst any precise "geographical
localisation" is quite beyond what the saga writers intended, he insists
that the biblical witness is here speaking of a "definite place on earth".
Although such a place would clearly be inaccessible to human beings, and
whilst mention of the place is only "semi-concrete", this saga is aiming
7. CD, III, 1, p. 239.
8. CD, III, 1, p. 250.
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to relate real history. Barth is a trifle ambivalent, however, as may
be gleaned from the following sentence: "It is palpable that in these
passages we have to do with a genuine consideration of real events,
persons and things, but only with a consideration and therefore not with
a historical review but with constructions which do not have their origin
in observation but in imagination". 9
 In short, they belong to "pre-
historical history" as Barth so defined in the first creation saga.
Attention is now directed to a number of individual features in the garden.
Firstly, the garden is God's sanctuary by virtue of the fact that he pos-
sesses it and is Lord over it. Secondly, what determines and characterises
this place is the divine beneficence operating in man's favour. Man is a
cherished creature. Thirdly, fertility and all possibility of life have
their origin here in Eden and particularly in the one river which flows
from it. Fourthly, the garden itself is the place of Eerrlichkeit. For
all that God will do outside this sanctuary "goes back to the promise and
revelation and gift" which he realised within it. But the most important
feature is the centre of the garden, a "Holiest of Holies". This compri-
ses the two trees, the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil. The first tree appears to be obsolete and of no use to man.
But "with its fruits" it "is the divinely given sign of what he (man) has
10to do with the earth". 	 The tree thus represents man's rest and security
within God's sanctuary. And man leaves this first tree untouched. The
second tree is not a sign of an existent reality but the "sign of a possi-
bility presented to man by God". 1 ' The essence of this tree is knowledge
of good and evil. God does not will that the possibility represented by
this tree should be realised. The determining feature of the Creator is
his ability to make distinctions between right and wrong, good and evil,
9. CD, III, 1, p. 252.
10. CD, III, :1, p. 256.
11. CD, III, 1, p. 257.
- 62 -
and man could not possibly usurp God's position without incurring his
wrath. Barth relates the consequences of man's decision to the judicial
office of God in creation. God commands obedience as he alone can know
what is good for man. In seeking "a responsibility which exceeds his
capacity" man will "have to share with God" nothing less than "the whole
12
responsibility' of God's 'judicial office, knowledge and sentence".
In the light of this an obvious question arises. Could not God's grace
have prevented the free choice of man? Could it be that the divine pro-
hibition actually served to strengthen the temptation? Certainly man has
freedom at this point, but this is not "a freedom of choice between obe-
dience and disobedience". 13
 God has not put before man the possibility
of usurpation of his sovereignty but only the possibility of "a free deci-
sion". Thus the notion of temptation is inappropriate. God gives man
"freedom to obey" to live a life with him in love. But neither obedience
nor disobedience are "physically necessary" nor "impossible")4
Barth steps back to recall and amplify his line of exposition. "It can
hardly fail to be noticed", he writes, "that the whole actuality of Israel
in Canaan" is being "here projected backward, or better still, is here
perceived and revealed as the meaning of creation"1 15 The holy land of
Eden is a prototype of Israel itself. Abraham, for example, the Patriarch
of the Jewish nation, was himself called to a new land assigned by God in
a similar way to the first man who is called to live in his home (the
Garden of Eden). But the "decisive parallel" consists in the comparison
between the trees which occupy the centre of the Garden of Eden and the
12. £.' III, 1, p. 261.
13. CD. III. 1. p. 263.
14. £2. ' III, 1, p. 266.
15. £2. ' III, 1, p. 268.
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Law of God which formed the centre of Israel's life. 16
 Thus the Law of
Cod revealed to Israel has its prototype in the Tree of Life in the
Garden of Paradise. Both are signs of the fact that Israel and man must
hold fast to their election and to the sovereignty of God. Everything
depends upon this decision. Barth. sees "idolatry" as the clearest ex-
ample of the knowledge of good and evil. Moreover, the reason why Israel
must "suffer and vanish" when it refuses to acknowledge the sovereignty
of God in the similar way that the first man must suffer and vanish when
he does likewise is simply that "at this moment it is involved in inevi-
17	 .table failure". 	 The whole political and spiritual status of Israel is
threatened when it will not recognise that Yahweh is alone "the righteous-
ness of this people". 18 To the question, therefore, why is God's grace
insufficiently strong to prevent misdeeds there is only the answer in both
cases that God would not be taking the other seriously if this were so.
Since God wills the free response of his creatures and this in fellowship,
the possibility of good and evil as represented by the tree in the garden
must always be present. Barth concludes that "the grace of God is so
profound that it condescends to call and receive man as his free covenant-
partner" 19
Before completing this section, Barth is keen to raise and relate what
he sees as the objective "Christological meaning" ( christologischen Sinn)
of this episode. For the Jewish reading of creation history, namely of
a covenant established and then lost, of grace found and then disposed,
and of promises made only to remain unfulfilled, is a woefully inadequate,
indeed tragically inauspicious, rendering of creation history. Only if
creation history has its goal in the person of Jesus Christ can God's
16. CD, III; 1, p. 269.
17. CD, III, 1, p. 271.
18. CD, III, I, p. 272.
19. CD, III, 1, p. 273.
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faithfulness be vindicated. Without this goal creation is left with a
"grandiose illusionI.20 In the life and person of Jesus, God actualises
the covenant to which the Old Testament bears witness. This is "the
Christian reading" of the Paradise saga.21
(iii) Sexual Difference as Human Co-partnership
Barth now turns to the "climax and conclusion" of this second saga (Gen.
18 - 25), namely the creation of woman. God does not wish to create soli-
tary man, but man as a duality of male and female. Barth makes great play
of this inherent two-foidness of humankind, for it is a sign of unity-in-
difference, or complex unity, which in turn is a sign of being made in
the image of the triune God. To be a partner with God in the history of
the covenant, man himself required a partner. But in order to grasp the
meaning of this final section, we need to consider the significance of
the final cry of man when God brings the woman to him. The exclamation
"This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh" Cv 23) is the
"goal" of the saga because man is seen as appropriating and accepting for
himself - as a free decision - God's own gift.. The animals are also
created and brought to him but they are insufficient for his needs. Man,
it is true, names the animals and thereby expresses his lordship over them
and only "in their relationship to him" are they "what they are". 22 But
the creation of animal life is only a prefiguring of the vital decision
man must make about the creation of woman. The making of animals was not
"a divine experiment which failed" but a necessary preparation of what was
to come. Man must be able to choose between possibilities in order to
make his choice his own. "He chooses the fact that he is elected", sum-
marises Barth.23
Particular elements of the story are now examined. Why, in the first
20. CD, III, I, p. 275.
21. CD, III, 1, p. 276.
22. CD, III, 1, p. 292.
23. CD, III, 1, p. 293.
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place, should the saga want to describe a deep sleep falling upon man
during the creation of woman? (v 21) Barth answers that we have here to
deal with God's wholly sovereign act of creation.. While man is called
upon to affirm God's work, there can be no element of creaturely partici-
pation or indeed observation. It remains first and last God's own work.
Because of this, the story of the creation of woman must of its nature be
story, that is, saga. Nevertheless, we can know four things concerning
the how of the creation of woman. The first is that woman is truly of man.
When the saga speaks of the rib taken from man and from, which God formed
the female, it posits the closest possible relationship between the two.
Man relates to woman as he does to his own flesh. The second is that as
woman is a constitutivé part of his being,, man cannot separate himself
from her. The third is that mart has truly given of himself in the crea-
tion of woman. "He experienced a loss", as Barth indicates. An injury
that could have resulted in death but was in fact subsequently healed.
The fourth point, and the most decisive, is that man recognises in woman
"something of himself" but that with "its own autonomous nature and struc-
ture". 24 In the relationship between male and female, in their unity,
yet separateness; in their closeness yet distinctive individuality, Barth
sees nothing of "chance or human arbitrariness" - a point that figures
prominently in later analysis.25
Thus the cry of man when God brings the woman to him: "This at last is
bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman because
she was taken out of man", (Gen. 2:23) is more than simply the giving of
a name or a factual assertion. It concerns the ordering of man and his
relationship with himself in dual form. But who is this woman? Who is
"this"? Barth offers the simplest and most comprehensive definition
24. CD, III, 1, p. 296.
25. CD, III, 1, p. 298.
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of what woman is as "the being to which man, himself becoming male,
can and must say in the exercise of his freedom that this is now the help-
meet which otherwise he had sought in vain but which now had been fashioned
and brought by God". 26 Those who do not know this, adds Barth, really do
not know woman at all. They are "merely giving rein to theory and fancy".
The meaning of the Hebrew 'isha, whilst difficult to grasp in its entire-
ty, is essentially this: "woman is of man". She belongs to him. This re-
lationship is not a question of "value, dignity and honour but of order".27
Woman has a special place but that is inextricably bound up with the posi-
tion of man and the fact that she is chosen by him.
(iv) Human partnership past-figures divine election
The second narrative concludes with two further observations. The first
begins: "Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to
his wife, and they become one flesh" (v 24). Barth is much exercised bythe
preposition "therefore". What can it signify in this context? He sug-
gests two possibilities. The first is that the monogamous relationship
of man to woman in society follows from what has been described so far,
and the second that this relationship is grounded in revelation. Barth
sees in this verse an elaboration of the whole notion of man's pre-
eminence previously explored, for only in love and marriage is this pre-
eminence grounded. Indeed man's supremacy over woman consists in "his
subordination to this arrangement". 28 Either view must see the histori-
cal reality of love and marriage as having its basis in the nature of
creation. The second concluding passage begins: "And the man and his wife
were both naked, and were not ashamed" Cv 25). The nakedness described
here is a sign of holy shamelessness and innocence. They had nothing to
hide. Masculinity or femininity are not weaknesses to be concealed.
26. , iii, 1, pp. 300/1.
27. •, III, 1, p. 301.
28. ç•, iii, 1, p. 306.
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Barth now seeks to establish more clearly the overriding significance of
these final emphases of the second creation saga. We find ourselves be-
fore "the mystery" of the covenant of grace in that it reflects the inner
29basis of creation itself. 	 But in what sense? In the first place, love
and marriage between man and woman, particularly as exemplified in the
Song of Songs and the later prophetic tradition, is a "parable and sign"
30
of the relationship between Yahweh and his people. 	 Yahweh can be proper-
ly described as the "Lover, Bridegroom and Husband" and Israel as his
partner. Their relationship is the "prototype" of human love and marriage.
Barth, however, is not satisfied that the analogy should rest there. In
the second place, there is a striking Christologica]. dimension in two
further respects. On one hand, there is the link between human sexuality
and the "procreation of the Holy seed". 31 Human hopes and messianic,ex-
pectation here converge. Does not human sexuality look forward beyond
itself "to the future Son"? 31 On the other, pushing ahead of the Song of
Songs and the prophets, we are forced to see the correspondence between
Yahweh and Israel and the greater mystery of Christ and his Church. It
is precisely because Jesus Christ is himself the basis of Israel's call
that it is appropriate to describe the relationship between Yahweh and
Israel in "erotic" terms. There is indeed here an analogy of love point-
ing forwards and backwards to the nature of the inner basis of creation.
From this standpoint we affirm that Jesus Christ and his Church "are the
internal basis of creation".33
The Anthropocentric Meaning of the Covenant
Before we examine various aspects of Barth's exposition, we need first
to explore the pivotal presupposition that vastly influences his treatment
29. CD, III, 1, p. 312.
30. CD, III, 1, p. 315.
31. CD, III, 1, p. 312.
32. CD, III, 1, p. 320.
33. CD, III, 1, p. 322.
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of the combined section: 'Creation and Covenant'. Barth states this pre-
supposition clearly in his summary: " ... according to this (biblical)
witness the purpose and therefore the meaning of creation is to make pos-
sible the history of God's covenant with man which has its beginning, its
centre and its culmination in Jesus Christ". 34 S4'mpathetic commentators
agree that this is "the way" to approach the doctrine of creation. He is
"right and illuminating", argues Alec Whitehouse, "in finding the rela-
tion of creation and covenant to be the key to the whole mystery of what
35God the Creator has done".	 Again and again throughout the three parts
of this major section, Barth affirms, re-affirms, refines, restates and
constantly illuminates this fundamental insight. "The decisive anchorage
of the recognition that creation and covenant belong to each other", he
writes, "is the recognition that God the Creator is the triune God, 'Father,
Son and Holy Spirit". 36 "Nowhere, to the best of my belief", writes White-
house, "have the eyes of modern men been opened to the meaning of God's
work in creation, as in these pages".37
The Ambiquous Status of the Non-Human
From our perspective, however, there is a major and unresolved question:
who are the partners in this covenant relationship? The whole of creation?
The wide circle of animate beings blessed with the power of independent
movement? The inner circle of those beings (including man) created on the
sixth day and which together are given food and habitation and blessing?
Or is man the sole covenant partner? The assumption throughout is that
man alone is called to be God's partner in this way. The fullest state-
ment on this can be found in Part Two. In context Barth is offering exe-
gesis of Genesis 2:7 concerning the breathing of life into man:
34. CD, III, 1, p. 42.
35. Whitehouse, 'Karl Barth and the Doctrine of Creation' in The Authority
of Grace: Essays in Response to Karl Barth, ed. by Ann Loades (Edin-
burgh: T and T Clark, 1981) p. 11.
36. CD, III, 1, p. 48.
37. Whitehouse, op. cit., p. 14.
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When God breathes His breath into the nostrils of man and
thus makes him a living being, He seems to be doing mate-
rially the same thing as might be said of the animals. It
is merely a matter of form that it is said specifically of
man. The material difference emerges only in the fact that
the continuation of the story is the history of the covenant
and salvation, not between God and animals, but between God
and man. The course of events described in Genesis 3ff.
occurs between God and man, and not between God and the animals.
This shows what is involved in the fact that God gave man the
Spirit. He gave the Spirit to animals also, but obviously not
in the same way. Man is the being between whom and God such
events can take place ... Thus man's soul per se has an aff i-
nity to the Spirit by whom it is made. And thus it is created
a priori in this affinity, i.e., for the realisation of a con-
nexion between man and his Creator. This is the factual ex-
planation of these very striking linguistic usages of the
Bible. In regard to animals, they would both be inexplicable,
because a retrospective consideration of animals, looking from
salvation history back to their nature, is impossible for us.
In regard to man, both are readily explicable, since we not
only can but must understand human nature from the standpoint
of salvation history.38
We shall consider at a later point the question of the spiritual nature of
animals (see especially pp. 252-270). What is striking in this passage is
Barth's denial that "the course of events described in Genesis 3ff. occurs
between God and man, not between God and the animals". Does the biblical
material support his view? Of course it cannot be held that animals are -
major partners to the covenant, or that they figure prominently through-
out the whole of Genesis. But do the events from Genesis 3ff. support
38. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, 2, The Doctrine of Creation, Part Two
('The Creature') eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, ET by H.
Knight, G.W. Bromiley, J.K.S.. Reid and R.H. Fuller (Edinburgh: T and
T Clark, 1960) n. p. 396; my italics. There are surely echoes of
Calvin here. "Although the favour which the Lord promises extends
also to animals, yet it is not in vain that he addresses himself only
to men, who, by the sense of faith, are able to perceive this bene-
fit ... (God) declares that he will be propitious also to brute
animals, so that the effect of the covenant towards them, might be
the preservation of their lives only, without imparting to them sense
and intelligence", Commentaries on the First Book of Moses called
Genesis, ET by John King (Edinburgh: The Calvin Translation Society,
1847) vol. I (1847) p. 297; my italics. A view, ironically perhaps,
which is consistently found in Catholic textbooks, e.g. "Things
lower than man, it is true, come to be, develop and pass away, but
they lack mind, that force which forms history in the real sense",
Eberhard Welty, A Handbook of Christian Social Ethics, ET by Gregor
Kirstein (Freiburg: Herder and Edinburgh/London: Nelson, 1960) vol.
I (1960) p. 41.
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the interpretation that animals do not form part of the covenant relation-
ship or play a part in Heilsgeschichte? Apparently not. Barth appears
to have overlooked the saga of Noah. For the violence and carnivorousness
of mankind precipitated God's anger upon mankind and also expressly the
beasts around him (Gen. 6:7 and 13). The building of the Ark symbolised
God' s mercy not only towards Noah and his wife and children but also to-
wards each pair of living beings (vv. 18 and 19). Moreover, after the
Flood an everlasting covenant is enjoined not only with Noah and his de-
scendents, but also "with every living creature that is with you" (Gen.
9:10; 12; 16; 17). How then is it possible to deny that animals form
part of the everlasting covenant relationship? Interpreting Barth here
is not straightforward. In earlier passages the anthropocentric character
of his understanding appears resolute "What is meant'is the history of
"39the covenant of grace instituted by God between Himself and man
Later on Barth refers in a concise and illuminating discussion of the status
of animals to the fact that they too are remembered by God and included
within the covenant relationship. 4° But the implications of this recog-
nition are not pursued. In his main discussion of the creation of ani-
mals, he writes: "Man's salvation and perdition, his joy and sorrow, will
be reflected in the weal and woe of this animal environment and company".
And he continues: "Not as an independent partner of the covenant, but as
an attendant, the animal will.participate with man (the independent part-
ner) in the covenant, sharing both the promise and the curse which shadows
the promise". 41 How adequate then is Barth's treatment of the place of
animals in the covenant relationship? It should be remembered that ani-
inals are not entirely overlooked in Barth's discussion. In his concise
three page discussion of the status of animals Barth brings to light many
39. CD, III, 1, p. 59; my italics.
40. CD, III, 1, n. p. 180.
41. CD, III, 1, p. 178.
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positive features concerning their role and significance. Animals are
linked with man throughout the Old and New Testaments.
	 The beasts give
honour to God (Is. 43:20); a righteous man will look after them (Prov.
12:10) and even the cattle of Nineveh are of account to the Lord (Jon.
4:11). Moreover, Barth stresses the theological bond that unites man and
animals. For both share not only God's blessing but also his curse.
Thus animals are expressly included in the divine judgement on Israel for
they shall "languish" with man (Hos. 4:3); God's anger shall be poured
out upon them also (Jer. 7:20); birds and beasts shall be destroyed be-
cause of man's wickedness (Jer. 12:4); and all shall "shake" before the
presence of the Lord (Ezek. 38:20). Sharing the same blessing and curse
means that animals share "in the confusion of his (man's) existence and
his (man's) world". Barth goes further to include the possibility of re-
demption for animals too. "But (in its own way) it will also be freed
from the bondage of +8op into the glorious liberty of the Sons of God".
Thus Romans 8 and Psalm 36:6 are taken as "a thread" running through "the
whole of the Bible" and affirming that animals share in the inner circle
42
of God's redeeming work.
In the light of these very positive affirmations of the place of animals
it is very difficult to understand Barth' s ambivalence about animals form-
ing part of the covenant relationship. It is possible that Barth's lack
of a full and precise treatment of this area may have led to ad hoc judge-
ments. In the light of his often promisingly positive statements we could
only wish that he had taken more time to develop a more comprehensive
position. There is so much more we could have learnt if only these ques-
tions had received more of his attention.
But perhaps the most important question that can be raised concerns the
42. CD, III, 1, n. pp. 179 - 181.
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adequacy of Barth's handling and interpretation of the biblical material.43
It will be remembered that he speaks in his sectional summary of how "this
witness", that is the biblical witness, understands the meaning of crea-
tion in terms of "the history of God's covenant with man". In relation
to animals he interprets this witness in one of two major ways:
(i) animals are not independent (.selbstndig) but
only attendant partners to man in the covenant, or
(ii) animals have no place in the Heilsgeschichte, that is
"the history of the covenant and salvation".
To the first Ci) it is difficult to know what Barth means by this notion
of attending. It cannot be claimed, of course, that animals are the major
covenant partners. He is surely right in supposing that they stand at
some distance within the covenant relationship itself. They are "fore-
runners", "companions", brute "witnesses" and "precursor(s) of man".44
But where Barth fails to account for the biblical material is in his im-
plication that animals are not actually part of the covenant at all.
Their role and significance may be as Barth describes as prefiguring and
precursing that of man, but they can only do so as they stand alongside
man within the covenant relationship. This can be shown by two examples
from the Noah saga. In the first place, and apparently trivially, it is
the bird that seeks the dry land for the community within the Ark (Gen.
8:7 ff.). It is that community, saved from threat, including within it
43. It is not just that Barth overlooks one text, he does not grapple
sufficiently with the consistent intimations that animals have a
covenant .relationship with God, e.g. "I will make a covenant on be-
half of Israel with the wild beasts, the birds of the air, and the
things that creep upon the earth, and I will break bow and sword
arid weapon of war and sweep them off the earth, so that all living
creatures may lie down without fear", Fiosea 2:18; NEB; my italics.
Freedom from fear, that is, of violence between species which is a
serious aspect of covenant relationships almost entirely overlooke
by commentators (see also esp. Joel 2:21 - 23 and Ezek. 34:24).
44. CD, III, 1, p. 178.
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all species and kinds of life that God wishes to maintain and for which
food is provided (Gen. 6:21). Secondly, and more importantly, it is ani-
mal kind which constitutes the offering to God after the Flood and which
in consequence issues in God's declaration of everlasting resolution (Gen.
8:20f.). In the light of our previous discussion of sacrifice, we can
see that it is precisely at this point that animals are more than attenders
of the covenant relationship. It is actually the offering of animal life
which constitutes regeneration and atonement. Barth understands
this offering of animals as a prefiguring of "the indispensable but saving
offering of the Son of Man as the proper content of the permission and
promise given to him". But he fails to draw from this the obvious corol-
lary that animals then are actual, as well as prefigurative, signs of
God's saving purposes. He speaks rightly of the "lowest humiliation" of
animals in this regard45 but fails to grasp that as with the Son of Man,
so with animals, humiliation is turned into freedom and victory. The sig-
nificance of animals could be said to be that within the covenant relation;
they prefigure and actualise to man God's saving intent. The same point
needs to be remembered in the context of the "new regulation" as Barth
calls it, that sanctions the taking of animal life for food. He inter-
prets this new freedom on man's part as an indication of how animals may
be seen as serving his covenant relationship with God. 46 But in fact their
offering (which is the greater) can be seen as signifying how fundamental
and indispenle they are to the continuation of the covenant relation-
ship with both man and animals. Moreover, the new regulation is not with-
out limits. While God allows the taking of clean (that is non-carnivorous)
kinds of animals for food and sacrifice, this freedom involves two respon-
sibilities. The first, that no blood should be taken, that is the life
(nephesh) of the animal belongs to God and may not be appropriated for
45. CD, III, 1, p. 187.
46. CD, III, 1, see pp.409f.
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man's purposes (Gen. 9:4). Secondly, man will be held to account for the
life of animals taken except in obedience to God's command (Gen. 9:5).
Such a picture, far from suggesting that animals are incidental to the
covenant relationship, presupposes that the relationship enfolds and in-
cludes a symbiotic relationship with them. It is a mistake to understand
man's prerogatives over animals as signs of their inferiority. It is pre-
cisely because God wills animals to be the instruments of his saving pur-
pose (which incidentally involves their death) that makes them significant-
ly important within the covenant relationship. Barth's Christological
emphasis rightly relates the sacrifice of animals to the supreme sacri-
fice of the Son of Man. But this actually involves placing the sacrifice
of animals on a higher and more significant level than he appreciates.
The humility of animals and their openness to God's will, understood
theologically in terms of the humility and sacrifice of Christ, point un-
mistakably to their decisive and affective contribution within the covenant
relationship. In Part Two, Barth writes of the work of Christ:
Be finds it worth His while to live and work for His
fellows and their salvation. He does not hold aloof
from them. ... He gives Himself freely to them. He
has only one goal: to maintain the cause of these men
in death and the conquest of death; to offer up His life
for them that they may live and be happy.47
Such a Christological framework once grasped means that we must see the
sacrifice of the lowest as having the highest significance.48
To the second (ii) position that animals have no place in the Heilsgeschichte
47. CD, III, 2, p. 215.
48. Cf. J.L. Houlden: "New Testament writers enjoin the following of
certain lines of conduct or the acquiring of certain qualities, not
on the grounds of their intrinsic worth or rightness, but on the
grounds that they are characteristics of God or of Jesus and are
therefore to be imitated as part of a life of discipleship". Among
these pre-eminently are generosity (II Cor. 8:9) and humility
(Philip. 2. 3 - 11) , Ethics and the New Testament (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1973) p. 13.
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we can see in context that Barth is concerned to stress the special nature
of the reception of the Spirit by man. Man has a special status, he argues,
not in the form in which it appears in the biblical material, but in the
fact that the "continuation of the story is the history of the covenant
between God and man".
Of course Barth can and does argue that man's spiritual status can be
shown in how and to what degree he is capable of living the covenant rela-
tionship in its fullness. e could also point to the ways in which man's
decisions for good or ill move the course of salvation history to new and
decisive peaks of divine love and judgement. He would surely be right in
at least claiming for man a major share of the covenant partnership. But
Barth is at his very weakest in claiming that animals do not figure in
any part of the history of salvation as recorded from Genesis 3ff. Indeed
from what we have already described, he needs to postulate in animals such
a gift of the Spirit that enables them to prefigure and actualise God's re-
deeming purposes. This is not to deny that Barth may be right in suggest-
ing some special gift of the Spirit in man but what is questionable, how-
ever, is the use of the biblical material to suggest why this may be.
Barth concludes his discussion by arguing that:
In relation to animals, they would both be inexplicable
(that is, that there is an affinity between the Spirit
and man, and that it can be so realised as he claims)
because a retrospective consideration of animals, looking
from salvation history back to their nature, is impossible
for us. 49	-
But why from the standpoint of the Heilsgeschichte is it so impossible? It
cannot fail to be noticed that Barth is claiming support for a presump-
tion of difference at the very point where the biblical material is argua-
bly ambivalent, if not in opposition. What is it that constitutes the
49. CD, III, 2, n.	 p. 396; my italics.
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nature of an animal that precludes it becoming a "covenant partner"
(Bundesgenosse)? If we look again at those elements of the first creation
saga which animals share with humans, namely
(i) creation as grace;
(ii) divine blessing;
(iii) independent life and movement;
(iv) common habitation and food, and
(v) co-existence with the Creator;
it is difficult to see a basis upon which Barth could claim such a dis-
tinction. Again if we look at those elements of the first creation saga
which differentiate animals from man, namely:
(a) sexual differentiation
(b) man's lordship or dominion
(C)	 the Sabbath invitation, and
(d)	 the divine likeness
we need to inquire in which of these faculties or relationships such a spe-
cial gift of the Spirit could be said to cohere. But from our previous
exploration, Barth's major area of located difference lies not in the
giving of dominion (only a consequence of being made in God's image), or
in the granting of the divine image, but in sexual differentiation, thus:
The only real differentiation and relationship is
that of man to man, and in its original and most
concrete form of man to woman and woman to man.5°
We need here to interpret Barth with care. It will be seen that sexual
differentiation for all its apparent straightforwardness has special sig-
nificance in prefiguring the inner unity of God himself. It is conceiva-
ble that man's being made in the image of God so draws him to a unity
with the Second Person of the Godhead that a special gift of the Spirit
50. CD, III, 1, p. 186; my italics.
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must be supposed. It is also conceivable that some special gift of the
Spirit may be said to accompany the special responsibility given by God
to man in his exercise of God-like power over creation. But whatever the
possible or real justifications for human difference, Barth does not in-
voke them. But, and this is the central point, even if such a justifica-
tion for man's affinitywith the Spirit were advanced, it is very diff i-
cult to see on what basis we could claim no spiritual capacity for animals
to participate to a greater or lesser degree in the history of the covenant
of salvation. Barth may have good reasons for positing the special rela-
tionship between man and the Spirit but in this area at least he fails to
supply the necessary biblical support required to defend it. 51 Moreover,
it is, from the standpoint of the sagas, unevidenced to suggest there is
something in the nature of animals so described that precludes their parti-
cipation in covenant history. The choice of covenant relations is a ques-
tion which is settled by God's choice and decree and about which, as Barth
often says, man may entertain pious or not so pious thoughts, but which
are incidental to the reality of divine election. The clearest and most
satisfactory rendering of Genesis 9 is that God has elected an eternal
covenanted fellowship with man, his descendants and "with every living
thing that is with you" (v. 10).
The Symbiotic Dimension of the Covenant
But is it significant that animals form part of the covenant relationship
and therefore participate in the Heilsgeschichte? Could Barth after all be
right that in practice the inclusion of animals within the covenant rela-
tionship is interesting but largely inconsequential? How and why does it
matter that man is convicted by God of his covenant relationship together
with and inseparable from other living beings? Or, as Whitehouse poig-
nantly questions: "If, aided by Barth, we penetrate to the secret of why
things are, and find that secret in the fact of Christ and His Church,
51. See, however, the :discussion pp. 251 - 256.
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dare we suppose that the whole existence and worth of flowers, beasts,
sunsets, and storms, has been exhausted by such understanding?" Or again:
"Is there not something to learn about life from created things, seen as
52for the most part we are bound to see them, out of relation to the Gospel?"
The first point of significance for us in this saga concerns the setting
and place of man in creation (Gen. 2:4 - 7); " ... this saga is not as
anthropocentric as it is often made out to be." Why is this? Because man
is described as the one who tills the earth, indeed divinely appointed so
to do. Man is "the being who had to be created for the sake of the earth
and to serve it".
	
In discussion Barth makes three further points:
(i) Here, too, creation is really the creation of the heavens
and earth (with an emphasis on the terrestrial sphere), and
not just that of man; indeed it is the creation of the man
who must work and serve under the heavens and on earth, i.e.,
in relation to his fellow creatures ... For in this account
it (vegetable life) is a kind of end in itself (hier hat sie
zunchst so etwas wie einen Selbstzweck) . 53
Vegetation exists prior to the creation of man and appears to have its own
Selbstzweck. 54 Thus the life of other beings may have significance in
themselves as made by God, that is, even without the existence of man.
Perhaps we may say that their significance is to be as God would have them
be.
ii) But to make that which has been planted thrive, God needs
the farmer or gardener. This will be the role of man. He
thus appears as the being which must be able and ready to
serve in order to give meaning and purpose to the planting
of the earth.
The purpose of man is not seen as it were outside his relations with the
52. Whitehouse, op. cit., p. 15. But are created things "out of relation to -
the Gospel"? See pp. 163 - 177 for my discussion of Christology.
53. CD, III, 1, p. 235; my italics.
54. "Self-purpose" is an alternative rendering of Selbstzweck (p. 235)
Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, III, I, p. 266. Thus the sentence could
also read "it (the vegetable kingdom) has a purpose of its own".
- 79 -
natural world but towards and through them. The first purpose of man is
that of serving the earth. The significance of this will only become
apparent in the light of how Barth subsequently expounds the theological
goal of this saga. It is important to remember that man stands in rela-
tion to the earth in the same way that God stands in relation to man.
This point, from a different perspective, is also made in the first saga.
The notion of dominion, which Barth rightly describes as lordship, means
that man shares in the creative responsibility of God: he gives "meaning
and purpose" to creation because he is, in this sense, inseparable from it
(iii) In view of this complete integration into the totality
of the created world, there can be no question of a
superiority of man supported by appeals to his special
dignity, or of forgetfulness not merely of a general but
of the very definite control of Yahweh Elohim over man.
In spite of all the particular things that God may plan
and do with him, in the first instance man can only serve
the earth (der Erde dienen) and will continually have to
do so.55
Once again a convincing creation centred view of man. This seems to imply
a covenant relationship in the sense that man is called by God to perform
work within creation and to be integral to it. A more striking illustra-
tion of man's closeness and interdependence with the non-human would be
difficult to find. There is to exist on both sides a radical interde-
pendence meaning that both may serve (dienen) and support the life of the
other. Plants in their giving of food, and man in his tilling of the soil
constitute a symbiotic relationship. Man stands in this relationship as
the definitive partner - not in the sense of holding within himself the
totality of theological purpose, but in the sense of having power and re-
sponsibility, that is, responsibility because he has the God-like exercise
of power. John Austin Baker speaks of this interdependence as a sign of
creation's openness to God's purposes: "The world is not a closed system",
he writes, whilst "man is utterly dependent on the world", it is equally
55. CD, III, 1, p. 235; my italics.
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true that "nature also needs man". "It is dependent upon him to realise
the potential of good present in the natural order; and this means that
men have been given their power to dominate the world not simply, or even
primarily, that they may enjoy it, but as a responsibility to care for it,
and to enable it to fulfil its proper destiny".56
The Christological Basis of Man's Stewardst4p
We now turn to Barth's treatment of man. He is made "of the dust of the
earth". A fact that points to his "humility" within creation. 57 "That
God made him and that he made him of the earth are both things which he
has in common with the beast", he writes. 58 But Barth does treat further
this remarkable occurrence. He does not see in it "a concord of the whole
creation with itself" or how "by a provision of the supreme Mind there is
an intermixture of the intellectual with the sensible world, in order",
writes Gregory of Nyssa, "that nothing in creation may be thrown aside as
worthless ... or left without its portion of the Divine fellowship". In
this way St. Gregory sees the forming of man from the dust of the ground
as a divine "inspiration" enabling all things earthly to be "raised up to
the Divine, and so one certain grace of equal value might pervade the
whole creation". 59 What then is the difference between man and animals?
Formally only in the fact that he is made a human body. But, crucially,
56. Baker, 'Man: His Nature, Predicament and Hope', in Man: Fallen and
Free, ed. by E.W. Kemp (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969) p. 98.
57. Cf. Thorl f Boman: "there can be no doubt about the fact that man's
littleness is (t)hereby designated", Hebrew Thought Compared With
Greek, ET by J.L. Moreau, The Library of History and Doctrine
(London: SCM Press, 1960) p. 91.
58. CD, III, 1, p. 236.
59. Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catechism, ed. and ET by H. Wace and P.
Schaff, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
Christian Church (Oxford: Parker & Co.., and New York: The Christian
Literature Co., 1893) 2nd series,vol. IV, Ch. VI, p. 480, Cf.
"For even if the understanding looks upon any other existing things,
reason observes in absolutely none of them the self-sufficiency by
which they could exist without participating in true Being", The
Life of Moses, ET, intro, and notes by A.J. Maiherbe and E. Ferguson,
pref. by J. Meyenidorff, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New
York: Paulist Press, 1978) para. 25, p. 60.
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man "becomes a living soul as God breathes the breath of life into his
nostrils". Barth sees considerable significance in this fact. "It is
to man, and to man alone, that God gives breath in this manner.... And
this, and this alone, is the distinguishing feature of man". 6° Because
of this, man is constituted as the source of hope for all creation and
as the one who can triumph over its aridity, barrenness and deadness.
Man is therefore responsible to "both God and the creature" and "in this
function he fulfills the meaning of his own existence". 61 Barth's exposi-
tion at this point could not give a clearer and a more definitive state-
ment of man's mutuality with and responsibility towards animals. Man's crea-
62tion is thus a sign" of the future destiny of creation itself. 	 It is
not surprising therefore that Barth takes this picture of man and links
it first to Old Testament anthropology and secondly to the work of Jesus
Christ. The man really spoken of in this first creation saga is none
other than Jesus Christ. We are therefore "at the threshold of the history
of the covenant and salvation".
What is the significance of this for the non-human creature? It could
not be more telling. For if the analogy is to be pressed, the work of man,
and supremely that of Jesus Christ, is the service of all creation. Barth
does not articulate this possibility precisely, but it is the clear impli-
cation of the argument. For Jesus is what he is "for all Israel, all huma-
nity, and even the whole world". 63
 In the light of this powerful analysis
we cannot but ask if the subsequent exposition of the saga will hold and
develop this crucial reference. Will Barth now advance a creation centred
understanding of man? Shall we reach a point at which we can surely mdi-
cate the value and meaning of the non-human? Shall we be able to point
60. CD, III, 1, p. 236; my italics.
61. CD, III, 1, p. 237.
62. £.' III, 1, p. 238.
63. £.2.' III 1, p. 239; my italics.
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decisively to one or more statements which summarise the purpose and end
of the prefiguring creation which surrounds man and which he is purposed
to serve? Yet Barth speaks of this saga as having not only a specific
"climax and conclusion" but also only "one theme", namely the creation of
man and woman. The creation of animals is only of "incidental signifi-
64
cance".	 Solitary man, that is single man, is incomplete. God willed
to complete his creation in the making of man male and female. Why should
this be so? Barth's answer is emphatic: "To be God's partner in this
covenant, man himself needed a partner". Again,	 should this be?
Barth's answer is less than straightforward. According to him man needs
to be both like God and unlike him within his very being. "To be created
good" he argues,
man needs a being like him and yet different from him so
that in it he will recognise himself but not only himself,
since it is to him a Thou as truly as he is an I, and he
is to it a Thou as truly as it is an 1.65
How are we to assess the adequacy of Barth's theological approach here?
It is the perceived relationship between sexual differentiation and cove-
nant partnership that is the underlying theological concern in Barth's
exegesis. "God's whole intercourse with man", writes Barth, "will now be
strictly related to man conjoined as male and female". 66 Much here is
perceptive and illuminating. We may judge that he is on strong ground in
perceiving relationships in their prefiguring capacity of love as illus-
trative of God's dealings with man. The traditional understanding to
which he alludes in Ephesians 5:25 of a subordinate relationship between
man and wife as exists between Christ and his Church cannot be overlooked.
The love of God for man as with the love of man for woman is a matter of
64. CD, III, 1, p. 288.
65. CD, III, 1, p. 290.
66. CD, III, 1, p. 308.
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order and design. But that point established there is still the separate
question of whaty be validly deduced from such an analogy and prototype.
Whilst it is evident that the question of relationships dominates the nar-
rative, the anthropocentric reference is not its sole concern. Man is
also set in two other distinct and fundamental relationships. The first
in relation to the earth as a whole. He is to till the soil and serve the
creative purpose of God within creation (Gen. 2:5b). More specifically
within the garden in Eden man has, within limits, a commission to live to-
gether with the glory of what God has created. The second in relation to
animals as represented by their being brought to him and his naming of
them (Gen. 2:19). Barth pays little attention to this. While the "trans-
action is not a divine experiment which failed" it is only a preparation
and necessary expedient for the later section concerning the creation of
woman. 67 But the significance of this passage is much greater than Barth
will allow on two fronts. Firstly, God wills animals as a helpmeet (or
partner, as Barth prefers) for man. They are not designed as a subsidiary
or secondary thought to the special creation of man. -Whatever else we
must say about the subsequent development of this passage, it must be
clear that God willed animals to be man's partner within creation. When
Barth speaks of animals as "only a dark background to the true work to-
wards which the narrative hastens" he supposes that animals are simply in-
strumental to man. 68 But what are we to draw from the corresponding fact
that man did not choose animals? Much here depends upon our theological
understanding of naming C'_isha). It conveys at the very least a sense of
belonging, that is, a deep and natural affinity between two beings. Of
course there is in this relationship an order and a priority. Hence
Barth writes of the naming of woman:
67. , III, 1, p. 293.
68. £2' lii i 1, p. 291.
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the relationship is not one of reciprocity and equality
The supremacy of man is not a question of value, dignity
or honour, but of order.69
Therefore it is the same task that is required of man with woman that is
also required of man with animals. In both relationships the naming im-
plies both order and fellowship. In eager anticipation of the perceived
climax to this narrative the point is overlooked that animals while not
the intimate partner of man still belong to him (in this sense) and have
a fundamental affinity with him.
The parallel of all this to the first saga will be noticed. Man and ani-
mals are created on the same day. While man shares the image of God he
also shares with animals special blessing and the command to live and re-
produce himself. Man stands over animals as one who possesses dominion
or Herrschaft, that is, he participates in the God-like exercise of power
with all its attendant responsibilities. It is only when we perceive that
lordship, which carries with it a pre-eminence, also involves service and
responsibility that we see how close we are to the picture of man as the
•	 .	 70tiller of the soil at the beginning of the second saga.
But parallels aside, it is only by selection that Barth can claim for the
second saga that it issues in a special covenant relationship between God
and man alone. Of these three relationships, to the earth, to animals,
and to woman, clearly the latter relationship has special significance and
import. In this other being of the same flesh man does indeed find his
perfect partner. Here we may say is the innermost circle of grace. But
69. CD, III, 1, p. 301; my italics.	 -
70. John Black writes: "Nowhere in the Jahwist narrative of the creation
is man given dominion over the animals" and suggests that the two
sagas are evidence of "two opposing views of the relationship betwen
man and animals", The Dominion of Man: The Search for Ecological Re-
sponsibility (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970) p. 41.
But this can only be the case if 'dominion' and 'care' are opposing
concepts. The evidence is against this as I have tried to indicate.
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to accept this point and to allow it to have theological weight does not
involve denying the other two fundamental relationships on which this other
stands. Can it not be asked whether the structure and nature of man's re-
lationship to woman is possible except on any other basis that man finds
within creation parallel and paradigmatic relationships to his own? Indeed
Wolff, beginning his theology of the Old Testament precisely from Barth's
starting point here, maintains that the love between men and women and
that "they live together in this way and not in warfare is an essential
presupposition for the success of the stewardship of the world entrusted
to them" •71 And is it not true that man' s relationship to animals in
particular has such a nature of bondage and intimacy (save that of the actual -
intimate human partnership itself) that no full account of man can be offered
that does not see him within these two greater and less determinations?
Maft as a Christological Paradigm
If this is so, the further question must be asked: why is it that Barth
fails to relate these relationships to his own Christological method and
understanding? Why is it only in relation to woman that the covenant re-
lationship of man to God can be expressed? Simply put the answer appears
to be that only in man's relationship to woman can man adequately pre-
figure the relationship between man and God. But accepting that such a
relation can indeed signify and token God's relationship, even pre-
eminently, it does not follow that other relationships may not also, per-
haps to a lesser degree, prefigure that same relationship.
Once again it is not that there exists a significantly prefigurative ele-
ment within the man-woman relationship that is questionable, but what
Barth assumes and deduces from it. It is not in what Barth affirms but
71. Wolff, op. cit., p. 162; my italics. For details of his methodology
see his introduction, esp. pp. 2 - 4.
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in what he negatively implies that makes his exposition so problematic.
Does Barth in failing to give an adequate account of man's other partner-
ships in creation fail at the same time to see their potential Christolo-
gical significance? It is worth recalling at this point that his under-
standing of creation is vastly influenced and determined by his understand-
ing of the Word of God itself. For it is in Jesus that we have the sure
ontological basis of Creation, and it is in Jesus that we have the decisive
notional relationship. But if this is so, how can it be that any relation-
ship within creation is incidental or insignificant? Barth has shown
earlier that he thinks there is and should be a connection:
The inner basis of the covenant is ... (that) which God
has decreed in Himself as the covenant of the Father with
His Son as the Lord and Bearer of human nature, and to
that extent the Representative of all Creation.72
That granted, it must follow that there can be no peculiarity, disposi-
tion, faculty or being within the created world which is irrelevant or
incidental to the divine purpose of creation. The one overwhelmingly
problematic aspect of Barth's treatment of this saga is that in separating
and distinguishing man in partnership with himself from partnership with
the rest of creation, he appears as a result to sever the link between
the revealing Word and the creation in which the Word is revealed. St.
Gregory warns us in this respect not to "take too narrow a view of things"
when it comes to God's relationship with the world. "For when he consi-
ders the universe, can anyone be so simple-minded as not to believe that
the Divine is present in everything, pervading, embracing and penetrating
it? For all things depend on Him who is, and nothing can exist which
does not have its being in Him who is".73
72. CD, III, 1, p. 97.my italics.
73. Gregory of Nyssa, 'Address on Religious Instruction' in Christology of
the Later Fathers, eds. E.R. Hardy and C.C. Richardson, The Library of
Christian Classics (London: SCM Press, 1964) vol. III, p. 302. Cf.
"Therefore the Command of God, His Logos, shining like a lamp in a closed
room, illuminated the region under the heaven, making light separately
from the world", Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, text and ET by
Robert M. Grant (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970) p. 49.
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One example may illustrate this further. Barth takes up the passage in
Ephesians concerning the relationship between Christ and his Church. Thi
passage is important in his development of the relationship between mn
and woman as a prototype of the relationship between Christ and his Church.
But he does not refer to the opening verses in Ephesians which place
Christ's redeeming work within the context of all that is. That God "might
gather together into one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven
and which are on earth ... " (1:10). What is striking here is the inclu-
sive character of God's work in Christ. A work that extends through the
Body to include all powers, principalities and possibilities of existence
(1:21f.). Is there not here a Christological dimension and setting for
the second creation saga? 74 Is it not possible to see man's relationship
with creation as paradigm of Christ's relationship with all that is
to become one in him? Is there not here both an analogy of order and aff i-
nity as with the relationship between man and woman? If the work of Christ
is to bring together into unity the creation which testifies to him, should
not the work of man be properly seen as inseparable from this unity of crea-
tion? This is not to deny the distinctive place of man within creation
and that he singularly represents the place of incarnation. But in the
light of this Christological model we have to ask whether the distinctive
nature of man is not to prefigure in his relations with the natural world
the unity that exists between Christ and his creation. It could be that
in and through his relations in turn with the earth, its living beings
and then finally within his own duality of male and female, that man re-
presents as a microcosm as well as a prototype God's holistic redeeming
74. "The accord between the work of salvation and the eternal purpose of
God is made especially clear in Eph. i. 3 - 14. To the actual 'bles-
sing' in Christ, i. 3, corresponds the election in him before the
foundation of the world, i. 4", N.A. Dahl, 'Christ, Creation and the
Church', in The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology,
ed. by W.D. Davies and D. Daube (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1956) p. 432; see also Heinrich Schlier's Principalities and Powers
in the New Testament, Quaestiones Disputatae 3 (Freiburg: Herder and
Edinburgh/London: Nelson, 1961) esp. pp. 40 - 52.
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purposes. This possibility frees us from the "m.isconcept.tàn",
against which Eric Mascal]. complains, "that Jesus Christ is of immense
significance to human beings, but of no importance whatever to the rest of
the universe".75
In principle Barth appears to recognise this when he writes that "by its
whole nature the creature is destined anddisposed for this covenant".76
But what is omitted is that the very structure of creation, both external-
ly as creation and internally as election, and especially the living
beings within it, are so bound up with man that they too share,
with him God's electibn and promise. Again in principle Barth sees the
force of this when he writes of animals that in their relationship to man
"they are what they are". 77
 This does not mean as with the naming of
woman that animals are simply man's property or exist only to serve his
purposes. It is rather that their theological meaning and purpose are
fundamentally related as can be grasped by the fact of common blessing and
curse, or that they share together the judgement and mercy of God. But
the question that must inevitably be raised is how far animals can on this
understanding share the fundamentals of life with man without existing in
75.. Mascall, The Christian Universe (London: Darton, Longman & Todd,
1966) p. 91f. Mascall sees the universe as participating in the
purposes of God through a process of "Christification" and thus
moving towards a hope that "both the human race and the material
universe, of which the human race is part, may be taken up into the
very life of God himself and be transformed into a condition of un-
imaginable glory" 
(p. 
109). Cf. here the notion of theosis, divi-
nised life, in Gregory of Nazianzus, The Dynamics of Salvation: A
Study in Gregory of Nazianzus by Donald F. Winslow, Patristic Mono-
graph Series, No.. 7 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Philadelphia
Patristic Foundation, 1979) pp. 92f. For a modern restatement see
Brian Borne's A World to Gain: Incarnation and the Hope of Renewal
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984) esp. pp. 3 - 23. For dis-
cussion of Mascall's views see Whitehouse, 'New Heavens and a New
Earth' in op. cit., pp. 205 - 206.
76. CD, III, 1, p. 97.
77. CD, III, 1, p. 292.
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the covenant partnership with him. This is not to lose sight of the dif-
ference between them. But it is to question the total exclusivity of some
of Barth's exposition, and this we should do if we are to hold that the
disclosure of the revealed Word is the key to the theological understand-
ing of creation itself. "A dogmatic theology that takes its inquiry
seriously", writes Thomas Torrance, "cannot stop short of inquiring into
the relevance of the concrete act of God in Jesus Christ for our redemp-
tion, but must go on to inquire into its relevance for all creation. It
cannot stop short of the significance of Jesus Christ for the life of the
Church but must go on to inquire into his universal and cosmic significance... ,7E
Summary and Review: The Interaction between the Human and the Non-Human
To review this section as a whole, I shall very briefly suxnmarise the
ground covered in response to our two main questions:
(A) How does non-human creation stand in relation to the human?
and
(B) What end and purpose does non-human creation have?
(A)
We need to consider those common elements which the human and the non-
human share in the second creation saga:
(i) the free gift of life;
(ii) common habitation;
(iii) relationship of affinity with man, and
(iv) the beneficence of God.
78. T.R. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910 -
1931, The Preacher's Library (London: SCM Press, 1962) p. 209; his italics-
Barth appears to have grasped this at least in his Gif ford Lectures
in 1937: "What do we know from any other source about 'God', the 'world'
and 'Man', and their mutual relations? ... By God's taking thought for
man in Jesus Christ, now as in the past, He has provided us with know-
ledge about the creating, j-sustaining and governing of the world and
man and about His glory and ours", The Knowledge of God and the Service
of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation, ET by J.L.M. Haire
and Ian Henderson (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1949) pp. 43/4; my ita-
lics.
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(i) That life is grace, that is, free and generous gift, is one of Barth's
underlying assumptions. While it is true that man is seen as sharing this
gift in a special and particular way (see (b) later) life as given by the
breathing of God's Spirit is the basis of all living beings. Although
Barth everywhere assumes the common gift of life (albeit differentiated in
the case of man) he nowhere explores precisely the profound and necessary
bond that this implies for man and creation, and of creation, animals in
particular. It must follow that the . life of both is ontologically guaran-
teed. Not by any quality, disposition or faculty in either being but by
virtue of their relationship to God who wills them to be. This point
9	 vastly assumed by Barth is of considerable significance. For whatever dis-
tinction, difference or degree of both that separates man and animals they
will always possess together the guarantee of their existence in their re-
lationship to God.
(ii) As with the first saga, non-human beings have a domain and a terri-
tory which they share with man. This territory is the whole earth. What
order and priority, if any, can be established from Genesis 2 is obscure.
Vegetable life already exists and abounds before the existence of man who
has the job of facilitating its fertility and thereby assuring its conti-
nuance. Man's place in the garden of Eden whilst especially suited for
him in no way precludes the existence of other living beings, including
trees and vegetation. Perhaps the most satisfactory interpretation is
that which sees in its own order the mutuality of the human and the non-
human within the garden and the whole earth. There is no hint at this
stage of territorial disputes, of one claim of one kind of being over
another kind of being. What is striking in the picture thus given is the
interdependence, the symbiosis of all living things as given together by
God.
(iii) And what underpins this arrangement and which can be said to be the
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necessary prerequisite of such harmony? It is the relationship of man
to creation understood in two distinct ways which serves the vitality and
interdependence of the earth. Firstly, man is set within a relationship
of service (not servility of course) to the earth as a whole. He will
tend the soil and make life habitable for a].1. This point is expressed
forcefully by Barth when he writes: "Seen even from this perspective he
(man) has no independent position in the totality of creation". Moreover,
•	 1
'His (man s) nature is that of the earth on which he lives and moves'.
Secondly, man names the animals. By this we understand a fundamental affi-
nity and bond between them. Not, to be sure, a complete and intimate
partnership, but a deeply held bond that is analogous to their special
creation in the first creation saga on the sixth day. Barth makes great
play of the fact that woman is presented to man and has to be recognised
by him (2:23). But it is worth noting that animals too are recognised by
man. Not as intimate partners but as partners none the less for their
being, even more so than with the earth itself, is inseparable from man's
own life and destiny. Once again Barth perceives this fundamental link-
age but fails to develop the point precisely.
(iv) Finally, and pre-eminently, the non-human share with the human the
profound beneficence of God. This is everywhere to be grasped from the
second creation saga. That they exist complementarily; that this mutuali-
ty is good; that within the garden life flourishes and gives glory to God,
are all signs of God's favour towards them. Even more fundamentally God
wills to unite himself with this creation. Not merely to stand alongside
it, but to enter within it, and to make his purpose manifest within the
dust of the earth and the flesh and blood that comprise not only man but
all breathing beings. Doubtless we see in this the special election of
man as the appointed place for incarnation. But again it is arguable
79. CD, ill, 1, pp. 235 235/6.
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whether this divine will could be operative at all within a creation that
is incidental or irrelevant to this purpose. Since every part, particle
and element within the created world is made with the knowledge and with
the foresight that God so wills to enter into a unity with creation, every-
thing made must be seen as belonging to the divine economy and therefore
important to him. "It is our contention that precisely here", writes
Daniel Deegan, "Barth's primary thought-form passes from that of realism
to idealism". Realism is defined as the affirmation of the "independent
reality of God and the substantiality of the creature" whereas the "ele-
ment of idealism" shown in Barth "links all cosmological and anthropologi-
cal reality directly to Jesus Christ as the prius, both ontologically
and noetically, for all other beirLg". 8° In this way, contrary to Barth's
intention, the full reality and value of finite, existing creatures tends
to be minimised.
Having identified those common elements we need to isolate those areas
of difference:
(a) sexual differentiation;
(b) the breathing of life into man, and
(c) the covenant partnership.
I shall discuss the first two together and the third separately.
(a) and (b) As we discovered in Barth's discussion of the first saga,
it is not the making of man in God's image that is the crucialdifferen-
tiating factor, but the making of man male and female so that in that
capacity they may reflect and become a prototype of God's co/6enant rela-
tionship. In relation to the second saga it has a more definite
80. Deegan, 'The Christological Determinant in Barth's Doctrine of Crea-
tion', Scottish Journal of Theology, 14, 2 (1961) p. 126. For a
developed critique of Barth's 'docetic' tendency see Wil ied Hrle,
Sein tlnd Grade: Die Ontologie in Karl Barth's Kirchlich r ogmatik
(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1975) esp. pp. 270-313.
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Christological basis in its perceived relation to Yahweh and his people
and then in turn to Christ and his Church. Barth thus stands in a long
tradition of understanding human sexuality as a prefiguring of God's love
for creation. But what is striking in his exposition is the claim that
this sexual relationship constitutes in itself the one basic differential
between man and animals. Of course this insight does not stand alone and
is in turn crucially related to the notion of covenant partnership. But
the one we are almost obliged to say follows from the other.
Allied to the question of sexual relations is the perceived distinction
between man and animals which relate to the nature of their creation.
Barth is emphatic on this point: "It is to man, and to man alone, that
God gives breath in this manner". One might assume from this that Barth
sees the breathing of the Spirit as the unique ontological foundation of
man. But closer inspection does not support this view. He writes "the
only difference between him and the beast is that he is dust formed into
a human body", and again:
Primarily, then, the distinctive election of man is merely
that he is formed from this dust as opposed to all other
dust and given this form which is distinct from all other
beasts .81
It is not the mariner of man's creation that is seen to distinguish him but
that he is made a human being. That this is how Barth understands the
matter is confirmed later when he writes "the material difference emerges
only in the fact that the continuation of the story is the history of the
covenant ... of man and God. 82 But Barth perhaps unwittingly is involved
at this point in a circular argument. In seeking to establish what is
the difference between man and animals in the covenant partnership he
emphasises the special breath of Spirit within man and when seeking to
81. CD, III, 1, p. 236; my italics.
82. CD, III, 2, n. p. 396; my italics.
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establish the specialness of man's breath within him he refers to the
special covenant relationship. Does it matter that the precise grounds
for man's election appear, after inspection, to be rather obscure? Cannot
it simply be read that man does exist in this relationship and then pass
on? The problem is, however, that Barth returns as we shall see time and
time again to the fundamental distinctions we are exploring. They have
material significance, in other words, for his subsequent exposition of man
(see crucially, e.g. p.254). Because of this we are led once again to sepa-
rate the question of fact from the question of significance. It is not
(formally) the fact of sexual differentiation or the fact of being given
the breath of the Spirit that distinguishes.man from animals, but the
significance he attributes to these facts. Perhaps some kind of clue to
his thinking is given when he refers to the "only difference between him
(man) and the beast is that he is dust formed into a human body". 83 Per-
haps here Barth ends up indicating what in fact he would otherwise not
wish to do, namely, that it is simply self-evident that human form or kind
is different from animal form or kind.
(c) Leaving aside these presently unresolved questions, it is clear that
the central thrust of Barth's understanding of the internal basis of crea-
tion is God's election of man and his covenant relationship with him. All
other questions of difference may still issue fundamentally into this one
theme. In summary, what is problematic about Barth's account is his appa-
rent denial that animals too form part of the covenant relationship (in
opposition to the biblical material), a view which elsewhere tumbles over
into total anthropocentricity since the election of God has "as its sole
content the fact that God elects man in order that man may be awakened and
83. CD, III, 1, p. 236.
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summoned to elect God". 84 Secondly, there is his ambivalence or agnosticism
about the significance of the other prefigurative and actual relations in
which man is placed. For if, at heart, man is bound up inseparably with
animal creation, it is difficult to see how they can be absolutely diffe-
rentiated at this crucial point. Perhaps, however, we have missed a vital
distinction in Barth's exposition. Since he does acknowledge in one in-
stance that animals exist within the covenant relationship he is proposing
unknown to us a distinction between existing within the covenant relation-
ship and being an actual covenant partner. This would at least make sense
of his claim that animals are not independent (selbstandge) partners
within the covenant relationship. It may be claimed, for example, that
because animals cannot make free decisions the very possibility of their
full inclusion within the covenant is eclipsed. This might be so if it
was not for Barth's insistence that freedom, in the absolute or perhaps
even relative sense, is not the deciding factor in determining covenant re-
lations. Indeed as we have seen man's freedom even when faced with the
possibility of it in the Garden in Eden is slight indeed. He cannot,
through disobedience, wrench himself from God's covenant relationship.
God is not unfaithful to the covenant. Divine sovereignty is what is
established by this relationship and not even the most calamitous of human
choices can reverse this priority. It cannot therefore be argued, on
Barth's own assumptions, that free choice is a hallmark of being able to
enter into the covenant relationship. When he speaks of animals as not
being independent partners he overlooks his own earlier insistence that
it is God's election, not the elected's own choice, determination, qua-li-
ty, adherence or disposition, that constitutes the covenant relationship.
84. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II, 2, The Doctrine of God, Part Two, ET
G.E. Bromiley, J.C. Campbell, lain Wilson, J. Strathearn McNab. H.
Knight and R.A. Stewart (1957) 'The Eternal Will of God in the Elec-
tion of Jesus Christ, p. 180; my italics. Again: "He (God) elected
man as covenant-partner. In His Son He elected Himself as the cove-
nant partner of man" (p. 166). Some might argue that in these in-
stances Barth is speaking Christocentrically of God's humanity in
Jesus, but, if it is a verbal slip, it is a consistent one throughout
the Dogmatics.
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Non-Human Creation without Covenant
(B) We need now to gether together material in relation to our second
question concerning the purpose and end of the non-human.
The denial of the covenant relationship with animals means that all kinds
of possibilities of articulating their theological purpose are robbed
from us. The result is that we have largely to deal with hints and guesses
as to what their purpose and end might amount to. Frequently Barth reaches
pregnant points of exposition but refrains from giving them precise and
concrete expression. It is worth gathering together some of these hints
and points to see what they amount to:
Ci) Creation is one long preparation, and therefore the being
and existence of the creature (Geschpf) one long
readiness, for what God will intend and do with it in the
history of the covenant.
And. Barth continues: "Its nature is simply its equipment for grace".85
Clearly this statement at the beginning is full of promise. But is the
promise realised? Are we shown how the nature of non-human creation is
equipped to participate in the grace of God?
(ii) "The main interest now" in the second saga is how creation "pre-
figures and to that extent anticipates the covenant relationship".86
Creation, Barth emphasises, is not the covenant. The two must not be
confused.. But how does the non-human creation prefigure and anticipate
the Covenant?
(iii) In its relationship to man the non-human creation acquires "mean-
ing and purpose". But which purpose or purposes precisely?
85. CD, III, 1, p. 231; my italics
86. CD, III, 1, p. 232.
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(iv) "For in this account (the second saga) it (creation) is a kind of
end in itself". 87 But what kind of "end" or "self-purpose" (Seibstzweck)
has it?
(v) In this function (serving the earth) man is responsible
to both God and the creature. And in this function he
fulfils the meaning of his own existence.88
How does man fulfil his meaning in the serving of creation if every part
of this creation is outside the elected covenant fellowship?
(vi) Man created and chosen is a "sign of the future He (God) has destined
89for all creation as such".	 But what is the future of creation? Is there
a "future" for animals? What future has non-human creation outside the
covenant relationship? The point is striking because previously Barth
writes of how the fact that "it is man God has chosen" is a sign of the
future for "all creation". 9° The problem is compounded further by the link-
ing of the choosing of man to the election of Jesus Christ. Since the first -
man really spoken of in this saga is none other than Jesus Christ, Barth
has to say that Jesus is the one given "for ... even the whole world".
He is the man who did not return empty handed, but with the
spoils of hope, to the earth from which he was taken but
for which He was also given.91
If Barth is serious in his exposition here, and his conclusion to the
effect that this is the decisive Christian interpretation of the saga
would suggest that he is, what we shall necessarily look for in his sub-
sequent exposition is some statement of how precisely the work of Jesus
is for "even the whole world".
87. CD, III, 1, p. 235.
88. CD, III, 1, p. 237.
89. CD, III, 1, p. 238.
90. CD, III, 1, pp. 236/7.
91. CD, III, 1, p. 239; my italics.
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(vii) It was not because man needed vegetation that God had
to plant it, but because God willed to plant the earth
that he created man.
Once again a potentially telling statement. It invites two questions:
(i) how and in what way must man then serve the creation of God? and
(ii) since by analogy and design the saga at this point speaks of Jesus
Christ, how and in what way must Jesus serve the creation of God? What
Barth may, however, deduce from this relationship of service is confused
by his previous sentence which begins:
That man cannot be lord of the earth but can only serve
it is decided already in the description of the terminus
a quo of creation in v. 5.92
This seems to imply that lordship and service are at odds with each other.
In fact as we saw from his handling of the first saga, it is precisely
because man is called to participate and represent the lordship of God
in creation that he has respernsibility for it and must act as one like a
steward who must render up some account. Does not the lordship of Christ
-	 find expression in his service? Indeed is not the lordship of Christ
signified, made concrete and altogether rightly epitomised by his sacri-
ficia]. giving which in turn represents the self-giving of God himself?
And if this is true of Christ, shall it not necessarily be true of man?
(viii) "It is in their (animals') relationship to him (man) that they
are what they are." 93 It is here more than anywhere else that we can per-
ceive Barth's tendency to assume the purpose and meaning of animals with-
in that of man. The naming of animals must mean that they are tied in
some sense to man. But Barth does not see that this makes the signifi-
cance of animals greater rather than lesser. It stands in odd relation-
ship to his insistence that animals are not man's covenant partner in
92. CD, III, 1, pp. 242; 242/3.
93. CD, III, 1, p. 292.
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creation. For if it is really true that the bond that unites animals and
man is so strong that rio other statement of theipurpose and end can be
described other than in relation to him then it must follow that everything
Barth wishes to claim for the special relationship of man to God must be
claimed at least in principle for the relationship between man and animals
as well. Of course that is precisely the conclusion Barth does not wish
to draw from the second saga. But we have to raise whether the logic of
his method does not point in a wholly different direction. Barth's sub-
sequent point that man does not recognise in animals his intimate partner
cannot alter the fact that there is a profound bond between them.
In the light of (vi) and (vii) it is clear that whatever reason there may
be for the reluctance on Barth's part to explore more fully the doctrine
of the non-human it does not stem from his Christological methodology.
Here at least he cannot claim to be constrained by his perceived centre
of theological understanding. He appears to abandon anthropocentricity
at the beginning of his exposition only to take it up again more force-
fully at the end. Thus he is able to write in his final foothote to this
section: "The aim of creation was the completion of one man in his exist-
ence as man and woman". 94 We cannot help wondering whether in this pro-
cess there has not been some reversal of insight and understanding. For
at the end we have again to ask what account has been given of the non-
human? What meaning, purpose and end has it? If it is incidental how
can Jesus give it a future? More fundamentally, why should it exist at
all? Why should the Word which brings all things to be in his co-creativity
with the Father, make beings which are substantially irrelevant and inci-
dental to the further works of reconciliation and redemption?
94. CD, III, 1, n. p. 328; my italics.
CHAPTER THREE: GOD ' S YES: THE REALITY AND GOODNESS OF CREATION
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SURVEYING THE GROUND: Ci) God's benevolence to man
The third (and final) major section of Part One is entitled 'The Yes (Ja)1
of God the Creator' and is divided into three further sections. The first
is called 'Creation as Benefit' (Schopfung als Wohitat).
Barth now begins the task of examining the "distinctive nature" of creation
"in itself and as such". One point emerges clearly. The divine work of
creation is a work of a specific character and design. Revelation enables
the perception of "this intrinsic character" which is solely due to the
fact of its Creator. 2
 What we see in this creation nothing less than
the goodness of God. Divine creation is therefore divine benefit. The
meaning of God's "yes" involved in the allowing of creatures distinct from
himself needs to be pondered. Creation is "election" (Erwahlung) ,"accep-
tance" arid "blessing". "We are not free to think or speak in this matter
otherwise or even uncertainly or equivocally" writes Barth. 3 God could
not have united himself with creation if he had rejected creation or re-
garded it as unworthy in some way. The divine "yes" is not a divine "no"t
Barth insists that the notion of creation as benefit must flow from the
concept of covenant. If we seek, or stand by, some insight, other than
the biblical witness that creation is good, our affirmation of the covenant
and its fulfilment in Christ is correspondingly weakened. If we do so, the
notions of creation, Creator and creature are "also robbed of their content"
for "what distinguishes them from neutral categories (such as operation,
cause and effect, or art, artist and work of art)" when the notion of cove-
nant is lost? 4 Once we slip from the full biblical witness we end up with
1. The German Ja is more emphatic than the English "yes". It implies
acceptance and commitment as well as assent, e.g. Ja is the only word
uttered by a bride and groom in a German wedding ceremony,
2. CD, III, 1, p. 331.
3. CD, III, 1, p. 331.
4. , III, 1, p. 334.
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the idea of a hostile nature or even that creation is evil. As witnesses
of this Barth gives the examples of Marcion and Schopenhauer (see pp. 113-117
for discussion).
The distinctiveness of Christian doctrine here consists simply in the dis-
tinctiveness of its source, namely revelation. While other "world-views"
(Weltanschauungen and Weltbilder, see pp. 118-120) have the problem of "pure
becoming" inherent or "objectively present" in them all "whether perceived,
distorted or ignored" and while these will be interesting or perhaps fasci-
nating to the Christian, doctrine "destroys itself" if it embraces them in
any form. Again whilst theology must not lay down or decide in advance
what "new 'dimensions' myth might one day be able to express itself, philo-
sophy to think, or science to investigate" and whilst it is "improper for
theology to assume a priori an attitude of scepticism", 5 if any system is
to be of "real interest" its notion of pure becoming must be "an affirma-
tion both of that which becomes and of that which has become". Put simply:
there is no "equivalent" philosophical basis to revelation. 6
 To do justice
to the subject matter of Creator and creation a philosophical world-view
"must itself become theology".
Barth spells out in six brief points the implications of a. distinctive
Christian doctrine in this matter. Firstly, "it cannot itself become a
world-view". If it does, it can only remain just that. Secondly, "It can-
not base itself on any world-view". For no world-view can maintain the
themes of Christian doctrine. Thirdly, "It cannot guarantee any world-
view", 7
 and fourthly, it cannot partially accept or reject any world-view.
While Christian doctrine does not seek to contradict them, there is an
inevitable and radical contrast between them. Fifth1y Christian doctrine
5. CD, III, 1 pp.341; 341/2.
6. CD, III, 1, p. 342.
7. CD, III, 1, p. 343.
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does not claim "a better but a different type of knowledge which does not
exclude the former but is developed in juxtaposition and antithesis to it".
Encounter with alternative views helps doctrine to elucidate and clarify
itself. And finally, "dogmatics pursues its own special task" arising
from the church's life and proclamation. It is not "embarrassed" to admit
that the creation sagas expect "no material or direct help from any world-
view, ancient, modern or future". It is thus seen that natural theology
and the problems and questions posed thereby "cannot be taken into account"
(ii) The reality of creaturely freedom
The second sub-section is entitled 'Creation as Actualisation'. Creation
is not a dream or an illusion, it really exists. This follows from the
"yes" of God to what he has created, namely that he has in reality "actua-
lised it". But this is not a simple observation, it is an element in the
total knowledge given by revelation. The philosophical problem of reality
and perception is considerable. It seems obvious that our consciousness
should imply existence and "the supposition pointing in this direction is
irrefutable, but it is not unprovable". 9 It is not a certainty that our
perceptions give a true account of reality or that they are in fact real.
"Thus in point of fact we live without knowing that we are or that any-
thing is", summarises Barth. We can only affirm with any sense of security
that something is, when we are "authorised and compelled" to do so.1°
We have to be told by our Creator in order to know that we exist. Barth
alludes in passing to the traditional argument of Anselm concerning onto-
logy. •"It may well be the case," he argues, "that in such an argument we
have to do with the most characteristic and immediate act of the human
,,11	 .
mind .	 For human beings to desire to know that they exist and thus "it
may well be that our consciousness of God - or, if we like to put it this
8. CD, III, 1, p. 344.
9. CD, III, 1, p. 345.
1.0. CD, III, 1, p. 346.
11. CD, III, 1, p. 347.
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way, our consciousness of a perfect being which as such also exists - is
the crowning testimony to this supreme desire which in itself is so obvious-
ly deep rooted and inescapaiDle". 12
 But desire, and attaining desire, are
two different things. Unless we are told by God that we exist, we can only
live as if we do. "We emphasise", argues Barth, "that this awareness of
creaturely existence rests wholly and exclusively upon God's self-
communication in revelation".13
Yet the precise point of Christian affirmation, and also indeed of proof
has still tobe reached. The proof of man's existence is not only that God
is gracious and beneficent or indeed that his creation discloses a cove-
nant between them but supremely in the fact that God is united to his crea-
tion in Jesus Christ. In Christ can we truly say "creation is actualisa-
tion". In this sense "the Christianc1rch can and will always offer such
a proof". 14 The Cartesian proof of conscious existence (discussed in de-
tail with reference to Descartes' Meditationes de prima philosophia, see
pp. 121-124) is replaced by a Christological proof of man's existence.
We know that we exist because God has affirmed our humanity in Jesus Christ.
(iii) Creation for Jesus Christ
The third sub-section of the third major section which concludes Part One
is entitled 'Creation as Justification' (Schopfung als Rechtfertigung).
How can man know that the world around him, including his existence itself,
is indeed favoured by God, that is, that God truly wills his existence and
that it is well pleasing to him? The question follows from the problem of
actualisation. For "If the creature cannot know of itself that it is",
questions Barth, "how can it know of itself that it is good?" If he is
confidently to affirm this, "he must receive an intimation to this effect
from the source which has justified it". 15 Even the "Deus Optimus Maximus"
12. CD, III, 1, p. 348.
13. CD, III, 1, p. 349.
14. CD, III, 1, p. 365.
15. CD, III, 1, p. 367.
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is still inneed of justification. 16 But when Barth affirms the justifi-
cation of creation in the light of the self-disclosure of God, he is not
doing so to "rescue the optimistic thesis". It is in no way a reinforce-
ment• of ordinary human feeling or opinion. The knowledge (Erkenntnis) of
God and who he is, and how he stands in relation to us, "shines authori-
tatively and thus liberates us from all human opinions") 7 We simply must
not confuse Erkenntnis with what our human feelings may or may not indi-
cate about the pleasantness of existence. "What we consider to be the
truth about the created world is one thing", argues Barth, "Quite another
is the covenant of grace, the work of Jesus Christ, for the sake and in
fulfilment of which creation exists as it is
There is, of course, a utbrighter side" of creation. But the justification
of creation is "not connected with. the fact that the sun shines, that there
are blossoms and fruits, pleasing shapes, colours and sounds, realities
and groups of realities which preserve and foster life, purposeful rela-
tionships and order, intelligible, controllable and serviceable elements
and powers, which enlighten the created mind of man, speak to his heart,
and in some way correspond with his will for life and foster it") 9 The
"yes" of God the Creator certainly includes the "yes" of the human crea-
tion, but it is in no way dpendent on it, indeed is wholly independent of
it. Equally the justification of creation is to be distinguished from the
"darker side" of human life. "The justice of creation", writes Barth,
"is not compromised by the fact that the heavens grow dark, that harmony
is engulfed in disharmony and teleology obscured by senselessness 20
In comparison with the goodness of God, creation "is not good and he (the
16. CD, III, 1, p. 368.
17. CD, III, 1, p. 369. Erkenntnis is something that one has just come
to know or realise, as opposed to Wissen, which is knowledge in the
static sense.
18. CD, III, 1, p. 370; his italics.
19. CD, III, 1, p. 371.
20. CD, III, 1, p. 372.
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creature) cannot with conviction close his eyes to its riddles, paradoxes
and contradictions". 21 Thus man is called upon to weep and to laugh. He
cannot avoid, and should not attempt to do so, the misery of existence.
But neither on the other hand should it lead him to despair of the Erkenntnis
of the justifying power of God which lies beyond all earthly sensations.
To secure his line of exposition, Barth now offers four points of lengthy
explanation. The first concerns his Christological interpretation of theo-
dicy. Why is it that divine revelation both transcends and implies "these
two aspects and judgments" (the brighter and the darker sides) of human ex-
istence? It is here that we grasp the profound connection between the Crea-
tor and creature that binds the covenant relationship. There is "a twofold
determination" of exaltation and wretchedness. 22 Since "God created man
to lift him in His own Son into fellowship with Himself", this exaltation
"presupposes a wretchedness of human and all existence which His own Son
will share and bear". This "two-fold and contradictory determination" en-
compassing as it does all human joy and misery, hope and despair, is founded
on the will of God. It is his will that creation be for Jesus Christ. This
is really the command of God", argues Barth, "that we should rejoice with
them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep". It is only the sceptic
and the indifferent, "the indolent and neutral" who oppose the will of God.23
Secondly, how is it that God transcends these two aspects? Our rejoicing
and sorrowing are "absolutely" transcended because God himself "assumes
both aspects of existence" and "authenticates the matter in His own person,
24
making Himself the subject of this two-fold determination of being".
Barth has now set the stage for the third and "decisive point" of explanation.
21. CD, III, 1, p. 373.
22. CD, III, 1, p. 375.
23. CD, III, 1, p. 376.
24. CD, III, 1, p. 377.
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In the light of the recognition of the two-fold contradiction of human ex-
istence are we led to posit a duality either in the created world or in-
deed in God himself? "And is this duality its eternal destiny?" he asks.25
Once we recognise that there is "no human basis" on which we can establish
any co-ordination of these aspects, we are led to the further recognition
that the Creator himself "willed to endure, and has endured, and still en-
dures the contradiction in creaturely life". 26 Barth's determination to
retain the unity of God in the face of this discovered earthly contradic-
tion pushes him to the limits of divine impassibility. "A further step
has necessarily to be risked" he continues. For if there is not to be "an
ultimate antithesis of two spheres, of a parallel infinity of the two as-
pects, of a stable balance or absolute symmetry of these two factors, or an
eternal dualism", we can only affirm that God does not eternally suffer but
that in the person of Jesus Christ, he only "transiently shared the pain
and death of creation". 27 The Creator has done this in a moment but that
moment."has now passed". 28 Thus God contains within himself the perfec-
tion of the creature by his own intervention and sovereignty. This is an
eternal "no" to the "sphere of nothingness" which continually threatens
the being of creation.
Barth's fourth and final point returns him to the theme with which he began
Part One. Godts self-disclosure reveals and "mediates a secure, decisive
and binding knowledge of all this". 29
 We have no point of true reference
other than the work of God himself. No human feelings, opinions, views
or sensations can bring us to the point of knowing what we do on the basis
of revelation. Are we not at this point in a circle? Indeed we are. It
25. £2. ' III 1, p. 378.
26. £2. ' III 1, p. 380.
27. £2. ' III 1, p. 383.
28. £2. ' III, 1, p. 384.
29. £2. ' III 1, p. 386.
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is "a circle in which we may and must move, but in which we can do so only
in one direction, and which we can no longer leave".30
The Election and Goodness of All Creation
What then is the distinctive nature of this creation? "What does creation
mean as a divine work undertaken and completed to this end and in this sense?"3
Creation has a "specific character and design" is the first level of
answer. To recognise creation as creation involves recognising its dis-
tinct shape, character and design. These things are not secondary to theo-
logical insight but integral to it. "What takes shape in it", he writes,
"is the goodness of God". Barth also refers to the view of the Early Church
and the Reformers that creation is to be seen as "an act of divine gratia,
misericordia, bonitas". That this is the case can only be seen in rela-
tion to the fact of covenant. "The process", writes Barth, "whose funda-
mental purpose ... is the history of salvation which culminates in Jesus
Christ, cannot itself be hostile or indifferent, but can only be a benefit
and can only be understood as such". 32 But this being so, what must also
follow is that every part, particle and aspect of the entire creation must
stand in relationship to the fulfilment of that creation in the covenant
and be relevant to it. Barth does not bring out this point precisely but
it is necessarily implicit in what he writes. Once the fact of the bene-
ficence of God the Creator has been grasped, it is not possible to take
from any living thing the guarantee that this beneficence represents.
30. CD, III, 1, p. 388.
31. CD, III, 1, p. 330.
32. CD, III, 1, n.p. 330. But a "benefit" for whom? Adopting this stand-
point from the Reformers, Barth also takes over the largely anthropo-
centric concept of "benefit" or "use" of creation which certainly
Calvin assumes, e.g. God "willed to commend his providence and father-
ly solicitude towards us, in that before he fashioned man, he prepared
everything.he-foresaw would be useful and salutory for him",
Institutes of the Christian Religion, ET by F.C. Battles (London, 1961)
vol. 1, p. 182; cited and discussed by Passmore, op. cit., pp. 12 - 13.
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The divine "yes" must be a "yes" to all creation or it is no "yes" at all.
The nature of the divine "yes" involves election (Erwâhlung) and
acceptance. How can we know this? The logic of the incarnation makes it
inescapable. For "As God in creation manifests His inner being outwardly
He says "Yes" not only to Himself but also to another". The affirma-.
tion of creation as the work of God turned outwards means that God actual-
ly "participates in the right, dignity, and goodness of the 'Yes' in which
He is God by Himself". 33 Thus perceived, it must follow once again that
all creation participates in the "yes" that is God's "yes" to himself
within the act of incarnation. "Isn't the Word always already revelatory",
asks William Gray, "in that it reveals, discovers, makes manifest the
34
world?".	 What is at stake in Barth's discussion here is not some attribute,
33. CD, III, 1, p. 331. Erwhlung (election) is a key concept in Barth.
It is defined as a "special decision with a special intention in rela-
tion to a special object" (CD, III, 2, p. 142). He nowhere defines it
in strict opposition to non-human creation, but it can be safely
assumed that election almost always refers to man or Jesus, or both.
Whether it needs to be defined solely with these points of reference is
another matter. See H.H. Rowley's The Biblical Doctrine of Election
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1950) and Stuart McLean's Humanity in the
Thought of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1981) pp. 26ff. for
a recent exposition and discussion.
34. Gray, 'The Myth of the Word Discarnate', Theology, 88, 722 (March 1985)
p. 114; my italics. "Could it be that the Word is in essence incarnate,
that incarnation is not the passion of the discarnate Word, but the Word's
self-presentation as he really is?". In this way incarnation can be
properly seen as "an ontological characteristic of the Word". His
conclusion is startlingly relevant: "The myth of the discarnate Word is
an expression of this craving for a false transcendence, and is deeply
anthropomorphic and idolatrous in that it fashions God after an idealized
image of ourselves. Meanwhile, a suffering and threatened world awaits
the emergence of a humanity which does not have to prove and secure
itself by domination, but which will allow itself to be fashioned into
the image of a God whose glory is displayed in his self-emptying into a
fully human death and life" (pp. 115 and 117; his italics). Cf. C.E.
Gunton: "The paradox must remain: that the absolute claim of God is
exercised through the contingency and vulnerability of the human. And
this means that the function of a doctrine of the political Christ or,
better, the Lordship of Christ in its political implications, is to
teach that power does not grow out of the barrel of a gun ... but from
the lordship of the crucified", Yesterday and Today: A Study of Conti-
nuities in Christology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983) p. 199.
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quality or desirable faculty within creation itself but God's own determina-
tion, nature and freedom. Man and all living things come to be as a conse-
quence of God's own affirmation and election of himself. The goodness of
creation can therefore be grasped theologically as the movement of God to
man, and through man, to all men and all creation.
God Rejoices in Differentiated Being
Moreover God's relationship with creation is not a static "yes".
A once and for all event (although it is this too) by which we may dimly
V	 judge a general undefined beneficence. Rather "God rejoices in another
which as such has not shared in the divine being", and again "He honours
and approves this other within the limits of its distinct being". This
point requires some elucidation. God's election of himself as man does not
involve the abolition of humanity or the destruction of creatureliness.
God elects within himself the reality of created humanity in a way that
brings creaturehood to himself, maintaining and not rejecting its diffe-
rence and distinctiveness. From the standpoint of the non-human there is
here a point of relevance. The creativity of God recognises and respects
the distinctive divisions within creation itself. The fact of distinction
and difference are not in themselves barriers to the creative designs of
God; they are inseparable from them. The logic of the incarnation, and in
particular the exaltation of man involved with it, is such that it under-
lines the rightness of all created being, distinct and differentiated as
it is. Barth does not develop this point in relation to the non-human crea-
tion but it is implicit in what he writes. One further conclusion follows
from this: it is not the fact of difference that constitutes the benefi-
cence of God. It is not that there exists within man such and such a
quality, aptitude or ability that qualifies him for the place of incarna-
tion, but rather God's sovereign will and decree. To the question, there-
fore: Why does God create so many distinct and differentiated beings blessed
by his beneficence and enlivened by his Spirit - beings of which he appa-
rently has no need - there can at this stage be only one answer, namely that
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he rejoices in them. This has profound implications as Torrance observes:
"If the Church believes that Christ is the Light of life, why should it
not believe that that Light, as it rises and shines upon men, is reflected
in the being and existence of the cosmos ... And why then should the people
of God not rejoice more than any others in all creaturely being and acti-
vity and in the fulfilment of creaturely existence and meaning?".35
Barth seems to develop this point when he writes of created beings
as "necessarily and completely the object of the divine good-pleasure".
Only that which is not created, the realm of the non-being, can be objects
of God's wrath and judgement. Moreover God's disposition here is "the
root, the foundation and the end of the divine creation". That it is real,
and not unreal; that it is creation rather than a shadow is the continuing
sign that God wills it to be and that it possesses a future with him. In
the incarnation we see that God "made Himself the responsible Guarantor of
it". 36
 In this context Barth illustrates the force of the divine "no".
Only when creation is understood as creation, as a deliberate and continued
activity on God's part, and therefore as "yes" to being in this distinct
way, can we realise the possibility of the divine "no" which must relate
to all. that is really or hypothetically unreal. But the question may be
raised; What of the "end" (Ziel) 37
 of the whole creation which has its root
and foundation in the good-pleasure of God? The point to grasp at this
stage is that creation does have an end with God.. Human speculation, dis-
cussion or opinion, however realistic or theologically informed, cannot
separate the creation from its Creator who is in this sense both its ori-
gin and destiny. We shall need to explore further what kind of Ziel crea-
tion may be said to have in the light of Barth's subsequent thesis as a
35. Torrance, op. cit.,pp. 213/4.
36. CD, III, 1, p. 331; my italics.
37. Zie]. is "end" in the sense of "aim", something one is heading for.,
not just end as in a physical sense, or end of a story.
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whole, but as this juncture we can only point to what appears to be the
unmistakable conclusion that in God the guarantee of creation is ensured
through his own mysterious activity of reconciliation and redemption.
The Divorce between Covenant and Creation
We have seen how Barth holds absolutely to the binding relationship between crea
tion and covenant. Any loosening or obscuring of this relationship means that
"it (creation) collapses altogether if this bond is dissolved". This, of
course, needs to follow from all that Barth has previously stated. Every
part, particle and aspect of creation is to find its meaning and signifi-
cance within the covenant relationship with God. But his subsequent state-
ment throws this emphasis into relief:
That God's creation has the character of benefit derives
everywhere, as we have seen, from the fact that its funda-
mental purpose lies in the covenant between God and man. 38
Barth's writing is ambiguous here. At first sight it might appear that he
is referring to God's humanity in Jesus and therefore only maintaining an
anthropocentricity in a Christologically qualified sense as he justified
at the beginning of Part One (see p. 14). But subsequent reading
indicates that "man" in this context means humanity in general and thus
the whole force of the repeated assertion that creation and covenant belong
together is fundamentally weakened. Does Barth here avoid the "naive and
dirt'Anthropozentrismus against which he had earlier protested?
The primary difficulty is that Barth does not clarify the sense of his
assertion that the "benefit" (Wohitat) derives from "its fundamental pur-
pose ... in the covenant between God and man". Is this fundamental purpose
inclusive or exclusive of the rest of creation? There are a variety of
possible senses here: (1) that man focusses the beneficence of God; or (ii)
that man represents the beneficence of God; or (iii) that man actualises -
38. CD, III, 1, p. 332; my italics.
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(through his capacity for gratitude and praise) the beneficence of God,
or (iv) that man only and solely represents the beneficence of God in crea-
tion. This lack of clarity opens Barth up to the charge that he does not
actually grasp any significance of the covenant for non-human creatures.
The ramifications of this become clearer as Barth intensifies his
insistence that creation and covenant belong together. He speaks with a
renewed sense that the affirmation of the beneficence of creation is indeed
a bold step. But this affirmation can be made "responsibly" because it is
"a statement of faith which implies knowledge and of which an account can
be given't . This is only true because creation can only be known as crea-
tion and therefore as good because this knowledge is inseparable from know-
ledge of Jesus Christ. "For although it can have indirect validity where
the connection is externalised and nominalised but has not completely dis-
appeared and is not utterly denied t' he nevertheless maintains that "it is
rendered quite ineffectual when the divorce between these two spheres is
logically carried through". 39 But if this is tight and the relationship
between creation and covenant is of such inner logical necessity, it must
be questioned whether in failing to grasp and articulate the meaning of
non-human creation within the covenant, the actual affirmation which
Barth wishes to make is correspondingly weakened. Is there not here the
precise danger of "divorce" between these two spheres against which he so
eloquently warns us? For if, on the very basis of theological insight,
we can deny that there exists, or exists meaningfully, or that there ex-
ists in relationship with those agents which represent the meaning, a pur-
poseful relationship between creation and covenant are we not presented
here with a separation of the "inner connection" to which he wishes to
testify? Barth concludes this particular part by insisting that "where
the covenant is no longer seen in creation, or creation in the covenant,
39. CD, III, 1, p. 333.
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the affirmation that creation is benefit cannot be sustained". 40 In asses-
sing this we need to recall the earlier statement that creation is not
itself the covenant; it is not the brute fact of creation which constitutes
the covenant relationship. But equally, if Barth is right that the, cove-
nant is nevertheless the "inner basis of creation", and that there exists
a fundamentally important "inner connection", the question must be raised
as to whether he has helped us to see what he wishes to affirm so strongly,
namely that the covenant must be seen within the creation if we are to hold
the affirmation of the beneficence of God the Creator. Is not Barth's
failure to grasp the significance of the covenant relationship for the
non-human creation a fundamental flaw in advocating such an inner connec-
tion and correspondence?
Barth in a lengthy footnote to this section gives a detailed account
of the views of Marcion and Schopenhauer.. As he sees it both views "have
at the decisive point, namely, in the opposition to the affirmation that
divine creation is benefit, a common origin as well as a common conclusion".
Thus whilst both hold out for a separation of creation and covenant "they
develop this in opposite directions". The problem with Marcion, on one
hand, is that he looks exclusively to the covenant. In his insistence upon
the evil of creation (by an inferior god) and the necessity of further re-
demption by the true God, we can say that "there are few theologians who
refer faith so strictly to God's revealing work in Christ". 41 Marcion's
theology depends entirely-upon the release from the evil of creation which
Christ alone can bring. Barth in a brilliant piece of writing clearly
shows the essential point of seeing creation and covenant as integral to
each other. If creation is to stand at a permanent distance from the
activity of redemption through the covenant then it must follow that creation
40. , III, 1, p. 334.
41. oJ, III, 1, n. p. 337.
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is evil or will remain unredeemed. The weakness in Marcion's thesis is
that Christ is essentially docetic, thus making it impossible for him
either to enter into the evil of the world or to truly redeem it. There-
fore, Barth writes: "this means above all that there cannot be a Gospel of
this unknown God because even in Christ. He has confronted man in alien
form, and remained alien, not entering into solidarity with him". But
Barth, for all his brilliant exposition here, does not see that his own
treatment of creation and covenant suffers from a tendency which fails to
reconcile these two spheres. Can it not be asked whether his continued
and, at times, exclusive focus upon man makes his Christ alien to the non-
human creation which God has brought into being? Is there not such a
strain of arithropocentricity here that if we follow it too closely, we too
shall be caught in the same divorce between creation and the covenant it-
self, except at a different point? Barth goes on to indicate the aloof-•
ness of a God who in Marcion's terms cannot of necessity become incarnate
within an evil creation. The point must be seriously taken, but his own.
articulation of God's relationship with the created world (even in a de-
rived sense through mankind) currently lacks so much definition and posi-
tive illustration that we may wonder whether this God is not properly to
be seen as fundamentally aloof from the creation he has made. In this
sense Barth fails to answer the question he set himself in the opening of
this section, namely "What does creation mean	 42 We have yet to be
given a full account of the meaning of the covenant for creation as a whole.
Since creation and covenant are intertwined there needs be correspondence
and significance at every turn between them. Again Barth appears to re-
cognise this for he writes "The aim and fulfilment of the real covenant
is Christ as very God and very man in one person". In this clearly Christo-
logically defined sense there.is hope for all creation because "the real
42. CD, III, 1, p. 330;my italics.
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covenant does not exclude but includes Israel and the Old Testament, the
43Creator and creation".	 But whilst the meaning or would-be meaning of
creation is implicit in at least some of what Barth writes, its full eluci-
dation and positive description is often lacking.
Schopenhauer, on the other hand, succeeds in reaching the same conclusion
"by abstracting in the opposite direction and focusing his attention on
creation". B concentrating upon the individual human will, its desires,
frustrations and necessarily incomplete fulfilments, Schopenhauer shows
us a world of "perpetual deception". Thus life is continual suffering;
each new effort of the will only brings new possibilities of misery.
Accordingly human history "is one great sphere of accident and error, of
folly and evil, in which what is excellent is only an exception proving
,, 44	 ,	 I,the rule .	 According to Barth, Schopenhauer s view of the world is in-
evitably as god-less as Marcion's view of God as world-less". 45 Barth's
summary of Schopenhauer is both perceptive and illuminating. Thus in a few
pages he condenses a biting orthodox critique deploying it s]lly to en-
rich his insistence upon the need to bind -the notions of creation and cove-
nant together. But once again does Barth himself escapo the critique he
proposes with such force on others? He writes:
What remains of Creator, creature and creation in Schopen-
hauer's world view is simply man himself, whose will has its
focal point in the genitals, and whose power of contemplation
is at once the author and weaver and the bearer and the con-
templator of the veil of Maya.
But does not Barth's own articulation of the issue run the risk of sever-
ing man from creation and therefore from the fullness of purpose within
the covenant relationship? To abstract God from man is indeed serious,
but, so too by default, imprecision or ambiguity, is it to abstract man
43. CD, III,. n. p. 338; my italics.
44. CD, III, 1, n. p. 338.
45. CD, III, 1, n. p. 338.
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from creation, and thus view him alone as the seeming totality of divine
relationship within the earthly sphere. Of course it is not Barth's
intention to abstract man from creation; to set man adrift from the rich-
ness of the created world or to suppose that he represents the totality of
it. But what we do have to contend with in Barth is such a colossal focus-
sing on man, such a weight of theological anthropology that much that needs
to be said is either left unsaid or pushed to the margin of theolog'Ical
enquiry. In contrast Torrance posits the clear necessity of the "Covenant
of Grace" embracing "not only man but the whole of creation". Since this
covenanted correspondence cannot repose upon "some inherent relation of
likeness" between man and God, but solely upon "the gracious decision of
God to create a world utterly distinct from Him", we have no alternative
but to assume that all created things have such a "close relation with Him
that it may reflect His Glory 46
Two further points may illustrate our difficulty. Firstly, Barth accepts
that "When creation is viewed in isolation from God, as the world of human
will and idea, it can only be shrouded in the darkness in which Marcion en-
velops it by his isolation of God from creation". 47 The point is finely
made. But it also follows that any part of creation which is seen in iso-
lation from God, and more precisely, whose theological significance is
insufficiently grasped, also runs the danger of appearing to sever the re-
vealing Word from the creation in which the revealing Word is revealed.
What cannot be said from a theological perspective is that the creation
as a whole stands outside the creative and redeeming purposes of God.
From a human perspective of course, theologically uninformed as it is, we
may often see it that way: the world may appear to us to be from time to
time all that Schopenhauer thought it to be: " ... a sea full of rocks and
46. Torrance, Theological Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1969)
p. 68.
47. CD, III, 1, n. p. 339.
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whirlpools with the certain prospect of shipwreck" as Barth eloquently
puts it. 48
 But Barth fails to see that his own method constrains him at
this point to offer a full statement of the positive meaning of each and
every part of creation precisely in order to dispel the darkness of unin-
formed human perception. The second point is related to the first.
Schopenhauer apparently failed to grasp an adequate knowledge of man in
the world because he failed to grasp the knowledge of man-with-God. "In
the last resort he (Schopenhauer) can arrive at this knowledge only because
he has viewed the being of the world ... and man without and apart from God",
writes Barth. Thus "he has not seen the real but the unreal creation in all
its abstractness and unreality because divorced from the covenant and the
divinity of the man Jesus ... (he) has necessarily to understand and speak
49	 .
of it in those terms".	 That being so, it has yet to be sufficiently ex-
plained how it is that knowledge of the divine-man Jesus actually gives us
meaning - of depth and profundity - about creation and the non-human with-
in it.- To be fair to Barth he sees clearly how vital an issue is at stake.
"For an honest gaze the creation from which God is excluded can only be
evil" he writes. 50 But whilst we have found an appreciation of how impor-
tant the issue must be, what we have not found is a convincing attempt at
its resolution. "Is there really any good reason", asks H. Paul Santmire,
why we should not "explore the posSibilities of a theology that deals sub-
stantively with the whole universe as God's good creation, and not just
humanity alone? Is it legitimate for us any longer - exegetically, theo-
logically, existentially - to think of nature merely as the scenery, merely
48. III, 1, n. p. 336.
49. £' III, 1, n. p. 339.
50. CD, III, 1, n. p. 340.
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as some kind of adjunct for human history?"51
Word without World?
Barth concludes this section on 'creation as Benefit' by insisting that
theology "cannot itself become a world-view". If it seeks to do so "it
abandons its special object, which is distinguished by the special charac-
ter of divine creation from the object of every world-view". Thus losing
contact with its special object theology would thus "transmute itself" into
another philosophical scheme. 52 There is obvious sense in this. By taking
on board starting points other than theology, no matter how currently attrac-
tive or seemingly feasible, doctrine runs the risk of entering worlds to
which it has no proper claim. But "world-view" in translation is a render-
ing of Weltanschauung and Weitbild. The first has all the philosophical
overtones (of 'philosophy of life') which Barth rejects, but the second is
a more neutral term best translated as "conception of the world" or "world
picture" as Emil Brunner so defines. Because of this ambiguity, we can
only ask whether Barth intends theology to develop a view of the world that
is consonant with his Christocentric methodology. Could it be that he is
misled by his own deeply held desire to separate theology from other secu-
lar disciplines to the extent that he overlooks the need to offer the ful-
lest theological account of divine creation possible? Is not 'the worlds
51. Santinire, 'Ecology and Ethical Ecumenics', Anglican Theological Review,
59, I (January 1977) pp. 101 - 102; his italics. This is a review
article of Thomas Sieger Derr's Ecology and Human Liberation (Geneva:
WSCF, 1973); USA ed: Ecology and Human Need (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1975), the result of work for the World Council of Churches on
ecological problems. "Karl Barth thought of theology as 'the-
anthropology', as a confession and exposition of God's special rela-
tionship with the human creature ... For better or worse ... that is
the theological framework that has dominated theological reflection
about humanity and nature in international ecumenical Protestantism
providing the platform for the last three decades or more" (p. 98).
Santmire may be a little optimistic about Barth's influence in the
W.C.C., but it is certainly true that its work on Christ and creation
has been minimal. For an account of Barth's involvement with the
W.C.C. see Busch, op. cit., esp. pp. 395 - 400. For Santinire's full
critique see The Travail of Nature: The ambiguous Ecological Promise
of Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985) esp.
pp. 145-155 for a discussion of Barth.
52. CD, III, 1, p. 48.
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about which secular theorists seek to theorise and speculate also
'the creation' about which Barth wishes to secure (from the self-
disclosure of God) real and binding knowledge? The question is grasped
by Brunner, "Does our faith in Jesus christ as the decisive self-
communication of God imply something also about the origin and destiny
of the world?"53
The second point concerning the sixth implication which Barth deduces is
related. Dogmatics "pursues its own special task which is imposed upon
it in the service of the Church's proclamation, and which consists in an
increasingly unqualified and full apprehension, and faithful and exact
reproduction, of the self-witness of the Creator in His revelation, and
therefore of the biblical witness to creation". But what if this very
proclamation, this very process of understanding, restatement and repro-
duction requires of dogmatics, in defence of the Gospel itself, the fullest
statement of the meaning and purpose of the Kosmos? Barth firmly rejects
the view that the creation sagas require any "material or direct help
from any world-view, ancient, modern or future" 	 But could it be that
world-views of human devising have something to learn from the doctrine
of creation derived from the Logos? Torrance sees the "radical reversion"
of priorities required within the()iurches if this question is taien
seriously. "It amounts", he writes, "to a demand that we set our sights
again on the great intangible realities as the primary factors regulating
the universe" and find in Jesus Christ "the real solution" to them. His
challenge is quite explicit: "What is supremely neededr therefore, in all
the Churches today, is a far profounder understanding of the Incarnation,
53. Brunner, Dogmatics, 4 Vols. (London: Lutterworth, 1952) Vol. III,
-The Christian Doctrine of the Church, the Faith and the Consummation,
ET. by D. Cairns and T.H.L. Parker (1962), p. 425 and translation
of world-view p. 432.
54. .2.' III, 1, p. 344.
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the coming of God himself into the structures of creaturely and human
being, in order to restore the creation to its unity and harmony in
itself - that is, a Christology with genuine substance in it once more,
the theology of the incarnate Son of God, the one Lord Jesus Christ,
'being of one substance with the Father, by whom. all things were made".55
A Non-Human Echo?
Barth's second sub-section is entitled 'Creation as Actualisation'. Why
has God actualised and made real the non-human creation? Or more properly,
how do we know on the basis of God's own self-disclosure that the creation
is real and actualised by him? The question is not lost on Barth. He
knows that the reality of the created order, affirmed by the incarnation,
must issue in some significance for all created beings. "No creature is
rooted in itself, or maintained by itself, but each is willed, posited,
secured and preserved by God, and therefore each. in its place and manner
is genuine reality." 56 But the affirmation of existence, guaranteed and
distinct as it is, cannot itself be sufficient. It is not the bare
reality of creation but the order, structure and purpose within it that
must be discerned if we are to give an adequate account of its divine
actualisation. Barth appears to give an answer in the following way:
We emphasise that this awareness of creaturely existence rests
wholly and exclusively upon God's self-communication in
revelation. It is wholly and exclusively an echo and response
of the creature to what is said to him by his Creator. It is
neither a spontaneous nor a receptive accomplishment of the
creature, for it does not rest upon any of his inherent faculties,
nor is any of these faculties capable of this recognition. It
me:rely takes place. It is a sheer fact that the creature whose
faculties in themselves do not suffice to achieve this recog-
nition, orientating himself according to God's self-revelation,
55. Torrance, Theology in Reconciliation: Essays towards Evangelical
and Catholic Unity in East and West (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1975),
p. 283; his italics.
56. £2.' III 1, p. 345.
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is compelled to adopt this recognition. It is recognition
in the form of acknowledgement; acknowledgement under the
law of faith and obedience.57
Is the non-human creation capable of an "echo" in the form of response,
or, of recognition of the self-disclosure of the Creator? If we charac-
tense the Logos, as C.K. Barrett also suggests, as God's "self-communica-
tion" with all beings he has made, it follows that "life and light" are
the "primary forms in which this self-expression in creation becomes
communicable" and thus divine communication to non-human spheres becomes
a possibility too. 58 One continually puzzling feature with Barth's
position, however, is the establishing of the reality of the entire crea-
tion wholly and completely within the divine-human encounter and this
because God's Word can only "speak" in human language devised, by self-
cons cious beings. Does he in this way define the relationship between
God and the creature so that the existence of the non-human can only be
seen as inappropriate or peripheral? If we are to take this particular
writing as characterising Barth's considered position in this regard, we
can only conclude that "the creature" (das Geschöpf) here spoken of can
only be man himself, and that man's echo, and his God given capacity for res-
59
ponse, is the sole means of creaturely awareness.
Descartes and Knowledge of the World
The ramifications of this may become clearer as we consider Barth's lengthy
discussion of Descartes.60 It is hardly surprising that the notion of
57. CD, III, 1, p. 349; my italics.
58. Barrett, 'The Prologue of St John's Gospel' in New Testament Essays
(London: SPCK, 1972) p. 45.
59. But why should there not be a non-human creaturely "echo" to the Spirit
of God immanent in creation? A recent attempt to show how nature can
be seen as "responding" to the love of God is offered in W.H. Vanstone's
Love's Endeavour Love's Expense: The Response of Being in the Love of
God, foreword by H.A. Williams (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977)
esp. pp. 77 - 99.
60. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641), CD, III, 1,
n. pp. 350 - 363.
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the innateness of the idea of God within man should not pass without
discussion. How can we move satisfactorily from clear and distinct ideas
in our minds to external or divine realities? Despite its splendid
concentration and admirable sophistication such a procedure cannot yield
God, not even a clear justification for the existence of others beyond
oneself. Barth sees in this process an inevitable appeal to the power
of human transcendence: "By transcending myself, I never come upon an
absolute being confronting and transcendent to me, but only again and
again upon my own being. And by proving the existence of a being whom I
have conjured up only by means of my own self-transcendence, I shall again
and again succeed only in proving my own existence." It is not human
demonstration, argues Barth, but "God's self-demonstration" that is valid
as a basis for proof. God, as Descartes seeks to prove him, is "hopelessly
enchained within the mind of man". 61
 Notwithstanding this compelling
critique, it may be questioned again whether Barth himself is not open
to the opposite charge. For is not God, as Barth practically descrthes
him, so overridingly linked with man and, at least in part, so exclusively,
that little of the world can actually be known? The same question may be
asked of the otherwise perceptive comment that: "The knowledge of the
reality of the created world, and therefore the legitimation of our cons-
ciousness of the ego and the world, depends essentially upon the knowledge
62
of God ...".	 But what kind of knowledge is presupposed here? A know-
ledge of bare existence? Simply a knowing affirmation-of external reality
as opposed to dream or illusion? Simply a knowing affirmation of the beyond?
Clearly not. What Barth wants to posit is a full and rich knowledge of
the created world presupposed by the incarnation. But, once again, we look
in vain to find in Part One a presentation of the knowledge which Barth
61. CD, III, 1, xi. p. 360; his italics.
62. CD, III, 1, n. p. 361; my italics.
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insists (rightly I judge) must follow from his theological starting
point. Would not Barth's critique have especial force and consistency
if at this juncture he could spell out the precise knowledge of the
created world through the incarnation that so determinedly opposes itself
to all attempts at human self-transcendence? I do not want to labour this
point, so one further example will suffice. Barth rightly rejects the
implied Cartesian view that nature itself can reveal what it is supposed
to reveal, namely the objectivity of God:
Nature in itself and as such, the actual conjunction of our
thinking with the other than ourselves which oar senses
suggest to as similarly existent, is able to convey this
truth to us only because it is created by God and because
the God who is its Creator Himself bears witness to us that
it is so. But the testimony of God on which everything
depends must not itself be the testimony of our own mind,
but the witness of God Himself to our minds, if it is to
convey to us certainty regarding what is in itself the
problematical teaching of nature.bJ
But this is surely the point. If God the Creator reveals knowledge of
the created world, then we need to know this knowledge before it can be
opposed or contrasted with other forms of knowing. For in practice what
fullness of knowledge does Barth propose to us concerning the designs and
purposes of creation itself? The weakness of the argument here is not
his positing of different kinds of knowledge, of one superior and the
other inferior, or even of one true and the other false, but his practical
reluctance to give us the barest outline of what knowledge there can be
of God's purposes and designs for the created order. We must therefore
risk one farther question. Is not Barth's presentation of the purpose of
the natural world in practice only slightly removed from Descartes's bare
affirmation of its existence? Are not both in a practical sense similarly
God-less, that is, do not both assume a realm and a sphere in which God's
63. CD, III, 1, n. p. 362; my italics.
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mysterious activity, though linked with man, is fundamentally irrelevant
or at least incidental? The question is important in more ways than one.
Cohn Gunton describes Barth's 'proof' from revelation as characterising
"certain events as acts of God because they impose themselves as such
upon the interpreter". A rational (but not rationalistic) 'proof' is
possible because "certain events ... are correctly attributable to the
agency of God and are such as to illumine consistently both human life
and the world in which they happen". 64
 But this is surely the rub. The
less allowed for the illumination of the world by the insights of revela-
tion, the weaker the rational 'proof' becomes.
The Ambiguity of Anthropocentricity
Barth's problem in this quarter is further exemplified by his subsequent
attempt in this main section to underpin the specifically "Christian
understanding of creation, the Creator, and the creature". The vital
question is: who is"the creature"? Our problem will be discussed by
reproducing Barth's substantive section here and indicating in italics
the confusing range of options presented:
1 The God who posits and guarantees creaturely existence
2 (gesch6pfliche Existen•z), and by whose self-disclosure it is
3 revealed and secured to the creature (Gesch6pf), is He who in and
4 through His creative activity has established His covenant with
5 the creature (Gesch6pf).
6 As Creator He does not exist as a monad, but in the overflowing
7 plenitude of His life as Father, Son and Holy Ghost, in the
8 desire and love in which He does not will to keep His glory to
9 Himself but also to magnify it outside Himself, in which he does
10 not will only to live for Himself but also for another distinct
11 from Himself ... He lives as the God who so loved man (Mensch)65
12 that he condescended to become man (Mensch) Himself in His only
13 begotten Son ... Hence His creation (Sch6pf) is not the mere
14 positing and guaranteeing, the mere actualisation of this other.
64. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne
and Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) p. 219; his italics.
65. den Menschen (object case) - to make things easier, all nouns have
been cited in their basic (nominative) form.
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15 It is no characterless creation66 and event, but one that is
16 characterised as the affirmation, election and acceptance of the
17 creature (Gesch6pf). It is the positing and guaranteeing of the
18 other (des Anderen) to whom God wills to manifest His glory to
19 confirm his good-pleasure and thus to bind and commit Himself.
20 Creation (Sch6pfung) is a benefit because it establishes the
21 presupposition and the execution of this divine will and plan,
22 because it provides a sphere and object for the divine
23 affirmation, election and acceptance, for the divine goodness and
24 providence. Creation (Schöpfung) is a benefit inasmuch as it is
25 based upon and attains its end in the divine convenant with man
26 (Mensch). Thus even the creature (Geschpf) does not merely
27 exist, but does so as the sphere and object of the covenant, as
28 the being (das Sein) to whom God has devoted His good-will and
29 whom He has destined to share in the overflowing of His own
30 fulness of life and love. To be a creature (geschöpf sein) means
31 to be determined to this end, to be affirmed, elected and
32 accepted by God. To be a creature (geschöpf sein) means to exist
33 after the manner of Israel; after the manner which God in His own
34 Son has not deemed it unworthy to adopt as His own. To be a
35 creature (gesch6pft sein) means to be prepared for the place
36 where His honour dwells. The creature (Geschöpf) is a
37 beneficiary because his being does not arise without this
38 intention and end. And finally even the self-revelation of the
39 Creator to His creature (Geschpf) is not the mere making known of
40 the fact that He, and therefore His creature (Gesch6pf) is real
41 and that creation (Schöpfung) is actualisation. It is this too;
42 it includes it. But it is not only this. It embraces the Creator
43 not only as such but also as the sovereign Lord of the covenant
44 of His grace; creation (Sch6pfung) not only as such but also
45 including the covenant which underlies it; and the creature
46 (Geschöpf) not only as such but including his determination as a
47 covenant-partner with God. It takes place in the course of the
48 history of the covenant. It is the impelling factor in this
49 history; the Word of God to His people, to Israel and the Church;
50 the Word of grace for lost and saved sinners spoken in the course
51 of God's dealings with men (Mensch). Its content is the Good News
52 that God in His Son is not against them but for them. Proclaiming
53 this to man (Mensch), it meets him in sheer confrontation, but it
54 also wins his heart and at the same time wins authority over him,
55 awakening him to faith and obedience, placing him in a position
56 of pure thankfulness, compelling him with a compulsion which
57 excludes all choices and gives him freedom for the only true
58 choice, viz, the acceptance of his own election. As the glad
59 tidings of Jesus Christ, God's self-disclosure is the work of the
60 Holy Spirit in which man (Mensch) is inwardly assured of the
61 grace of God and his own existence in grace, being both captured
62 and liberated in God.67
66. The translation is very loose at this point. A literal translation would
be: "It is no characterless activity and event, but one that is charac-
tensed as the affirmation, election and acceptance of the creature".
67. Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, II, 1, pp. 415/6; ET CD, III, 1, pp. 363/4.
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The difficulty of giving an accurate, let alone adequate, interpretation
of this section should now be evident. Who is "the creature"? (Lines
3, 5, 16/7, 26, 30, 31, 34/5, 36, 39, 40, 45.) pny object of creation?
Living beings? Or only man? Geschapf, it is important to remember, is
an inclusive term for all living beings. Part of the answer may appear
to be in the simple interchangeability of the words "man" and "creature".
Pnd it is certainly true that Barth's selected words yield a wide possibility
of interpretation. Thus "the creature" (3 and 5) transmutes into "another
distinct from Himself" (10/11) and to man (11) - In short: the terms
"creation", "the creature", "another", "man", "covenant partner" and "His
creature" lack precision. The crucial question is how did he intend this
section to be read, even allowing for a variety of interpretations at
particular points? At first it seems clear that Gesch6pf is the subject
under review. Thus the opening lines speak generally of creation and only
later of man. But as the exposition proceeds the range of possibilities
is so defined as to bear a wholly anthropocentric reference, to the point
where no other term is utilised (51 - 60). The intention then it seems,
notwithstanding ambiguity, is to present a doctrine of man as Gesch6pf.
The main deficiency of this Anthropozentrismus is that it is not
Christologically qualified as Barth earlier insisted such talk should
be. He does not speak "theanthropocentrically" as Brunner
carefully cautions. "The goal of the whole vast universe", insists
Brunner, "is not man, but humanity redeemed in the God-man Jesus".68
Barth cannot therefore claim that "only from this standpoint ... (is)
the Cartesian proof of existence left behind". He is unable to affirm
that "only from this standpoint ... the Christian Church can and will
68. Brunner, Dogmatics, III, op. cit., p. 431. Because of this "the world
is not a self-sufficient entity, nor is it merely an entity that is
"there for me", but it exists through and "for" the Logos of the
Creator and Redeemer God" (p . 431).
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always offer such a proof". 69
 For, unwittingly perhaps, he has only
offered a proof of human creation and human incarnation; as far as the
rest of the creation goes, there is no proof, nor can there be.
All this is all the more extraordinary because there are hints and guesses
throughout the Dogmatics which suggest something different. In The Doctrine
of the Word of God, for example, the interdependence of creation and reconcili-
ation is stressed. Reconciliation presupposes creation; creation can only be
understood in terms of its "realisation and fulfilment" in reconciliation.
Thus the conclusion is emphatic: "dogmatics cannot be a system of atone-
mentI.?0 But if this is so, Barth has not supplied the necessary relation-
ship whereby we can see the fundamental connection between the creative
activity of God concerning the non-human and its corollary in the work of
reconciliation. There is no connection here advanced. Is Barth therefore
guilty of a form of "idealism" as Deegan suggests, which at least in
relation to the non-human gives the impression of a docetic Christ? Does
the Logos really impinge upon creaturely history, substance, creatureli-
ness? Can God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit be anything else in relation
to all creation but Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer?
Anthropocentric or Christocentric Justification?
We now move to a decisive phase of the argument as Barth reaches his
concluding sub-section; 'Creation As Justification'. Actualisation
necessarily implies justification. "Its being is not neutral; is it not
bad but good", writes Barth. 71 Does this justification extend to the
non-human? By implication, undoubtedly yes. But in what way?
69. CD, III, 1, p. 365.
70. CD, I, 2, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Prolegomena, Part Two, ET
by G.T. Thompson and B. Knight (1956), p. 874; see also p. 877, Cf.
Whitehouse: "The heart of the Lutheran objection to reformed theology
comes out in this comment that Barth takes the significance of crea-
tion for redemption to be the essence of the work of creation",
'Karl Barth and the Doctrine of Creation' in op. cit., p. 14; his italics.
71. CD, III, 1, p. 366.
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(j) "of course, the Creator justifies the cosmos" writes Barth. "But
he does so only because the latter is created according to His will and
plan, and therefore with the'purpose of instituting and fulfilling the
covenant between the divine Creator and man ... The created world is,
therefore, right as it is because it is an appropriate sphere and instrument
of the divine activity." 72
 Creation it would appear is only justified in
an indirect, operational sense. It is not because of what it is in itself,
but because of what will be accomplished within it as the framework for
fulfilment. First of all, it needs to be noted that Barth is only able
to maintain this distinction because of his particular view of the covenant
relationship. Animals are not covenant-partners and therefore do not belong
to the circle of divine activity with "man at its heart" . 	 But could there
be an even stronger reason for questioning Barth's exposition here? The
statement and answer to this riddle may lay in Barth's own concluding
thought "... which has its beginning, centre and end (semen Anfang, seine
Mitte und sein Ziel) in Jesus Christ". 74
 For his exegesis at this point
is dependent to some degree upon a contrast between the work of creation
and incarnation. Only marginally and indirectly are other living creatures
seen as playing a part in the divine activity. But to maintain this
emphasis strongly would involve guestioning the work of Christ as Co-
creator with the Father. For if (1) Christ "is the image of the invisible
God, the first born of all creation", if (2) "in him all things were created
through him and for him", if (3) "He is before all things, and in him all
things hold together", and if (4) his purpose is "to reconcile to himself
all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of
the cross" (Col. 1: 15 - 21), then we cannot separate the purpose of
72	 CD, III, 1, pp. 369/70; my italics.
73. CD, III, 1, p. 370.
74. CD, III, 1, pp. 369/7O my italics.
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creation from the act of incarnation. 	 In short: the answer is this.
There can be nothing at all in creation which has not come to be but
through the deliberate design and purpose of God himself and that this
purpose is that.all things in creation partake of the divine work through
the design to reconcile them.
(ii) "Because the divine self-disclosure has as its content the covenant
of grace and therefore the work of the Son of God, it carries within itself
the adequate and conclusive and incontestable answer to the question of the
rightness of creaturely being as such ... What is creaturely exists in
order to be serviceable to the glory of God in the work of His Son". 76 -
Barth here, I think, has the measure of the question. The nature of the
question concerns God's glory; his justification of the creature's justi-
fication. But it is worth reminding ourselves that the glory of God as
expressed, for example in Colossians, actually consists in the execution
of his justification and reconciliation of all things. In this sense the
word "serviceable" may be misleading. Non-human beings do not need to
justify their existence before God by serving other beings within it
75. It is curious how Calvin overlooked the significance of this and
other "cosmic" verses. Stress is laid on how Paul meant (in the above)
"chiefly to refer to the angels" and how the Son of God "may preside
over angels as well as men", but no reference is made to the non-
human creation, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians,
Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians, eds. D.W. Torrance and
T.F. Torrance, ET by T.H.L. Parker, Calvin's Commentaries (Edinburgh
and London: Oliver & Boyd, 1965) pp. 309 and 310. Again on Eph. 1:
7 - 12, Calvin avoids the implication of restoration or recapitula-
tion of all creation by stressing the notion of "order" and how all
things outside Christ are reduced in this fashion, op. cit., p. 129.
Exegesis of Philip. 2: 10 amounts to an attack on the "Papists" who
"trifle childishly" by "infer(ring) purgatory" from the text (p. 252).
Perhaps Barth follows in the footsteps of this inadvertence. Cf.
Whitehouse: "The cosmic hopes expressed in Rom. 8: 21, in Ephesians
1: 10, in Colossians 1: 20 ... must be maintained in fidelity to God",
'New Heavens and a New Earth' in op. cit., p. 212. Of the many critical
studies, see R.H. Fuller's summary in The Foundations of New Testament
Christology, Fontana Library of Theology and. Philosophy (London:
Collins, 1969) esp. pp. 203 - 229.
76. CD, III, 1, p. 370; my italics.
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precisely because they are not peripheral to the central reconciling
purpose of Christ. The work of reconciliation cannot be earned, bought,
rewarded or serviced in this sense. Once again this is not to deny that
man is the central focus of this reconciliation, so uniquely accomplished
within the inner life of God himself. But perhaps, and this may be the
crucial point, it is the work of man thus reconciled by the "blood of the
cross" to "serve" the divine purpose by recognising, celebrating and
rejoicing (as only man can) in the divine work of reconciliation in other
parts of creation. "Christian hope is sustained by, and expresses itself
in, a reverent grateful love for the good earth" emphasises Daniel Day
Williams. Because divine creation is dynamic rather than static, our
concern flows from the conviction of the continuing re-creative energy
of God, that "what God has provided shall be used to serve nothing less
than His good which is the one real good of all things". 77 Barth appears
to recognise this in the following way: "It is our duty - arid this is
what we are taught by the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ - to love
and praise the created order because, as it is manifest in Jesus Christ,..
it is so mysteriously well-pleasing to God". Once again,, if this is the
real point of knowledge in this matter, that is, our understanding of
Jesus Christ is central in grasping our true relation to the rest of
creation, then we can only point out that it is in the life, suffering
and death of him, that we can perceive the moral content of "service" to
the divine purpose of reconciliation.
(iii) "God created man to lift him in His own Son into fellowship with
himself. This is the positive meaning of human existence and all existence.
77. Daniel Day Williams, God's Grace and Man's Hope (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1949), pp. 163 and 166; his italics. Cf. Torrance: "It
follows ineluctably that the Church, which is the Body of Christ in
the world, is committed to its union with him, to the mission of
healing and reconciliation in the depth of being", Theology in
Reconciliation, op. cit., pp. 282/3.
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But this elevation presupposes a wretchedness of human and all existence
which His own Son will share and bear. This is the negative meaning of
creation. Since everything is created for Jesus Christ and His death and
resurrection, from the very outset everything must stand under this two-
fold and contradictory determination". 78
 The telling thing to notice
here is the strident way in which the non-human creation is seen as sharing
these twin determinations. But apart from an acceptance of the "intrinsic
valuet of creation, 79 the force of this section concentrates wholly upon
the work of God for the liberation and salvation of man.
But what of the sorrow and joy in the non-human creation? For what purpose
do other living beings sharing this double determination exist and live?
For what purpose do animals share with man both the "blessing" and "curse"
of the Lord to which Barth earlier referred us? For what purpose does the
inner circle of creation made by God on the sixth day share the complex
intimacy of man? What purpose is there in the animal company sharing the
"weal and woe" of the human situation? What is the purpose of animal kind
so disclosed that whilst it "prefigures and to that extent partakes of the
covenant" it does not enter into any of the liberation of creation as
promised to man? What is most striking in Barth's discussion here is not
the absence of a particularly novel way of answering these questions, but
the absence of these questions themselves. Is not the sorrow and joy of
the animal world likewise to be referred to Christ as the firm ground of
theological knowledge and explanation? "It must never be forgotten",
writes Austin Farrer, "that God is the God of hawks n less than of
sparrows, of microbes no less than of men" 80 Barth can have no good
78. CD, III, i, p. 376; my italics.
79. CD, III, 1, p. 372.
80. Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Fontana Library of Theology
and Philosophy (London: Collins, 1966) pp. 104/5.
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theological ground (as he has expounded it) for the loss of Christological
nerve at this point. Could it be that he dimly saw that his final
emphasis upon man as the sole covenant-partner would be weakened if he
had to include non-human creatures in a more direct way? Could it be
that when Barth writes that "the truth about our existence in its confront-
ation by God's self-revelation is that we are those who have been loved
and sought and found by Him, won for Him and called to faith in Him -
nothing else and nothing more", 81 he is conscious that there might in
fact be something more and something less. Is not the force of St. John's
Gospel (3: 16) on which his Christological emphasis is so dependent that
God "so loved the world" as well as the human-kind within it?
Creation as Man's Pleasure Garden
This concluding section finishes with a long and compelling note on "a
philosophical counterpart" to justification, namely philosophical Optimism.
Barth's judgement is not unreservedly negative. It is worth capturing the
generous nature of his response: "in all its forms it (i.e. Optimism)
approximates closely to the doctrine of creation as justification". More-
over, "We, too, have had to state clearly the principle that the nature
as well as the existence of the created world is affirmed by God its
Creator, so that to this extent it is justified and perfect ... Hence we,
too, have espoused a definite optimism, and we cannot be ashamed of the
company in which we find ourselves". 83
 And what is this Optimism that so
closely approximates itself to the Christian Gospel? Barth takes the
thought of Leibniz as primary. The world must, if created by God, be the
very best world possible. "If it had been possible for a better world
than this to exist, God's wisdom must have recognised it, His goodness
81. CD, III, 1, p. 387; my italics.
82. "We must remember that cosmos in John means mankind or human nature
primarily and not the material world", T.W. Manson, On Paul and John:
Some Selected Theological Themes, Studies in Biblical Theology, 8
(London: SCM Press, 1967) p. 153. Primarily man is the central
focus, but not exclusively.
83. CD, III, 1, n. p. 404.
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willed it and His omnipotence created it". 84
 And what of the existence
of evil? The answer is broadly three fold:
(i)metaphyica1evil needs to be distinguished from created evil;
(ii) the character of evil is privative rather than positive, and
(iii)the existence of evil necessarily contributes to the growth
and development of the good.
This third point is taken up by Leibniz' younger contemporary, Christian
Wolff of Halls, who defines perfection as "the coherence of the manifold".85
Thus by observation and analysis of nature it is possible to know both the
mind of the Creator arid the divine pattern which works inexorably for
good, or at least the very best. This, Barth perceives, is
developed to its logical conclusion in Freidrich Christian Lesser's
Insecto-Theologia which maintained that "The great God has placed before
reasonable men for their intelligent consideration of all kinds of
creatures including the insects as a mirror and testimony of His infinite
power and wisdom". 86	Lesser's brief is to demonstrate the utility
of every living insect. Thus, for example, silkworms provide clothing;
some are useful for baits for fishermen and huntsmen; locusts, flies and
gnats are instruments of divine judgement; bees give us honey; and many
have medicinal properties for man. During the Peasants' War of 1525 a
story is told of a pastor who in order to avert danger threw beehives into
a crowd, and so, the argument runs, who can decry the value of bees?
"There are no useless insects, but only those whose utility is not yet
known to us and have still to be discovered". 87
 This view is fully exem-
plified by 3.E. Brockes, a Hamburg Senator, whose verse so confidently
84. CD, III, 1, n. p. 389.
85. Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des
menschen, auch allen Dingen tiberhaupt, den Liebhabern der Wahrheit
mitgeteilt (1719) cited CD, III, 1, n. p. 393.
86. Lesser, Insecto-Theologia (2nd Ed., 1740, p. 3) cited CD, III, 1, n.p. 396.
87. CD, III, 1, n. p. 398.
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strove to illuminate the wisdom of the Creator that it was set subsequently
to music by the Zurich theologian, J.K. Bachofen. Two small extracts will
be sufficient to grasp the genre of this writing. The first is part of
a reflection upon a grazing herd of JUne:
Sweet kine, standing here
I see thee milked
And I wonder how it is possible
That in thy body thus marvellously
Grass becomes meat and drink for me
And as in living kilns distils itself.
Speak now, 0 man and say
Is it not meet to give eternal praise
To Him who made it thus?
The other extols the virtues of creation happily made for man's use:
To hunt and fish and shoot
Are pleasures innocent
To him who thinks anent:
These pleasures are God-given
And God is well content
If only we have striven
Gladly to honour Him
And bless Him with heart and soul
Hills, valleys, meadows, woods,
Ploughiand and plain,	 88
To us are pleasant goods
Is Barth right in supposing that these pictures in their aim of justifying
creation	 "approximate closely" to his own doctrine?. Of course he is
not uncritical. He cannot confirm their "abstract this-worldliness and
anthropocentricity, descending at its lowest to gastrocentricity". 89 But
Barth's general generosity of reception may give rise to some unease. His
view that in the light of Lesser's insect theology "the existence of
insects is fully and precisely justified" begs the fundamental question.90
For if we speak at this point of divine justification, then questions of
88. Brockes, Irdisches Vergntigen in Gott, bestehend in physikalisch- und
moralischen Gedichten (1721) cited CD, III, 1, n. pp. 400 and 402;
my italics.
89. III, 1, n. p. 408.
90.. CD, III, 1, n. p. 399.
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human utility can only be raised in a wholly secondary and subsequent
manner, if at all. For the whole tenor of Barth's method has been to
place in juxtaposition human opinion and divine revelation, and thus rule
out the possibility of theological judgement from unaided human observa-
tion. "What we consider to be the truth about the created world is one
thing. Quite another is the covenant of grace, the work of Jesus Christ,
for the sake and in fulfilment of which creation exists as it is." 1
Now if this is true, postulating from the point of view of human utility
cannot be given even limited credibility. It is ruled out because the
measure of the goodness of creation exists independently of human obser-
vation (however sympathetic or critical). This is not to deny, of course,
the appropriate response of gratitude, praise and genuine thanks-giving
for the mystery of the created world and the ways in which it can be
useful to human-kind. But no theory or philosophy which claims to stand
at this point on human judgement can even "approximate" the doctrine of
divine justification. Man cannot claim to be the total measure of good
as regards all his fellow creatures. He may claim of course that they
are no good to him. But he may not posit that his good is always identical
with God's good. Creation "exists for God's glory", argues a recent
Report, "it has a meaning and worth beyond its meaning and worth as seen
from the point of view of human utility ... To imagine that God has created
the whole universe solely for man's use and pleasure is a mark of folly".92
91. CD, III, 1, p. 370; his italics. 	 -
92. Man and Nature ed. by Hugh Montefiore (London: Collins, 1975) p. 67
The Report is the result of a working party set up by the Archbishop
of Canterbury in 1971 to "investigate the relevance of Christian
doctrine to the problems of man in his environment" (preface) . Cf. John
Burnaby: "The difficulties raised for our belief in a good Creator by
the evils of the world are unnecessarily exaggerated by certain assump-
tions ... With our immensely wider horizons, we can easily read the
story (of creation) as though the whole structure of the universe had
no other purpose but the production of the human species and that all
things in it had been made for the use of man. And we may slip from
there into the further assumption that the "use" of man can only mean
his happiness or even his material comfort", The Belief of Christendom:
A Commentary on the Nicene Creed (London: SPCK, 1963) p. 40.
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Earlier Barth spoke of the seeming necessity of maintaining a similar
view asking "Who is able to do justice to its (creation's) intrinsic
value in quality only (to say nothing o the quantitive wealth all around
us) and to be genuinely and correspondingly joyful and thankful?" and again
"What would be our position if the revelation of the grace of God were tied
to this witness of the created world, and we were dependent on our wretched
understanding of this witness?" 93 The disappointing feature of Barth's
treatment is that he appears not to have responded to his own poignant
questions.
The second issue relates to Earth's fourfold rejection of Optimism and
returns to my developing question concerning the adequacy of his own
approach. The first rejection of Optimism concerns the way in which it
"does not so much eliminate as assimilate" the negative aspects of crea-
tion by its limitation of evil, and thus transform it into "a kind of
margin to the sphere of light"	 Barth speaks of people "in a glass
case" who are able to perceive the world but who are precluded from being
able to be moved or touched by it". Thus Optimism has no "true and urgent
and inescapable awareness of the imperilling" of the creature. 95 This is
finely put. But has Barth a sufficient sense of the negative dimension
within all creation, human and non-human? Where does he speak of pain
and suffering of the animal world in such a way as to bring it into cons-
ciousness even as a problem? Where is his theological cognisance of the
peril, pain and death of the non-human creation? If Optimism, through
ideologil default, misses the pain of creation, where does Barth show an
awareness of the full range of the travail and woe in the non-human creation?
If adequacy of explanation is to be the criterion here, then it cuts both
93. CD, III, 1, p. 372.
94. CD, III, 1, n. p. 406.
95. CD, III, 1, n. p. 407.
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ways. The problem is crisply stated by C.S. Lewis: "So far as we know
beasts are incapable either of sin or virtue: therefore they can neither
deserve pain nor be improved by it".96
The third point concerns the failure of Optimism to speak sufficiently
of the positive aspect of the world. Barth writes: "It stands or falls
objectively with the existence of the creaturely world as such and sub-
jectively with the human capacity to see its actual character in the best
light" and again: "There is no escaping a question which cannot be answered
within this circle of ideas - the question of the goodness of the good, of
the ultimate meaning and purpose of this harmony or mechanism or useful.
aparatus". 97
 Barth is right here, I judge, in indicating how without some
objective goal for creation, all within it may be reduced to the level of
subjectively defined, and often transient, human utility. But for all its
deficiencies and defects, did not Optimism have a clear sense of creation
justified as a whole, as one complete interlocking mechanism including
man, which is pressingly absent in much of his own treatment? At least in
this philosophy our eyes are turned outwards to the natural world to see,
enquire and examine within it what in its own terms may be said of it,
arid this needs to be said no matter how bizarre and gastro-centric the
results.
The same question may be raised concerning Barth's third point, namely
that its utilisation of the idea of God is vacuous and based entirely upon
"human self-confidence".	 In utter contrast to this "It is on the basis
of His (God's) revealed decision that in Christian faith 'Yes' is said to
the world ...". But it could be that Optimism has grasped something which
96. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, Fontana ed. (London: Collins, 1967)
p. 117. For Barth's discussion of Rom. 8 see pp. 174-177; 275-6.
97. CD, III, 1, n. p. 400.
98. CD, III, 1, n. p. 410.
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even Barth neglects. Even if Optimism only stands under the name of an
unknown God, at least some of its adherents see a link between man and
creation, even if this is achieved at the cost of a weaker link between
God and man. This is related in turn to Barth's fourth concern that in
rejecting Christian revelation "they (i.e. the Optimists) only had an
optional use for this God". "They are like oriental despots in relation
to their subjects, they have no personal interest in things." 99 ' Such a
charge can only be sustained if it can be shown that Christian revelation
provides an adequate and sufficient understanding of the reality of human
and non-human creation; of its purpose and meaning and of its ultimate
end. It would be too easy, of course, to counter-charge that like his
oriental philosophers, Barth fails to have a personal intezestin creation
beyond its human creatures. It must be said that Barth has not provided
a sufficiently sure ground on which he can strike so easily against his
opponents. For where in his approach is the compelling need to address
the problem of creation in itself and as such? Writing disparagingly of
the Optimists, he states that "they sit at their telescope or in their
cosy studies or on the turf among the cows, observing and then reflecting
on what they have seen. They do not allow themselves to be personally
affected, for all their interest in these things." Thus they only learn
100from the "book of nature". But it obviously does not occur to Barth
that this option may present itself as a philosophical and theological
possibility precisely because no serious reason has been advanced for the
relationship between the world as we see it, and the world in which the
Word reveals itself. It could be that the point at which Optimistic
theory most approximates the justification of creation is not at the stage
at which both may appear to advance its relationship and utility to man,
99. III, 1, n. p. 411.
100. CD, III, 1, n. p. 414.
- 139 -
but rather at the point where both accept that creation is in itself
intelligible and purposeful by virtue of its creation. In this sense
Torrance is undoubtedly right that Christian faith has enabled "the
development of empirical science" or at least nurtured the soil which
made scientific exploration possible)°1
Assessment	 -
Now that we have completed our survey of Barth's Part One, we may begin
a deeper discussion of the questions set out at the opening of our inquiry:
What account does Barth give of the creation of the non-human?
How does non-human creation stand in relation to human creature?
What end and purpose does non-human creation have? and
What, if any, is its theological significance within the created order?




101. Torrance, Theological 	 , op. cit., p. 67. Where Torrance is
wrong, however, is in his uncritical assessment of scientific methods
in exploring creation. His adulation for Francis Bacon who pursued
scientific work "in obedience and gratitude to God" and who puts "the
question to nature" even in a "violent form" is unfortunate. Theology
in Reconstruction (London: SCM Press, 1965) pp. 274 and 275. "The
underlying idea - that in science we may use animals without any
external constraints - is written into the constitution of modern
science. Bacon is, so to speak, one of the authors of this constitu-
tion", Brian Klug, 'Laboratory Pnimals, Francis Bacon and the Culture
of Science', Listening, 18, 1, (Winter 1983) p. 113. A scientific
conquest of nature without a sufficient sense of grace and reverence
will always turn against us • To be fair, Torrance appears to recognise
this when he utilises the term, borrowed from Richard Schiegi,
'malevolent technology'. 	 "Here we have the creation of mechanisms
in which man embodies his own devices, but which have a sinister habit
of gaining momentum of their own and exercising a demonic-like power
over man himself . . ." Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford; Oxford
University Press, 1981) p. 131.
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(1) Presuppositions
The question of presuppositions ask, 'What can and should be presupposed
in theological enquiry?' Barth' s answer all but determines his method
and results. This is not to suggest that his particular starting points
are arbitrary or ill-considered. On the contrary, it is clear throughout
that the business of presuppositions, of knowing where to begin and where
to distinguish theological knowledge from human opinion, is a matter of
the utmost seriousness. Indeed, we see from the Preface that Barth would
have happily preferred to give over this work to others if only he could
have been convinced of different starting points. There is a sense of
reluctance and weariness with which he approaches the necessity of begin-
ning differently. "The theological principle (theologischer Ansatz) which
I accept without a rival", he writes, "has made it almost compulsory that
I should present the doctrine ... in the old-fashioned form of a radical
exposition of the contents of the first two chapters of the Biblet.l02
It will be seen that this Ansatz determines all. This does not mean,
however, that all subsequent questions about methodology, analysis and
result are simply questions of embellishment and detail. What Barth seeks
first and foremost is a starting point that will make sense of the material
under consideration. "The theology of Barth lacks nothing - except a
basis" - this and many other "one-sentence dismissals" of his work
102. CD, III, 1, p. iv (preface)
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abound. 1°3
 Arguably, however, no other theologian this century has actually
spent more time. justifying and explaining his theological approach. What is
exceptional about Barth is not that he has presuppositions, since all
theological work involves these, but the rigour, dexterity and determination
with which he pursues the theological task certain that there is under-
standing to be gained and knowledge to be acquired. We may wish that other
theologians had subjected their own presuppositions to the rigourous examination
that Barth had subjecthis own 104 Our primary concern in what immediately
103. This particular one is S.W. Sykes' "favourite", see his Karl Barth -
Studies of his Theological Methods, op. cit., p. 3. Here ate some
others: (i) "Barth, then, is to be read (some of him, at least), but
not to be imitated", Maurice Wiles, The Remaking of Christian Doctrine
(London: SCM Press, 1974) p. 25; (ii) •.• Barth's influence has tended
to encapsulate Christian thinking within the Church, and to sever its
connection with the secular world", John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century
Religious Thought: The Frontiers of Philosophy and Theology, 1900-1980,
Revised ed. (London: SCM Press, 1981) p. 324; (iii) "Theologies, such
as that of Barth, which threaten to destroy all relative moral judge-
ments by their exclusive emphasis upon the ultimate religious fact of
the sinfulness of all men, are rightly suspected of imperilling relative
moral achievements of history", Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny
of Man: A Christian Interpretation, 2 vols. (London: Nisbet & Sons,
1941) Vol. I, Human Nature (1941) p. 234. Niebuhr's judgement, espe-
cially his view that in "radical Protestantism", characterised by Barth,
"the very image of God in man is believed to be destroyed", op. cit.,
p. 285, flies in the face of substantial evidence, see my summary pp.27-28.
Perhaps it is not surprising that Barth asked himself in later life
whether "people only pay me attention out of respect, without really
listening?", letter to H. Gollwitzer, 31 July, 1962, cited in Busch,
op. cit., p. 461.
104. For example: (i) "God is a unifying symbol that eloquently personifies
and represents to us everything that spirituality requires of us", Don
Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (London: SM Press, 1980) p. 9; (ii) "For
to say, without explanation, that the historical Jesus of Nazareth was
also God is as devoid of meaning as to say that this circle drawn with
a pencil on paper is also a square", John Hick, 'Jesus and the World
Religions' in The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. by John Hick (London: SCM
Press, 1977) p. 178; (iii) "The second consideration that has made the
traditional account of the doctrine of the incarnation incredible for
me has been the growing conviction that in our account of Jesus Christ
we must begin from the assumption that, whatever else he was, he was a
real human personality", A.T. Hanson, Grace and Truth: A Study in the
Doctrine of the Incarnation (London: SPCK, 1975) p. 2; (iv) "... I do
not believe that it is possible for us to claim that kind of precise know-
ledge (however mysterious) about the nature of God in himself ... I cannot
with integrity say that I believe God to be one in three persons", Maurice
Wiles, Christian Believing: The Nature of the Christian Faith and its
Expression in Holy Scripture and Creeds, Report of the Doctrine Commis-
sion of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1976) p. 126; cf. "We have
no other starting point (for theological knowledge) than our ordinary
(cont. over)
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follows, therefore, is not to quarrel with Barth's Ansatz, that is to
posit or justify alternative theological principles which might have
illuminated the doctrine of creation in a different way, but rather to
ask whether Barth secures the ends he seeks, given his starting points.
In short: this is not primarily a comparative exercise nor a contrasting
one; but primarily an analytical one. We want to know whether beginning
at the point at which Barth begins we can really construct an adequate
doctrine of creation as such.
What then is this Ansatz that Barth accepts "without a rival"? It is the
presupposition of God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. This principle is
normative (in the sense that it provides the basis of enquiry); regulative
(in the sense that it shapes the nature of that enquiry) , and determinative
(in the sense that the end or result of that enquiry is related to its
beginning). Barth makes this clear in his outline summary:
The insight (Einsicht) that man owes his existence (Dasein) and
form (Sosein), together with all the reality distinct from God,
to God's creation, is achieved only in the reception and answer
of the divine self-witness, that is, only in faith in Jesus
Christ, i.e. in the knowledge of the unity of Creator and creature
actualised in Him, and in the life in the presence mediated by
Him, under the right and the experience of the goodness of the
Creator towards His creature.-
We may suinup the ways in which the Ansatz operates by itemising the ways
in which Christ relates to the creature, thus: (i) notionally the self-
104. (cont.) experience of the world", The Remaking of Christian Doctrine,
op. cit., p. 25. These "starting points" or "assumptions" effectively
govern what can subsequently be concluded, e.g. is it self-evident
that the question about the resurrection of the body should be posed
in this form "... are there features of the human situation as such
which point towards a belief in immortality for man?" Wiles, The
Remaking of Christian Doctrine, op. cit., p. 132. At least we can
say that Barth's assumptions do not suffer from any lack of explicit-
ness or elaboration.
105. CD, III, 1, p. 3; for a discussion of the meaning of Einsicht see
Whitehouse, 'Karl Barth and the Doctrine of Creation' in op. cit.,
pp. 12 - 14.
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disclosure of God establishes the reality of the creature because God
has affirmed the reality of created life in himself in this way; (ii) onto-
logically the basis of creation is affirmed in Christ, since it is the Son
who is the agent of creation, the Co-creator with the Father, who sustains,
upholds and rules creation; (iii) Christ is the centre, purpose and goal
of creation; it is made for him who is necessarily its "basis, norm and
meaning"°6 ; (iv) the shape and nature of creation, including the right
and appropriate response of man, is determined by the way in which God has
chosen to reveal himself within creation; (iv) the incarnate humanity of
Jesus is thus the meaning of creation and, in this sense, "man is and
represents the secret of the creature"; 107
 (vi) the covenant relationship
with man, as described and detailed by Barth, "has its beginning, it centre
,,108	 .
and its culmination in Jesus Christ	 because this relationship is the
prototype of, and a prefiguring of, the inner relationship between God in
himself as Father, Son and Holy Spriit; (vii) Christ is the "guarantee"
that creation is not indifferent, hostile or ambivalent but real (actual),
good and beneficient because God has joined himself to it through the
incarnation; and (viii) Christ is the sign of the unity of creation, because
God has reconciled creation, its brighter and negative aspects, to himself
through the work of the Son.
(2) Methods
How then, given these presupposed relationships, does Barth advance a
doctrine of creation? As we have seen, his primary data are the two crea-
tion sagas. His concern is to show how these sagas are to be read in the
light of Jesus Christ. "I have no christological principle and no
106. CD, III, 1, p. 25.
107. CD, III, 1, p. 18.
108. CD, III, 1, p. 42.
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christological method" wrote Barth provocatively in 1952. "Rather, in
each individual theological question I seek to orientate myself afresh -
to some extent from the very beginning - not on christological dogma but
on Jesus Christ himself." 109
 The point is not to show from the material
how or why it is true that God has so disclosed himself in Jesus Christ,
but rather how it is that the confession of God the Creator is inseparable
from the confession of Jesus Christ, crucified and risen. Barth does this
by establishing the Genesis narratives as "witnesses" to the divine self-
witness, i.e. Jesus Christ, and therefore feels free to offer explicitly
110Christological interpretations of the Genesis material.	 The second way
109. Letter to B. Gherardini, 24 May 1952, cited in Busch, op. cit., p. 380.
Cf. "Sometimes I don't like the word christology very much. It's not
a matter of christology, nor even of christocentricity and a christo-
logical orientation, but of Christ himself", conversations with
Göttingen students, 12 October 1963, cited in Busch, op. cit., p. 411,
his italics.
110. It is vexing to recount the number of commentators who fail to see
Barth's distinction between the Revealed Word (Christ himself) and
witnesses to that Word in scripture and preaching, see my note,
30, p. 12.	 For example: Ci) "For him (Barth) the Bible was a given;
the limits of the canon were ultimate limits to the vehicle of divine
revelation", John Bowden, Karl Barth: Theologian (London: SCM Press,
1983) p. 98; his italics. But the Bible is not in itself the vehicle of
revelation; it only becomes so when it witnesses to the Revealed Word;
(ii) "For Barth's word of God - the church's preaching? scripture?
Jesus himself? - demanding the 3bedience of faith cannot be unambiguous
because it remains at least problematical whether it is God and divine
revelation and not merely human convictions", Wolfhart Pannenberg,
Theology and the Philosophy of Science, ET by Francis McDonagh (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976) p. 273; his italics. Parinenberg's crit-
icism might be just if Barth had not in fact taken pains to distinguish
precisely the meaning he attributes to "revealed", "written" and
"preached" Words; (iii) "According to Karl Barth, dogma is the agreement
of the preaching of the Church at a particular time with the revelation
testified to in scripture - that is, the preaching of the Church insofar
as it agrees with the Bible as the word of God", Michael Scbmaus, Dogma,
6 vols. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1968) Vol I God in Revelation (1968)
pp. 229/30. Again this appears to take the word in the Bible as the
primary source of revelation. Barth does not deny that Bible and
preaching are "primary witnesses", even that they-hold a "unique posi-
tion" to the Revealed Word, but the crux is that God can only reveal
himself and thus "Theology is modest because its entire logic can
only be human ana-logy to that Word (Revealed Word)", Barth, Evangel-
ical Theology: An Introduction, ET by Grover Foley, Fontana Library of
Theology and Philosophy (London: Collins, 1965) pp. 29 and 21; his
italics.
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is by the insistence that the creation sagas seek to relate
not only history, but also the history of the covenant between God and
man. Thus the covenant becomes the major interpretive theme for under-
standing the Genesis sagas.
Ci) Saga One (Gen 1: 1 - 2.4a) which describes the making of the heavens
and the earth is interpreted as "the external basis of the covenant".
Barth does not content himself with exegesis of this narrative but seeks
to find the right point from which intelligible exegesis can emerge.
It is not the brute fact of existence, but the divine purpose willing and
supporting creation which is central. Thus "Creation is not itself the
covenant " . 111
 Again: "Love, divine love, wills something with and for
that which it loves", and therefore creation points beyond to "an exercise
and fulfilment of His love ... to which creation in all its glory looks
and moves, and of which creation is the presupposition". 112
 Thus Barth's
exposition of Genesis sees Creation as moving towards a climax and goal,
of which the fact of creation is only the presupposition. Its first stage
is the creation of man which unlike the rest of creation, is "the true
occupant of the house founded and prepared by c3" 113 Man is to be God's
covenant partner. Again Barth could not be more emphatic: "Everything
(the non-human creation) that precedes only pre-figures this decision (the
election of man as a covenant partner) and prepares for it". 114
 Man, as
made male and female, reflects and copies the eternal "I" and "Thou" rela-
tionship within God himself. The second and more decisive stage is the
resting on the Sabbath. This is the "goal" of creation standing as it
were inside and outside of time. "Man is created to participate in this
111. 2.' III 1, p. 97.
112. 2.' III, 1, pp. 95/6.
113. 2.' "q	 p. 181.
114. £2.' III 1, p. 182.
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rest" writes Barth. "It is the covenant of the grace of God which in
this event, at the supreme and final point of the first creation story,
is revealed as the starting point for all that follows ,,115 In sum: the
first saga is interpreted with these three emphases, (i) the creation of
man as the true covenant partner; (ii) man, as male and female, reflecting
the inner relationship within God himself and, most iniportantly (iii) the
goal of creation as Sabbath rest, freedom and joy for men.
(ii) Saga Two (Gen 2: 4b-3) is described as the "internal basis of creation".
Because this saga begins with the goal of creation already, established we
are dealing with a history of creation from "the inside". In this saga we
see how Jesus Christ is the "beginning (the beginning because he is the
goal) of creation". 116 Barth therefore accepts that "it would be quite
out of place ... to apply the method used in relation to Gen. 1, selecting
a certain point in the passage and using it as a criterion for the rest".117
The first man created and described at the beginning of Saga Two is the
man necessary for the flourishing and tilling of the earth. Barth gives
us an explicit hristological interpretation: "He, Jesus Christ, is the man
whose existence was necessary for the perfecting of the earth". Once
grasped it is perceived that we are on the "threshold" of the history of
the covenant. 118
 The second fundamental emphasis concerns the creation of
woman, and man's recognition and acceptance of her as part of himself.
Again this receives an explicitly Christological interpretation. "The
whole inner basis of creation", writes Barth, "God's whole covenant with
man, which will later be established, realised and fulfilled historically,
is prefigured in this event, in the completing of man's emergence by the
115. £.' III i 1, p. 98.
116. •, III, 1, p. 232.
117. ca III, 1, p. 233.
118. 2.' III, 1, p. 239.
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119
coming of woman to man". The male/female analogy is seen as a pre-
figuring of the relationship between man and woman in general, between
Yahweh and his people, and more specifically and finally between Christ
and his Church. Jesus Christ and his Church are the inner basis of
creation.
How then are we to characterise Barth's method of approaching the creation
sagas? First and foremost, he is concerned to establish analogies of
relationship within the earthly sphere that reflect the inner relationship
within the life of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. If Barth is free
with his Christological interpretations it is because he is convinced that
there must be a fundamental relationship between the Word and the created
order made by God in which the Word becomes enfleshed. "(I)t is through
radically Christo-centric thinking that pure theology can arise 1', argues
Torrance, "and be preserved from all corruption from the side of anthro-
pocentric thinkingu)20 This analogy of relationship is most clearly
exemplified in the covenant relationship itself. It is not in any faculty,
ability, disposition or potentiality on man' s part that the covenant is
established but through God's wholly sovereign will and design. Man finds
himself as a covenant partner, in the same way for example, that woman finds
herself as the chosen partner of man. "She does not choose; she is chosen"
writes Barth. 121 This exegesis of this apparently small incident can be
seen as wholly illustrative of Barth's theme, namely the sovereign free
1l9. CD, III, 1, p. 295.
120. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910 - 1931,
op. cit., p. 143; his italics. It may be ironical that the strongest
claim made here for Barth consists in his freeing of theology from
anthropocentricity. It may be difficult in practice to know the dif-
ference between a theology of the Word which confines itself to know-
ledge of the human creature and "an anthropology that tries to solve
the riddle of human existence through man' s self-understanding", Torrance,
Karl Barth: An Introduction, op. cit., p. 166.
121. CD, III, 1, p. 303.
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choice of God to elect man within his very self. In the second place,
his method is designed to promote understanding of what must be true
about the nature of the world as described by Genesis, if it is also true
that God has disclosed himself in Jesus Christ. It is the making sense of
creation that follows the affirmation of the incarnation. Thus Barth
returns again and again to his theological starting point, not through
any disguised attempt at dogmatism, but in order to show how, even in
small and apparently trivial matters, creaturely life is significant and
purposeful. Created life in the light of the incarnation must be intelli-
gible, that is, it cannot be neutral, hostile or indifferent. The deter-
mination to juxtapose human opinion and revealed knowledge sterns from the
conviction that the key to understanding cannot be found in simple human
reasoning; it requires a response of faith and a readiness to stand by the
fully rational insights that flow from it) 22
 Thirdly, it is the notion of
insight, of something seen, of relationships perceived, of grace experienced,
that so characterises Barth's approach to the biblical material. It is not
incidental that he makes free with words like "witness", "perception",
"prefigures", "imagination" and "discovery". The business of biblical
exegesis is a dynamic process of relating one expression of truth to
another and seeking their inner correspondence. Those who question Barth's
approach purely from the standpoint of historical correctness or redaction
criticism often miss this point. But it has to be said that the typologi-
cal method which so characterises his approach has few theological friends
today. But since it was am influential form of exegesis in the early
church, it requires more attention than it currently receives. "If the
Bible is a unity in any sense, then it is plain that it must, in some
122. For a critical defence of Barth against neo-classical theology repre-
sented by Charles Hartshorne, see C.E. Gunton's Becoming and Being, op.
cit., esp.pp. 215 - 224. Gunton stresses: "We are very much In the
area of pre-rational views of the way things are, of which systems
of theology and metaphysics are the outworking in rational terms. It
is almost certainly true that men do not choose their view of the way
things are; in large part, it chooses them", p. 219.
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sense, be a book about Christ; and typology is simply a method of dis-
covering and interpreting the implications of that fact". 123 This is why
Barth feels free	 to postulate what to others appear extravagant or
fanciful correspondences and relationships - precisely because the inner
unity of the biblical witness betokens the rationality of the Word made
flesh. It is because of this that the creative on-going work of dogmatics
must involve the postulating of fresh correspondences and relationships
and why Barth was so eager during his lifetime that his work should inspire
others to pursue the same creative work that every generation is called
upon to perform. "I see ... the Church Dogmatics", commented Barth towards
the end of his life, "not as a conclusion but as the opening of a new con-
versation".	 Dogmatics should not be likened to "a house" but "as the
introduction to a way that must be followed, as the description of the
movement of something that can only be described in dynamic, not static
concepts. A house is a static object".124
(3) Results
The questions we must ask of Barth then are broadly these: Has he estab-
lished genuine points of relationship and correspondence between the
created world and the Word made flesh? Has he shown the intelligibility
of the created world in the light of his presuppositions and methods? Does
his exposition make sense of the created world? Does the doctrine of
creation as presented rationally cohere with and correspond to other
123. G.W.H. Lainpe, 'The Reasonableness of Typology' in Essays on Typology,
eds. G.W.H. Lampe and K.J. Woollcombe,. Studies in Biblical Theology,
22 (London: SCM Press, 1957) p. 23. Lainpe distinguishes typology
from allegory which "takes no account of history", whereas typology
"is grounded upon the Biblical writers' own understanding of history",
p. 31 and 32. See also 'Typology, Allegory and nalogy' in James D.
Smart's The Interpretation of Scripture, The Preacher's Library
(London: SCM Press, 1961) pp. 93 - 133.
124. 'Remembrances--of America', The Christian Century, 1963, 7ff. cited in
Busch, op. cit., p. 488; Conversations with youth chaplains from the




It will be seen straight away that the strength of the exposition lies in
its full arid systematic treatment of man in creation. Barth's thought
is coherent and structured because the nature of human creation is always
explained in terms of God's humanity in Jesus Christ. We have already
drawn attention to the depth and richness of much of his exposition in
this direction. What is much less clear is the theological significance
of creation itself. For Barth never addresses himself fully and directly
to the status and purpose of the non-human creation in itself and as such.
I shall now try to draw out the limitations involved in this omission.
(i) Christological Deficiency
I mean by this that there exists a whole dimension of relationship between
Christ and creation that must be laid to one side if creation is to be viewed.jn
a wholly anthropocentric way. There is, of course, a sense in which anthropo-
centricity is right and inevitable (see pp. l69f.; 304-10) but the problematical
aspect of Barth's analysis is the way in which it precludes full consider-
atjon of creation as it is in itself. It is not that Barth fails to see
meaning, purpose and significance in creation; it is rather, that what he
sees is too limited. He deals with questions relating to non-human
creation in a largely notional way, that is, he frequently perceives an
intellectual and logical relationship between one thing and another, and
states such a connection without necessarily developing it in full. Here
are seven examples which have some Christological bearing:
(a) Speaking of Jesus Christ, Barth asserts, "it is here that God has
revealed the relationship between Creator and creature - its basis, norm
and meaning") 25
 That there must be a relationship is evident, but he
125.	 p•, III, 1, p. 25.
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does not expound what kind of meaning is involved for the non-human
creature.
(b) "When we have discovered man as God's creature ... in Jesus Christ,
we have made a direct discovery of heaven and earth as the object of the
divine act of creation". Once again Barth posits the necessity of one
discovery involving another. But what meaning has the discovery if the
full meaning of the creation itself is undiscovered? The point is not
developed.
Cc) "We have established that from every angle Jesus Christ is the key
to the secret of creation." Again that there should be an important
connection is evident, but has Barth established it from "every angle"?
He continues: "It is thus clear that the knowledge of creation, of the
Creator and of the creature, is a knowledge of faith, and that here too
the Christian doctrine is a doctrine of faith" l26 Barth here assumes
that he has established a knowledge of creation and the creature. In fact,
however, he has only established a knowledge of the reality of created humanity
through the knowledge of God's humanity in Christ.
Cd) "The fact that God has regard to His Son - the Son of Man, the Word
made flesh is the true and genuine basis of creation ... a genuine neces-
sity is constituted by the fact that from all eternity He willed so to love
,,127the world, and did so love it, that He gave His only begotten Son
Once again that the one statement implies the other is evident, but what
is striking is that Barth nowhere develops this crucial notional relation-
ship between Christ's incarnation and God's love for the world. If this
is a "genuine necessity" why are we not told more of it? At this crucial
point why are we not informed of the meaning and purpose of the world that
126. CD, III, 1, p. 28.
127. CD, III, 1, p. 51.
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must stem from such a correlation and confession?
(e) "The inner basis of the covenant is simply the free love of God, or
more precisely the eternal covenant which God has decreed in Himself as
the covenant of the Father with the Son as the Lord and bearer of human
nature, and to that extent the Representative (Vertreter) of all crea-
tion". 128 That the Son should be the Vertreter of all is an important
and striking implication here, but Barth nowhere develops it further.
The implication is clear, that incarnation somehow involves creation,
but beyond that we are not told more.
(f) "... it is man whom God has chosen and created as a sign of the future
which he has destined for all creation as such". 129
 Once again that there
exists a connection between God's incarnation in creation and his purposes
for the future of this creation seems evident. But how this future may
be "for all creation" is not explained further.
(g) "Since everything is created for Jesus Christ and His death and resur-
rection, from the very outset everything must stand under this twofold and
contradictory determination1.l30 That there exists a relationship between
incarnation and everything created could not be more tellingly expressed
But the question must be asked; what is the meaning of this relationship?
It will be seen from the foregoing that Barth does indeed see the necessity,
both theological and logical, of positing a close relationship of meaning
between the Word and the creation in which the Word is revealed. Again
and again Barth comes back to stating such a notional relationship. In
offering exegesis of Genesis 1: 3, he speaks of how "the creature in its
128. CD, III, 1, p. 97.
129. CD, III, 1, p. 238.
130. CD, III, 1, p. 376.
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totality was allied to this living, divine Person (the Word), being
wholly referred to it for its existence and essence, its survival and
sustenance". 131 As before, this is a provocative statement about the
relationship between creation and the sustaining power of christ. But
its potential edge is taken away because we are not given a clear idea
of the relationship between "the creature in its totality" and the humanity
affirmed by the Word. Why is it that, at this point (like so many others),
having established the necessity of a connection and correspondence,
Barth grows silent?
The answer unfortunately is only too clear. The silence is a consequence
of Barth's considerable skill and concentration in keeping to his pre-
determined points of exegesis. In interpreting the first creation saga,
Barth moved determinedly to his pre-identified point and climax, namely
man as the covenant partner of God, called (in his duality of male and
female) to share the Sabbath rest. Everything, we have seen, moves inexor-
ably from one stage and circle of creation to another, stopping not at the
creation of man itself, but at the identification of divine purpose beyond
the eternal work of creation. In this sense the considerable strength of
Barth's exposition is also its weakness. For in grasping and sustaining
one (undoubtedly vital) piece of exegesis he pushes to the background
another (equally vital) insight. All this would be unexceptional in the
sense that most theological work advances by isolating some (often neg-
lected) insights and bringing them into focus with others, if it were not
for Barth's insistence that Christology is the centre of understanding in
this matter and that creation cannot actually be rendered intelligible
without the latter. We can only indicate the range of connection and -
correspondence which is not pursued more fully: Ci) the relationship
131. CD, III, 1, p. 110.
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between Christ as the Co-creator with the Father and therefore the
agent sustaining creation, and non-human creation; (ii) the relationship
between the affirmation by God in Christ of human nature in the incarna-
tion and the ion-human creation; (iii) the relationship between the lord-
ship of Christ in the incarnation and the lordship (dominion) of man over
non-human creation; (iv) the relationship between God's election of man
to a covenant relationship, pre-figurative of the relationship between
Christ and his Church, and the non-human creation and finally (v) the
relationship between the reconciling work of Christ in man and the non-
human creation. These points notionally established by Barth could, if
developed further, yield a rich and promising Christological interpreta-
tion of creation...
(ii) Biblical Deficiency
The covenant relationship is the major interpretive theme of the two creation
sagas. Yet Barth's approach to this matter as it affects the non-human
is a classic example of his notional method. He indicates in a footnote:
"And in the covenant made with Noah after the flood there are included
not only his sons, and their posterity, but also expressly "every living
creature that is with you" (Gen. 9: 10) 132 Notionally Barth acknowledges
that non-human living beings form part of the covenant relationship. He
sees the connection and states it. But nowhere in the whole of Part One
does he explore the meaning of this connection. It is as if Barth prac-
tically proceeds as if he had not noted the text. Indeed his outline
suniina4r clearly states the omission, thus:
But according to this witness (the biblical witness) the
purpose and therefore the meaning of creation is to make
possible the history of God's covenant with man which has
its beginning, its centre and its culmination in Jesus Christ.
The history of this covenant is as much the goal of creation as
creation itself is the beginning of this history.133
132. CD, III, 1, xi. p. 180.
133. CD, III, 1, p. 42; my italics.
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This omission is so serious that when viewed in the light of Barth's
whole exposition, it necessarily undermines his entire work. For it
cannot be said that the covenant relationship with man alone is the goal
of creation. It cannot be said that God has uniquely endowed man with
this capacity and thus that his being is especially and exclusively
equipped for this relationship. It cannot be maintained that man 'S sexual
differentiation is uniquely bound up with his sole capacity for the covenant
relationship. It cannot be said that man alone is called upon to partici-
pate in Sabbath rest. It cannot be said that the sole purpose "and
therefore the meaning" of creation is God's covenant with man. It cannot
be said that non-human creation can only "prefigure and prepare" for this
relationship if in fact the non-human are included within it. It cannot
be said that God actualised and justified creation with the sole purpose
of establishing man as his covenant partner which has its culmination in
Jesus Christ. It cannot be said that this is the only point at which we
can affirm the goodness of creation or celebrate the divine purpose within
it. It cannot be said that this one relationship makes sense of the
entirety of creation, if, as inseparable from this relationship, God has
in fact purposed other such relationships within the creation order. "The
anthropocentric procedure characteristic of Reformed theology is not to
be confused with that Idealism which makes man the measure of all things",
writes Whitehouse who offers in addition these stern words: "The theologian
must not proceed as though the significance of non-human creatures were
exhausted by their contribution to the being of man". 134
 In challenging
Barth in these terms one need not deny that the covenant relationship
with man is central to the biblical witness or that it should be seen as
having overriding significance. But as I hope to show the total significance
134. Whitehouse, 'The Christian view of Man: An Examination of Karl Barth's
Doctrine' in op. Cit., p. 18; my italics.
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of man may be actually weakened, rather than strengthened, by the exclusive
emphasis advanced here (see pp. 159-60).
(iii) Ontological Deficiency
Barth's approach desperately lacks some definition of how the non-
human creation stands in relation to the human. Because he does not
offer a full account of the meaning and, purpose of the non-human as it is
in itself, the main tendency in his work is to see the non-human purpose
instrumentally in relation to man. I mean by this that he frequently
subsumes questions concerning- the status and significance of the non-human
to other questions concerning their use, value or significance to human
beings.. Six examples from the first saga will illustrate the nature of
Barth's instrumental method:-
(i) The separation of the firmaments of heaven and earth (Gen 1: 6 - 8)
is essentially for man. "Thus the upper, hidden cosmos (now separated)
cannot be an object of real terror for man", writes Barth, and he continues:
"He (man) need not fear that chaos, death artd destruction will crash down
upon him from heaven") 35
 Again in concluding this section, "From the
very beginning, from the foundation of the world, God has had good inten-
tions toward man".
(ii) The creation of dry land (Gen 1: 9 - 13) is "the living space of
man9 137 While on the one hand Barth accepts that the plant is "created
138for its own sake as well",	 on the other his concluding remarks support
his anthropocentrism: "it is in this way, and this way alone, that we can
understand the work of the third day ... as the erection of a table in the
135. CD, III, 1, p. 134; my italics.
136. CD, III, 1, p. 135; my italics.
137. CD, III, 1, p. 141; my italics.
138. CD, III, 1, p. 143.
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midst of this house which is finally and supremely for man")39
(iii)The furnishing of the cosmos (Gen 1: 14 - 19) and the creation of
the lights are for man. "They serve the purpose of orientation", writes
Barth. Moreover "it belongs to creation that man should be given this
objective direction ... that is why man's cosmos should not merely be
orientated by God but orientating for man" 140
(iv)The creation of birds and fish (Gen 1: 20 - 23) belong to the
"outermost circle" and receive divine blessing) 41
 Barth writes: "The
spectacle offered in these spheres is one to inspire confidence for man."142
This is because they "must also bear witness" to the divine-human coven-
143
ant.
(v) The creation of living, creeping beings (Gen 1: 24 - 31) means the
creation of attendant witnesses to the covenant, "not as an independent
partner(s) ,,(l44) but as attendants animal-kind shares the hope and curse
of human-kind.
(vi)The creation of man (Gen 1: 24 - 31) is the climax of creation.
Thus "If we think of the rest of creation without man, we can think in
terms of something other than God, but only in the sense of something
distinct from God and not of a counterpart") 45
 Everything in creation
"prepares" for or "prefigures" the place of man. Finally "What distinguishes
him (man) and gives him authority and power is that fact that, although he
139. CD, III, 1, p. 144; my italics.
140. CD, III, 1, p. 158; my italics.
141. CD, III, 1, p. 170.
142. CD, III, 1, p. 169; my italics.
143. CD, III, 1, p. 171.
144. CD, III, 1, p. 178.
145. CD, III, 1, p. 184.
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is not radically different from the other creatures with independent
, he has been honoured by the grace of God to be in the image of
God in the uniqueness of his plurality as male and female" 146
The difficulty with Barth's exposition of the first creation saga is not
the overriding significance he attributes to man, or the generally high
place he occupies in creation. It is rather that, as articulated, non-
human creation is seen as incidental and fundamentally irrelevant to the
divine disclosure within it. Where is the relationship between Christ
as the Co-creator and agent of creation and the revelation within creation?
Barth could have benefited here from the lyricism of St. Athartasius who
likens the Word to a musician who:
produces a single melody ... holding the universe like a
lyre, draws together the things in the air with those on
earth, and those in the heaven with those in the air, and
combines the whole with the parts, linking them with his
command and will, thus producing in beauty and harmony a
single world and a single order within it
Thus the Logos is seen as extending "his power everywhere, illuminating all
things visible and invisible, containing and enclosing them in himself",
giving "life and everything, everywhere, to each individually and to
all together" thus creating an exquisite "single euphonious harmony".147
The second difficulty is that Barth comes perilously close to assuming an
Anthropozentrismus of an unqualified kind. He writes of "man's cosmos"
in clear opposition to his previous thought that creation is made for
Christ and his disclosure within it. The slip into identifying the good-
ness of creation with its purpose for man-as-man, seriously weakens his
Christological emphasis. For, as Barth indicates, it is the affirmation
146. CD, III, 1, p. 188.
147. Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. and ET by Robert
W. Thompson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) pp. 117 and 115.
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of God's humanity in Christ and not humanity plain and simple that is
the central point of Christian understanding. Perhaps it is for this
reason that creation appears only partially intelligible in the light of
the Word. For the most part we do not know why the grass grows, the sun
shines and creation teems with millions of varying species. These aspects
of creation are not genuinely necessary to the Word incarnate as Barth expounds
them. They are beings in the context of whose existence the revelation of an
entirely different being is made manifest. There is no intrinsic relation-
ship between Christ incarnate and Christ the Co-creator here defended.
Because of this it must be questioned whether Barth actually gives us a
doctrine of creation as it is in itself.1
One further query must be raised. This concerns the nature of man as
defined by Barth's exegesis. Since his approach involves seeing the whole
meaning of creation as disclosed in the divine-human convenarit, he there-
fore has no alternative but to argue that "it is in their (animals') rela-
tionship to him (man) that they are what they are". 149
 In this sense, as
we have seen, the meaning of the non-human can only be understood in terms of the
human. Without this frame of reference their lives are largely or completely
inexplicable. But does this approach also limit man's place in creation?
Does this mean that man cannot be free to be a creature among other
148. I do not, however, share the view of Rowan Williams that because
Barth cannot offer some form of natural theology he "has as little of
a. doctrine of creation as Hegel" and that in opposition to Hegel, God
and the world are "entirelydiscontinuous". "The Fall has, it seems,
obliterated any theological significance in the created order as such
in the Barthian picture ...." 'Barth on the Triune God', in Karl Barth:
Studies of his Theological Methods, op. cit., p. 188. This wide
judgement cannot be reconciled with Barths strong emphasis on the in-
carnation and his utter determination to minimise the effect of the
Fall in particular (see. pp. 240f. ). The Fall indeed makes no
difference to the theological standing of creation as such. Where I
agree with Williams, however, is in his concern about Barth's irisuf-
ficiently developed doctrine of the Spirit active within creation,
op. cit., pp. 181f.
149. CD, III, 1, p. 292.
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creatures within creation? Is man free to see creation as intelligible
except in the light of himself? Is he truly free to meet other creatures
as objects of worth in their own right? Is he free to say with God that
creation is "good" since outside his relationship with them they appear
to have no value, purpose or significance? On this account it seems as
if the very possibility of man encountering creation and recognising him-
self in relation to it is taken away, for there cannot be any human dis-
covery of the intrinsic meaning of other creatures. At the very least
we should say that "Barth's grounding of the history between God and man
in the eternal trinitarian being of God obscures somewhat the independent
150
status of the created order".
Once this possibility is grasped, it will be seen that the danger in Barth's
exposition is that man as created is seen as existing within his own morally
exclusive world. The reality of Creator and created gives way to a quasi-
Platonic notion of the real (human) creation and the unreal (non-human)
creation. What appears solely real and purposeful is human creation as
affirmed in Christ.. Man is thus set adrift from creation for the relation-
ship of purpose which unites the Word with the creation as a whole, and
through which the world is redeemed, is unavoidably severed.
(iv) Trinitarian Deficiency
What is wanting in Barth is some description of God's interaction with
creation as a whole. -Where is the necessary concretisation of God's
initiative and sovereignty? This question must appear odd in
relation to the one theologian in this century who has seemingly
done so much to defend the sovereignty of C-ad in creation. In
any case it would certainly not be possible to convict Barth
150. Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1971) p. 437.
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of being wholly wrong in this matter. For the divine-human
covenant relationship is the natural place to begin interpreting "the
inner basis'of creation". Much of Barth's analysis of the place of man
in that context. is profound and illuminating. The weakness is simply that
in tying all creation to this divine-human encounter, the very possibility
of divine initiative and purpose within the non-human creation is eclipsed.
So anthropocentrically are the lines drawn that even the furnishing of
the cosmos is really intended for man and not for the life of all crea-
tures together. Even in the second creation saga, where Barth reaches a
real possibility of affirming the independent value of non-human forms of
life, he shrinks from its full exploration. We have seen how potentially
transforming some of his comments could have been in this area if only
he had taken time to develop them fully. The most startling of these was
the suggestion that man stands in relation to creation as one who serves,
"the being who had to be created for the sake of the earth and to serve
it". 151 If only he had developed this vision of man as sharing in the
divine work of reconcilation within the cosmos, his substantive conclusions
may well have been very different. As it is in Part One man is strangely
irrelevant to the actual life of creation which is sustained and loved
by God. For this is surely the point: if creation is a dynamic organism,
given life by a truly creative Creator, should our eyes not be set upon
the work of the Spirit within creation as well as upon its reconciliation by
the Son?	 -
We point here to what appears to be a strange omission. For whilst Barth
is wholly trinitarian in his opening statement of God's relationship to
the world, he is oddly binitarian in his choice of relationships which
are said to express this inner unity and correspondence. In practice this
151. CD, III, 1, p. 235.
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is only achieved by leaving to one side (temporarily, of course) the work
of God as Holy Spirit. Every inner correspondence and relationship points
to the work of the Son, or the Father and the Son, or Christ and His
Church, but seldom if at all, to the Holy Spirit. We are simpiy not
given any fundamental analogy that would enable us to see the pre-figurative
work of the Spirit in creation. "One of the fundamental contradictions of
Barth's teaching is the fact that it limits the potential agency of the
Holy Spirit on man and on the world". 152
 I do not want to pre-judge here
the important section on the Spirit in relation to the question of body
and soul discussed in Part Two (see pp. 250f. ) but it is significant that
the threefoldness of God and the prefigurative relationships which may
express them do not form any part of this work so far. Is the Spirit
active in creation, even in its non-human parts? What function does the Spirit
fulfil within the created order loved and cherished by God and redeemed
by the Son? Is not the life of all beings breathed upon by the Holy
Spirit one way in which the divine purpose within creation can be charac-
tensed? nd what purpose has the Spirit-filled life of non-human crea-
tion? Barth, of course, insists that the life of the Spirit in human
beings is different at least in degree from that of animals, but even so he
does not deny that the same creative force is the basis of both. Could it
be that his strong emphasis upon the election of man as a covenant partner,
and therefore the development of analogies of relationship between Christ
and his Church, has actually weakened the fullest statement of the three-
fold relationship of God as Trinity to the created world as a whole?
"The third person of the Trinity ... is the mode of being of the one God
by whose activity is anticited the future redemption of man and the whole
152. Nicolas Berdyaev, Spirit and Reality, ET by George Reavey (London:
Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1939), p. 181. Berdyaev's
complaint is particularly against the notion that the Holy Spirit is
only-"eschatologically present in man" (p. 181). Elsewhere he writes
in a vein	 which Barth would surely have approved, e.g. "The tendency
to regard the spiritual life as a way of salvation, and Christianity
as a religion of personal salvation, has led to spirituality being
narrowed, diminished and weakened" (p. 165).
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created order of which he is a part".'53
Christological Reconstruction
We are now in a position to offer some account of how Barth might have
presented the question of the non-human and its relationship with the human
accepting the framework of presuppositions within which he wishes to work.
The sole deviation from this will be (in fidelity to the biblical witness)
the inclusion of. other living beings within the dhrine covenant
relationship.
A. Christ as Co-creator
We begin by affirming Christ as the Co-creator with the Father of all that
is. He is the agent "through whom all things come to be". (Jn. 1: 3) and
with the Father the source of love for the world which continually sus-
tains it. From this we deduce that all creation, vegetable, animal and
human has divine purpose and significance. By the fact that it is and
that it continues to be we have no alternative but to deduce a fundamental
divine beneficence towards it. Barth speaks of creation as "presupposi-
tion", "the external basis" of God's covenant, "the sphere" or "the stage"
of God's subsequent activity. 154 But from the fact of its creation we
have no alternative but to affirm at the beginning that God's good crea-
tion has value and purpose in itself and as it is. Barth writes that "It
would be a strange love (divine love) that was satisfied with the mere
existence and nature of the other, then withdrawing, leaving it to its
155
own devices".	 But the assumption is not as Barth describes it. The
fact is that creation cannot be left alone, according to its own devices
153. Gunton,- op. cit., p. 218; my italics. Be argues that there is "some-
thing like a scholarly consensus that Barth has in many respects
failed to keep his concept of God open to the future" ( p . 218).
154. CD, III, 1, see pp. 44; 94 - 99.
155. CD, III, 1, p. 95.
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and remain creation. This is precisely the point. By the fact that it
exists and continues so to do we have no alternative but to accept the
beneficent purpose which allows it to be as it is in itself. If only
Barth had stated this necessary presupposition at the beginning of his
work, the question of the non-human would not have appeared in the sharp
form in which it has presented itself. This is not to deny the general
force of Barth's insistence that creation is not itself the covenant, that
is, the fact of creation does not equal the totality of divine purpose
within it. But, and this is the crucial point, the reality of the covenant
relationship is only possible, not because God wills the bare existence
of the cosmos, but because its actual existence must be purposed by him
in order to exist at all. We begin then by affirming categorically that
all creation, all that is genuinely creation, has meaning and purpose in
itself by virtue of the fact of its divine creation. One other way of
expressing this would be to emphasise the essentially dynamic nature of
God's creation and its openness to him. Thus all elements or particles
within the cosmos are "moving according to their own dynamic, and ... this
movement infolds them". 156 This dynamic is nothing less than the work of
the Triune God who is perfecting the creation he continually allows to be
with him.
B. Christ as God-incarnate
The vital question to be answered is how the work of creation is related
to the work of incarnation, that is, what is the relationship between the
156. Daniel W. Hardy, 'The Dymamics of Creation', unpublished paper presented
to the Society for the Study of Theology (1982) p. 29; his italics. Hardy's
paper is one of the few attempts to relate distinctly trinitarian
theology to models of reality proposed by some of the natural sciences.
He writes of how 'the withdrawal of natural science from theology has
meant that the content of theology "has tended increasingly to become
a gnosticism concerned with a spiritual reality validated by its
connection with a secret tradition of faith ..." (p. 1).
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Word which causes all things to be and the disclosure of that Word within
creation. Barth's approach as we have seen is to develop every possibility
for stating the special significance of man in creation and thus the
special appropriateness of the work of incarnation. This is deduced not
from speculation about man's special abilities but from what he takes to
be the meaning of the incarnation itself. It is not that Barth affirms
the special significance of man because of what he wants later to affirm
about incarnation; on the contrary the special significance of man must
be affirmed because of the fact of incarnation. The reality of creation
is therefore subsumed under the fact of incarnation as follows: "The reason
why God created this world of heaven and earth, and why the future world
will be a new heaven and a new earth, is that God's eternal Son and Logos
did not will to be an angel or animal, but a man, and that this and this
alone, was the content of the eternal divine election of grace". 157 Barth
is not wholly wrong here. He is not wrong that there must be a relation-.
ship of purpose between the Logos which creates all things and. his disclo-
sure within creation. Where Barth is not right is in his insistence that
the divine election of man can bear the entire meaning and significance
of the purpose of creation. There are two primary reasons why we must
assert that he goes wrong here. In the first place, if as Barth affirms
the act of incarnation precedes the act of creation it must follow that
the work of binding that creation together must presuppose the entirety of
that creation itself. We see that this must be true by supposing the
157. CD, III, 1, p. 18; my italics. Barth's exclusivity closes, pre-
maturely, the question of possible "divine manifestations in other
areas or periods of being". Paul Tillich is emphatic about the
need to keep this option open: "Incarnation is unique for the
special group in which it happens, but it is not unique in the
sense that other singular incarnations for other unique worlds are
excluded. Man cannot claim that the infinite has entered the finite
to overcome its existential estrangement in man alone. Man cannot
claim to occupy the only possible place for Incarnation", Systematic
Theology, 3 Vols. (London: SCM Press, 1957) Vol I, Part III,
Existence and the Christ (1978), p. 96.
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contrary. If God's incarnation did not presuppose a creation which was
purposeful in its own right then it could not be possible for the divine
purpose to be so manifest within it. In the second place, the Word which
causes all things to be is the same Word which becomes incarnate in Jesus
Christ. It cannot be adequate therefore to juxtapose the two realities
as though the one was inferior to the other, or that the one was merely
the context in which the other was caused to happen. In Christ the very
juxtaposition of creation and incarnation is rendered obsolete. This is
not to deny the particular manner of incarnation (and the divine choice
which it represents) and the centrality of man within the cosmos. But this
is precisely the point. It is man within the cosmos, or as Barth somewhat
inadequately puts it "man and his cosmos", that is the subject of the
incarnation. This is not to suppose multiple incarnations or to detract
from the uniqueness of the one historical incarnation. It is only to
insist upon the fundamental purposeful relationship disclosed between the
Word and what he has created. Barth almost reaches this point when he
writes of the representational relationship of Christ and man. Thus God's
Son is seen as "the Representative of all creation" 158
 and man "is and
represents the secret of the creature". 159 If Christ, as Word and as Word
incarnate, represents the totality of creation, that is all that is created
which is distinct and apart from God, there cannot be two realities of
creation, namely, human and non-human, as Barth sometimes seems to imply,
but one creature and one creation albeit differentiated and ordered in a
particular way. In summary we may articulate the relationship as follows:
Because the Word incarnate is also the Word of creation, that is of the
creature, the work of incarnation must represent and actualise the bene-
ficence of God towards all creatures. This is not to deny the centrality
158. CD, III, 1, p. 97.
159. CD, III, 1, p. 18.
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of man and his particular work within creation. On the contrary the
specific and particular "yes" to man, is part of, and can only take
place within the context of, the specific and particular "yes" of God to
all creation in all its order and peculiarity. The alternative to this,
of appearing to treat as separate and distinct entities the work of
creation and the work of incarnation severs the link between the revealing
Word and the creation in which the Word is revealed, and in so doing severs
the relationship within God as he is in himself as Father, Son and Holy
Spirit. For the work of creation, incarnation, reconciliation and
redemption is the work of the same God. In saying this we do not deny
the difference and order within the creation itself. Neither do we deny
the possibility of closer or more distant relations with God in creation.
We merely affirm that no part of creation can be radically distinct from
the work of God as defined by trinitarian theology; we merely insist that
no one aspect of God's work within creation can be divorced from another.
As such, the purpose and meaning of the non-human cannot be treated as
though it were relevant to one work of the triune God but irrelevant to
another.
Our concern must therefore be to articulate the way in which man's place
in creation truly reflects the way in which he is bound through the incarn-
ation to a relationship of affinity and interdependence with creation
itself. There are three biblical insights here of significance:
(i) the image of God in man;
(ii)the position of dominion, and
(iii)the covenant relationship.
Barth's treatment of the image of God, as we have seen, is strangely unsatis-
factory. This is because he links the giving of the image to the sexual
differentiation within man as male and female and therefore to man's
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capacity to prefigure within himself the inner life of God as Father
and Son. The weakness as we have seen with this account is that it
presupposes a unique sexual differentiation in man whereas this differ-
entiation is also present within non-human creation. A far more satis-
factory understanding is one that relates the image of God in man to his
work within creation, one that sees man' s "dominion" or "lordship" over
creation following from his prior position in creation. "The dominion is
certainly connected with the image, and one might say that, without the
160
, the dominion would never have been given." 	 Man is the being
uniquely charged with the authority of God within creation, to act as his
vice-gerent and steward and thus the one who has God-like power and res-
ponsibility. This is reinforced in the first saga where the granting of
dominion has clear limits especially concerning the use of animals for
food and cannot therefore be of an unrestricted kind.1 1 In the second
saga the relationship of man to the earth is expressed in an even more --
striking way. His exis+ence is actually necessary to the earth for its
flourishing and cultivation. Barth accepts that this "dominion" of man
is a prefiguring, perhaps even a participation in the "lordship" of Christ
but he does not draw out precisely the obvious Christological significance
160. David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, intro, by D.E. Jenkins, The
Fontana Library of Theology and Philosophy (London: Collins, 1973),
p. 28. Cf. C.F.D. Moule: "Perhaps the most satisfying of the many
interpretations, both ancient and modern of the meaning of the image
is that which sees it as basically responsibility", Man and
Nature in the New Testament: Some Reflections on Biblical Ecology
(London: The Athione Press, 1964), p. 5; his ita1ics
161. Cf. "In the case of animals there is a limit to man's dominion. Their
blood, that is to say their life, belongs to God", Cairns, op. cit.,
p. 29. A powerful idea which continues to find expression in litera-
ture of all kinds. Kasyan remonstrates with the hunter: "A fish
doesn't have feelings, it has no living blood in it ... Blood, blood
is holy! Blood does not see the light of God's sun, blood is hidden
from the light ... And a great sin it is to show blood to the light
of day, a great sin and cause to be fearful, oh, a great one it is"
Ivan Turgenev, 'Kasyan from the Beautiful Lands' in Sketches from a
Hunter's Album, selected and ET by Richard Freeborn, Penguin Classics
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983) p. 89. The Kasyan story is a remarkable
essay on the morality of hunting and the theological questions it raises.
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and meaning of this. We may articulate it now. In the same way that
the power, priority and authority of God is expressed by Christ in his
katabasis, his humility, his self-costly loving, his active compassion
for the weak and helpless, so man is placed within creation to express
and exercise a similar lordship and responsibility. This analogy of
relationship offers a rich Christological dimension on which to build a dis-
tinctively Christian reading of the biblical witness. In this sense we
may see the meaning of the notion of representation to which Barth some-
times alludes. Man is to be the Vertreter of Christ, the Logos, in
creation. He is to represent and focus within himself the purpose of
God in creation. Not just within himself as the mark of his humanity in
the strangely undynamic way in which Barth suggests, but in his relation-
ship and ordering of creation, he is to be the agent of God's purposeful
design. In this anthropocentricity? At first it might appear so. But
the important feature of this human work is its necessarily sacrificial
quality; it is man who gives of himself for the earth in the strikingly
similar way that Christ humbles himself in creation) 62
 If we interpret
the image and, the notion of dominion in this sense, we are able to provide
the fullest Christological basis for man's relationship with the non-human
because we are able to characterise this relationship in a moral way.
But the strongest ground for affirming the moral bond between animals and
man consists in the divine election of both within the covenant relationship.
162. Many exegetes of Genesis miss this vital point. E.g. "The word dominion
is related to the Latin word dominus; he is one who has gained the
upper hand; he has come out on top. To exercise dominion ... is to
fasten one's will upon that situation ... to subordinate, render sub-
ject, make subservient", Leonard Verduin, Somewhat Less than God: The
Biblical View of Man (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Erdmans,
1970), p. 28; his italics. Stated in these bold terms, it is the pre-
cise antithesis of Genesis. Man's dominion is under the lordship of God;
its exercise is to serve not autonomous man but the will of God. It is
only "responsible authority" that is "God-like", Moule, op. cit., p. 5.
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It is at this point that we must include the theme that Barth neglects.
From all that he has said about the covenant relationship we know that
this one relation more than any other reflects and prefigures the inner
life of God himself. It is this one relationship which he characterises
as the "inner basis of creation" itself. The inclusion of other "living
beings" at this point vitally alters the way in which we may understand
the triune work of creation and incarnation. We may affirm that man
exists as Christ's moral paradigm within creation. The Christian life
as "imitation of Christ commits the believer to obedience to the 'method'
of Jesus". "The Incarnation is seen by the Christian as the way God. would
have his truth taught", writes E.J. Tinsley. 3
 In this sense it is the
way of humility, self-sacrifice, costly-loving, so exemplified in the life
of Jesus, that must be for us the moral exemplar in our relations even for
the least among us. Does Barth grasp something of this possibility when
he writes that "man's salvation and perdition, his joy and sorrow, will
be reflected in the weal and woe of this animal environment and company"?164
But this should properly be affirmed, not simply because, as Barth would
have it, animals are "attendant witnesses" to the covenant, but because
they actually share with man the divine hope and blessing which the covenant
represents. It is on man, once lost and now found, that rests the respon-
sibility to focus and exercise the moral reality of the covenant. It is
for this reason that we can understand the biblical emphasis on man as the
pivotal covenant partner. This is not because, as Barth would surmise,
other living beings are irrelevant to it, but because - in the words of
Wingren - "Man must be restored in order that God's Creation may become
whole and perfect again".165
163.. Tinsley, The Imitation of God in Christ: An Essay on the Biblical Basis
of Christian Spirituality, The Library of History and Doctrine (London:
SCM press, 1960) p. 180.
164. CD, III, 1, p. 178.
165. Wingren, op. cit., p. 101.
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C. Christ as Reconciler
Because Barth places a wedge between the act of creation and the work of
incarnation as it concerns the non-human, it is not surprising that the
non-human creation, even the living beings within the covenant relation-
ship, are seen to be incidental to the work of reconciliation. "The
secret, the meaning and goal of creation is that it reveals, or that there
is revealed in it, the covenant and communion between God and man" writes
Barth. 166 By implication it may be assumed that the meaning of the recon-
ciling work of God may be exhausted in its relation to man and the covenant.
And yet Barth does not want to give up entirely on the biblical witness
that the world, the Kosmos, participates in the work of reconciliation
through the Son. In a poignant passage (to which we have referred before),
writing in answer to the question concerning the joy and sorrow of created
life, he replies:
The answer is to be found in the fact that the revelation of
God the Creator so closely binds the life which He has
created with the covenant in which He willed to make Himself
the Lord and Helper and Saviour of man: with the reconcilia-
tion of the world with Himself to be accomplished in Jesus
Christ. In this intention of the Creator and therefore this
final goal of the creature as manifested in the divine reve-
laTtion, there is implied from the very outset ... a twofold
determination: on one hand an exaltation and dignity of the
creature in the sight of God ...; and on the other hand the
equally clear need arid peril of the creature before Him
God created man to lift him in His own Son into fellowhship
with Himself. This is the positive meaning of human exis-
tence and all existence. But this elevation presupposes a
wretchedness of human and all existence which His own Son will
share and bear. This is the negative meaning of creation.
Since everything is created for Jesus Christ and His death
and resurrection, from the very outset everythij must stand
under this twofold and contradictory determination.167
Despite his overall position, Barth comes interestingly close here to an
affirmation of God's reconciling work in Christ as it relates to all parts
166. CD. III, 1, p. 377; my italics.
167. CD, III, 1, p. 376; my italics.
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of creation in their brighter and darker sides. But the logic of his
position necessarily points him in an even more definite direction. For
if "everything" is made for Jesus Christ then it must follow that the work
of reconciliation is inclusive of all things. Or if "the negative meaning"
of creation, as Barth sees this, is that Christ should "share and bear"
all the sorrow of creation, so that all its potentiality is experienced
in him (albeit transiently within his incarnate life), then it cannot
but follow that all suffering creation must be included within the work
of reconciliation. It is the reconciliation, not just of creation in general,
but of all things capable of suffering and sorrow- for which Christ died,
if we are tenaciously to follow the line of thought which Barth advances.'68
But if this is true, it cannot be held that the total meaning of the work
of reconciliation is exhausted in its relationship with man, and thus,
and this is a critical inference, that man alone stands as the solely
reconciled object of God's work in Christ. Barth simply does not appreciate -.
that the logic of his position concerning the work of reconciliation wholly
undermines his anthropocentric thesis, a point we may affirm without
denying either that man remains the centre of God's reconciling work
through the incarnation or that man is centrally significant. Christ is
"the Saviour of the universe (tou pantos)" writes Athanasius 169
 and is not
this the inexorable conclusion to which Barth's logic leads us?
168. Mascall indicates the "very wide range" of possibilities "between
which orthodox Christian doctrine leaves us perfectly free to decide"
when it comes to understanding God 's reconciling work for the non-
human. It could be that man is the only rational creature that needs
redemption. It could be that there "may or may not be somewhere in
the universe rational beings" who may "have fallen". "If they have
fallen, their redemption may or may not require that the Son of God
should become incarnate in their nature". Or it could be that "by
becoming incarnate in one rational species, the Son of God has ipso
facto become the redeemer of all", The Christian Universe,op.cit.,pp. lo6f
It will be seen that I regard the last possibility as the most con-
vincing. Are not all things summed up in Christ?
169. Athanasius, op. cit., p. 5.
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Barth himself recognises that "The linking of man and beast in the account
of the sixth day of creation corresponds to a familiar thought in the Old
and New Testaments1.l70 Indeed he itemises the examples of this closeness
of relationship, emphasising in particular the ways in which man and animals
are seen as experiencing together both the hope and the judgement of the
Lord as, for example, in Ezekiel 38: 20. 	 As we have grown to expect,
however, he does not see the fundamental theological significance of this
connection. It is that as created on the same day, man and animals share
the same hope of reconciliation and renewal. Barth never ponders why it
should be that man and animals share together the grace and judgement of
God. The answer, of course, moves in an opposite direction to the path
ta]en. It implies that human and animal-kind are fundamentally related,
not in any identical work or function, but in the work of God in Christ
as Creator, Incarnate and Reconciler. The inner circles of creation
participate more fully in the work of reconciliation than any other parts
of creation. To this must be added the significance of the practice of
animal sacrifice. If, we have suggested, this practice is most properly seen
as the freeing of an animal, its actual liberation to be with God which is its
end, then we cannot but see animal sacrifice as prefigurative of the
sacrificial work of Christ in reconciliation. In this way animals may
be seen as participating in the earliest tradition of reconciliation,
which strengthens the vision of the inseparability of human and animal-kind
within the covenant relationship.
D. Christ as Redeemer
Our argument so far has been that man and creation are fundamentally
related not only by the Word incarnate but through the same Logos which
is the source of all creation. Because they are related in that way it
170. CD, III, 1, n. p. 180.
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must follow that the work of reconciliation is inclusive of all creation.
Within this work, however, there is an order and a priority. It is
through man, firstly in the Christological sense, and secondarily through
man constituted to complete the work of Herrschaft within creation, that
the reconciling work of God is completed. Man is central to this process
as the Vertreter focus of creation on one hand, and of Christ as the icon
of creation on the other. The work of reconciliation proceeds outwards
from the Father to the Son, to its basis in the incarnate Logos, to
man the moral paradigm within creation, and from man
to the inner circles of creation which are bound to him through God's
covenant relationship, and thus in the work of service within that coven-
ant to the whole earth. The work of man is therefore to represent the redemp-
tive purposes of God and to actualise them with his own relationship with
other living beings. Barth, of course, does not overlook the possibility
of redemption of all creation. But in relation to the non-human his
discussion consists of only fourteen lines within a footnote. We repro-
duce it in full:
Paul's well-known statement in Rom. 8: 19 about the
ctrroKapctcSoKicz of the icr y is which involuntarily, for man's
sake, and therefore not without hope, has been subjected
to vanity, and thus groans and travails with us for the day
of the Messiah, certainly applies to beasts. It is not for
nothing that, in its totally different nature and form of
existence, it is so near to the innermost circle of
creation. It is not for nothing that it is blessed with
the same blessing with which man is also blessed. This
means that it is also burdened with the curse which man
has to carry. It shares in the confusion of his existence
and his world. It must suffer and die for him. But (in
its own way) it will be freed from the bondage of
peop into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. "0
Lord, thou preservest man and beast" (Ps. 36: 6) is a
thread which runs through the whole of the Bible; and it
first emerges in a way which is quite unmistakable when
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the creation of man is classified in Gen 1. 24f with
that of the land animals..171
But the notion of the redemption of all creation is far more significant
than Barth's treatment of this one passage would imply. In the first
place, Barth points to the fundamental bond between man and animals which
this passage suggests. The creation is actually linked with man to share
171. CD, 1 III, 1, n. p. 181; my italics. If we ask why Barth does not
take up more forcefully Paul's insight into the liberation of creation,
there seem to be two answers. The first is that Barth's early writing
on Romans develops a fundamental dichotomy between man seen in terms
of God on one hand, and man seen in terms of the world on the other.
When it comes therefore to ascribing anything other than transitory
theological significance to the world, he is restrained by his
dialectic. "We cannot, surely, pronounce the created world to be
direct, genuine, and eternal life". It is not this world which is
eternal, but the world in the mind of God, "the new heaven and the new
earth", "which the Father hath subjected to Himself through the Son".
The new birth of which St Paul speaks "can never take place in time",
The Epistle to the Romans, ET by E.C. Boskyns, Oxford Paperbacks
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) pp. 308, 310. By this tor-
tuous exegesis, we are delivered from the need to wrestle with God's
redeeming activity in the world as it is and in the present time. The
point is made by F.W. Camfield: "We do not know what time may mean for
beings other than ourselves, the lower creation for example. We could
not make with confidence the assertions about them which we have made
for ourselves", 'Man in his Time', Scottish Journal of Theology, 3, 2
(1950) p. 139. But in this way one of the important creaturely
characteristics described by Paul, which unites man and . other creatures,
is lost. The second reason why Barth loses the edge of this important
passage is simply that he stands in a tradition of similar neglect.
His dependence on Calvin and Luther is clear. Luther offers no exegesis
of the travail of the non human. The sighings and earnest expectation
of the creatures are important but ozily because they show the folly of
scientists and philosophers who "have no thought whatsoever for the end
for which it was created". Moreover, "the creature subject to vanity"
in v. 20 refers primarily or, possibly even exclusively, to man. In this
way Luther is freed from offering any account of the end of the non-
human. Lectures on Romans, ed. and ET by Wilhelm Pauck, The Library
of Christian Classics (London: SCM Press, 1961) Vol. XV, pp. 236-8.
Calvin is characteristically bolder. All creatures are cursed: "all
innocent creatures from earth to heaven are punished for our sins"..
Will their redemption therefore be the greater? Calvin is reticent.
They will be redeemed only "in their own manner" (Barth seems to have
taken over this notion). Calvin protests against "unbalanced commenta-
tors" who ask "whether all kinds of animals will be immortal". "If
we give free rein to these speculations, where will they finally carry
us?" The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and the Thessa-
loniaris, eds. D.W. Torrance and T.F. Torrance, ET by Ross Mackenzie,
Calvin's Commentaries (Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 1961)
pp. 173-174.,
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his suffering "not of its own will but by the will of him who subjected
it in hope" (8: 20) and therefore shares man's blessing and curse.
As Barth correctly expounds it, the meaning of animals at least is
fundamentally tied to the existence of the human. Animals are inextric-
ably related in terms of their being by God's decree to their relationship
with human beings. But the problem is that Barth simply does not appreciate
that such a fundamental relationship makes the significance of animals
greater rather than lesser.
In the second place, as we have observed before, if it is really true that
the bond which unites animals and man is so strong that no other statement
of their purpose and end can be described other than in relation to man
then it must follow that everything that Barth wishes to claim for the
special relationship of man to God must be claimed at least in principle
for the relationship between man and animals as well (see pp. 99f.).
The logic is clear: it is not that animals "in their own way" participate
in redemption but that they participate by virtue of their fundamental
relationship with man in "his way" of redemption. If animals have no
independent existence in themselves save as involuntary co-sufferers with
man then it must follow that the same divine work of redemption necessarily
extends to every part which is so affected. In this sense we see that
Barth only maintains the coherence of his work by avoiding the implications
of those biblical witnesses which point in a different direction. It is
not that Barth denies them. He gives notional validity to them. He does
not oppose the notion of God's reconciling work concerning all things or
that man is placed within this overall design and purpose; or that the
redemptive activity of God includes even the most unlikely (as he sees
them) spheres of creation. But these insights stand in contrast to the
centrally anthropocentric design and character of Part One.
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It will be seen, however, that much more needs to be said about the
relations between the human and the non-human in creation, and with this
in mind we now turn to the second part of Barth's work on creation con-
cerning the doctrine of the human itself.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE LONG QUEST FOR A DISTINCTIVE HUMANITY IN
OPPOSITION TO THE NON-HUMAN
- 178 -
"The most massive account of the doctrine of man in our times" is the
Editors' claim for Part Two of Barth's work on creation. 1 Barth himself
accepts that his "new path" had meant becoming a "pioneer".. 2 His theolo-
gical method had involved departing more widely from past dogmatic tradi-
tion especially concerning the question of the "so-called 'soul'". But
this new path" hinges as always on his method, for all depends upon his
theological doctrine being "not only possible, but the only one possible".3
Creation Doctrine not Cosmology
The first section is entitled 'Man as a Problem of Dogmatics' and sub-titled
'Man in the Cosmos'. Barth begins by maintaining that "in practice the doc-
trine of creation means anthropology -. the doctrine of man". Why should
this be so? In the first place, man is not the only creature. "Man is
4
only a creature and not the creature" argues Barth. Man is only one part
of the created cosmos. In this sense "the Word of God does not envisage
man except in his insignificance". Non-humans have "their own dignity and
right" and that "enveloped in the secret of their own relation to their
Creator". And if this is the case, it is "a serious question" as to whether
the doctrine of creation "should not be expounded as a doctrine of the tota-
lity, of the whole created cosmos". Barth is clear that while it is not the
task of dogmatics to present cosmology, there can be no isolating of man
from the rest of created order. For even if the dominant theme of theolo-
gical dogmatics is man, this must not spell an attitude of "blindness,
1. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, 2, The Doctrine of Creation, Part Two
('The Creature') eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, ET by H. Knight,
G.W. Bromiley, J.K.S. Reid and RH. Fuller (Edinburgh: T and T Clark,
1960) p. vii (Editors' Preface).
2. CD, III, 2, p. x (Preface).
3. CD, III, 2, p. ix (Preface).
4. CD, III, 2, p. 3; his italics. Barth argues the contrary in his lectures
on theological ethics published after his death: "Man is the creature of
God. This is where we start", Ethics, ed. by Dietrich Braun, ET by G.W.
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1981) p. 118. Ethically his treat-
ment entirely reflects the a.nthropocentric standpoint which doctrinally
he appears to reject.
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indifference or disparagement" to the remainder. 5
 Barth locates the justi-
fication for this tradition of theological anthropology (theologische Anthro-
pologie) in the true object of theology: "The Word of God is concerned with
God and man". Moreover this Word "does not contain any ontology of heaven
and earth themselves." 6 Barth accepts, however, that human witnesses to the
Word of God may ally themselves with various cosmologies at various times,
but he is insistent that there is no "specific cosmology" (Kosmologie, Welt-
anschauung, Weltbild) which is central to theology. He gives five justifi-
cations for this view. In the first place, while human witness to the Word
has allied itself with various cosmologies, no one Christian world-view has
emerged. There has always been "more or less critical use of alien (world)
views". 7 Secondly, faith in the Word can never "find its theme in the tota-
lity of the created heaven and earth". There may be various formulations of
one or another varied component in the created order, but no one element
(save that of man) properly locates the true Christian focus. Thirdly, faith
must in the last resort be "supremely non-committal" to the assumptions and
consequences of such cosmologies. In the end "faith is radically disloyal
to them", and "accepts no responsibility for their foundation, structure,
validity or propagation". 8 Therefore, fourthly, faith when expressed in
one or another full or partial world-view is essentially deviation from true
faith. Such deviation is always possible in the life of the church but can
never be the norm of faith itself., Lastly, faith is in this sense autono-
mous of all world-views: inevitable "marks of contradiction" appear between
these attempted unions. As an example, Barth gives the use of the Baby-
lonian creation myths in the Genesis saga for whilst it appears to make use
of them, "it actually criticises the latter at every stage". 9 The question
5. CD, III, 2, p. 4.
6. CD, III, 2, p. 6.
7. CD, III, 2, p. 7.
8. CD, III, 2, p. 8 and n. p. 8.
9. CD, III, 2, p. 10 and n. p. 10.
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is resolved. Theology is therefore "anthropocentric" in the sense "pre-
scribed by the Word of God; the orientation on Man".1°
Barth then proceeds to describe how dogmatics encloses an "anthropology"
and an "ontology" of man based on God's own declaration about himself.
The Word of God compels us to say that "we know the cosmos only through its
relation to man", but this does not mean that "its life is necessarily ex-
hausted in this relation". 11 But theologische Anthropologie has no right
to become Kosmologie. Barth's insistence here that man is the object of
God's purpose for the cosmos, and most importantly "in which this purpose
is revealed", makes him at once reject the notion that man constitutes the
world or even "a microcosm" of it ("for he is far too insignificant to be
understood as the measure and epitome of all things") 12 but also to indi-
cate what we cannot say about the cosmos. 	 Quite simply "the Word of
God is silent on this point". Whilst we can, and should, affirm that man
is the centre of God's revealing purpose, we cannot by implication affirm
or deny such things concerning the cosmos or any part of it. We simply do
not know. This does not mean that Barth regards any such enquiries or specu-
lations of this kind as "strictly forbidden". But from the standpoint of
the Word of God they can never be "more than exercises in pious surmise or
imagination". 13 It has become clear that man is "made an object of theo-
logical knowledge" by virtue of his relationship to God which "is revealed
,, 14to us in the Word of God . 	 Theology may only give a dim and blurred re-
flection" of this divine light "but this does not affect in the least the
uniqueness, the height and depth, the richness of the material which it tries
to use for better or for worse") 5 But how does theological anthropology
10. CD, III, 2, p. 12.
11. CD, III, 2, p. 15.
12. CD, III, 2, p. 16.
13. CD, III, 2, p. 17.
14. CD, III, 2, p. 19.
15.. CD, III,, 2, p. 20.
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stand in relation to all other anthropology? Can theology orientate itself
by any anthropology independent of its own claims and insights? Can we
learn from its methods and results? Should we regard theologische Anthro-
pologie "merely as a species", that is, as one of many attempts at human
understanding, all of which have some part in a collective picture of man?
Barth acknowledges that non-theological anthropology dominates the scene
with rival and often comprehensive claims. He attempts an analysis of two
distinct forms of anthropology each of which require a different attitude.
The first type considered is that of "the speculative theory of man" often
resting upon a "pure self-intuition purporting to be axiomatic". From this
starting point hypotheses are mounted and defended. This kind of anthropq-
logy Barth readily dismisses. It rests upon an over-confidence in man's
own abilities. "He thinks that in some way he can know himself" argues
Barth. It may be that this form of anthropology includes or excludes the
idea of God but in either case the method is that man himself becomes "both
the pupil and teacher of truth". Here is an "enemy" of theological anthro-
16pology.
The second type is that of the "exact science of man". Here man is also the
object of knowledge but one formulated by physiological, biological, psycho-
logical or sociological hypotheses. "These sciences", maintains Barth,
"have at their disposal in every period temporarily authoritative formulae
which sum up the results of previous research and which indicate hypotheses
and pointers for future research". 17 To the extent that they remain scien-
tific, they will refrain from formulating hypotheses into axioms and dogmas.
Since they are concerned "not with the being of man but the appearance; not
with the inner but the outer; not with the totality but with the sum of
16. CD, III, 2, p. 22.
17. CD, III, 2, p. 23.
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specific and partial phenomena". they should resist the claim that their
particular conclusions form the "basis and criterion for all other investi-
gation and knowledge". A different attitude is required to this form of
anthropology. Like other forms of human activity ("eating, drinking and
sleeping and all other human activities, techniques and achievements") it
does not "prejudice" the hearing of the Word of God. 18 It only does so if
it dogmatises its (necessarily temporary) conclusions.
In contrast theologische Anthropologie has to do not "merely with man as a
phenomenon but with man himself". Its concern is to proclaim the truth
about man in the light of God's Word. This claim for truth is a responsi-
bility of dogmatics but that in turn "does not mean that it cannot err, that
19
it does not need continually to correct and improve itself." But we see
the inappropriateness of non-theological anthropology when we consider how
it might be possible for it to understand man as a creature of God. Theo-
logical anthropology based on the Word of God judges us in marked contrast
to other approaches. For "the revelation of God does not show us man as
we wish to see him" but rather creatureliness "in its perversion and cor-
,, 20
ruption
Barth ponders the mystery of how it may be possible on one hand to posit
(as we should) the "total and radical corruption of human nature", and yet
on the other hand to affirm that human nature "as constituted by God is
reasonable and necessary". The only answer is to be found where at first
sight it appears most "impenetrable". For "it is the Word of God which sets
us this problem", 21
 he argues. This is not only because the Word itself
shows us the depravity of human nature, but because it also reveals what is
18. CD, III, 2, p. 24.
19. CD, III, 2, p. 25.
20. CD, III, 2, p. 26.
21. CD, III, 2, p. 29.
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necessarily hidden, namely man's true nature. This knowledge cannot be
grasped by our own power of reasoning nor by inference "from any residual
lineaments in the biblical picture of sinful man" to what the true essence
of created man might be. Rather "knowledge of sin and of human nature" are
only possible "in their interconnexion within the comprehensive knowledge
of the Word of God".22
Barth has now reached the point where he can state his main thesis of this
section: "As the man Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the
source of our knowledge of the nature of man as created by God" •23 Since
the Word is the centre and goal of all theology we are able to perceive both
the nature of sin and God's awesome grace. God shows us both the gravity of
sin and. the possibility of atonement. Thus Barth can write of "the nature
of the man Jesus" as the "key to the problem of human nature". In short:
"This man is man". Theological enquiry must therefore seek an answer to
this question: "What is the creaturely nature of man to the extent that,
looking to the revealed grace of God and concretely to the man Jesus, we can
see in it a continuum unbroken by sin, an essence which even sin does not
and cannot change?"24
Before proceeding to discuss relevant parts of this section, it is worth re-
minding ourselves of the surprisingly tentative nature of Barth's intentions
as revealed by his Preface. He begins by indicating that the publication of
this volume had not appeared as planned. The "inward cause" was that the
theme required "a constant collecting, assessing and shaping of the material
before I dared publish the results". 25
 In addition Barth is still question-
ing whether all the material relevant to the doctrine of man has been fully
treated. "In a first draft", he writes, "I had a section on 'Man and
22. CD, III, 2, p. 31.
23. CD, III, 2, p. 41.
24. CD,	 III, 2, p. 43.
25. CD, III, 2, p. ix (Preface).
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Humanity' in which I dealt with the individual, societies and society, but
I later dropped this because I was not sure enough of the theological approach
to this problem and therefore of the right way to treat it". Moreover in a
crucial line, Barth indicates that much of his treatment of cosmology may be
in need of subsequent revision by others. "I also think it conceivable", he
writes, "that, in spite of the counter-arguments adduced, the limits of the
term 'creature' may with the necessary boldness and sobriety be more widely
drawn than I have dared attempt". Thus further work may take up the argu-
ments presented "in relation to other things which may be missed or cen-
sured lt. 26
 Such generous statemensgo beyond the characteristic reserve of
Barth in presenting each new successive volume for consideration. At this
telling point, namely in his definition of "the creature", on which so much
in his discussion hangs, he is prepared to countenance bold revision.
Kerygma without Kosmologie?
The major thrust of Barth's argument in this first sub-section is that "in
practice the doctrine of creation means anthropology - the doctrine of man".
The startling nature of this thesis is not lost on Barth. But qualifications
aside, he finds support in "the overwhelming consensus of dogmatic tradi-
27tion".	 Until the eighteenth century it was usual to speak first of angels
and then of man but no specific cosmology was supposed by this. There was
not even encouragement "from the curious account of the sixth day of crea-
tion (Gen. 1:24 - 31), or a passage like Mk. 1:13, to set alongside the doc-
,,28trine of man at least a doctrine of the animal creation . 	 Even when re-
liable information about the nature of the earth became available from the
Middle Ages onwards, only in one case, namely Polanus in his Syntagma Theologie.-_
of 1609 do we find cosmology interfused with theology. Only the Dutch
Neo-Calvinists of the nineteenth century, as exemplified by Abraham Kuyper's
26. CD, III, 2, p. x (Preface); my italics.
27. CD, III, 2, p. 6.
28. CD, III, 2, p. 5.
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Dictaten Dogmatiek of 1910, or later, Arthur Titius' Natur und Gott of 1926,
or Borst Stephan's Glaubenslehre of 1928, do we reach anything like a serious
attempt at theological cosmology and that invariably in fragmented and incon-
sistent forms. Barth is emphatic:
The inner justification of this tradition, and the inner
necessity of following it, are to be found in the fact that
by the nature of its object dogmatics has neither the occa-
sion nor the duty to become a technical cosmology (Kosmologie)
or a Christian world-view (Weltanschauung) ... Its true ob-
ject is the revealed, written and declared Word of God.
Those who have claimed to have a world-view ... have always
derived it from other sources than the Word of God. Here at
the outset we part company with the exponents of all world-
views. This is imposed upon us negatively by the fact that
the Word of God does not contain any account of the cosmos;
any ontology of the created reality. The Word of God is con-
cerned with God and man.29
Barth is baffling at this point. There are four major areas of difficulty.
Firstly, definition. Barth again does not define what he understands by
"world-view" or "cosmology" •30 The consistent assumption throughout is
that world-views must be secular, alien and foreign. In this sense they must
necessarily be opposed or indifferent to dogmatics. Moreover this lack of
definition allows him to exclude by implication any statement about the
nature of the world generally and non-human living beings
within it. Secondly, consistency. The unfortunate inconsistency is that
Barth unwittingly devastates the edifice of Part One which sought to offer
a doctrine of created being, human, animal and vegetable. But even within
the first ten pages of Part Two the tension is clear. Thus he writes (page
4): "It has often been missed and has always had to be rediscovered that the
Word of God in its ultimate and decisive form in the New Testament has a
'cosmic' character to the extent that its message of salvation relates to the
man who is rooted in the cosmos, and who is found arid renewed by his Creator
at the heart of the cosmos", whereas later (page 6) he writes: "The Word of
29. CD, III, 2, p. 6; my italics.
30. See pp. 118-120 for previous discussion of these words.
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God is concerned with God and man". Thus Barth actually advances his case
by limiting what he previously accepted as the New Testament witness con-
cerning cosmology. Thirdly, and inevitably, the biblical witness. For if
Barth is right	 that the biblical witness holds fast to the cosmological
dimension of man in the universe, how can he simply sweep this witness away
at this point? In footnote commentary, he makes what from his standpoint
is a vexing (some would say tenuous) distinction between "the true content"
31
of the biblical message and its clothing in the cosmology of its time',
but even if such a distinction is possible, it surely requires argument and
further elaboration. If all world-views, that is perspectives on the world,
theocentric or otherwise, are to be disregarded at this point, how are we
to understand the importance which Barth attached to the Genesis sagas them-
selves and which form the largest part of his substantive work in Part One?
Is there not a view of the world, its character, order and design disclosed
within these sagas however variously they may be interpreted? Is there not
here something closely resembling an "ontology of heaven and earth" which
Barth now denies? "When, however, the writings of the New Testament are in-
terpreted without reference to the fact that the whole of their message con-
cerns the restoration of Creation", writes Wingren, "and where the early
Christian kerygma is interpreted without being related to mankind' s prehistory
in Genesis, this New Testament kerygina changes its meaning and loses part of
its substance". 32 Fourthly, and most importantly, Barth's view is theolo-
gically strained in the form in which he presents it. It simply cannot be
true that the revealed Word of God "does not contain any account of the cos-
mos". The difficulty may be grasped immediately once it is appreciated that
the Word incarnate is the same Word through whom all things come to be and
31. CD, III, 2, p. 8.
32. Wingren, op. cit., p. 191. He inveighs against the isolating of the
kerygma from its Old Testament roots. It is perhaps ironical that
Barth, one of the theologians who provides an exhaustive discussion
of the Genesis sagas, should fail to make more of the restoration theme.
Where, for example, is his discussion of the messianic hope for all
creation?
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through whom, with the Father, all is loved and sustained. "For the Word
spread himself everywhere", writes Athanasius, "above and below and in the
depth and in the breadth, in the world". 33 Because of this fundamental re-
lationship it must logically be possible to offer an account of the Word
and the world. This is not to suppose a detailed geophysical description
of each and every part and particle of the creation. -It is not to suppose
that every detail of human or animal life must be presupposed by the estab-
lishing of this relationship and connection. But the logic of Barth's posi-
tion, as we have seen, moves from the confession of Jesus Christ as God in-
carnate to the necessity of the confession of God as Creator. The one,
Barth holds, is inseparable from the other. Moreover, this is a confession
of God as Creator of heaven and earth, that is, all created reality distinct
from himself. Of course Barth is right to hold that the biblical witness to
the Word places man in a central position, indeed a unique one. But to
affirm that "in practice the doctrine of creation means anthropology" must
be to give up on the fullness of Christian confession. "In practice" it
means that the doctrine of creation (anything in the created order apart
from man) is cosmology and therefore "essentially foreign".34
Barth's approach is all the more surprising because on one hand he sees the
dangers involved in it and on the other hand his positive thesis in no way
requires it:
33. Athanasius, op. cit., p. 19.
34. Barth completely ignores the strong patristic evidence in favour of a
cosmos-embracing doctrine of redemption, see esp. 'Christ the Victor
and the Doctrine of the Recapitulatio', Ch. 3 of H.E.W. Turner's The
Patristic Doctrine of Redemption: A Study of the Development of Doctrine
during the First Five Centuries (London: A.R. Mowbray & Co.,, 1952) pp.
47 - 69; also Gustaf Aulen's classic defence of Irenaeus in particular,
Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea
of the Atonement, ET by A.G. Herbert (London: SPCK, 1931) pp. 20 - 51.
The vital point is not, of course, whether we accept Irenaeus's view
of what was overcome through the act of reconciliation but his insistence
that the work of reconciliation extends to all things.
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Because man, living under heaven and on earth, is the
creature whose relation to God is revealed to us in the
Word of God, he is the central object of the theological
doctrine of creation.35
As a positive statement this is unexceptional. It must follow from the in-
carnation that man is centrally important. But this theologische Anthropo-
logie does not necessarily have to exclude a doctrine of the non-human. It
is difficult to avoid the judgement that Barth here is caught in such a dia-
lectical method that he is bound to over-draw, even exaggerate, his position.
Perhaps he is simply misled by the often secular meaning of cosmology.
Perhaps his "no" at this point is meant only as a preliminary warning against
the all too widespread supposition that theological anthropology can be
broadened out to include strictly non-theological elements. But in the end
we must judge Barth by his own declared intentions: "In this present exposi-
tion we must not and will not be guilty of any failure to appreciate the sig-
nificance of the cosmos, of any insulating of man from the realm of the non-
,36human creation'.	 In response we can only ask where in this chapter volume
or elsewhere in the Dogmatics, is the necessary consideration of man's rela-
tions with the non-human which would acquit him of the charge to which he
pleads innocent?
There are a number of points in Barth's development of this theme that we
need to confront directly.
1. "The Church and its leaders constantly found themselves in the presence
of ways of regarding the world. They shared in the decay of old and the rise
of new conceptions of this kind. They took part in these changes either
eagerly or reluctantly, but usually without any great interest and concern
But in this matter they were never and nowhere creative." 37
 Barth's
35. CD, III, 2, p. 3.
36. CD, III, 2, p. 4.
37. CD, III, 2, p. 7.
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point on the face of it is obvious and convincing. But it oddly misses
the prior point that the confession of God the Creator was the necessary
background to the engagement or rejection of secular or neutral cosmologies.
The issue is not whether the Church and its leaders developed in turn their
own distinctive and detailed cosmology, dependent upon or independent of
others, but whether the confession of God the Creator of all things neces-
sarily supposed a view of the world as belonging to him and made for his
purposes. Again our criticism of Barth is not that he does not entertain
many of the exciting and currently feasible cosmologies on offer, but that
he fails to see that the confession of the Word incarnate is implicitly a
cosmological view. Torrance brings this out by refining further the "Nicene
conception of space" developed by Athanasius. The key is the relation of
homoousios to the creation; the Word holds and contains all created being
"binding it into such a relation to God that it is preserved from breaking
up into nothingness or dropping out of existence, while at the same time
imparting to it light and rationality". Therefore "statements about acts
of God in the Incarnation imply and demand statements about the creation of
the universe and the unique relation in which as Self-existent Being the
Creator stands to the creation". 8
2. "The reason why there is no revealed or biblical world-view character-
istic of and necessary to the Christian kerygma is that faith in the Word of
God can never find its theme in the totality of the created world". 39
 But it
does not follow that because the theme of God's relationship with man is
central to the Christian confession that all other relationships within
38. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1978) pp. 14 and 55; my italics. He contrasts the Patristic notion of
space "as the seat of relations or the place of meeting and activity in
the interaction between God and the world" with the Aristotelian idea
of space "as the immobile limit of the containing body" (pp.24/5).
39. CD, III, 2, p. 8.
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creation are insignificant to this one prior relationship. Barth resists
one early strand within the kerygma which sees the work of Christ as having
effected reconciliation of all things in heaven and earth. Is the restora-
tion or fulfilment of all things proclaimed, for example, by Peter (Acts 3:21)
as inseparable from the work of Christ to be regarded as transient cosmolo-
gical wrapping? And is the early Christological hymn in Philippians (2:5-11)
with its world embracing theme to be similarly jettisoned?4°
3. "There is no world outlook which can be described as biblical, or even
as Old Testament, or as prophetic or Pauline ... none is expounded as a doc-
trifle, and none is made obligatory for faith ... However serious the pro-
posal to substitute for the affirmations of the Christian Gospel those of
regnant world-views, it always happened in fact that the latter were adjusted
and transformed, the attempt being made to make them more splendid by addi-
tions, more tolerable by subtractions, and more meaningful by involutions".41
Barth is at least half right here. The facile identification of various cos-
mologies as necessary or as an adjunct to Christian faith is a cautionary
tale that needs to be heeded. But he does not ponder 	 it is that cosmo-
logical thinking, theologically inspired or otherwise, has nevertheless held
such an attraction for Christian followers. The reason I suggest is not
difficult to find. It lies in the continued and continuing attempt to relate
the world as defined by the Word to the world as defined in each age by the
40. Barth's own exegesis severely limits what some might argue is the central
thrust of this hymn, namely that the praise of Christ resounds throughout
all creation (v. 11). He interprets it as saying that "God may be wor-
shipped by every creature which, having been created in God's image, can
worship God, needs reconciliation with God and is capable of it", The
Epistle to the Philippians, ET by James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press,
1962) p. 68; my italics. Cf. Gunther Bornkamm: "One cannot emphasize
too much ... that this event of enthronement concerns the world and not
only or even primarily the congregation. Thus 'Kyrios' does not mean
Jesus' honoured position in cultic worship ... but the cosmic ruler",
Early Christian Experience, ET by P.L. Hammer, The New Testament Library
(London: SCM Press, 1969) pp. 117/8.
41. CD, III, 2, n. p. 9.
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presuppositions of culture. 42 Of course in this attempt there has been
reckless compromise, periodical success and, more often, frequent failure.
But it would be a mistake to assume that the attempt at this connection has
always been extrinsic to the kerygma and necessarily a betrayal of it. Indeed
Allan Galloway strongly argues that the doctrine of cosmic redemption "was
the very heart of the primitive Gospel". 43 One further point may perhaps be
risked. Against Barth's optimistic view that the confession of faith has
retained its integrity and meaning despite its alien cosmological assailants,
it could perhaps be posited that it is precisely because Christian faith has
largely failed to develop a view of the world which is consonant with its
faith in the revealed Word, that the very possibility of a secular world
without God, and especially God incarnate, has become a cultural reality.
Once the cosmological wrapping of a supernatural God who acts, and works and
intervenes in and on the world is abandoned because the world is 'not really
like that' the incarnation as well as the cosmos becomes unintelligible.
"Are we sure", asks Maurice Wiles, "that the concept of an incarnate being,
one that is fully God and fully man, is after all an intelligible concept?"44
42. A point well developed by C.N. Cochrane who argues that the early church
claimed to possess in the Logos "a principle of understanding superior
to anything existing in the classical world". Therefore "To accept this
faith was to believe that, however obscure this might appear to the scien-
tific intelligence, the esse of the Father embraced within itself the ele-
ments of order and movement and that these were not less integral than
substance to the divine nature. It was, moreover, to hold that on these
essential constituents of the Deity depended the structure and purpose
of the universe", Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought
and Action from Augustus to Augustine (London: Oxford University Press,
1944) pp. vi and 238; my italics; see also W.A. Whitehouse's Order,
Goodness, Glory (London: Oxford University Press, 1960) pp. 1 - 26.
43. Galloway, The Cosmic Christ (London: Nisbet & Sons, 1951) p. x; my ita-
lics. He convincingly argues that much of the cosmic imagery of the New
Testament was designed to "symbolise all the distortion in the structure
of existence" on one hand, and to assert "that the work of Christ is Uni-
versally effective for all creation" on the other. The doctrine of the
cosmic Christ "arose as a necessary implication of the fundamental in-
sights of Jewish and Christian theology" (pp. 28, 49, 55).
44. Wiles, 'Christianity without Incarnation' in The Myth of God Incarnate,
ed. by John Hick (London: SCM Press, 1977) p. 5; my italics.
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4. "Even where (in certain types of thought among certain Christians and
movements) we think we detect an absolute union of faith with this or that
world-view, we are not really dealing with faith at all, but with a partial
deviation from faith such as is always possible in the life of the Church
and of individuals." 45 Barth is again at least half right here. It is
quite possible that individuals or movements within the Church can compro-
mise or weaken their faith through uncritical, or even critical, engagement
with contemporary world-views. But the rest is question-begging. Of course
compromise with "alien" world-views must be rejected, but that is not in dis-
pute. What must be questioned is whether this right rejection of secular
cosmology should also lead us to the view that the doctrine of creation must
in practice solely confine itself to anthropology. A counter-question should
therefore be posed: is the Church not free to make sense of the created order
(the cosmos) in the light of its conviction concerning the Word made flesh
who is also the Word through whom all things come to be? It is hard to see
why this question should present such difficulty for Barth. For what follows
in Part Two is precisely this kind of doctrinal development with man as its
object, coherently argued and systematically presented, controlled at each
point in relation to the perceived centre of understanding. Barth is keen
throughout his work to maintain the relationship between Christian confes-
sion and human culture. "In understanding Jesus Christ, the Word, the logos
made flesh ... Barth opens the private language of the church to a relation-
ship with culture." 46
 Frequently he refers to maladroit theological claims
that have adversely affected our understanding of ourselves within society
and led to false social developments (see, e.g., his discussion of Marxism
pp. 258 - 9). From this perspective, we must not be deflected from our
task of judging, illuminating and assessing our relationship to the world
in the light of the purposes of God disclosed in Jesus Christ. One recent
45. CD, III, 2, n. p. 9.
46. McLean, Humanity in the Thought of Karl Barth, op. cit., p. 59,
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writer perceives that the Christian tradition has failed to oppose
the "rigid philosophical and theological dualisms operating in western
thought, and the current social, technological and environmental crises
which are to a considerable extent the consequences of those dualisms" be-
cause of the absence of a unifying vision of the world as exemplified in the
logos doctrine. "(I)t is especially incumbent upon Christianity ... to seek
at its roots avision and ethic to help overcome the crises which it has done
so much, both passively and actively, to perpetuate".47
The Word and the Intelligibility of the World
One further and inevitable question arises: Does Barth actually jettison the
doctrine of creation altogether? At first sight it may appear so. But sub-
sequent argument introduces a number of significant qualifications. In the
first place, Barth returns to his theme of the "indissoluble connection" be-
tween creation and covenant, 48 and that the created world is a "prototype
and pattern of that for which he (man) is addressed by the Word of God".
The doctrine of creation then, as expounded, certainly includes the earth
but must "confine itself within ... limits". Theological doctrine is
" anthropocentric in the sense that "it follows the orientation prescribed
by the Word of God; the orientation on man". 49 I shall not repeat the diffi-
culties with this view, except to point out that even this heavily anthro-
pocentric structure does not necessarily preclude a full statement of the non-
human. The Word can be viewed as orientated for man, and through man, for
all creation. We need to distinguish between "anthropocentricity" - that
is orientation centrally on man, and "anthropocentrism" - that is exclusive
orientation on man. Secondly, the problem concerning the limits of theo-
logical knowledge:
47. Casey Bailey, 'Cosmotheandrism: A Unitive Vision and Environmental
Ethic for Survival' , CTNS Bulletin, The Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences, Berkeley, California, 4, 3 (1984) p. 10.
48. £2. ' III, 2, p. 11.
49. CD, III, 2, p. 12.
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But we do not know (wir wissen nicht) how the lordship and
praise of God are exercised in the cosmos around us. We do
not know this even from the Word of God. The Word of God
is silent on this point.50
The issue is serious and merits attention. It is certainly true that much
in the created order, its specific pattern, design and function, is beyond
immediate theological explanation. We cannot know specifically how the Spirit
relates to all parts of creation and how their inner workings co-operate with-
in the general beneficence of God. The same, however, must also be said of
many human phenomena. Within particular circumstances we may be unable to
render much of human life specifically intelligible. Beyond the fact that
such-and-such is possible we may. have to be agnostic as to the finer details.
We may be questioning, incredulous, perplexed or baffled but we cannot draw
from the fact of unknowing some human gnosis that would enable us to declare
emphatically in the negative. The limit to theological knowledge of creation
is indubitably a complex question and a real one. But the argument from re-
lative silence would appear more convincing if Barth had taken up at earlier
points some of the real possibilities concerning man's relationship with the
non-human as the biblical witness developed them. For Barth may be right
that outside the covenant relationship the place and purpose of living beings
are impossible to render intelligible. But included within the covenant re-
lationship at least a major part of the non-human creation can be viewed
from another light.
The puzzling feature of the concluding part of this section is that Barth
does appear to grasp this point, only subsequently to lose it again:
Hence in the disclosed relationship of God with man there
is disclosed also His relationship with the universe
This does not rest on a world-view ... It is man in cove-
nant with God who reveals this plan. He does so repre-'
sentatively for the whole cosmos ... He alone sheds light
on the cosmos ... As God's covenant with him (man) is
disclosed, the cosmos is shown to be embraced by the same
covenant . 51
50. CD, III, 2, p. 17; my italics.
51. CD, III, 2,pp. 18/9; my italics.
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The logic of Barth's conclusion moves away from the position even of rela-
tive silence which he advanced earlier. For if man's relationship to God
discloses the purpose of the universe it is inconceivable that some account
cannot be given of it. If man actually represents the divine purpose for
the cosmos, or if his own covenant relationship embraces the cosmos, it
mustbe impossible to offer a theologische Anthropologie that does not de-
scribe this fundamental aspect. Far from the doctrine of creation meaning
in practice anthropology, the precise reverse must be true. The doctrine
of man must imply a working doctrine of creation.
Barth, alas, does not see this. He concludes that it is "legitimate" that
"we concern ourselves with anthropology alone" - one that does not in fact
reveal any specific purposes for creation. Thus he compounds the difficulty
by beginning his second sub-section by stating what is plainly inconsistent:
Man is made an object of theological knowledge by the fact
that his relationship to God is revealed to us in the Word
of God. We have seen it is this which distinguishes man
from the rest of the cosmos.52
In fact what distinguishes man from the cosmos is not that God's purpose is
uniquely disclosed in him for himself, but for the whole cosmos, as pre-
viously accepted. In man, as previously defined, we have no alternative
but to reckon with a disclosure of meaning for the entire cosmos.
Barth's overall thesis of the second sub-section, namely that "As the man
Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the source of our know-
ledge of the nature of man as created by God" 53 is, as positive thesis and
explanation, theologically unexception 	 It is not the positive assertion
but the negative implications which are difficult to follow. For Barth
proceeds by contrasting the specific and definite knowledge of man from the
general and wholly unspecified knowledge of creation that can be gleaned
52. CD, III, 2, p. 19; my italics.
53. CD, III, 2, p. 41.
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from the incarnation. In one sense of course he must be right, that is,
it must follow that man is most centrally revealed by the incarnation.
But it does not follow that real knowledge of creatureliness, of man's re-
lationship to other creatures and nature itself, cannot be deduced from God's
self-disclosure. Barth does not grapple at this point with the long tradi-
tion of theology spearheaded by Irenaeus and particularly strong in Eastern
theology which insists upon the relationship between Christ and creation as
a whole. Notice the emphases in this well-known passage of Irenaeus:
For the Creator of the world is truly the Word of God: and
this is our Lord, who in the last times was made man, exist-
ing in this world, and who in an invisible manner contains
all things created, and is inherent in the entire creation,
since the Word of God governs and arranges all things; and
therefore He came to his own in a visible manner, and was made
flesh, and hung upon the tree, that He might sum up all things
in Himself.54
It is our very God, in other words, the actual Creator of this vast and
mysterious universe, who pledges himself to the very materiality of existence
through the incarnation and therefore raises all existence into union and
fellowship with him. "Thus the world's essential goodness as the creature
of God is confirmed and enhanced by its redemption through the incarnate
Logos", writes Richard Norris in commentary, "and so far is the world from
being alien from its Creator that it becomes in man the recipient of an
immortal kind of life". 55 In this way the redemption of man is seen not as
opposed to, but as the prerequisite of, the redemption of all creation.
Ironically because Barth is not able to confess any knowledge of the created
world as revealed by the incarnation, he opens up the very possibility of a
54. Irenaeus of Lyons, 'Pgainst Heresies' in The Writings of Irenaeus, 2
vols., ET by A. Roberts and W.H. Rambaut, Ante-Nicene Christian Library
(Edinburgh: T and T Clark, n.d.) Vol. II, V, 18, 3, pp. 105/6; my
italics.
55. Norris, God and World in Early Christian Theology: A Stuy in Justin
Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen, Studies in Patristic Thought
(London: A and C Black, 1966) p. 74; his italics.
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secular world, that is a world divorced from the saving activity of God
and largely unintelligible from that light. Thus it could be that Barth
allows too much for the "exact science of man" which he claims does not
stand in opposition to the insights of the Gospel. For whilst such enquiry
must be careful not to dogmatise on the basis of its results (and thus
render itself theologically unacceptable), it cannot escape our attention
that scientific explanations of nature, and particularly creatures within
it, largely dominate our contemporary understanding of the world. Whilst
the doctrine of man may be safeguarded by Barth's insistence upon a centre
of theological knowledge in this respect, the doctrine of non-human creation
is in no such way safeguarded. Thus scientific enquiry, and more often than
not the presumptions of the same, have come to dominate our understanding
of the cosmos in which we live. 56 Doctrine is therefore practically reduced
to a gnosis of man separated and insulated from the otherwise explained natural
world. To summarise, the issue is not whether man is rendered intelligible by
the Word but whether the world in which the Word is revealed is also made
intelligible.
Jesus as Man within the Cosmos
The next major section is entitled 'Man As The Creature of God' and its
first sub-section 'Jesus, Man for God'. "In this section", begins Barth,
"we ask concerning the outline and form of our object, its character and
limits, and therefore the special characteristics by which it is distinguished
from other objects". Who or what do we mean by 'man'? More particularly, who
and what is 'man in the cosmos'? If we look to the man Jesus we see that
56. Owen Chadwick defines secularision in the way laid down by Lilbbe as
"'the relation (whatever that is, which can only be known by historical
enquiry) in which modern European civilization and society stands to
the Christian elements of its past and the continuing elements of its
present'", Sakularisierung (Freiburg, 1965) p. 86, cited in The Secu-
larisation of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge:
University Press, 1975) p. 264. In this sense there can be little doubt
that our view of the world, and nature especially, has been progessive-
ly and successfully secularised. The discontinuity consists in the
"self-enclosed positions" which result from the "withdrawal of natural
sciences from theology", Hardy, 'The Dynamics of Creation', op. cit.,
pp. 1-3.
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scripture presents him as a man living in historical space and time "through
a series of conditions, actions, experiences, in the recurrence and confirma-
tion of its identity through all these active modifications of its being".57
But who is this Jesus?
First of all, he is "wholly and utterly the Bearer of an office". 58
 It is
impossible to conceive of him except in terms of the office bestowed upon
him. There is no contradiction between the two: his office and his humanity
are one. This is because the humanity of Jesus is most appropriately de-
scribed in terms of work. When the Evangelists describe him in terms of
Prophet, Priest and King it is clear that they have his saving work in mind.
Barth insists that Jesus' humanity and his saving work constitute together
Real Man (der wirkliche Mensch). There is no abstract Jesus: "not a neutral
humanity in which Be might have had quite a different history; not a humanity
which we can seek and analyse in abstraction from or otherwise than His
work'.
Barth now reaches his "decisive point". The New Testament witness is united
in seeing in the work of Jesus nothing less than the work of God himself.
"We cannot say that Jesus did not act in His own right, but in the name of
another, namely God". Whilst the same may be said of prophets and apostles,
what distinguishes Jesus is the way in which his own cause and that of God
become one. "God acts as Jesus acts", maintains Barth. 6° It is in being
one in his divinity with the Father, in his work and activity, that Jesus
is Himself, this man 61
Barth now stands back a little to recapitulate. Who and what is man within
57. CD, III, 2, p. 55.
58. CD, III, 2, p. 56.
59. CD, III, 2, p. 59.
60. CD, III, 2, p. 62.
61. CD, III, 2, p. 64.
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the cosmos? Six points are made. The first and major is that man is the
only one among the creatures who must "recognise at once the identity of
God with Himself". We can say here 	 what can only be "problematical" of
all other creatures, namely, "with the existence of this man we immediately
encounter that of God also". Secondly, Barth makes this point more pre-
cisely and in a way that is central to his whole theology. For as God wills
and works in this man, he works and wills "for each and every man". 62
 He
is the Saviour of man. Jesus makes actual in his person and work the for-
bearing, providential activity of God. Thus God's presence in Jesus is
"not just a fact but an act". Thirdly, God wills this as an act of his own
sovereign freedom. God is free in his sovereignty, to choose freely as he
wills. "His deliverance is always the act of his freedom", maintains Barth.
Fourthly, this sovereign act of God encompasses man. "Man, this man, exists
as such in the enactment of this history, in the fulfilment of the divine
act of lordship which takes place in it". 63 Hence man exists within the
sovereign fiat of God. In Jesus are not juxtaposed two kinds of being, one
human, one divine, but rather one inclusive divine reality "in which as
such the human is posited, contained and included". Fifthly, precisely
because of this inclusive divine and human reality (what Barth under-
stands as the significance of the doctrine of the anhypostasia64)
it must follow that the creature is perfectly open to the divine will and
"the divine deliverance enacted in it". 65 The creature is not just "the
locus" or "the form" of this deliverance for other creatures. Neither does
God simply utilise this creature in his plan for the salvation of man.
62. CD, III, 2, p. 68.
63. CD, III, 2, p. 69.
64. CD, III, 2, n. p. 70. Barth does not ask himself the question which
is begged by this notion, namely is there such a thing as distinctly
human substance?
65. CD, III, 2, p. 70.
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Rather the closest possible identification must be made between this man
and God if we are to understand Jesus as the Word of God. 66 Finally, Barth
sums up the distinctive importance of Jesus in the fact that he "is for
God". This means that this creature "is for the divine deliverance and
therefore for God's own glory, for the freedom of God and therefore for the
67	 .love of God".	 What radically distinguishes this man from all other crea-
tures is that he is wholly and completely for God. What we see in Jesus is
the "purpose and presence and revelation of God actualised in His (own) life"
and becoming "His own purpose". Therefore Barth speaks of human life as
"identical" with this telos
Man Juxtaposed with Creation
This is a good moment to pause and consider more precisely the distinctly
human incarnational logic of his thesis developed here. We need to remember
that Barth's concern is "who and what is man within the cosmos?" and this
"first in relation to the man Jesus". 68 From this he hopes to establish the
"distinctive characteristics" of man over and against other creatures. Here
is a summary of the stages of his argument in propositional form:
Stage One: In this man (Jesus) we recognise the identity of the
one who is identical with God.
66. In the light of this, we can only bewail the thought of commentators
like John Macquarrie, who argue that Barth "in his most typical utter-
ares, regards God as wholly other to man". It is true that some allow-
ance is made for the change of thought as represented by Barth's The
Humanity of God, ET by J.N. Thomas and T. Wieser, Fontana Library of
Theology and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: Collins, 1971) esp. pp. 240ff.,
but the following anecdote surely represents a libel at least on CD, III,
2: "When in the nineteen-sixties some American theologians revived
Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God and believed that they could
construct a Christian theology of God, it was noted that they had all
been at one time devotees of the theology of Karl Barth. The connection
was made clear by the statement of one of them, William Hamilton: 'It
is a very short step but a critical one, to move from the otherness of
God to his absence", The New Essence of Christianity (Darton, Longman
& Todd, 1966) p. 55, cited in Macquarrie's In Search of Humanity: A
Theological and Philosophical Approach (London: SCM Press, 1982) p. 255
and 254 above; my italics.
67. CD, III, 2, p. 70.
68. CD, III, 2, p. 68.
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Stage Two: The relationship (therefore) between God and this man
cannot be indifferent. As God wills and works through
this man he works and wills for all men everywhere.
Stage Three: Cod's sovereignty is not compromised by this identity,
indeed it is the act of God's freedom. (Therefore) it
is the freedom as well as the love of God which dis-
tinguishes this man.
Stage Four: This man therefore exists within the lordship of God.
Therefore there are not two realities (human and divine)
but one reality in which both are posited and included.
Stage Five: (Therefore) this man is no mere channel of God's activity;
it cannot be neutral or indifferent. Because God dwells
within this creature, we can know that God is active within
him.
Stage Six: This creature is for God: for divine deliverance, purpose,
love and glory.
We now see immediately the circularity of Barth's thesis. Once the pre-
supposition is granted, namely that in him (Jesus) we have to reckon with
the one who is identical with God, everything else follows. But it is not just
the circularity that is disconcerting, but the way in which the human crea-
ture is seemingly abstracted from the reality of the created world.. For
what is striking is that it is precisely not what Barth claims for it,
namely "man within the cosmos". A view of human life and nature is pre-
supposed that is independent of the creaturely world and the cosmos in gene-
ral. The problem can best be approached by asking: What or who is assumed
in the incarnation? Of course human nature is so assumed. But this
nature is at the same time the nature of the creature, of creatureli-
ness and of creaturehood. St. John of the Cross emphasises
how "in uniting Himself with man He united himself with
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the nature of them all ... in this lifting up of the Incarnation of his
Son, and in the glory of His resurrection according to the flesh, not only
did the Father beautify the creatures in part, but we can say that he left
them aLl. clothed with beauty and dignity". 69 We need to remember that on
Barth view so far itis not the specialness of human nature per se, but the
divine attitude towards it that makes it special. If this is the case,
what must also be presupposed in the incarnation is God's especial relations
with all creaturely being. There is no special man elected within the God-
head, but only man, the creature, with whom God so elects to have special
relations. On this question turns the whole possibility of the incarnation
being the key to the meaning of all creaturely being. If the creaturely life
taken up into the life of God and thereby made one inclusive reality with
him, is not the same creaturely reality that pervades all creaturely being,
human and animal, then there can be no genuine point of correspondence, or
of course of redemption, for either.7°
If, therefore, the man identical with God is not only the same being identi-
cal with human nature but all creaturely nature, and moreover if this being
has the same creaturely nature as exhibited by all God's creatures because
of their creatureliness, then all the subsequent stages of Barth's argument
are in need of revision. In stage one the fact of identity between God and
man in the incarnation is stressed which means that "with the existence of
69. St. John of the Cross, The Complete Works, ed. and ET by A.E. Peers, 3
vols. in one ed. (Wheathampstead, Bertfordshire: Anthony Clarke, 1974)
Vol. II, V, p.. 49. The sheer profundity of St. John's vision is ex-
pressed in this line: "To behold them and find them very good (al]. crea-
tures) was to make them very good in the Word, His Son", p. 48. The
Word beautifies all creatures "communicating to them supernatural being",
p. 49.
70. Barth writes elsewhere: "Nothing in true human nature can ever be alien
or irrelevant to the Christian ... That means that we can understand
true human nature only in the light of the Christian gospel that we be-
lieve", Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5, ET by T.A. Smail,
Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers, 5 (Edinburgh: Oliver &
Boyd, 1956) p. 43. But if the argument is sound, it must also logi-
cally follow that all created nature is relevant and intelligible in
terms of the gospel.
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this man we immediately encounter that of God also", and therefore "This
cannot be said of any other creature". But Barth cannot have it both ways.
He cannot on one hand posit that there is no attribute, quality or dispo-
sition on man's part that uniquely equips him for incariation and on the
other hand hold that the incarnation is the assumption of a specifically
equipped human nature. For in the end, on Barth's view, we do not know what
human nature is, nor what creaturely nature is either except through the in-
carnation.
In stage two we move to the theme that this man is "the Saviourof men
their unique and total saviour". 71 But the man incarnate is not just one
man among other men, but at one and the same time the Logos through whom all
things come to be. It is not only that there can be no "quiescent and in-
different" relation between man and the incarnation, but also there can be
no such indifference between incarnation and all creaturely being through
whom it actually comes to be. The Logos of God cannot be set apart from the
world which it has originated and through whom it continues to be. A simi-
lar point needs to be made in relation to stage four. Barth rightly sees
that God's sovereignty is not compromised in the act of incarnation, that it
is an act of God's freedom. But when he continues that only in human history
is this divine freedom revealed, he unwittingly separates the divine nature
and activity. He speaks of "a story" which can only be understood "a priori,
indisputably, and axiomatically, as the divine-human history". 72 Of course
the "story" is about this, but what story could it be concerning a kind of
creature so unlike all other kinds of creatures that its telling can only
be advanced by placing in contrast and juxtaposition all other kinds of crea-
tures? Barth strongly emphasises that there are not "two juxtaposed realities"
in the incarnation, but one fully human and divine reality because "He is as
71. CD, III, 2, p. 68.
72. CD, III, 2, p. 69; my italics.
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He is in the Word of God". 73 But how does the one relate and belong to the
other if the incarnate Word is to be seen as independent and separated from
the Word through whom all things come to be? Is there not here an essential
and abiding division and contradiction?
In stage five the division is almost complete. "No distinction can be made",
writes Barth, "between what this creature is and what it does, between what
God does through this creature and what He does in it. For this creature is
in the Word of God". 74 But the creature described here is not a being whose
nature is bound up and related to other creaturely determinations and rela-
tionships. It has to be asked whether the way in which Barth advances his
case by stressing specifically human nature in fact renders all creatures,
non-human and even human creatures, strangely redundant. Man that is cut
off from his existence in the creaturely world, from his relations within
that very world determined by the Word, can only be a shadow of that which
the purpose of God intends. This point, in turn, is reinforced by Barth's
sixth stage and summary. For he writes how man is by definition "for God"
and in this "surpasses all other creatures". 75 But is not man also made
for the world, the cosmos in which he has been placed? Is not man also tied
fundamentally to the earthiness of the earth, and is he not placed within
it to serve its fruition and completion? Vladimir Lossky, in utter contrast,
speaks of how "Man is not a being isolated from the rest of creation, by
his very nature he is bound up with the whole of creation". This "cosmic
awareness", he argues, "has never been absent from Eastern spirituality
In his way to union with God, man in no way leaves creatures aside, but
gathers together in his love the whole cosmos disordered by sin, that it may
73. CD, III, 2, pp. 69/70.
74. £2.' III, 2, p. 70.
75. £2. ' III, 2, p. 71.
- 205 -
at last be transfigured by grace". 76 The picture that emerges in Barth,
however, is one that is wholly anthromonistic, in the sense that all divine
activity and endeavour are concentrated within the sphere of human na 4 Are,
history and destiny. Of course the man spoken of here by Barth is the man
Jesus. It is not human creation per se, but Jesus as the Word that is the
centre of God's reconciling purpose. But because of this, it cannot possi-
bly stand as an adequate interpretation that man who is for God is not at
one and the same time for God's purposes within creation and his determina-
tion to reconcile all things to himself. And this is precisely what we must
say of all men because we may say it first of this man, Jesus.
Requirements of Theological Anthropology
The second sub-section of the second major section is entitled 1 Phenomena
of the Human' (Phnomene des Menschlichen). After outlining his Christo-
logy, Barth now proceeds towards a definition of man in general. He reminds
his readers that the question of the nature of the man Jesus can only be a
basis for anthropology for "anthropology cannot be Christology, nor Christo-
logy anthropology". 77 Between Jesus and ourselves there remains the "mystery"
of our own sinfulness and the "mystery" of his identity with God. Because
of this "irremovable difference" we cannot simply move from a specific know-
ledge of Jesus to a specific knowledge of man in general. But we can cer-
tainly know who man is indirectly from this process.
But Barth is clear that his Christological outline does allow us "certain
criteria". He seeks to indicate these more precisely in relation to the
six points previously made. Firstly, if it is true that in the humanity of
Jesus we are confronted with the being of God then, despite dissimilarity
in certain respects, it must follow that "every man is to be understood, at
least mediately and indirectly, to the extent that he is conditioned by the
76. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, ET by members of
the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius (Cambridge and London:
James Clarke & Co., 1973) pp. 110 - 111.
77. CD, III, 2, p. 70.
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priority of this man, in his relationship with God". 78 Secondly, it must
also follow that each man must also be conditioned by the fact of "divine
deliverance enacted in the man Jesus". 79 Thirdly, it must follow that if
the "divine action in favour of each and every man in Him (Jesus)" involves
the sovereignty of God himself, it must also follow that the "being of every
man ... has its true determination in the glory of God". Fourthly, if it is
true that Jesus fulfils the lordship of God and is indeed in this sense truly
Lord of the universe, it must follow that he is Lord also of every man and
that every man stands under the Lordship of this one man. Fifthly, if the
history of Jesus is truly the history of deliverance it must follow that "the
being of everyman must consist in this history". Each man will have to de-
cide how to respond to the "grace addressed to him" in Jesus, that is, how
he will determine his life in accordance with the history of deliverance
which confronts him. Finally, if the life and work of Jesus, indeed his
whole person and activity, is for God, then it must follow that "if there is
the slightest similarity" between his humanity and our own, that "no other
man can be understood apart from the fact that his existence too, as an
active participation in what God does and means for him, is an event in which
he renders God service ... ". Man cannot escape therefore that "his part is
for God" simply because "God first willed to bind Himself to man".
Barth now stands back from his enumerated criteria. They are not as yet
sufficient for a full concept of man to emerge, but they are nevertheless
his appointed limits in which "we shall have to move in our search for a
theological concept of man". 8° They are at the very least "minimal require-
ments" and they provide us with sufficient guidelines for a critical analy-
sis of other systems.
Barth begins by giving "a general delimitation". No generally descriptive
78. CD, III, 2, p. 70.
79. CD, III, 2, p. 73.
80. CD, III, 2, p. 74.
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picture of man fed from accessible and empirical elements within the human
phenomena can define real man. "Human self-knowledge" (Selbsterkenntnis),
argues Barth, "must be regarded as a vicious circle". For underlying these
attempts of man to find himself by his own abilities is the philosophical
,81problem of "who is the man who wants to know himself and thinks he can?'
Barth does not deny the possibility of knowledge of genuinely human character-
istics, but in the recognition of these traits alone "no-one will discover
himself, or what he truly is". People who surmise from the edges of true
theological knowledge "are speaking only about knives without edges, or
82handles without pots, or predicates without subjects".
Barth maintains that the difficulty inherent in all attempts at human self-
knowledge is to be found in the example of man's relationship with animals.
For if there is no clear concept of real man, how can one seek to establish
his particularity amongst the plethora of earthly species? Man, that has
no theological distinction can easily "merge into his environment" possibly
being assimilated into it Whilst there should be no "unbecoming depreca-
tion of any of our fellow-creatures", he is clear that the true distinctive-
ness of man can only be found in "the history which has its basis in God's
attitude to him". If we abandon this theological distinction, we shall for
ever lose sight of what constitutes true humanness. For we shall end up in
the process of isolating such and such a characteristic, to which greater or
lesser degree it may to some extent be found in the animal world and to which
greater or lesser extent it may correspond with our own ambiguous self-
knowledge. "But whether or not they are such symptoms", maintains Barth,
,,	 83
obviously depends on whether we already see and know real man".
After examining two separate anthropologies, one ethical and another existen-
tial, Barth is convinced that he has now dispensed with attempts at "autonomous
81. CD, III, 2, p 75.
82. CD, III, 2, p. 76.
83. CD, III, 2, p. 78.
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self-understanding".	 This does not mean that he has rejected these
approaches altogether as a means of "human self-examination", or that the
level at which these analyses are made may not be acceptable. No one, or
collection, of these approaches can alone provide a coherent picture of
man. Theological anthropology requires that "the sovereignty in which man
claims to know himself is renounced, or rather that it is regarded as rela-
tive rather than absolute". 85
 Only from God, as an outside source, can ob-
jective knowledge be found. Since only God truly knows what man is, "he
must receive and accept the instruction of God" concerning himself. It is
only in this context, in his relationship with God, and not as an isolated
being, that man can know himself. But this general outline is not itself
sufficient. For it might be thought that such an ability to receive divine
communication was in some way an "attribute" of man. But such a thought
must not be entertained. For God would then "be noetically and ontically
immanent as well as transcendent, and its immanence as present as man him-
self is present". We need, therefore,to recognise that the relationship
between man and God cannot be described in terms of mutual co-ordination,
but rather in terms of God's declared attitude towards man. And it is this
attitude which is revealed under the lordship of God within a specific
history. It is this history "in which particular decisions and purposes
give rise to action and suffering, speech and hearing, question and answer,
,,86
on the part of God and then of man . 	 Knowledge of real man is therefore
84. CD, III, 2, p. 121. Barth rejects the "ethical understanding of man"
because "it is at one with the naturalistic in visualising man as a
self-contained entity", p. 109. Whilst this may be true of some, even
many, is it true of all? Schweitzer's 'reverence for life', for ex-
ample, is characterised by the need to "show to all will-to-live the
same reverence as I do to my own" and therefore avoids many of Barth's
strictures, Civilization and Ethics, ET by C.T. Campion, Unwin Books
(London: A and C Black, 1967) p. 214. See pp. 271 - 81 for further
discussion of Schweitzer.
85. CD, III, 2, p. 122.
86. CD, III, 2, p. 124.
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only possible if man reverses his autonomous understanding into a "theo-
self-understanding". 87 Unless the circle of self-knowledge is
broken there can be no way forward to true self-knowledge.
Real Man: Un-real Creature?
At this stage we should examine more closely the "minimum requirements" of
theological anthropology expressed in the six "full and sober limits". I shall
reproduce in full the first of these as they form part of a repeated pattern:
If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that in His
humanity we are confronted immediately and directly with the
being of God, then necessarily, assuming that there is a simi-
larity between Him and us in spite of all dissimilarity, every
man is to be understood, at least mediately and indirectly, to
the extent that he is conditioned by the priority of this man,
in his relationship with God, i.e. in the light of the fact that
he comes from God, and above all that God moves to him.88
The problem here is knowing how this definition could possibly exclude non-
human creatures. If man, the human creature, is to be so understood "at
least mediately and indirectly" in relation to Jesus, are not all creatures
to be similarly understood? This is not to suggest that they are all speci-
fically determined in the same way. But that all creatures stand under the
same and general determination must follow. How could it be otherwise but
that the incarnate Logos "through whom all things come to be" necessarily
shapes and determines the nature of all creatures that originate with him?
Is not the "priority of this man" even more directly relevant to those
beings for whom this man holds the key to their theological reason and
being? Perhaps it is for this reason that Teilhard de Chardin formulates
"three natures in Christ" precisely in order to preserve the insight that
"Christ's relation to the cosmos is as real as his relation to the divine
89Word and to Jesus of Nazareth".
87. CD, III, 2, p. 125.
88. CD, III, 2, p. 73.	 -
89. J.A. Lyons, The Cosmic Christ in Origen and Teilhard de Chardin: A
Comparative Study, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1982) p. 217.
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The second limitation is that "every man as such must exist and have his
being in a history which stands in a clear and recognisable relationship
to the divine deliverance enacted in the man Jesus". Insofar as this is
true every creature must stand in a "relationship to the divine deliver-
ance". This is not necessarily to suppose that the deliverance of man and
other creatures has .an identical form, but that both exist in a "recogni-
sable relationship" to it is inescapable. This is not a question, we need
to remind ourselves, of human conjecture or opinion, but of theological
truth. For it is the Word as Co-creator which is the same Word incarnate
who effects the reality of deliverance. All creatures must by virtue of
their existence be related to the Logos. Even if it is advanced that non-
human creatures stand only secondarily in such a relationship, the point
remains. Indeed it could be argued that since the deliverance of all men
wrought by this one man is the pre-requisite of the relationship of deli-
verance for all creation, the relationship is equally if not more signifi-
cant. In this way "on man, thus redeemed, falls some responsibility for
,, 90the redemption of all creation
The third limitation, namely that man "as this history essentially concerns
it ... has its true determination in the glory of God (in the very fact
that it can participate in that history)" is taken to be a distinguishing
mark and therefore the criterion of humanity. But can this be so? Are
God's non-human creatures incapable of participating in history? Barth's
later definition would appear to be wholly anthropocentric:
The history of a being begins, continues and is completed when
something other than itself and transcending its own nature en-
counters it, approaches it and determines its being in the
nature proper to it, so that it is compelled and enabled to
transcend itself in response and in relation to this new factor.91
90. Man in his Living Environment: An Ethical Assessment, Report of a Work-
ing Party of the Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility
(London: ClO Publishing, 1970) p. 65. The Report adds the necessary
caveat: "This does not make man his own God. It is possible only to
man redeemed by God and in the power of God", p. 65.
91. CD, III, 2, p. 158; my italics.
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Such a definition, however, does not strictly presuppose only human history
in relation to God's intervention and activity. It could be that human
activity in relation to other creatures constitutes for them history in at
least a secondary sense. But is not God's Spirit free to relate to the non-
human creation outside the confines of specifically human history? In any
case are not the animals slain in sacrifice, the creatures assembled in the
ark or the beings which share with man the Sabbath experience also "parti-
cipators" in history and therefore in the glory of God? "By proclaiming
the summons of a transcendent God", writes Evode Beaucamp, "the Bible unites
the movement of the universe with the momentum of history".92
The fourth criterion stipulates that: "it must be said of every man that
it is essential to him that as he exists, God is over him as his Lord and
he himself stands under the lordship of God the Lord". How can there be a
Herrschaft of God over man which is separate and distinct from his lordship
over all creation? Of course there may be facets of the life of man which
require of God a corresponding difference of attitude and command.- Man's
dominion or lordship, for example, over animals singles him out in particu-
lar. But human responsibilities apart, what case can there be for positing
a radically different lordship of God over man from that of the rest of
creation? Is not God the Creator of all creatures and also by definition
their Lord also? Can we point to any creature, that is genuinely created
being, of whom God is not also Creator and lord? Lord, that is, precisely
because he is their Creator? If we follow Barth too closely at this point
we may threaten the very meaning of the terms "creation" and "Creator".
Ironically it is A Catholic Dictionary which reflects similar thinking and
compounds an absurdity: lower animals are "not directly created by God, but
derived with their bodies from their parents by natural generation".93
92. Beaucamp, The Bible and the Universe: Israel and the Theology of History,
ET by David Baihatchet (London: Burns & Oates, 1963) p. 177.
93. A Catholic Dictionary, eds. W.E. Addis and T. Arnold (London: Virtue
& Co.., 1924) p. 31.
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If creatures are not genuine creatures, God cannot be their Creator but
likewise if there is no Creator there can be no genuine creatures either.
The bald truth is that God must be the direct Creator and Lord of all ex-
isting beings.
The fifth and sixth criteria need to be taken together. Both stress
the distinctive nature of man as an active participator in
the work of Cod: "Not only his actions but his being will consist
in his participation in what God does and means for him"
	 Here
we may reach something close to a distinctive definition.
But it is important to note that this definition is one that emphasises
activity. It is the work of man which so closely identifies him with the
activity of God. Of course the question of activity, as Barth rightly points
out, cannot be divorced from the question of being, indeed in "Real Man" the
two are inseparable. But what Barth does not take up at this point is the
obvious parallel between the work of God in Christ for the service of the
whole earth and the unique ability of man so to perform the similar work
of sacrifice. The crucial point of correspondence is precisely this ana-
logy of relationship whereby man is able to reflect an ast-figure within
his own being the relationship of self-giving and costly service that charac-
tenses the work of God in himself as Father and Son. It is for this reason
especially that the recounting of differences between man and other crea-
tures must take into account from the beginning that man is so set within
this twin determination and reality. He is the creature set between heaven
and earth whose own being and activity is able to reflect and copy the
divine being and activity.
What is therefore most puzzling and difficult in Barth's exposition of the
distinctive nature of man is precisely his abstraction of man from his
94. .2.' III, 2, p. 74.
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relations within creation. A knowledge of man is proposed as he is in him-
self quite independently of the creaturely nature he shares with creation
or the purposes of God within creation itself. Barth rightly inveighs
against the notion of man finding himself through Selbsterkenntnis alone.
"And in what he declares he knows we can only recognise himself, a phantom
man, and not real man". 95 But the weakness of the exposition here consists
in the tendency to underrate the reality of the creature in order to accen-
tuate and develop an arguably exaggerated doctrine of man. So strongly is
this line pressed that the reality of the created world is practically treated
as a phantom or a shadow.
Barth subsequently makes the motive for his approach clear:
The real man whom we are seeking must obviously be the being
which is distinguished as man from all other beings and which
in spite of any affinity or relationship or common features
that it may have with them is always man and only man, and is
not therefore interchangeable with them,
and again "Real man cannot merge into his environment' t .. But is it obvious
that the real man sought must be so absolutely distinauishable from all other
creatures? Barth's insistence and striving at this point betokens an inse-
curity of approach. Is not the fact of incarnation itself sufficient to
render a theological distinction between man and "his environment"? It is
not clear what theological gain there might be in Barth's determination at
this point. How could it weaken his Christologically grounded anthropology
if he generously accepted that much that we take to be peculiar to human-
kind is in fact a common creaturely possession endowed by God? How can it
be construed as laying an axe to his Christological foundation if at this
stage our definition of creaturehood is wider rather than narrower, more
rather than less inclusive? Barth defends himself against this prospective
criticism in the following way:
95. CD, III, 2, p. 75.
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That this is so is clear at once if from the very outset we
view him (man) in the history which has its basis in God's
attitude to him. This does not require any unbecoming depre-
ciation of any of our fellow-creatures. We do not know what
particular attitude God may have to them, and therefore what
may be their decisive particularity within the cosmos. We are
not in a position to ascribe or deny any such particularity to
them. We can and must accept them as our fellow-creatures with
all due regard for the mystery with which God has veiled them.
But we are clearly marked off from them by the history which
has its history in God's attitude to us, to man. Existing in
this history, the being of man is plainly separated and dis-
tinguished from all others.96
I will not take up now the important question of the history of man which
separates him from fellow creatures (see pp. 228f.). But we may well be
puzzled to know what kind of election of man it could be that requires a
practical agnosticism concerning the life and nature of our fellow-creatures.
It is not adequate to answer "we do not know" as though the procedure was
entirely open and therefore allowed for the question at the beginning as a
serious option and possibility. Rather, as we have seen, the nature of his
thesis in Part Two has advanced by the presumption of ignorance from the out-
set. What is at stake in the manner in which Barth approaches this problem
is whether God is "the ground of the transformation of all things, of the
,,97
entire world, and not simply the interior life . 	 Does God's work in Christ
have relevance beyond the human community? It is possible that in all this
Barth has over-reacted to what he takes to be the Darwinian threat which
forms part of his later detailed discussion. 98 But it is not clear why he
should take such objection to evolutionary findings if, as he contends, the
question of distinctive theological anthropology does not in fact rest upon
96. CD, III, 2, p. 78; my italics.
97. Stuart McLean, op. cit., p. 64. McLean claims this as one of the posi-
tive aspects of Barth's thought which lead to political involvement but
he fails to grasp the inadequacyof Barth's treatment of cosmology, p. 24f._
98. CD, III, 2, n. pp. 79 - 90. It is not clear that Barth always maintained
an attitude of hostility to evolutionary theory. In a letter to his grand-
niece worried by the apparent conflict between Genesis and evolutionary
theory, Barth writes: "Thus one's attitude to the creation story and the
theory of evolution can take the form of an either/or only if one shuts
oneself off completely either from faith in God's revelation or from the
mind (Or opportunity) for scientific understanding", To Christine Barth,
18 February 1965 in Karl Barth: Letters 1961 - 1968, op. cit., p. 184.
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the results even of exact rather than speculative sciences of this kind.
The welcoming attitude given to some forms of naturalistic evidence 99 has
the character of special pleading as if some real issue were at stake.
But if the self-disclosure of God as man does not depend upon any human
attribute, faculty or disposition but upon the sheer, generous giving of
his grace, the central theological question is not about man's nature or
potentiality but about God's inclusive purpose in making himself known in
this form and in this way. Moreover, if man rpresents the telos of God,
as Barth advanced previously, the unresolved questions about the relation-
ship between man and the rest of creation have a direct poignancy.
Man in Opposition to the Non-Human
The third sub-section of the second major section is entitled 'Real Man'.
Barth now turns to the "constructive part" of his task, namely the answer-
ing of the question what "constitutes human being, i.e. the question of
real man".'°° The first and simplest foundation is that "every man as such
101is the fellow man of Jesus". 	 Barth emphasises that theology must not be
"timid" in its insistence upon this primary relation. Man cannot in the
light of this choose or determine a neighbour other than that which is
given. Moreover, to be with Jesus is "to be a man with this correspondence,
reflection and representation of the uniqueness and transcendence of God,
to be with the One who is unlike us". We have therefore to reckon, second-
ly, with this decisive determination that Jesus is the one man among others,
and because of that "basically and comprehensively, therefore, to be a man
102is to be with God .
	 It is for this reason that Barth asserts what appears
at first to be at odds with the rest of his results, namely that "godlessness
99. See the discussion of Adolf Portmann's Biologische Fragmente zu einer
Lehre vom Menschen (1944) CD, III, 2, n. pp. 85 - 88. Portmann's views
are welcomed because they aim to show "human particularity by means of
biological research", n. p. 85.
100. CD, III, 2, p. 132.
101. CD, III, 2, n. p. 134.
102. CD, III, 2, p. 135; my italics.
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is an onto].ogical impossibility" for man. This is not to deny that sin-
fulness exists, but that man's being excludes sin as a possibility. Quite
simply: man chooses an impossibility if he denies God. Since "sin ... is
a mode of being contrary to our humanity", it follows that any attempt of
103
man to surrender to sin "burdens, obscures and corrupts himself
Barth emphasises that herein lies the distinctiveness of man as opposed to
other creatures. He does not deny that "all creatures are as God is with
them arid they are therefore with God". But, Barth continues, "not every
creature is with God as man is with God". Jesus is here seen as the "mean-
ing and motive" of all creaturely being. But what it may mean for non-human
creatures that they have "the same divine Counterpart as man, and to that
104
extent the same ontological basis" 	 is simply not known. What we do know
is that God did not choose to be like them, that is as a stone, or an animal
or a star. But Barth is also insistent that what happens in the human sphere
has significance for the totality of creation. He is eager to affirm human
particularity in such a way that "the particularity of other creatures is
also emphasised". Thus he surmises, "For all we know, their glory may well
be the greater". It is not clear that "the outer circle" exists for the
inner or that both circles do not have "their own autonomy and dignity, their
distinctive form of being with God". 105 His overall stress on human parti-
cularity, however, is justified by the consideration that "godlessness
(Gottlosigkeit) seems only to arise within the sphere of man". Since we do
not know for certain the relationship (or absence of it) that may appertain
to non-human creatures with God, it would be unwise to be absolute, but a
negative judgement here is "preferable' t to a positive one in the absence of
106
clear evidence.
103. CD, III, 2, p. 136.
104. CD, III, 2, p. 137.
105. CD, III, 2, p. 138.
106. CD, III, 2, n. p. 139.
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Barth offers two "material and therefore primary statements" about man.
Firstly, that "the being of man as a being with Jesus rests upon the elec-
tion (Erwhlung) of God". 107	Here all the themes of Christian theology
converge first as they are exemplified by Jesus and then as they affect
creatures. For Jesus is the "spearhead of the will of God their Creator".
And what is God's purpose?
It is the will of God, begins Barth, that the Yes which He
as Creator has spoken to his creation should prevail; that
all men and all creatures should be delivered from evil,
i.e. from that which God the Creator has rejected and pre-
served from its threat and power ... a whole monstrous king-
dom, a deep chaos of nothingness, i.e. of what the Creator
has excluded and separated from the sphere of being, of what
he did not will and therefore did not create, to which he
gave no being, and which can exist only as non-being, and
which thus forms the menacing frontier of what is according
to the will of God.108
Thus the saving power of God is directed not against sin, but "against the
nothingness affirmed in sin". God through his own forethought and provi-
dence "bound Himself to His creation from the very act of creation" in order
to ensure that the possibility of ontological dissipation became itself an
ontological impossibility. Barth writes lyrically of this saving plan:
resolved before all things, before being was even planned, let
alone actualised, before man fell into sin, before light was
separated from darkness or being from non-being, and therefore
before there was even a potential threat to being, let alone
actual; resolved as the very first thing which God determined
with regard to the reality distinct from Himself; resolved as
the all-embracing content of His predestination of all creature-
ly being. 109
Barth now turns to his second material statement that "the being of man as
being with Jesus consists in listening to the Word of. God". At first this
affirmation may appear odd for Jesus is himself "the sum of the divine
address, the Word of God". But it is precisely for this reason (and in
107. CD, III, 2, p. 142.
108. CD, III, 2, p. 143; my italics.
109. CD, III, 2, p. 144; my italics.
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this sense) that the proposition must be understood. For "If the eternal
Logos is the Word in which God speaks with Himself, thinks Himself and is
conscious of Himself, then in its identity with the man, Jesus, it is the
Word in which God thinks the cosmos, speaks with the cosmos and imparts
110to the cosmos the consciousness of God". 	 We need to ponder the katabasis
of the Logos, for this Word is not "the presence of a dictator and tyrant
brutalising the world he controls". Rather the Word speaks for itself "to
teach, convince, to seek and win recognition, and to conquer in this indi-
vidual manner". In passing, Barth formulates "a first definition of real
man" which rests in turn upon "summoned" as the meaning of "real". We must
say of man then that he is "Summoned because chosen") 11 For what can we
know of real man but that he is summoned by God (von Gott aufgerufen)?
How, apart from this summons, can man know his real self or what he really
is?
Barth now turns to examine his statement that the being of man "is a history". -
Only in the dynamic movement of the Creator towards the created, from the
outer to the inner, is the real nature of the creation constituted. More-
over, it is within the specific history of Jesus that man is encapsulated
and enveloped, so that whatever he may speak of himself as himself can only
be done	 through reference to and in engagement with this "primal" his-
tory. 112 From this actual point in history the creature is "transcended
from without and transcends himself outwards". Thus we reach the standpoint
of affirming that "The word and summons of God to each and every man is the
existence of the man Jesus".13
110. CD, III, 2, p. 147; my italics.
ill. CD, III, 2, p. 150.
112. CD, III, 2, p. 157. Barth refers in passing to the reported say.ing of
John Stuart Mill that humanity "cannot be reminded too often of the
fact that there was once a man named Socrates". This must also be said
and in a pre-eminent way of the man Jesus. For "In Him we have the
central human factor", n. p. 160.
113. CD, III, 2, p. 164.
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This insight is formulated into four propositions. He is confident that
"it is in the closed circle of the relationship between divine grace arid
human gratitude that we have to seek the being of man". Firstly, when we
speak of "true and essential gratitude" it is obvious that such belongs
to God alone as the true Benefactor. This must be distinguished from pass-
ing human favours such as may be bestowed by one fellow creature on another.
Secondly, when we consider man in relation to God, that is, that which con-
114
cerns him essentially, we conclude that God can only be thanked by man".
Everything else that man does in the realm of his relationship with God has
its root in this acknowledgement of gratitude. "Obedience without grati-
115tude would be nothing , writes Barth. 	 Thirdly, man fulfils and completes
his true being by giving thanks to God. Finally, but with "hesitation and
reserve", Barth proposes that "to thank God in this way is incumbent on man
alone". 116 In the sense that man is only one creature among many and since
these also live by the grace of the divine Word, "as we must say of man that
he is what he is only in gratitude towards God, we shall have to say the
same of all other creatures". We have therefore disclosed a sign both of
man's essential creatureliness and his humility. Thus "He (man) does no
less than the sun and Jupiter, but also no more than the sparrow of the lane
or indeed the humblest Mayfly". 117 But Barth will not let go of his dis-
tinction: for it is precisely in man's humility of gratitude, such that in
Psalm 148 he calls upon creation to praise God and is thus prepared to be
classed with them, that we see who he is. For only man can actualise in his
being, through his own action, what is required of all creation.
Barth reaches the point where he can isolate another important character-
istic. Since man's gratefulness involves both receptivity to and reciprocity
114. CD, III, 2, p. 169.
115. CD, III, 2, p. 170.
116. CD, III, 2, p. 171; my italics.
117. CD, III, 2, p. 172.
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with God, he is i.volvedin personal responsibility (Selbstverantwortung).
But this is not merely a potentiality. "God does not merely make man re-
sponsible by His Word", argues Barth, "but in speaking His Word He engages
man in active responsibility to Himself". 118 Barth's concluding proposition
is that "As the being of man is a being in responsibility before God, it has
the character of freedom (Freiheit) which God imparts to it". 19 But how is
it possible for man to stand free in relation to God, sovereign over all his
creation? The notion of freedom is "the decisive definition of man as sub-
ject' because it is a "gift" from God not "to be hidden away in a napkin".120
It must be seized and actualised. Freedom does not mean mere passivity, but
movement in Selbstverantwortung before God. The being of man is the "his-
tory of this self-responsibility" 121
 which we see uniquely fulfilled in the
Real Man. But how free is man's freedom? Has this "free being" (freies
Wesen) real freedom of choice? Certainly. But as freedom granted by God,
it is freedom to choose rightly. As Calvin would have it, if there is a
choice at all, the choice can only be between "the highest good" and the
•	 ,, 122greatest mi.sery .
	 Therefore man's freedom can never be freedom to repu-
diate his freedom, that is his responsibility before God. While man may
lose himself in his own sin and his own self may thus be incomprehensible
to him, real man is always held by his Creator. The conception of real man
has therefore been reached. "We have learned from the Word of God who and
what this man is", concludes Barth.'23
How Distinct is Human Nature?
In summary, Barth proposes the following distinctions:
i. To be a man is to be with God;
ii. Man is a being which derives from God and is dependent unon him;
118. CD, III, 2, p. 174.
119. CD, III, 2, p. 174.
120. CD, III, 2, P. 195.
121. CD, III, 2, p. 196.
122. Calvin, La confession de foi et de l'glise (1943) p. 9, cited CD,
III, 2, n. p. 184.
123. CD, III, 2, p. 196.
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iii. Man's being rests upon the election of God;
iv. Man's being consists in the hearing of the Word of God;
v. The nature of man's being is a history;
vi. Man is a being in gratitude;
vii. Man is a being in responsibility before God.
Ci) Ontology
Jesus is "the ontological determination" of man. 124
 an this not also
be said of other creatures? Yes, replies Barth, but only in a general sense.
"All creatures are as God is with them and they are therefore with God"; how-
ever "not every creature is with God as man is with God". We should, how-
ever, not rush to the "perverse conclusion" that the thing particularly true
of man is not also true of other creatures "in their own way". But subse-
quent argument gives creatures status with one hand and then takes it away
with the other. Thus "We can and must, therefore, say of every creature that
it has the same concrete divine counterpart as man, and to that extent the
same ontological basis", but also "in the case of non-human creatures we do
not know what it means that they have this basis". This is an "impenetrable
secret"; we do not know how they are with Jesus. God did not become a crea-
ture, but man. "It was in this man and not in any other creature that He
saw the meaning and motive of His whole creative work". 125
 Our difficulty
can be summarised in three ways. Firstly, the "don't know" argument is de-
ployed inconsistently. Earlier Barth spoke of how the Word "does not contain
any ontology of heaven and earth", 126 that is, strictly speaking,
124. CD, III, 2, p. 136.
125. CD, III, 2, p. 137; my italics. This discussion is closely paralleled
later in the Dogmatics. Barth affirms that "God with us" is what we
can say "of all creatures". But there is "a special act" which binds
man and God together. But when we ask what this special act means, the
reply is as follows: "The ordaining of salvation for man and of man for
salvation is the original and basic will of God, the ground and purpose
of His will as Creator", Church Dogmatics, IV, I, The Doctrine of Recon-
ciliation, Part One, ET by G.W. Bromiley (1956), pp. 8 and 9.
126. CD, III, 2, p. 6.
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cannot even know of our ignorance of ontology. In this section the argu-
ment is employed variously to offer a positive reading of creatures, "For
all we know their glory may be the greater", 127 or negatively (relatively):
"since we do not know how non-human creatures are with God, we cannot give
a categorical denial", or (preferentially - in the same note): "a negative
128
answer is at least preferable to a positive". 	 The problem is that the
"don't know" argument does not constitute, in the way in which Barth presents
it, a positive statement of man's distinctiveness. At least in principle
as much may be claimed for other creatures in their "own way". Secondly,
despite earlier protest to the contrary, Barth siips too easily from Christo-
logy to anthropology. Thus when wanting to emphasise the special place of
man, he speaks Christologically in a way that supposes that Real man is ordi-
nary man, whereas what can be claimed for Jesus can only (as Barth accepts)
be claimed with reserve and caution for man generally. The argument of
course is circular, but more importantly it confuses the very possibility
of knowing what Barth claims we cannot know about the ontology of creatures. --
Thirdly, he writes: "Of the other created spheres we know only that the God
who has created all other men and all other creatures for the sake of this
one man confronts them in majestic dissimilarity". 129 This, alas, is pre-
cisely what we cannot know, if we do not know! The positive thesis that
man is differentiated from other creatures because God has become a human
creature must, if it is true, stand by itself. It implies no negative judge-
ment, categorical or provisional, about other creatures. The simple point
is this: if we have no real knowledge of the ontology of other creatures,
then we cannot affirm, without difficulty and inconsistency, the special
place of man.
That our criticisms are just and right at this point is confirmed by
127. CD, III, 2, p. 138.
128. CD, III, 2, p. 139.
129. CD, III, 2, p. 137; my italics.
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subsequent discussion of the question of "godlessness" in the non-human
sphere. Barth denies that godlessness, and therefore of course sin, can
arise in the animal creation. 13 ° He doesn't want to give a "categorical"
denial since "we do not know how non-human creatures are with God".13
But he is clear that sin is only a possibility "where the creature is con-
fronted by its Creator" and this he laims can only be properly said of
man. Barth may be on strong ground here. But he does not address the
possibility that non-human creation may variously share the effects of sin,
or as he previously accepted in relation to Romans 8, be "bondaged to decay"
in a way that resembles the human sphere. 132 For if there is no godlessness
possible, either in a direct, indirect or mediated sense, how are we to make
sense of the notions of reconciliation and redemption within the non-human
realm? That Barth's thesis does not stand the test of coherence is demon-
strated four pages on (in recounting his doctrine of reconciliation) when
he is actually forced to give some account of "evil" in the non-human world:
It is the will of God that the Yes which He as the Creator
has spoken to His creation should prevail; that all men and
all creatures should be delivered from evil, i.e. from that
which God the Creator has rejected, and preserved from its
threat and power.
Is not "evil" to be recognised as "godlessness" and, as with man, seen as a
possibility and threat for all creation? Barth's thought reveals further
inconsistencies:
130. There is an underlying theological issue in Barth's stridency here.
Creation, as the work of the one holy God, must be good. He will not
compromise on this basic insight. "Every creature of God is wholly
and unreservedly good", Deliverance to the Captives, ET by M. Wieser,
pref. by John Marsh, 2nd ed. (London: SCM Press, 1966) p. 94; also
Credo, op. cit., pp. 35 - 37. Evil, human or non-human, can only be
"nothingness", Church Dogmatics, III, 3, The Doctrine of Creation
('The Creator and His Creature') ET by G.W. Bromiley and R. Ehrlich
(Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1960) pp. 289 - 368.
131. CD, III, 2, p. 139.
132. See esp. discussion pp. 294-8.
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a. "And so the will of God for His creation is to preserve it from
the nothingness to which it would inevitably succumb apart from
the divine initiative, to save the creature from the threat which
it cannot overcome of itselft.l33 The language of salvation
applied here to all creatures implies a common threat, i.e. a
common godlessness.
b. "And for the fulfilment of this aim He bound Himself to His creation
from the very act of creation". Does not Barth here confess the im-
plication which elsewhere he has sought to avoid, namely that God's
incarnation in human nature necessarily means that all nature is
drawn unto him?
c. "He alone is the archetypal man (Jesus) whom all threatened and en-
slaved men and creatures must follow". Barth cannot have it both
ways. He cannot at one stage speak of godlessness as an "ontological
impossibility" for non-human creatures and then at another speak of
their "threatened and enslaved existence".
d. The final paragraph is so telling that it needs to be reproduced in
full:
His (Jesus') existence was eternally resolved in the sovereign
will of God to save us and all creation: resolved before all
things, before being was even planned, let alone actualised,
before man fell into sin, before light was separated from dark-
ness or being from non-being ... resolved as the all-embracing
content of His predestination of all creaturely being. It is
for this reason that the man Jesus is the executive and revela-
tory spearhead of the will of God fulfilled on behalf of creation.
It is for this reason that He is the kingdom of God in person.
It is for this reason that as against all other men and the whole
world of creation He is the Representative of the uniqueness and
transcendence of God. It is for this reason that to be a man is
properly and primarily to be with God. 134
Perhaps here Barth's internal inconsistence is most apparent. For whatever
13. CD, III, 2, p. 143; my italics.
134. CD, III, 2, p. 144; my italics.
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may be true about the special place and nature of man in creation, we
can only point to the fact that it is not here established. The final
line simply does not follow from the previous. What Barth has established
is the special nature and work of Jesus, but not man as "ordinary" as con-
trasted with "real" man. It is ironical that having established and stated
so clearly the creation-centred work of God in incarnation, creation and
reconciliation, Barth fails to see that his anthropocentric conclusion does
not follow. This is not to suggest that some kind of Christologically quali-
fied anthropocentric conclusion is inappropriate, i.e. that man as the icon
of Christ could not validly be understood as representing and focusing in
his relations with the natural world the will and purpose of God. But what-
ever the rich possibilities, they are not stated. What must follow from his
argument is that not only man but all creatures are to be understood as
"properly and primarily to be with God".
(ii) Dependence
We take this issue one stage further when we consider the second dis-
tinction, that man is a being deriving from God and dependent upon him. In
this, Barth maintains that "we do not speak speculatively but concretely of
135	 .
man".	 But how can it be that this is distinctly true of man alone? We
search in vain for the necessary concretisation of this distinction. Our
difficulty may be summed up in the following line: "It thus concerns all
men and every man that in the man Jesus God Himself is man, and therefore
acts and rules and makes history".' 36 No-one of course would wish to deny
that the incarnation "concerns" man, but it is only when we ask in what way
does it distinctly concern man that we are faced with a void in this matter.
It may well be a logical and necessary assumption that the incarnation pre-
supposes a special relationship between man and God, and Barth may well be
right in feeling free to pursue his thesis on the basis of this assumption.
135. CD, III, 2, p. 140.
136. CD, III, 2, p. 141.
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But we can only point here to the fact that it is an assumption. As advanced
here it does not constitute an argument for human distinctiveness as opposed
to other creatures. We have yet to learn what distinctive relationship,
work orfunction necessarily corresponds to the divine incarnation inhuman flesh.
(iii)Election
The next statement defines man as a being resting upon the election
of God. What meaning does this have for the non-human? It is highly sig-
nificant that man's election is placed within the context of God's purposes
for all of creation. This is first developed Christologically in terms of
the work of Jesus who is seen as the "penetrating spearhead of the will of
God ... penetrating because in Him the will of God is already fulfilled
and revealed and the purpose of God for all men and creatures has thus
reached its goal; and the spearhead to the extent that there has still to
be a wider fulfilment of the will of God and its final consummation".137
In the light of our earlier criticisms, the manner in which Barth now enumerates
the place and function of man is highly significant. For to
be a man with Jesus is to share the purposes of God within creation. This
work begun in man "which has found its first and proper object in Him, pene-
trates and illuminates the whole world of creation". 138 Here Barth is at his
most convincing. For the election of man, far from separated and distanced
from the whole of creation, is Christologicaily grounded in terms of God's en-
veloping will for the cosmos which along with man awaits its final consummation.
(iv)Hearing the Word
A similar positive interpretation is offered in Barth's second "material
and therefore primary" statement that man's being consists in listening to
the Word of God. Jesus is the "sum of the divine address, the Word of God,
to the created cosmos". This man is himself the divine speech; the divine
137. CD, III, 2, p. 143; my italics.
138. CD, III, 2, p. 145.
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Yes standing alongside creation in person. Moreover Jesus is the Word
"in which God thinks the cosmos, speaks with the cosmos and imparts to
the cosmos the consciousness of its God". 139 And what is the meaning of
this Word for creation as a whole? "It (creation) belongs to its Creator
and to no-one else", writes Barth. "This is what is declared by the man
Jesus within it ...". As advanced, therefore, the distinction between man
and the non-human creation does not consist in the fact that one hears the
Word and the other cannot, since the Word has been spoken "for all crea-
tures". This can be maintained even though it is specifically "in the
140human sphere that the Word has been spoken". 	 Nevertheless Barth does
not ask the most important theological question here. As Athanasius puts
it: "Why would God have made creatures by whom he did not wish to be known?"
To limit, even equivocally, God's knowability by his creatures necessarily
diminishes the power of the Logos. To take human communication as the norm
of divine knowing is to eclipse the penetration of the world by Word and
Spirit.. It is because "the Word spread himself everywhere" that Athanasius
concludes: "Everything is filled with the knowledge of God")41
(v) History
Barth's discussion, however, reaches a critical stage when he seeks
to sum up the nature of man's being as a history. "It takes place that the
Creator concerns Himself about His creature by Himself becoming a crea-
ture" 142 But who is the creature here presupposed? The answer is wholly
anthropisti. Thus we know that man is a history from Jesus, something
that cannot be said of animals. History is defined as a dynamic interre-
lationship between a being confronted by another who "transcending
its own nature" shapes "its being in the nature proper to it, so that it is
compelled and enabled to transcend itself in response". "We do not really
139. CD, III, 2, p. 147; my italics.
140. CD, III, 2, p. 149.
141. Athanasius, op. cit., pp. 161 and 173.
142. CD, III, 2, p. 157.
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know what we are talking about when we speak of the history of a plant
or animal" •143 Thus "Being in history is human being alone" (Geschicht-
liches Sein 1st das menschliche urid nur das menschliche Sein) •144 The
task of grappling with Barth's thought here is daunting. For this present
stage, whatever the merits of its definition, does not follow from the pre-
vious. Since man is elected alongside and within the context of other crea-
tures, and since the Word of God spoken for him is also the same Word spoken
for all creatures as their "true and valid promise",' 45 it is difficult to
grasp how man can now be conceived independently of these previously estab-
lished connections and relationships. We may develop this matter in the
form of two questions. Firstly, what difference of concern, intention or
purpose is represented on God's part by the choice of incarnation which is
not already manifest by the fact of creation? In other words, what we have
yet to learn from Barth is how the nature of man can be distinguished from
that of creation, if the work of incarnation and creation have the §ame
telos , namely the preservation and salvation of the creature? If
the being of man is distinguished by the will and purpose of God, as with
al]. other creatures, and if the purpose of the incarnation is so to bind
that creation to himself to preserve it from the threat and possibility of
non-being, then it is difficult to know what precise difference of purpose
there could be which alone can separate theologically the work of incarna-
tion from creation. Indeed as Barth previously accepted the work of incar-
nation precedes the work of creation, and in this sense what is now being
claimed as the distinguishing mark of man must in reality be the distin-
guishing mark of all creatures, namely that God is with them and that in
him is their future and destiny secure.
The second question may be expressed in this way: since creation and
143. CD, III, 2, p. 158 and n. p. 158.
144. CD, III, 2, p. 174.
145. CD, III, 2, p. 149.
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incarnation are two interlocking works of God, not to be separated or seen
in isolation, how can a wholly anthropocentric interpretation be possible?
Of course man may be the centre, indeed the pivot, of God's designs, even
the efficacious means by which they may be achieved at least in some part.
But human history cannot by itself constitute creation history (Schopfungs-
geschichte) as though the concern of God for the creation could be exhausted
solely in terms of this relationship alone. For how can the purposes repre-
sented by the act of incarnation be less than those of the act of creation?
Since the one precedes and follows the other, we have no option but to assert
that no aspect of the Word can be irrelevant to creation in which the Word
becomes incarnate. Elizabeth Moberly suggests that gnostic ideology is now re-
placed by a perennial temptation to dualism. In relation to man we are
confronted by "dualism by default". "Man alone is seen as important", she
writes, "though in this it may be forgotten that man himself is a 'material'
being and is closely involved with the rest of the material creation".146
(vi) Gratitude
A similar difficulty is apparent in the description of man as a being
in gratitude. As a positive statement it is both obvious and unexceptional.
But Barth is not happy simply to isolate this one factor and point to its
significance. He does not simply state its positive meaning and pass on.
Rather he proceeds by characterising this feature as wholly distinctive of
man; thus in note (2) "God can only be thanked by man" and in note (4) "To
147thank God in this way is incumbent on man alone . 	 Barth's way of work-
ing here is illustrative of the underlying confusion of his thought. This
is shown by looking more carefully at the stages of arguments in note (4).
He begins by accepting that this final exclusion should be made with "hesi-
tation and reserve". Because we "cannot penetrate the inner reality" of the
divine/non-human encounter we "simply do not know the nature of this
146. Moberly, Suffering Innocent and Guilty (London: SPCK, 1978) p. 19.
147. CD, III, 2, pp. 169 and 171; my italics.
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relationship". 148
 But Barth fails to see that if we cannot know this of
the non-human, we cannot logically claim it wholly as a special category
of man. He seems to sense something of this difficulty, for he then pro-
ceeds by indicating the need to emphasise the words "in this way" in his
statement. Thus "To thank God in this way is incumbent on man alone".
And thus "As we must say of man that he is what he is only in gratitude
149towards God, we shall have to say the same of all other creatures".	 The
question we have therefore to ask is: How distinctive is this distinction?
If we cannot really know that other creatures do not show gratitude at the
very least "in their own way", what kind of distinction can be proposed but
one of degree? Barth compounds the difficulty by indicating the scriptural
support in Psalm 148 for the praise of God by non-human creatures. His exe-
gesis of scripture here is tortuous: for it is not in the fact of common
gratitude that man's place is to be discerned but because:
we know no other creature on whom it is incumbent to give
thanks to God and therefore to fulfil His being in such a way
that he himself is man responsible for this fulfilment, and
must answer for himself in this fulfilment. It is this being
in responsibility for gratitude towards God which isolates the
being of man from that of all other creatures ... . 150
Our perplexity arises from trying to understand what gain theologically is
made by this special pleading. Even if we accept that man's
gratitude is a responsibility laid upon him whereas for non-human creatures
gratitude is a natural aspect of their being, we may still fail to see how
this justifies the central proposition that "To thank God in this way is
incumbent on man alone". Indeed, far from seeing the question of gratitude
as a distinctive capacity of man, we may rather judge from the evidence that
Barth himself advances a certain solidarity between man and other creatures.
We have to say that Barth's actual conclusion does not bear examination of
148. CD, III, 2, p. 171.
149. CD, III, 2, p. 172; my italics.
150. CD, III, 2, p. 173.
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the evidence that he deduces in favour of it. 151 He writes:
We know nothing of the way in which the rest of creation gives
thanks to God and therefore is. It is incumbent upon man alone
to give thanks to God and therefore to be in this way.152
Within a discussion of four pages, Barth thus moves his position from "we
do not know" that non-human creatures express gratitude; to what is said
of man must be said of all other creatures "in their own way"; to "we know
153
nothing' of how creation gives thanks.
(vii) Responsibility
There is little in Barth's exposition of human responsibility that
we would want to argue with, except that as defined this responsibility ex-
tends only to his fellow man and to God. There is no sense of responsibility
articulated towards the created world in general or animals in particular.
The "real man" finally discovered and enumerated in these closing pages
concern a man abstracted and "un-real" in terms of the actual environment
in which God has placed him. Has man therefore no responsibilities to the
wide and beneficent created order in which God has been pleased to place him?
151. See, e.g. Artur Weiser who along with almost all Old Testament commenta-
tors understands Psalm 148 as a tremendous vision of cosmic praise to
God illustrating "the final goal which unites the whole universe in a
communion of God's service", The Psalms, ET by Herbert Hartwell, Old
Testament Library (London: SCM Press, 1962) p. 837. Weiser also stresses
how the salvation theme "is the culmination of the whole psalm and is
of crucial importance to the whole world", p. 838.
152. CD, III, 2, p. 174; my italics.
153. CD, III, 2, pp. 171; 172; 143; my italics. Elsewhere Barth offers an
entirely different interpretation of man and animals in this respect.
In answer to Calvin's question about what constitutes the supreme good
(the knowledge of God) without which "our condition is more unhappy
than that of any of the brutes", Barth confidently asserts that "brute
beasts do (and the same can be said of the whole creation) accomplish
God's intentions in creating them". Moreover the non-human, animate
and inanimate, "leave us (man) behind in this task of responding to the
divine destination". And how do we know this? Barth's reply may sur-
prise us: "Around us, praising is perpetual. The whole creation joins
together in order to respond to God who created it. But ;.. man stands
still and does not do what he should do. This is man's misery not to
fulfil the meaning of his creation". Note how the
issue turns not on whether creation can praise God and thus fulfil its
destiny but whether man is also capable. The Faith of the Church: A
Commentary on the Apostle's Creed according to Calvin's Catechism, ed.
by Jean-Louis Leuba, ET by Gabriel Vahanian, Fontana Books (London:
Collins, 1960) p. 23.
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And are these not obligations and responsibilities to God aä
Creator and designer? Again we point to the context in which
man's responsibility is articulated in theGenesis sagas,
namely that man's dominionis a result of being made
in the image of God. Despite his particular interpretation of the
image, it is significant that Barth's stress upon human responsibility is
in fact most consonant with the interpretation which he rejects, namely
that the image of God in man is co-terminous with moral responsibility to-
wards God and creation.154
Barth writes: "Man is the one creature which God in creating calls to free
personal responsibility before Him, and thus treats as a self, a free being".
As positive exposition there is nothing here to disagree with. In order for
man's relations with other creatures to so prefigure and reflect the divine
beneficence within creation, such a morally free and responsible agency must
be presupposed. But Barth's subsequent statement unwittingly challenges the
basis on which the above can be made, thus:
Among all creatures he is the one with which God, in giving
it being, also concluded His covenant - the covenant of the
free Creator with a free creature, so that man's being bears
irrefutably the character of a partner with the divine subject -
and therefore the character of freedom.155
But, as we have seen, man is not the only being with which God has chosen
to enter this covenant relationship; other living beings are also included
and thus there must be other "partners" to this fundamental relationship. And
it is to this that Barth again turns.
154. Another way of understanding the mutuality between human and non-human
in the Old Testament is through analysis of the concept of nephesh
(breathing, blood-filled life) which is used for both, Wolff, op. cit.,
pp. 18 - 22. This nephesh is inescapably corporate which is why the
future hope for Israel includes "the hope of a final consummation
of all creation", George A.F. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old
Testament (London: SCM Press, 1959) p. 340.
155. CD, III, 2, p. 194; my italics.
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'Man in His Determination as the Covenant-Partner of God' is Barth's third
section and his first sub-section is entitled 'Jesus, Man For Other Men'.
His concern here is to understand man within a twin determination: on the one
hand real man lives with God as his covenant-partner but, on the other hand,
we know man as man, that is as a creature made by God existing within the
cosmos. The question therefore arises as to the "inner relationship" between
these two aspects. His determination to be with God as the divine partner on one
hand, and his "creaturely and cosmic nature", his humanity, on the other.156
Is there anything of the divine determination left in man as we experience him?
Real Man Only for Other Men
If we want to know how it may be possible for both the human and divine de-
terminations of man to co-exist so that the one fully supports and allows
for the other, we need look no further than Jesus himself. For the unity in
Jesus, that of his relationship as Son to the Father "does not destroy the
157difference between divinity and humanity even in Rim".
	
In the hypostasis
of the Word itself, as in the history of Jesus (which in turn is the history
of man) we see the fullest, most comprehensive definition of God as that
being which not forsaking his divinity seeks and includes the humanity of
man. Barth writes lyrically of the mission of Jesus:
156. CD, III, 2, p. 221.
157. CD, III, 2, p. 307. In passing Barth rejects the notion of transub-
stantiation (the doctrine that the host is changed into the Body of
Christ) as an analogy of the incarnation. We need to see and posit
the divine dimension as the fulfilling and the completing of the crea-
turely element rather than as its replacement or diminution ( p. 208).
But Barth does not take up the significance of this sacramental co-
existence. He does not explore what it may mean for creaturely ele-
ments to become living signs of God's presence. "In the sacraments,
they (non-human creatures) are freed from their dumbness and proclaim
directly to the believer the new creative Word of God", writes Dietrich
Bonhoeffer. "In the sacrament, Christ is the mediator between nature
and God, and stands for all creatures before God", Christology, ET
John Bowden and intro, by E.H. Roberston, The Fontana Library of Philo-
sophy and Theology (London: Collins, 1974) p. 67. See also A.R. Pea-
coc]ce's 'A Sacramental View of Nature' in Man and Nature, op. cit.,
pp. 132 - 142, and especially 'The Dynamic Sacramentalism of St. Gregory
of Nyssa' in H. Maurice Relton's Studies in Christian Doctrine (London:
Macmillan & Co., 1960) pp. 250 - 270.
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In no sense, therefore, is He there for Himself first arid
then for man, not for a first cause first - for the control
and penetration of nature by culture, or the progressive
triumph of spirit over matter, or the higher development of
man or the cosmos. For all this, for any interest either in
His own person or intrinsically possible ideals of this kind,
we can find no support whatever in the humanity of Jesus.
He concludes: "What interests Him, and does so exclusively, is man, other
men as such, who need Him and are referred to Him for help and deliverance".
Therefore "It is for their sake that He takes the place of God in the cos-
158
mos'.	 Is this then the sum total of God's work in Jesus? Is there
nothing else to be added? "No", replies Barth, "really nothing else".
We see at once that if the humanity of Jesus is real humanity, then he stands
in relation to other men "in the most comprehensive and radical sense". What
is completed therefore is not the operation of deliverance simply "from with-
out, standing alongside", but rather by standing within their situation "He
159interposes Himself for them , within their very being. 	 But since we need
also to remember the divine determination of Jesus, that "In his divinity He
is from and to God", we are led further into the mystery of the incarnation.
For "In this there is disclosed the choice and will of God Himself". 16° That
is, since God is true to Himself and acts so to reveal nothing except his
true being, we see disclosed in Jesus the divine essence. "God repeats in
this relationship ad extra a relationship proper to Himself in His inner
divine essence", maintains Barth. Entering into this relationship, "He makes
161
a copy of Himself
Barth proceeds to affirm the humanity of Jesus as the true "image of God,
the imago Dei". But in so doing, he points to the qualification inherent
in this term. Whilst in his divinity, Jesus is the "repetition and reflection"
158. CD, III, 2, p. 208.
159. CD, III, 2, p. 212.
160. CD, III, 2, p. 217.
161. CD, III, 2, p. 218.
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of God, in his humanity, he "is only indirectly and not directly identical with
God". 162
	For the image belongs "intrinsically to the creaturely world,
to the cosmos" and therefore necessarily concerns the correspondence between
man and God and not God and God. Hence Barth sees a "disparity" between
the nature of the relationship within the innermost nature of the Trinity,
and that of God the Creator with that of the creature. 	 But for all the
dissimilarity and difference, the image necessarily speaks of a profound
similarity. This similarity, however, is not one of being (analogia
entis) but one of relationship (analogia relationis). 	 The being of God
cannot be compared with that of man but there is a correspondence. "The
correspondence and similarity of the two relationships consists in the fact
that the eternal love in which God as the Father loves the Son, and as the
Son loves the Father, and in which God as the Father is loved by the Son and
as the Son by the Father, is also the love which is addressed by God to man."
The humanity of Jesus is therefore seen as the "direct correlative" of his
-	 163divine being with the Father.
Real Creature for All Creation?
This section must not be overlooked because the way in which Barth advances
his understanding of the incarnation crucially affects what may be properly
said of the non-human in creation. There are two issues of importance. The
162. CD, III, 2, p. 219. It is this kind of language which makes commenta-
tors uneasy, e.g. "Karl Barth, that least 'gnostic' of modern theolo-
gians, still speaks of the 'worldly' form of Christ veiling the Word
of God, in a way that seems to revive the distinctioi.. between a sub- -
stantial and eternal truth and its accidental and temporal clothing",
Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge: Christian Spirituality from
the New Testament to St. John of the Cross (London: Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1979) p. 31; his italics. A view taken up and developed by Charles
T. Waidrop: "The human nature (of God) actually veils God revelation".
Perhaps the most vital criticism is expressed by Waidrop in this ques-
tion: "Is the theologically necessary distinction between God and man
finally collapsed through the notion that men have their being only in
Christ?" He sees independent human existence "obscured by Barth's
claim that the human nature which the Son assumed in the incarnation
has no independent existence", Karl Barth's Christology: Its Basic
Alexandrian Character, Reason and Religion 21 (Berlin: Moulton Publish-
ers, 1984) pp. 174 and 177. If this is true of human existence, how
much more must it be true of the non-human creation?
163. CD, III, 2, p. 220.
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first concerns the purpose and scope of the salvific work of Christ. We
ask primarily for whom is the incarnation? Barth's answer, as we have
seen, is uncompromising:
What interests Him (Jesus), and does so exclusively, is man,
other men as such, who need Him and are referred to Him for
help and deliverance. Other men are the object of the saving
work in the accomplishment of which He Himself exists. It is
for their sake that He takes the place of God in the cosmos
From the very first, in the fact that He is a man, Jesus
is not without His fellow-men, but to them and with them and
for them. He is sent and ordained by God to be their Deliverer.
Nothing else? No, really nothing else.164
Is Barth now saying what in fact he has so far resisted in his discussion of
man? Is there not here anthropomonism against which he protested in his
opening section, i.-e. " ... we must not and will not be guilty of any failure
to appreciate the significance of the cosmos, of any insulating of man from
the realm of the non-human creation?" 165 What is most difficult in Barth's
exposition is not its positive exposition but now its avowedly exclusive
flavour. Of course Jesus is for other men, for all men, for them as God is
for them, but can he be the "man for other men" without also being the crea-
ture for creation? How can this Jesus be the "meaning and motive of all
creaturely being" if his exclusive concern is man? How is it possible for
Jesus to be the spearhead of the creative will of God against the evil, and
threatened non-being of creation, if his exclusive interest is the salvation
of humankind alone? The discordance with his earlier writing is so apparent
that we may be forced to regard the above as misguided enthusiasm on Barth's
part. But his subsequent statement that "whatever else the humanity of
Jesus may be, can be reduced to this denominator (i.e. exclusive concern for
man) and finds here its key and explanation" perpetuates the error. It
misses the vital link that what happens in the human sphere has relevance
for all other spheres as well. How can Jesus be the "sum of the divine
164. CD, III, 2, pp. 208/9; my italics.'
165. CD, III, 2, p. 4.
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address, the Word of God to the created cosmos" if in fact Jesus is con-
cerned with none other than man?
The second issue concerns the analogia relationis between the being of God
166
and man.	 Much that Barth writes here is compelling and attractive. It
must follow that man created in God's image reflects the inner life of God
through correspondence and copy. But the significance of this takes us much
further than Barth will allow. For the creation sagas are united in the
conviction that as God is set in relation to man, so man is set in relation-
ship to the order of creation. Barth had earlier made play of the "twin
determination" of man's being ordered both upwards towards the heavens and
also set within creation to be responsible for it. He is placed unmis-
takably within a series of earthly relations in which he must exercise
power and responsibility, which in turn is related to his position as God's
vice-gerent and representative. Now if this is true we must go further and
say that if the reality of the divine purpose is reflected by man not in
terms of his being as man, but in terms of his relationships, there must
also be some inner correspondence between the nature of God's relation to
man and man's relation to the natural world. In other words, man must
fashion and direct the created world in his relationship with it in an ana-
logous way that God in Christ offers himself in service for the life of man.
It is striking that Barth continually fails to articulate this possibility.
He speaks of how there is "an inner divine correspondene and similarity
167between the being of the man Jesus for God and His being for His fellows
But if this is so it must also follow that there is a correspondence between
the relationship of Christ's service for us and our appointed work of service
166. Hendry clearly misunderstands Barth when he accuses him of "a verbal
lapse" because he fails to articulate an analogy of being. It is not
because of his "profound regard for the uniqueness of the divine crea-
tion" (op. cit., p. 148) but because of his profound regard for the
uniqueness of the divine being that he rejects analogia entis - a point
so strongly and repeatedly made that it opens him to the opposite charge
of neo-Apollinarianism, see note 152 above and Walrop, op. cit., p. 173.
167. CD, III, 2, p. 224.
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to the whole earth. We may say that as "Jesus is Man for other M%n" so
"Man, made in God's image, is Creature for other Creatures"
Man in Fellowship
The second sub-section of this third section is entitled: 'The Basic Form
of Humanity'. "We have to ask what it is", questions Barth, "that makes
them (human beings) capable of entering into covenant with God as the crea-
tures of God". This does not involve, in the first place, any positing of
some kind of "worth or merit" of man that makes him worthy to claim such a
right. Quite simply there can be "no claim of this kind; no claim of the
creature against the Creator", he argues. Secondly, it does not suggest any
special capability on man's part that enables him to enter into the covenant
relationship. "His creaturely essence has no power to do this", maintains
Barth. Qualifications aside, man properly has such a capacity "only as God
makes him His partner, as He calls him to take up this relationship, as he
exists as the one summoned to do so". Thus because, and only because, of
this fore-election of God, can we say that "man's creaturely essence cannot
be alien or opposed to this grace of God", indeed because of it there exists
•	 ,, 168
a 'certain familiarity
Barth draws from this discussion another distinguishing criterion for theo-
logical anthropology. What man is, is itself determined "by the primary
text, i.e. by the humanity of the man Jesus". The relationship of the huma-
nity of Jesus to ourselves is not a filling out of an already known concept
of ourselves; it is not yet one more interesting, even superior, way of un-
derstanding what we take to be humanity. Confident of our primary source
we must affirm that anything "incompatible with this similarity (between
Jesus and ourselves) is "ipso facto non-human". 169
 To illustrate and
168. CD, III, 2, p. 224.
169. CD, III, 2, p. 226.
- 239 -
reinforce this line of exposition, Barth considers at length, and offers
a penetrating critique of, Friedrich Nietzsche's anti-theological anthro-
pology. For Nietzsche is "the prophet of that humanity without the fellow-
man". 17° He was egotistically self-obsessed as illustrated in his monu-
mental Ecce Homo: " ... my humanity does not consist in fellow feeling with
men, but in restraint from fellow feeling". Despising Christianity,
Nietzsche vilified its emphasis upon sympathy and suffering for others.
"The neighbour is transfigured into a God ... Jesus is the neighbour trans-
posed into a divinity, into a cause awakening emotion", he writes. 171 More-
over what is found utterly repugnant in Christianity is its elevation of the
Crucified One into a God. No superman in Nietzsche's terms could emerge
while people still believed in the vicariousness of suffering; no true inde-
pendent, autonomous, self-assured, self-justified man could emerge whilst
Christian morality perverted the self-will in man. Barth concludes that
for all the terribleness of his doctrine, Nietzsche "discovered the Gospel
itself in a form which was missed even by the majority of its champions, let
alone its opponents, in the 19th century". He was a prophet of humanity
without fellow-humanity, "he thus hurled himself against the strongest and
not the weakest point in the opposing front".' 72 Against Nietzsche, Barth
secures and underpins his position. In short "The humanity of Jesus con-
173
sa.sts in His being for man .	 From this it follows that the humanity of
every man consists in the determination of man's being as a being with
others. Not in himself but only in co-existence, fellowship and mutuality,
does man correspond to his determination as the covenant partner of God.
"Humanity" (Humanitt) therefore becomes a "determination of human being"
170. CD, III, 2, n. p. 235.
17].. Njetzsche,Ecce Homo (written 1888, published 1908) p. 329; Der Will zu
Macht, p. 142, cited in CD, III, 2, n. pp. 234 and 239.
172. CD, III, 2, n. p. 235.
173. CD, III, 2, p. 243.
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174(eine Bestimmtheit des menschlichen Seins).
What does this discovery of our basic humanity mean in practice? Barth
suggests four elements. Firstly, "Being in encounter is a being in which
one looks the other in the eye". Secondly, in the fact "that there is
mutual speech and hearing". Thirdly that "we render mutual assistance in
the act of being", and finally that all these occurrences happen on both
sides "with gladness". 175
 Great play is made of the notion of gladness.
It is not enough to describe man generally as "being in encounter", we must
press forward to humanity as a form of "being which is gladly actualised
by man". 176 Here truly we can say that man's gladness in the exercise and
fulfilment of his humanity is the conditio sine qua non of his humanity.
In a concluding footnote, Barth clarifies this final point further. "We do
not associate ourselves, therefore", he writes, "with the common theologi-
cal practice of depreciating human nature as much as possible in order to
oppose to it more effectively what may be made of man by divine grace".
The logic of Christologically grounded anthropology must lead to a positive
affirmation of human nature as essentially good. "It is not by nature,
but by its denial and mis-use, that man is alien and opposed to the grace
of God", argues Barth. 177 The "false propositions" of Roman Catholicism
and humanism arise on one hand by their extreme emphasis upon the utter
depravity of man, and curiously by their conceding to man a power to save
himself (or co-operate in his salvation) on the other. Man cannot, of course,
save himself. "God alone saves and pardons and renews him", and in God's
174. CD, III, 2, p. 291. Humanitt does not mean 'humanity' in the sense of
humankind but 'humaneness'. It should be noted that this definition
alone is question begging. It is not clear, from the standpoint of
'exact science', whether altruism can be wholly denied to other spe-
cies see, e.g. Stephen R.L. Clark's The Nature of the Beast: Are Ani-
mals Moral? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) esp. Ch. 6
'Altruism' pp. 55 - 66.
175. CD, III, 2, pp. 250; 252; 260 and 265.
176. CD, III, 2, p. 266.
177. CD, III, 2, n. p. 274.
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free mercy is the only security of salvation.178
No Fellowship with the Non-Human?
In Part One Barth took as his interpretive theme the notion of covenant
as the "inner basis of creation". This consisted in the calling of man
(alone in creation) to be God's covenant partner. Our previous discussion
concerned the difficulty in ignoring that other living beings were also,
according to the biblical witness, called to participate in that relation-
ship (see pp. 67f.). Thus when Barth begins this section "We have
to ask what it is that makes them (human beings) capable of entering into
covenant with God as the creatures of God", we need to be aware that he
begins with the very presupposition which requires justification. It is not
just that he begins with the wrong question, but that the very posing of it
must lead in the wrong direction. Barth's pursuit of "a human form" corres-
ponding to the "essence" of humanity179 marks off an inevitable digression
from the biblical witness. Gone at this point is the insight that all crea-
tures share together aspects of creaturely life and common dependence upon
God the Creator. Gone is the "familiar thought", as Barth describes it,
which "links together man and beast" in the Old and New Testaments. The
very nature of Barth's enquiry as he has set himself must lead inexorably
to greater sophistication based on a void. This is not to deny the many
perceptive and challenging points made by Barth as usual in the prosecution
of his case, but it is to place a major question mark against the possibi-
lity of the argument summarised so far.
But it is significant, despite the fact that creation is left entirely to
one side, that Barth pursues the question of human creaturely relations in
some detail. His discussion of Nietzsche is both illuminating and telling.
But we may still wonder whether Nietzsche had not a grain of perception in
these words: "The neighbour is transfigured into a God ... Jesus is the
178. CD, III, 2, n. p. 275.
179. CD, III, 2, n. p. 226.
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,, 180
neighbour transposed into divinity, into a cause awakening emotion
This is not to seriously question Barth's presupposition that in Jesus
Christ is disclosed the objective truth about human life and destiny, but
we may surmise whether a presentation of the Gospel which concerns itself
solely with human life, suffering and well-being, leaving to one side re-
sponsibilities to creation, may not to the outsider be validly, albeit
erroneously, perceived in this way. The anthropocentric strain in Barth's
writing lamentably represents much of Christian thinking, especially in its
popular forms, as strongly in previous centuries as in the twentieth. 181
The real reply to Nietzsche lies not in the reformulation of the old misin-
terpreted anthropocentric apologetic but in its liberation to speak of God
as together Creator and incarnate and reconciler. For it is a fair question
at the outset why man must be defined as "fellow humanity" in contrast to
all other creatures, even those which share the same inner circle of creation
as posited in Genesis 1. There is an inevitable arbitrariness with which
Barth moves from consideration of fellow creatures in Part One to the large-
ly exclusive focus on man in this Part Two. It is by no means clear at the
beginning that the world of "real man" (with all its attendant ambiguity)
should issue into the practical non-reality of non-human creatures.
180. Cf. "Man is absolutely not the crown of creation: every creature stands
beside him at the same stage of perfection", Twilight of the Idols and
The Anti-Christ, ET,intro. and comm. by R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin
Classics (Earmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974) p. 124. But when we in-
quire concerning the relative status of animals and men, we find that
Nietzsche has taken over the scholastic/rationalist perception of
Descartes that animals are machines, except that he extends the notion
to include humans also: "our knowledge of man today is real knowledge
precisely to the extent that it is knowledge of him as a machine", p.
124.
181. For example: "A reader who came fresh to the moral and theological wri-
tings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could be forgiven for
inferring that their main purpose was to define the special status of
man and to justify his rule over other creatures", Keith Thomas, Man and
the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500 - 1800 (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books, 1984) p. 25. Thomas carefully documents the per-
sistent anthropocentricity of Christian thinkers until the gradual emer-
gence of some new sensibilities in the nineteenth century.
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Thus even Berth's rounded definitions at this point are question-
begging:
The humanity of Jesus consists in his being for man. From the
fact that this example is binding in humanity generally there
follows the broad definition that humanity absolutely, the
humanity of each and every man, consists in the determination
of man's being as a being with others, or rather with the other
-man. It is not as he is for himself but with others, not in
loneliness but in fellowship, that he is genuinely human, that
he achieves true humanity, that he corresponds to his determina-
tion to be God's covenant-partner, that he is the being for which
the man Jesus is, and therefore real man. 182
We cannot fail to notice the way in which the argument here moves backwards
and forwards from familiar phrases but when each is analysed individually
is seen to depend upon others for its coherence and meaning. Once a funda-
mental question mark is placed against any of these, the edifice collapses.
Thus it is not clear how Jesus can be distinctly for man and not generally
for all creatures as well. It is not clear why it is that fellow being can-
not include all kinds of being and not just human being. It is not clear
why man alone can be the covenant partner in the way supposed. Could it not
be that Jesus may be more properly defined as the Creature for all other crea-
tures, including those in closer and distant proximity, and that in being for
all other creatures, man thus exercises his humanity in the sense intended
here?
A question mark should also be placed against Barth's third definition espe-
cially that being in encounter (or relationship) consists "in the fact that
we render mutual assistance in the act of being". Is mutual assistance in
this sense to be exclusive of comradely care and help to other species, even
those with whom we have special relationship and therefore special responsi-
bilities? In reply, Barth may well stress the "mutual" in the proposition
given and that at least some animals, as far as we know, are not capable of
mutual assistance in this sense. But it is surely striking that the nature
182. CD, III, 2, p. 243; my italics.
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of Barth's proposal here is closed to any wider claims for assistance.
It presupposes what is in need of justification, namely that there exists
a human fellowship which can be abstracted from our diverse and multi-
farious relationships with the natural world. And even if these relation-
ships with the non-human cannot claim the primary.concern which relation-
ships with fellow humans may justly claim, it is by no means clear that
they are not at least theologically significant as analogies to the same.
Barth spoke earlier of how the beasts created on the sixth day with man pre-
figure the covenant relationship between man and God, and are they not even
in this reduced sense morally significant relationships? Barth's method,
however, pushes him to eliminate even this possibility of creaturely coinmu-
nion, for he writes of humanity which "consists in the fact that we need
and are capable of mutual assistance". 183 Thus a further way in which the
common life of creatures may be exemplified and expressed is abstracted as
a necessarily exclusive human characteristic. In all this it is hardly sur-
prising that Barth's work on creation should be regarded as his "weakest"
by some of his critics who understand him as espousing "unitarianism of the
second article" (through "Christo-centric constriction") by excluding an account
of "not only the psychological but also the cosmic". 184 Barth's closely Christo-
centrically based discussion here does little to avoid criticism of this kind.
Human Sexual Difference as the Basis of the Covenant Relationship
The third sub-section of the third major section is entitled 'Humanity as
Likeness and Hope' (Menschlichkeit als Gleichnis und Hoffnung). Barth begins
by recapitulating his major theme that the "basic form of humanity is fellow-
humanity", and moreover, "if it is not in some way an approximation to being
in the encounter of I and Thou, it is not human". This, for Barth, is not
an ideal quality or virtue of humanity, it is rather one of the determina-
tions with which we have to deal in theological anthropology and therefore
183. CD, III, 2, p. 262; my italics.
184. Hendry, op. cit., p. 25.
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has the nature of " fact" . No matter how man may reject, dishonour or mis-
construe it, at heart man has no choice but to be fellow humanity. "His
185being has this basic form
Barth develops his view with reference to the J saga in Genesis which he
regards as the "Old Testament Magna Carta of humanity". Put simply, what
we have in this saga is the "radical rejection" of the picture of man in
isolation.' 86 The relationship of man and woman here described "speaks of
the co-existence" between them "as the original and proper form of this
187fellow humanity .	 Barth holds that the Genesis picture reveals a true
and vital distinction within humanity, one that cannot be lost. He there-
fore interprets the Pauline verse in Galatians 3, concerning how there is
neither male nor female in Christ, in a way that maintains the distinction.
"Thus the fact that male and female are one in Christ does not mean that they
are no longer male and female", he argues. This distinction belonging as it
does to human nature (rather than to the despoliation of it) will not be
"set aside in the resurrection" and therefore relates inherently to what
man is and can only be here or in eternity.188
Pondering as before (see previous discussion pp. 53f.; 76f.; 82f.; 92f.)
the significance of this positing of humanity as male and female, Barth sees
behind it a prefiguring of the relationship between Yahweh and his people.
This is the true "original" relationship, to which the human prototype
points. When Paul interprets the Christian community, he draws upon the Old
Testament notion of God and his people, but also develops a unique Christo-
logical emphasis. Hence he writes to the community of Jesus Christ, people
who stand in an ontological relationship to him, and therefore to God himself.
185. CD, III, 2, p. 286.
186. CD, III, 2, p. 291 and n. p. 291.
187. CD, III, 2, p. 292.
188. CD, III, 2, p. 296 and n. p. 296.
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The Church is seen as the bride and Christ as the head or husband of the
community. Thus within the male/female relationship itself the man repre-
sents Christ and the woman "is subordinated to her husband as the whole corn-
189
munity is to Christ".	 Barth regards this priority of order as having nothing
to do with cultural relativism or social fashion. Indeed here is disclosed
the true theological significance of human relationships. "Dishonour and
harm are done both to man and to woman if this clear relationship is abol-
ished", he writes) 90 From this standpoint, Barth is able to share with
Paul the notion that we are here confronted by "a great mystery" (Eph. 5:32).
The humanity of man is a "mystery of faith", he argues, for behind all earth-
ly notions of relationship and difference, of duality and unity, lies the
prefiguring reality of Christ in relation to us. Barth concludes that man is
concretely within his humanity nothing less than the covenant partner of God.
We can now say that man is "by nature" such a covenant partner. The image of
God in man consists pre-eminently in this tertiuni comparationis, this analogy
of relationship, indeed "apart from this common feature everything is different".
The Significance of Sexual Difference in Non-Human Creatures
How secure is Barth's edifice here? He offers without doubt the fullest
theological account possible of sexual differentiation. Given his presup-
positions it must follow that any differentiation or differentIated rela-
tionship within man must find its correspondence and analogy in the rela-
tionship between God and man, and even more directly within the life of God
himself. The argument is less secure, however, at the point at which he
wishes to deduce from this analogy the total reality of human distinctive-
ness. When he writes "For apart from this common feature (analogy of rela-
tionship) everything is different", he stretches a possibly compelling case
to the point of exaggeration. 191
189. CD, III, 2, n. p. 314.
190. CD, III, 2, n. p. 312.
191. CD, III, 2, p. 320; my italics.
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We need to emphasise again two major problems. In the first
	 -- -
place, Barth does not grapple with the fact of sexual differentiation and
plurality in other species. He does not ignore the fact since the sagas
implicitly assume such differentiation, but he proposes a distinction that
human sexuality is different in kind from other sexual differentiation with-
in creation. We are now in a position to observe the full circularity of
this approach: in Part One the divine image means sexual differentiation;
in Part Two sexual differentiation means being made in the divine likeness4
Secondly, since the essence of Barth's argument is the analogy of relation-
ship, he does not grapple theologically with the fact that man exists in a
relationship with creation as a whole and other living beings in particular.
If relationship is to be the central determining factor here in distinguish-
ing the humanity of man, it cannot be overlooked that man's relationship
with other creatures betokens correspondence and analogy in a similar way.
If our criticisms are right, two conclusions follow. The first is that man
in his I and Thou relationship may be to other creatures as God is to him.
If Christ is for man, then man must be for creation and therefore for them
in a particular and unique way. The analogy of relationship must in this
sphere betoken inner theological reality as it does in the divine human re-
lationship. Man's relationship must actualise and express the inner reality
of God's beneficence towards all created being. How can this be so? It
must be affirmed because of the underlying ontological relationship between
Christ and every creature. Since man is set within other differentiating
relationships, there can be no single relationship with man that does not
enfold and include man as he is within these other relationships. Barth
cannot escape the fact that man is man as he is fellow human as he is crea-
ture among fellow creatures. There can be no humanity outside this con-
text and sphere; to abstract man in the way supposed is to deny his creature-
hood and therefore his full humanity.
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The second conclusion that must follow is this: all creaturely life that
is sexually differentiated must be prefigured by the inner life of God
himself. Not all of course in the same way or to the same degree. Man
here undoubtedly stands at the very centre because of the incarnation.
But if sexual plurality signifies an arialogical relationship there can be
no grounds for affirming it in the human sphere which do not also affirm
it in the non-human sphere as well. Barth's argument in this regard is
tenuous to say the least. He regards human sexuality as undefined "structu-
ral differentiation" which is absent in the case of animals. Sexuality in
animals amounts to a "non-essential" differentiation whereas for man it is
a sign of what he is. 192 	 But this will not do because the issue concerns
not being in essence but relationship. There is no analogy of being, but
only analogy of relationship. Is it really so astonishing that there should
also be some likeness of relationship between Creator and creation, even
among the non-human creatures? Barth's way of seeking to find the one human
point of absolute distinction is not easily compatible with the biblical
notion that Christ is the "first born of every creature" and "in him all
193things consist".	 If Christ is truly the source of all being, and there-
fore the sure ontological basis not only of man but all creatures, then it
must follow that there is some analogy of relationship not only specifically
between human beings, but between all beinpossessing this prior relation-
ship and correspondence. Whatever special significance may be attached to
humankind it cannot be such that it totally obliterates this primary and
decisive relation to all creaturely being. It is said of Barth that he is
"committed to one coherent framework of theological thought that arises
192. CD, III, 2, p. 286.
193. For exegesis of Col. 1. 12-17 see, e.g. Jean-Francois Bonnefoy's
Christ and the Cosmos, ed. and ET by M.D. Meilach (Paterson, N.J.:
St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965) p. 180f. "We take St. Paul's asser-
tion literally: God has willed that Christ be first in 'all things'.
And he leads all things, those in heaven and those on earth, to unity
through him and toward him", p. 194.
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within the unitary interaction of God with our world in creation and incar-
194
nation".	 As such it is a promise unfulfilled at least here. Barth's
mistake is to assume that man's special relationship with Christ can only
be supported and maintained at the expense of the wider relationship be-
tween Creator and creation.
All this, however, does not answer the question what it means for man to
be man for Christ, and therefore for other creatures in creation. We intend to
give some account of this possibility in our last ehapter (see esp. pp. 302-310).
Man as Besouled Body, Bodily Soul and Spirit
Barth turns to the question of the constitution of man in his fourth major
section entitled 'Man as Soul and Body'. The first sub-section is entitled
'Jesus, Whole Man'. Until now the problem of man's being "in itself and as
such" has concerned Barth, but he now turns to the problem of what consti-
tutes this being in terms of body and soul. To what extent can man be de-
fined as such a being? How does one begin this process of theological
investigation? Which of the many possible starting points does one adopt?
For Barth there is only one answer. Only one source of understanding can
be "authentic and normative" for theological investigation in this sphere
and this source is the "constitution of the humanity of Jesus". But what
is striking about the person of Jesus is the complete absence of duality.
Certainly there is an inner and an outer, but "it is almost more striking
and characteristic that everything has an outer, visible, bodily form" •195
Barth points out that those New Testament passages which mention the "soul"
or "spirit" of Jesus "are comparatively rare in appearance and parsimonious
196in content".	 This then is the first point Barth makes: Jesus' humanity
194. T.F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Know-
ledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological
Enterprise (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984) p. 295.
195. CD, III, 2, p. 327.
196. CD, III, 2, n. p. 328.
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is marked by "oneness and wholeness". 197 The second concerns the order of
this reality. We perceive that it has a particular structure. Jesus is
not subject to forces, one higher and one lower. He is not a chaos, a mass
of conflicting wills and emotions. Rather "He is both soul and body in an
ordered oneness and wholeness". And the cause of this unity is the "abso-
lutely unique relation with the Holy Spirit" that appertains to Jesus.198
Because the spirit of.kingship rests upon Jesus, in a way that cannot be
said of any other man, the result is a quite specific relationship of unity.
Hence we can say of Jesus that "His body is the body of His soul, not vice
versa".' 99
 The relationship between body and soul is, therefore, resolved
in this one man Jesus - "so much so", adds Barth, "that one might miss the
reality of their difference' 200
In his second sub-section, 'The Spirit as the Basis of Soul and Body'. (Der
Geist als Grund der Seele und des Leibes), Barth begins by expounding "the
basic anthropological insight", namely that man has Spirit and is as such
grounded, constituted and maintained by God as the soul of his body 201
Whilst God does not in any sense belong to the constitution of man, and
whilst "God is neither a part nor the whole of human nature", and whilst
further "He is identical neither with one of the elements of which in unity
and order we are composed", it is nevertheless true that "the whole which
we are in this unity and order is not without God". It is impossible for
man to know or understand himself without reference to God. "Man cannot
- escape God", maintains Barth, "because he always derives from him". He is
not therefore in any way "self-grounded, self-based, self-constituted and
self-maintained". All anthropology without God "rests on a plain error".202
197. CD, III, 2, p. 331.
198. CD, III, 2, p. 332 and n. p. 332.
199. CD, III, 2, n. p. 339.
200. CD, III, 2, p. 340.
201. CD, III, 2, p. 344.
202. CD, III, 2, p. 346.
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Barth amplifies what it means for man to be grounded and constituted by God.
The fact of human death helps us to appreciate that the life of man does not
stand in a fixed relationship to God but has the character of gift. "Man
lives and dies in the event of. the livingness of God", he argues. Only "in
this event" is man what he is; he lives and dies by the gracious hand of God.
"In this event and not otherwise 1" exclaims Barth. 203 What then does it
mean for man to be "soul of his body"? In the first place,"he is simply one
being among other visible material beings": his body is also physical (orga-
nic) as well as material. "To call man 'soul' is simply to say ... that he
is the life which is essentially necessary for the body". "This is all we
can mean", emphasises Barth. As will become clear, no notion of a disem-
bodied, or partly disembodied, or sometimes disembodied soul is being enter-
tained here. The notions of body and soul belong analytically together.
One is impossible without the other. "Soul would not be soul", if it were
not bodily; and body would not be body, if it were not besouled".204
But this alone is inadequate. "We introduce a concept which we earlier
saw fundamental for an analysis of the human nature of Jesus", writes Barth,
"the concept of spirit". Man "has spirit" (der Mensch hat Geist). But this
does not mean that he "is spirit". 205 In this way Barth secures at one and
the same time both the continuity and the discontinuity between man and the
humanity of Jesus. Jesus alone is Spirit, whereas for man generally the
Spirit is a gift and not his own possession. "The Spirit is immortal",
writes Barth. "For this reason it can be identical neither with the man nor
,,206	 .	 ,,	 .	 .
with a part of the being of man .	 What then is Spirit? Spirit is, in
the most general sense, the operation of God upon His creation, and espe-
,,207
cially the movement of God towards man .	 Barth digs deeply at this point
203. CD, III, 2, p. 349.
204. CD, III, 2, p. 350.
205. CD, III, 2, p. 354.
206. CD, III, 2, n. p. 355.
207. CD, III, 2, p. 356.
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into biblical anthropology in order to characterise the possession of Spirit
in individuals as the possession of a "commission from God"; "God's autho-
,208
risation and power for its execution' .
	
But the Spirit is necessary not
only as the authorisation to be an agent of God but also as the "principle
of (his) creaturely reality". That is, man cannot be body and soul with-
out Spirit. He cannot, simply put, be man without it. Is solely humanity
therefore, the receiver of the Spirit? Not at least in the sense that the
Spirit is essential to life and since all created, that is living beings
have life, they must also be counted as receivers of the Spirit. But what
distinguishes man is the "special movement" (besondere Zuwendung) of God
in giving the Spirit, that is, his determination to make man his covenant
partner. 209 "We know nothing of such a double determination in respect of
the beasts", argues Barth, "and hence we do not understand the manner of
their life or of their souls (though we cannot dispute that they have them)
and at the very best can only intuit". Barth summarises the question:
"Men and beasts can be born, but men alone can be baptised".21°
208. CD, III, 2, n. p. 357.
209. Zuwendung (movement) may be more accurately translated as 'turning
towards' or more figuratively 'giving someone your attention'.
210. CD, III, 2, p. 359. When we reflect further on the precise meaning of
Barth's proposed distinction here, all is less clear. C.F.D. Moule
has shown convincingly how the early Christian community developed
the "extraordinary conception of the Lord Jesus Christ as a corporate,
a more-than-individual personality" into which believers entered
through baptism, The Phenomenon of the New Testament: An Inquiry into
the Implications of Certain Features of the New Testament, Studies in
Biblical Theology, 2nd Series I (London: SCM Press, 1968) p. 21; cf.
The Origin of Christology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977) pp. 47 - 96. But this community also developed the extraordi-
nary conception of Christ as Logos through whom all things came to be
and were alive with his life. Is not this also a real incorporation?
The missing link here is the operation of the Holy Spirit. Barth does
not begin to grapple with what sanctification of all creation through
the Spirit might mean. Torrance offers this description wrestling with
St. Basil's doctrine of the Spiritus Creator: "Not only is the work of
the Spirit in Christ the norm of his work in all creation, but the
saving means of it, and the sole way through which it is fulfilled by
God; i.e. through the Son and in the Spirit", Theology in Reconstruction,
op. cit., p. 222 k his italics.
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Barth now defines more precisely what is meant by man having Spirit. He
offers four delimitations. In the first place, it means that "God is there
211for him".	 It cannot mean, of course, that man is of the divine essence.
Rather the Spirit witnesses that God stands in relation to him as his gra-
cious Creator. Secondly it means that man is determined "as soul of his
body". The Spirit is the centre of man. But it must not be interpreted as
a third side of human reality. The Council of Constantinople (AD 869-70)
was right to reject "the so-called trichotomism espoused by Philo, by Apol-
linarJusii the Christological conflict of the fourth century". 212 The Spirit
is not a third entity or being in man. Thirdly, the indwelling Spirit in
marx makes us posit a close intimacy, a real presence of God in man: again,
however, "while He is in man, He is not identical with him". 213 Fourthly,
within the nexus of body and soul, the Spirit has "a special and direct re-
lationship to the soulor soulful element of human reality". The soul as
the life of man relates primarily to the Spirit without which it could not
be. "The soul is a priori the element in which the turning of God to man
and the fellowship of man with God in some way take place." The same maybe said
of the.body but that only indirectly, and "only aj,osteriori", concludes Barth.214
The Soulless Non-Human?
Once again, Barth is convinced, as much if not more than in previous sec-
tions, that he can discover the distinctive nature of man. He writes:
Just as man is distinguished from the rest of the created
world by the fact that, as the likeness and promise of the
divine covenant of grace, he is called to responsibility
before God, so his special constitution, corresponding to
this calling, is determined by the fact that he owes it to
the God who is Lord of this covenant of grace.215
211. CD, III, 2, p. 262.
212. CD, III, 2, n. p. 355.
213. CD, III, 2, p. 264.
214. CD, III, 2, p. 365.
215. CD, III, 2, p. 347; my italics.
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What is then this "special constitution"? Firstly, man is a soul of his
body. He is therefore "one who also belongs to the visible, outward, earth-
ly world of bodies". He is a material body and his soul is the life appro-
priate for it. Barth adds to this the significant idea that man represents
the creation in his own being as body and soul. "The whole man ... " he
writes, is "a representation of the whole cosmos". 216 As Barth sees it,
the covenant relationship in which man stands makes this inevitable and
necessary. Secondly, man has Spirit which in turn is the basis of his body
and soul. What then properly distinguishes man and beast - body, soul
or Spirit? Barth's answer is telling and needs to be reproduced in full:
In this sense Spirit is the conditio sine qua non of the being
of man as soul of his body. There is value in reminding our-
selves, of course, that the same is also said of the beasts.
It is only by the Spirit of God the Creator that they also live
and are soul of their body. What distinguishes man from the
beast is the special movement and the purpose with which God
through the Spirit gives him life; and, connected with this,
the special spirituality of his life, which is determined by the
fact that God not only made him in his constitution as soul of
his body, but destined him in this constitution for that position
of a partner of the grace of His covenant. We know nothing of
such a double determination in respect of the beasts •.. .217
Barth's argument is again plainly circular. The distinctive nature of man
consists in his constitution - it is posited - but when analysed Barth ad-
mits no fundamental distinction of constitution, only of divine purpose
which lies beyond issues of constitution. Thus once again the only funda-
mental distinction proposed is that of covenant partnership. It is only on
this basis that any second layer of distinction is proposed. Ironically,
therefore, Barth rests at the very point where his thesis is weakest. When
he writes "We know nothing of such a double distinction in respect of beasts",
that is, their election within the divine covenant, could he really
have overlooked again that Genesis 9 expressly includes non-human beings?
Barth's subsequent claim, for example that we do not understand the "manner
216. CD, III, 2, p. 351.
217. CD, III, 2, p. 359; my italics.
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of their life" and that "so far as we know, they lack that second deter-
mination ... which is primary and peculiar" has, therefore, a hollow ring.
The very category by which we may advance an understanding of the life of
beasts and our relationship with them has been taken from us.
The puzzle is developed further by Barth's own exegesis of the Old Testa-
ment which supports the conviction that soul and spirit cannot be rightly
denied to beasts as well as humans. They too are expressly "living beings"
whose gift of life is a mark of the indwelling Spirit. This accepted, the
meaning and significance of such determination is left entirely to one side.
We may put the problem in the form of a question: If, as Barth argues, the
Spirit must rightly be defined in terms of God's operation and activity
within creation and if the being of man and other living creatures consists
not in their constitution as such but rather in the purpose of God which
may be understood in terms of his operation in relation to them, why is it
that the purpose of God represented and signified by the fact of their gift
of Spirit-filled life does not merit further attention and exploration?
Similarly when we ask in what way man may "represent the cosmos" - in the
striking way in which Barth proposes it - the answer unfortunately is very
unclear. 218
 This is simply because he characterises the notion of soul and
218. Although Barth rejects the notion that man is a 'microcosm' of crea-
tion, this idea appears similar to the notion of representation which
he sometimes employs but nowhere defines. The Eastern tradition pro-
vides rich suggestive cosmologies in this respect. "According to St.
Maximus", writes Lossky, "the work of creation contains five divi-
sions, from which are derived concentric spherof being, at whose
centre is man, virtually containing them all in himself". It is the
destiny of man to bring this whole creation as well as himself to the
state of deification willed by God, The Mystical Theology of the
Eastern Church, op. cit., p. 108. Cf. "Salvation by means of a flight
out of the world, an escape of the spirit from the world, will appear
as a limitation or spiritualistic deformation. In reality we are
dealing with a way of salvation which does not tear us out of the
world but is rather opened for this created world, in the Word become
flesh", Lossky on the significance of materiality in the Eastern tra-
dition, The Vision of God, ET by Asheleigh Moorhouse, pref. by J.
Meyendorff, The Library of Orthodox Theology (London: The Faith Press
and Clayton, Wisconsin: American Orthodox Press, 1963) p. 58; his
italics.
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Spirit in terms that do not allow his striking possibility to emerge as
a subject for further discussion. His "delimitations" on what it means
for man to have Spirit are advanced in abstraction from the operation of
the Spirit in creation. The first, for example, that man having Spirit
"means that God is there for him" does not wrestle with the fact that ani-
mals too have Spirit and thus with the obvious corollary that God is there
for them also. The same problem arises with the third delimitation, namely
that " since man has Him, the Spirit is certainly in man". But if the in-
dwelling Spirit is the basis of man's life it must also ipso facto be the
same for other living beings. In what way can man as postulated represent
the cosmos and other living beings if the nature of his being is constantly
in contrast or opposition to them? This is not to deny the possibility of
special gifts or closer relationships with the Spirit, but these would be
more convincingly advanced on the basis of the common possession of the Spirit
by all living creatures. In fact, despite Barth's claim to differ from Chris-
tian tradition in his treatment of the soul, his intent here at least is
tellingly similar to that of Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas. According
to Aristotle only man has the full complement of 'soul' in all its parts
and specLEicaUy only "man and possibly another order like man or similar to
him, the power of thinking, i.e. mind". 219 Notice Aristotle does not deny
souls or even "psychic powers" to animals but only the fullness of soul. It
is this crucial distinction, based in fact on purely speculative philosophy,
that has come to dominate Christian thinking until the present day.
Man's Rationality as the Basis of Soulfulness
In his final three sub-sections of his fourth major section, Barth examines
soul and body in their "interconnexion", in their "particularity", and
finally in their "order". Barth ascribes an overall priority to the soul,
219. Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, Ch. 3, 414a (28) - 415a (10); re-
printed in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. by Tom Regan
and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976) p. 54.
By "another order" Aristotle does not mean sub-humans like animals.
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as we shall see later, but is clear that no notion of man as only a soul or
try to do this", he maintains, for "Soul is life. What is lifeless is
soulless". Can we say this even of plants and animals? In principle
Barth appears happy so to do. But he is equally insistent that in doing
this we move from the realm of knowledge to that of surmising and specula-
tion. "What we mean when we speak of soul, we can strictly know only when
we speak of the human soul". 22° We do not know whether plants or beasts
are capable of knowing themselves as a conscious subject "because the beast
.,,221
cannot tell me anything about it .
	 Only humans then and possibly ani-
mals can have an "organic body", that is one that is "besouled and filled
and controlled by independent life". 222
 As for plants, whether they have
the subject necessary for soulful life is open to question.
Three vital "delimitations" are drawn in order to secure man as a unity of
body and soul. Firstly, there is the flat rejection of "the abstractly
dualistic conception" which may be called the Greek view and which has been
taken to be traditional Christian teaching in this matter. According to
this perspective, man possesses two parts, one soul which is immortal and
one body which is perishable. These two "substances are quite different
and even opposed in nature, and this involves an opposition of the worth
of the one (the soul) to the unworthiness of the other (the body)".223
It is of course in the rationality of man, in his capacity for rational
thought and reflection, that the immortality of the soul is discerned.
Secondly, Barth also rejects the materialist "reactions" to this view, the
first of these being "monistic materialism' t . According to this perspective,
"the real is only what is corporeal, spatial, physical and material".224
220. CD, III, 2, p. 374.
221. CD, III, 2, pp.374!5.
222. CD, III, 2, p. 378.
223. CD, III, 2, p. 380.
224. CD, III, 2, p. 382.
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As a reaction to the dualism of traditional Christian teaching, it is
understandable. As Barth writes: "They would be right if only they did
not want to be exclusively right". However, since "they want to be ex-
clusively right" they are necessarily erroneous. 225 In an exhaustive foot-
note he deals at length with the unfortunate history of Christian theology
in the area. Materialist thinking is not a modern phenomenon but a-.
necessary reaction to the uncritical acceptance of dualistic thinking by
Catholic and also in turn by Protestant thinkers. Calvin should have dis-
tanced himself from the prevailing Catholic view at the time of the Refor-
mation, but instead by taking on board the traditional dialectic, the Re-
formers together with their Catholic counterparts have secured the rise of
the considerable materialist reaction in the eighteenth, nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Materialist thinking has its origins not "in the re-
searches and results of biology and physiology, but in the rise of this
form of humanity (the emergence of soulless, industrial, automated man
brought about by the great industrial upheavals of two centures), in which
everyone who lives with open eyes in and with his time must willingly or
unwillingly recognise a little of himself". 226 In this respect Barth sees
the necessary emergence of the "historical materialism" advocated by Marx.
This comprises four primary presuppositions: first that economic history
wholly determines man and his relationships with others; secondly that as
a critique of previous history it construes history as "a struggle between
the ruling and the ruled strata or classes of the community"; thirdly, as
a prediction of history it forecasts the inner movement of forces to cata-
strophe and renewal; and fourthly, as a summons to consciousness and action
in the light of this forthcoming event. This economic ideology is a sign
of the failure of Christian apologetics in its advocacy of a false doctrine
225. CD, III, 2, p. 383.
226. CD, III, 2, n. p. 387.
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of man. Because Marxism has identified itself with at least half a truth
of anthropology, it has maintained at least half a cutting edge.. It should
not surprise the Christian Church that it is denounced as a "relic of capital-
isni' when it has donenothing "positively to prevent the rise of the figure
of soulless man". "Has it not always stood on the side of the 'ruling
classes'?" asks Barth. "And has it not with its doctrine of body and soul
at least shown a culpable indifference towards the problem of matter, of
bodily life, and therefore of contemporary economics?" 227
 Unless the Church
revises its anthropology at this very point, it will have nothing to say to
the masses. To this needs to be added a third delimitation against the
counter-reaction of "monistic spiritualism" which holds that "the soul is
the one and only substance of human reality". 228
 Again as a reaction to
counter-reaction it is quite understandable. It is not totally erroneous.
But at heart it rests upon an assumption of its own making. "Who or what
justifies this basic ontic and noetic assumption?" Real man is not soul
"without conditions or limits", he writes.229
Barth now takes up the second question of body and soul in their particu-
larity. "It concerns the inner differentiation of human creatureliness",
he writes, for whereas if we were dealing with the question of the soul of
animals we could legitimately stop at this point, we are bound in the case
of humans to grasp more securely the precise nature of the interconnection
between body and soul. For these two entities do not relate to substances
at all. Rather they are "two moments" of creaturely reality. He offers
two presuppositions. Firstly, "man is capable of perceiving the God who
meets and reveals Himself to him". Almost the whole of Barth's theologi-
cal anthropology presupposes this. "If God created him to have his being
in His Word and as His parther, it is already decided that He created him
227. CD, III, 2, n. p. 389.
228. CD, III, 2, p. 390.
229. CD, III, 2, p. 391.
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as a percipient being". If we ask what it means that man perceives God, the
answer proposed is that perception involves by definition reception into
the self-consciousness of the perceiver. "He can be aware of another and
think it", summarises Barth. Such awareness may be possible in animals
but "we do not know whether they think". Hence it is possible to general-
ly distinguish the role of the soul and the body respectively in their diffe-
rent functions of awareness and self-consciousness. In passing Barth re-
verses the traditional argument from natural theology. Beginning with the
assumption that man can and does perceive God, he argues that it is "For
this reason his nature, and he himself as soul of his body, is rational
nature". It is this, and not any autonomous rationality, which "marks him
off from the animals and the rest of creation". 23° The second presupposi-
tion is that man chosen as God's covenant partner cannot only perceive him
•.,,231but is called to be active in self reflective responsibility before Him
The life between God and man is characterised not only by knowledge but
active fellowship. Again, Barth does not know whether animals are active,
that is desiring, willing beings in this sense. We may speculate about this
but only in the case of man can we know. 232
 We may differentiate in this
question of activity two aspects, one of desiring which belongs to the body
(and which is largely passive) and the other of willing and attitude which
belongs to the soul (and which in turn is largely active). Barth estab-
lishes this distinction again negatively from the case of animals. "What
distinguishes man from animals and the rest of creation", he writes in a
lengthy footnote, "is that he (man) can desire and will in relation to God'.233
230. CD, III, 2, n. p. 402.
231. CD, III, 2, p. 406.
232. CD, III, 2, p. 407.
233. CD, III, 2, p. 409. Barth closely foUs the tradition in delinea-
ting propensities in which the soulful capacity may be said to exist.
Here he appears to take over Calvin's categories completely: "Thus
let us, therefore, hold ... that the human soul consists in two facul-
ties, understanding and will", Institutes of the Christian Religion,
ed. J.T. McNeill, ET by F.L. Battles, The Library of Christian Clas-
sics (London: SCM Press, 1961) Vol. XX, Books I.i tolli xiv, p. 194.
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Barth concludes his treatment of the body and soul by an examination of
their inner order. What is meant by the "primacy of the soul" is described
in terms of "an intelligibly ordered associatiQn of these two moments".234
Hence man is a rational being (Vernunftwesen) in the most comprehensive
sense. There is no evidence that animals are rational beings in this
way.	 The only basis on which we are able to confirm, indeed prove, man's
,,	 .	 235rationality at this point is because he is addressed as such by God".
Such a conclusion can only be deduced a priori from theology. "As God addresses
man, he treats him as a being who can rule himself and serve himself. He thus
treats him as a rational being", maintains Barth. 236 There is no possibility
of neutrality here: either man responds to the claim made u pon him by God and
thus perceives his own rationality before him, or else he loses himself.
The Switch to Naturalistic Criteria
The question of the status of animals requires elaboration. Even though he
had previously accepted that the Old Testament gives us no grounds for deny- -.
ing soul or Spirit to animals, Barth is surprisingly reticent here. He
begins by defining soul as "life, self-contained life, the independent life
of a corporeal being". But not every corporeal being is alive in this sense.
Then there is the obvious difficulty with plants. We cannot know whether
plants are capable of determined self-movement, whereas man and beast are
clearly "independent life". Can we therefore conclude that animals too have
souls in the sense intended here? Barth answers:
we must make the qualification that, although we recognise
the life of the beast as such, we do not know but can only
surmise or suspect that it is an independent life, the life of
a specific subject. The life of man, and man alone, is for us
the object of true and direct knowledge. What we mean when we
speak of soul, we can strictly know only when we speak of the
human soul.237
234. CD, III, 2, p. 413.
235. CD, III, 2, p. 422.
236. CD, III, 2, p. 424.
237. CD, III, 2, p. 374; my italics.
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Barth is most vexing here. His position logically embraces animal souls
at this point. For if "independent't self-willed life is to be the crite-
rion, there is no other option. And yet he speaks of how we "must make
the qualification ... ". And that we cannot know in the
case of animals. But why? Barth replies:
Soul is independent, the life of a particular subject. I
know it as such independent life as I know myself
Whether the beast is engaged in such self-knowledge
(Selbsterkenntnis) or is even capable pf it, I cannot know,
because the beast cannot tell me anything about it.238
When pressed then Barth's answer is not that independent life is the cri-
terion for the attribution of souls but self-knowledge of independent life.
Such beings have to be able to communicate to Barth their self-knowledge in
order that in turn he may know. Do animals, we may wonder, have to commu-
nicate knowledge of their own bodily sensations in order for Barth to know
if they too have a body? The difficulty here is not the evidently circu-
lar nature of the argument (for who can speak in a language Barth would
understand but other human beings?) but that he slips from theological to
naturalistic criteria. All his previously painstakingly established points
must show him to be in error at this point. For it is not what we think of
the created order, Barth previously stressed, but what we can know from the
self-disclosure of God in Christ Jesus. Previously in offering exegesis of
the creation sagas, he pointed directly to the creation of independent non-
human life and also to the biblical witness which gives us no grounds for denying
soul or Spirit to animals — indeed the reverse. Why then should Barth be
so apparently inconsistent? Is there a deeper reason for reticence at this
point?
At the very beginning of Part Two, Barth had drawn attention to the need to
depart from dogmatic tradition concerning "the so-called soul". He does
238. CD, III, 2, pp. 374/5; my italics.
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this subsequently with reluctance but boldness. This tradition, espe-
cially in the thought of Augustine and Aquinas, makes a sharp distinction
between the souls of men and animals on the basis of man's reason and capa-
city for rational thought. The similarity between these approaches and the
view now advanced by Barth in this section is unmistakable. It is "because
there is in man a rational soul", writes Augustine, "(that he subordinates to the
peace of the rational soul all that part of his nature which he shares with
beasts, so that he may engage in deliberate thought". Thus rational capa-
city becomes the absolute dividing line between animals and man. Augustine
theologises that God "did not wish the rational being, made in his own image,
to have dominion over any but irrational creatures". 239 God's image in man
therefore comes to consist in man's special rational capacities and with it
the right to rule over other creatures with absolute power. A point syste-
matically expressed by Aquinas who argues that "intellectual creatures are
ruled by God, as though he cared for them for their own sake, while other
creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures". The upshot
morally cannot be advantageous to irrational brutes. "(I) t is not wrong for
man to make use of them, either by killing or in any way whatever", claims
Aquinas. 240 Barth here slips from his own theological presuppositions to
embrace the sheerly naturalistic or rationalistic conceptions of soulful-
ness which have so characterised scholastic attitudes especially in their
unwitting denigration of animal life.
The Neglect of Materiality
Barth's strident and yet deeply sympathetic discussion of dialectical mate-
rialism as a judgement upon the Church's failure to prevent the "rise of
that figure of the soulless man" needs to be explored further. His treatment
239. Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, ET by H.
Bettenson, intro, by D. Knowles, Penguin Classics (Harmonsworth:
Penguin Books, 1972) pp. 873 and 874.
240. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ET by the English Dominican Fathers
(Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1928) Third Book, Part II, Ch. CXII;
reprinted in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, op. cit., pp. 56
and 59; my italics.
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is perceptive and illuminating. He sees clearly the relationship
between the view of man proposed by the Christian church and its effect
upon social and moral thought. Has the church's traditional doctrine of
human souls "at least shown a culpable indifference towards the problem
of matter, of bodily, life, and therefore of contemporary economics?".241
And not only economics, we may ask? "Has it not made a point of teaching
the immortality of the soul instead of attesting to society, with its pro-
clamation of the resurrection of the dead, that the judgement and promise
of God compass the whole man, and therefore cannot be affirmed and believed
apart from material and economic reality, or be denied or pushed aside as
ideology in contrast to material and economic reality?" 242 These valid
questions invite others. Has not the traditional doctrine of man as alone
the sure possessor of immortal soul (a view to which in principle Barth has
now committed himself) meant in practice the depreciationof the world,of
matter generally and with it the realm of nature and living creatures as
only automata devoid of rational souls and therefore moral status? 243
 Is
there not a direct correspondence between the church's neglect in this way
of the material and economic life of man, and its neglect of the material
creation to which man is set in a position of responsible dominion? If
241. CD, III, 2, n. p. 389; my italics.
242. CD, III, 2, n.pp. 389/90; my italics. Cf. Berdyaev: "But it is be-
cause spirituality has been divorced from life and relegated to an
abstract sphere that both human and religious life have become mate-
realised. Materialism has, in fact, a spiritual origin", op. cit.,
pp. 177/8.
243. "Most people associate the theory of animal automatism with Descartes,
but in fact it was Malebranche, not Descartes, who said that animals
eat without pleasure and cry without pain. Descartes himself, whilst
holding that animal bodies function mechanically, did not deny them
feeling. His followers, however, took the theory of automatism to
its limits, using it as an excuse for their tortures. 'They kicked
about their dogs and dissected their cats without mercy, laughing at
any compassion for them, and calling their screams the noise of break-
ing machinery", A.R. Kingston, in op. cit., p. 485; the quotation is
from J.P. Mahaffy, Descartes (London, 1901) p. 181. Tom Regan has
recently indicated, however, that whilst Descartes allowed "sensation"
to animals, his interpretation wholly eschewed any notion of "mind" and.
therefore of any real possibility of "consciousness", The Case for
Animal Rights (London: Routledge & Kegan Panl and Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1984) pp. 3 - 5.
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Marxism "reminds the Church and theology of debts which they have by no means
paid" 244
 is it not possible that the current disregard of our material environ-
ment, the claims of the non-human together with the supporting secular view of
the world, remind the church and theology of other debts which they have by no
means paid?
No Mind, Soul or Status?
Barth returns to the question of animal souls in pursuing the "particularity"
of body and soul. We need to ask concerning "the inner differentiation" of
human creatures. "We could very well halt here if we were merely dealing
with an animal", claims Barth. 245 But why? Why can we not speak of the inner
differentiation of the life of all beings who have body and soul? He replies:
What we perceive in an animal is indeed the conriexion of an
independent life with that which is quickened and lives by it.
The supposition that the animal, too, is soul of a body is
tempting at this point. But as we have seen we do not know
(wir wissen nicht) what we are really saying if we accept this
supposition. We do not know the particular element in the in-
dependent life of an animal. We do not know how it happens
that an animal is self-animating. Nor do we know the particu-
larity in which it is both self-animating and living.246
The argument thus subtly changes. Barth does not now deny that animals
have independent life or that there may be a particularity within such life
that animates them in a way that is to human perception at least highly sim.i-
lar to that of human beings. The problem is now that we cannot know how
they are animated or indeed the particularity which enables them to live at
all. Barth's utter agnosticism at this point is surely untheological. He
begins at this point with the crucial qualification "what we perceive
whereas previously Barth accepted that the Spirit must be the basis of all
independent life. What has now happened to this insight? Do we really not
know what gives life to the created world? Are there any grounds for assu-
ming that the Spirit which quickens human life is not also the basis of all
244. CD, III, 2, xi. p. 390.
245. CD, III, 2, p. 394.
246. CD, III, 2,pp. 394/5; my italics.
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creaturely life, that is independently motivated life? "Not only is the
Spirit reconciling fragmented factions of the human community to one another",
according to Philip Rosato, "but He is also at work in the ecological
forces of the earth which are straining as they wait for the revelation
247
of the sons of God".
Barth's thought moves through another transition. In a subseauent foot-
note on the creation of man in Genesis 2, he writes: "When God breathes His
breath into the nostrils of man and thus makes him a living being, He seems
to be doing materially the same thing as might be said of animals". So we
do know then that the Spirit is the basis of animal as well as human life.
"The material difference emerges only in the fact that the continuation of
248the story is the history of the covenant salvation ... between God and man".
I have already discussed before the considerable difficulties with Barth's
view at this point and I shall not repeat them here (see pp. 69 - 78).
What is distressing is the way in which he moves from criterion to criterion
seeking to establish the special place and nature of man in distinction from
that of animals, and yet when analysed how each criterion is presented in
terms of others which in turn look back to the previous. What is the point
of all this restless searching if he is really convinced by his material
249here?
We move to yet another stage of attempted difference finding when Barth seeks
to establish what follows from the particularity of body and soul in the
247. Rosato, The Spirit as Lord: The Pneumatology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh:
T and T Clark, 1981) p. 140; see also my pp. 297f.
248. CD, III, 2, n. p. 396; my italics.
249. Barth's persistent agnosticism about the spirituality of animals may
give us the uncomfortable. feeling that he is not as free from spirit!
matter dualism as he wishes to be. Can the Spirit only work through
intelligent matter, one might ask? Ugly dualism, it should be remem-
bered, still masquerades as Christian doctrine, e.g. "Soul and material
substance, grace and transforming commodity must, however, be regarded
as incompatibles", Oscar Hardman, The Christian Doctrine of Grace
(London: The Unicorn Press, 1937) p. 43; my italics.
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human creature. He proposes two qualities or rather "moments" of his crea-
turely reality. The first is that the human being "is capable of percei-
ving the God who meets and reveals Himself to him". As positive affirmation
this insight cannot be gainsaid. But Barth advances this affirmation as a
notion of distinction between man and animals. Can animals perceive their
Creator and have some sense of their origin and creation as may be glimpsed
from the biblical witness to their praise of God? Apparently not. Barth
writes: "We believe that we can see and know that there is awareness in
,,250
animals. But we do not know whether they think . 	 Barth's argument here
is amazingly similar to the rationalist approach of Descartes. "(I)f they
thought as we do, they would have an immortal soul like us", claims Descartes.
"(T)here is no prejudice to which we are all more accustomed from our earliest
years than the belief that dumb animals think". 251 Whilst Barth stops short
of actually denying mental capacities to animals, it is nevertheless proble-
matic that he advances his argument not on the basis of acinosticism, but a
practical denial of such a possibility.
We encounter inevitably the same problem with Barth' s secon& "moment" of
creaturely being, namely the ability to desire and will in relation to God.
Are animals capable of such activity? Barth answers:
We think that we see and know that animals desire. But we do
not know for certain that they will. Since we do not know
this, fundamentally we do not know whether animal desire
- however often human desire may remind us of it - is not some-
thing quite different. Thus we do not know whether and in what
sense animals are active beings.252
250. CD, III, 2, p. 399.
251. Descartes, Letters to the Marquess of Newcastle (November 23, 1646)
and to Henry More (February 5, 1649) in Descartes: Philosophical
Letters, ed. and ET by Anthony Kenny (Oxford: University Press, 1970);
see also 'Discourse on Method' in Philosophical Works of Descartes, ET
by E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (London: Cambridge University Press,
1956) Vol. I, pp. 115 - 118 for his famous line about animals opera-
ting "just like a clock"; all reprinted in Animal Rights and Human
Obligations, op. cit., pp. 60 - 66.
252. CD, III, 2, pp. 406/7; my italics.
- 268 -
But what does this "not knowing" amount to? An appreciation that animals
may desire or will in some way hitherto unknown or undiscovered? Apparent-
ly not. To the ascribing of other moments of creaturely being that may be
consonant with all else that is known about their creaturely being? Appa-
rently not. The unknowing of animal life in this regard is turned into a
statement of human distinctiveness, thus: "What distinguishes man from ani-
mals and the rest of creation is that he can desire and will in relation to
253	 .God .
	 It is here in the spilling over from agnosticism to outright
denial that we expose a fundamental weakness in Barth's methodology.
The Final Void
And yet his thesis is all the more remarkable and extraordinary because in
the end he senses something of the logical impossibility of the preceding
arguments. When considering the order of body and soul in the human creature,
he insists: "At this point we must again remember and maintain that we have
no information whether animals are or are not also rational beings in the
sense described". 254 This, it must be noticed, follows agnosticism concern-
ing the mental capacities of animals, the denial of their soulfulness and
the distinguishing of man from the rest of the created order precisely on
account of this unique ability to desire and will. And yet Barth maintains:
The evidence for this (man's rationality) cannot be used for
both man and animals, nor of course for man against animals.
It can be used only without reference to animals for man, and
for man only as he conducts himself as a rational being.255
In the end, therefore, the puzzle of Barth's treatment here is only inten-
sified by his candid assessment that the procedure he has followed cannot
in the final analysis reveal the result advanced. We have therefore to uii-
pick all the stages of argument concerning human distinctiveness and render
the conclusions void. In this section at least the result is profound.
We cannot know whether beasts are soulful, but our not knowing on the basis
253. CD, III, 2, n. p. 409; my italics.
254. CD, III, 2, p. 419.
255. CD, III, 2, p. 420; my italics.
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of what may or may not activate their life cannot be advanced against them.
It remains an open question. We cannot know also whether animals can per-
ceive their Creator because we cannot know either whether they perceive or
think in that sense, but our unknowing cannot be advanced against them.
It remains an open question. We cannot also know whether animals desire
or will or both, and therefore in what sense they are active beings, but
our unknowing cannot be advanced against them. All these questions remain
necessarily open and all that has been built upon them in terms of human
distinctiveness is rendered vacuous.256
The Trinitarian Weakness
One important lesson to be learnt from Barth's work on anthropology is that the
attempt to define man in consistent opposition to creation, cannot in the end
256. It will be noted that I have not contributed to the general debate
about the immortality of animal souls. Mainstream tradition rejects
such a notion although serious voices have been raised in favour,
e.g. "In 1722 the Spy Club at Harvard debated 'Whether the Souls of
Brutes are Immortal', and as orthodox a divine as Bishop Butler
thought it probable that brutes would enjoy an afterlife. Soame
Jenyns concurred, as did the Methodist theologian Augustus Toplady",
James Turner, Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain and Humanity in
the Victorian Mind (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1980) p. 8; for a sketch of the debate see Keith Thomas'
'Animal Souls' in op. cit., pp. 137 - 142; of the divines John Wesley
appears to offer the most considered account: "the whole brute crea-
tion will then undoubtedly be restored, not only to the vigour, strength,
and swiftness which they had at their creation, but to a far higher de-
gree of each than they ever enjoyed" from his famous sermon on 'The
General Deliverance' in Sermons on Several Occasions, 4 vols., with
biog. note by J. Beecham (London: Wesleyan Conference Office, 1874)
Vol. II (1874) p. 282; more recently C.S. Lewis theorised that "ani-
mals may have an immortality, not in themselves, but in the immor-
tality of their masters", The Problem of Pain, Fontana Books (London:
Collins, 1967) pp. 127 - 8; see also his discussion 'On the Pains of
Animals' with C.E. Joad, The Month, new series 3, 2 (February 1950)
95 - 104; more recently still Keith Ward posits "Immortality, for ani-
mals as well as humans, is a necessary condition of any acceptable
theodicy", Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1982) p. 202; cf. The Concept of God (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1974) pp. 222 - 223; and the provocative, if slight, discussion
by Edward Quinn, 'Animals in Heaven?', New Blackfriars, 65, 767 (May
1984) 224 - 226. Is the theory of incorporeal souls compatible with
the doctrines of God as Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer? Does Barth
engage here in a "cosmology" of man himself - that "sterile corner"
where the "Word of God has yet to be heard"? What evidence is there
from Jesus as "whole man" or from the biblical material generally to
justify this scholastic pursuit - for humans or animals? If the crea-
ture is able to contain within itself the reason for its existence,
can it still remain the creature?
- 270 -
give us an adequate account either of the doctrine of the human or the non-human.
Even more glaringly, it cannot give us a full account of God as Trinity: of
the exciting possibilities for the cosmos of the Father's love for all
being, of the Son's world-embracing reconciliation, and the Spirit's work
of inclusive redemption. The distinctions are so multiplied: history, grati-
tude, sexuality, willing and acting, rationality, covenant partnership and so
on, that man's being as a fellow creature among other creatures in God's good
creation is lost in a multitude of sophisticated abstractions. This is not a
question of justice to our fellow creatures primarily (though many of the dis-
tinctions proposed would not bear analysis according to "exact science"257)
but a question of fidelity to the Word who is the common source of all creatures.
and all creatureliness. If we have spent such a long time offering at every
point an embracing and persistent critique of Barth's work here, it is for
this very reason. Re represents a tradition that urgently needs reworking.
Even a theologian as different in method as Hans Kiing is heir to the same
thinking. KUng also takes anthropocentricity to its farthest possible limit
and argues that God's will can be defined wholly in terms of man's well-being.
"God wills nothing but man's advantage, man's true greatness and his ultimate
258dignity"
257. For recent discussions see Clark, The Nature of the Beast, op. cit.;
Regan, op. cit., pp. 34- 81; Mary Midgley's Beast and Man: The Roots
of Human Nature (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1979); Marian Stamp
Dawkins' Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare (London and
New York: Chapman & Hall, 1980) and Edward Carpenter's Animals and
Ethics (London: Watkins, 1980). If Barth is to allow human perception
of animals to form his theological judgement, then "exact science"
must be allowed to play a part in determining our view of animal con-
sciousness and behaviour. I like the line from Konrad Lorenz: "The
similarity is not only functional but historical, and it would be an
actual fallacy not to humanise", Letter to Williams, On Aggression,
ET by M. Latzke (London: Methuen, 1966) p. 54; cited in Stephen R.L.
Clark's The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1977) p. 38.
258. KUng, On Being a Christian, Fount ed. (London: Collins, 1978) p. 251;
my italics.
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Barth returns to the 'earthly' non-human creation 	 in Part Four of
Volume Three, 'The Command of God the Creator'. 2
 "The task of theological
ethics is to understand the Word of God as the command of God" . Ethics,
in this sense, flows from doctrine; it is an inseparable part of our human
response to the Revealed Word. Yet, from all that we have discovered so
far, can we really expect from Barth a major treatment of human respon-
sibility towards non-human creatures? If the Word of God is concerned
4
solely "with God and man", how can the ethical dimension of man's
relationship with animals have any theological force? Indeed Barth
begins his section on 'Freedom for Life' with a wholly anthropocentric
affirmation:
As God the Creator calls man to Himself and turns him to his
fellow man, He orders him to honour his own life and that of
every other man as a loan . . .
And yet it is surely significant that this section begins with a serious and
sometimes detailed consideration of life in general and animals in particular. -
The Non-Human as a Marginal Problem of Ethics
His sub-section borrows the term from Albert Schweitzer of 'Respect for
Life' (Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben). In doing so he sharply differentiates
1. The realm of non-being and the "ambassadors of heaven" are dealt with
in CD, III, 3:, The Doctrine of Creation, Part Three, ET by G.W. Bromiley
and R. Ehrlich (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1960), esp. pp. 369 - 531.
2. CD, III, 4, The Doctrine of Creation, Part Four, ET by A.T. Mackay,
T.H.L. Parker, H. Knight, H.A. Kennedy and J. Marks (Edinburgh: T and
T Clark, 1961). Barth's thought is closely paralleled here in his
Ethics, op. cit., pp. 137 - 143. These lectures were never published
during his lifetime because, according to the editor, Barth "appears in
them as still an advocate of the doctrine of the orders of creation
which later he passionately rejected" (p. vii). His thinking about
respect for life has not substantially changed, however.
3. CD, III, 4, p. 4.
4. CD, III, 2, p. 6.
5. CD, III, 4, p. 324 (sectional summary); my italics.
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.6his intention from Schweitzer's overall thesis in Kultur und Ethik.
Respect for life is not to be understood as the principle of ethics or
as "the supreme good". "Where Schweitzer places life, we see the command
of God" .' W1iilst Barth attacks ethical idealism, the notion of respect
must nevertheless be taken seriously. Man knows himself as he is addressed
by God. Be discovers himself as an independent, willing, thinking, cons-
cious and responsible being. He knows that he exists; in fellowship and
communion with other human beings. In these ways he learns that his life
is valuable, on loan from God and to be respected. Pnd does the Word
addressed to man. enable him to discover himself as one being among other
species of being? Can he find here too fellowship and unity? Barth
agonises. A tempting possibility especially "if we were following the
way of free speculation". But fidelity to the Word determines otherwise:
For it cannot be maintained that man addressed by God's
word was spoken to and must recognise himself as a
participant in the life of animals and plants or in an
almost universal life-act, however interpreted.8
Theological ethics, therefore, cannot concern itself with a supposed
world of animal and human fellowship. Whilst we cannot rule out the
possibility absolutely, we cannot proceed on the basis of it. "We may
entertain beautiful and pious thoughts, based sometimes on sensible
suppositions and observations, concerning the independent reality of
animal and vegetable existence ... (but) Man is not addressed concerning
animal and vegetable life, nor life in general, but concerning his own
6. Kultur und Ethik (1923); Civilization and Ethics, ET by C.T. Cainpion,
2nd ed,, Unwin Books (A and C Black, 1967). For a critical dis-
cussion see Oskar Kraus, Albert Schweitzer: His Work and his Philosophy,
ET by E.G. Macalman, intro, by A.D. Lindsay (London: A and C
Black, 1944).
7. CD, III, 4, n. p. 324.
8. CD, III, 4, n. p. 332.
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human life." The conclusion is inevitable: "... we must take seriously
the problem of animals (and in a certain sense even of plants) as a
marginal problem of ethics" (Ethischés Randproblem) .
What then, if anything, can be said of animals and vegetables? Barth
insists upon a distinction between the two. animals apparently have some
kind of claim to soulfulness, whereas vegetables have (if we know what we
are talking of at all) some kind of "vegetative" soul. Whether we can
apply to animals any kind of rationality is ultimately "an enigina")°
Yet there is a "close connexion" (Nachbarschaft) between man and beast
and a relationship "so unmistakable" that we must put them "at the
boundary" of concern for respect, for life. 11 Barth offers eight pages of
discussion.
Barth again begins by dissociating himself from the wider view of
Schweitzer that ethics "is infinitely extended responsibility to every-
thing that lives". 12 It is to say too much to claim that all life is "holy"
(heilig). But how can Barth "justify" himself if he differs in this matter?
What Schweitzer advocates, in any case, is not always possible, "we find
ourselves at the extreme limit" of human generosity, and therefore what is
proposed "cannot be understood as doctrine, principle and precept". nd yet,
Barth senses that Schweitzer has uncovered something telling. "Whatever
the solutions proposed, the problem itself is important" (das mit ihr
herausgesteilte Problem ist wichtig) •13 Barth's starting point is to accept
that man must behave with responsibility. But responsibility to animals
9. CD, III, 4, n. pp. 332-3.
10. CD, III, 4, p. 348.
11. CD, III, 4, p. 349.
12. CD, III, 4, n. p. 349Civilization and Ethics, op. cit., p. 215.
13. CD, III, 4, n. p. 350.
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is not the same kind of responsibility as should be shown to other
humans. "Only analogically" can we bring animals under the concept of
respect for life. The right treatment of animals is not a. primary human
responsibility, but "a serious secondary responsibility" (eine ernsthafte
seJçundre Verantwortlichkeit )•14 It must be remembered that other living
creatures form the background of life which makes human life possible as
well. Man is set up as "lord on the earth which is already furnished with
these creatures". Whilst animals do not belong to him, "(t)hey are
provided for his use" (sie sind ihm zurn Gebrauch Ubergeben). How do we
know this? Our knowledge depends upon the distinction that humans alone
are the creature "to whom God reveals, entrusts and binds Himself" thus
making "common cause" between them. Again this lordship and responsibility
is "a differentiated one" (eine differenzierte) in respect of animals and
vegetables. The "primary meaning" of dominion is that man may use, exploit,
harness and discipline other forms of life. 15 In the case of plants, we
may take this dominance for granted as sensible use of nature 's superfluity.
But in the case of animals, we are confronted with a different problem.
"For the killing of animals, in contrast to the harvesting of plants and
fruit, is annihilation". More specifically each animal is "a single being,
a unique creature existing in individuality" (eines Einzelseins, eines
einmalig, in ether Individualitt existierenden Lebewesens) 16 This means
that what humans do to animals in slaughtering them is in principle very
close to homicide. Have humans this right? Barth again agonises. He
carefully reviews the biblical evidence. What are we to make of the
sacrifice and use of animals on one hand and the prior command to desist
14.. CD, III, 4, p. 350.
15. CD, III, 4, p. 351.
16. CD, III, 4, p. 352.
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on the other? Barth's answer is similar to his conclusion concerning
the nature of sacrifice in Part One. Man may offer .the life of animals
17
and kill them "as representations of his guilt" in sacrifice.
	
But the
freedom to use animals in this way and also for food does not correspond
to "the true and original creative will of God" and therefore it "stands
under a caveat". 18 It may be justified only within the transitory and
interim time between creation and consummation.
Barth's conclusion is that man may kill animals for food only under the
"pressure of necessity" (Druck von N6tigung). This part of man' s lordship
is the most questionable, however. Barth is characteristically cautious.
This right must not be regarded by man as "self-evident"; it must never
become "a normal element in his thinking". 19
 Nevertheless, Barth's final
paragraph stresses the sacrificial nature of lordship in the following
way:
The slaying of animals is really possible only as an appeal
to God's reconciling grace, as its representation arid
proclamation. It undoubtedly means making use of the offering
of an alien and innocent victim and claiming its life for
ours ... Man sins if he does it without this authorisation
He must not murder an animal (Morden darf er auch das Tier nicht).
He can only kill it, knowing that it does not belong to him
but to God, and that in killing it he surrenders it to God in
order to receive it back from Him as something he needs and
desires ... The killing of animals, when performed with the
permission of God and by His command, is a priestly act of
eschatological character.'°
In a concluding note, before the discussion breaks off, Barth refers to
Romans 8:19 f. concerning the subjugation of animal life and its promise of
redemption. The groaning and cries of the animal creation must be heard
17. CD, III, 4, n. p. 354.
18. CD, III, 4, n. p. 353.
19. CD, III, 4, p. 354. N6tigung is stronger than its translation
"necessity". I have subsequently used "rigorous necessity" (p. 277)
to make the point.
20. CD, III, 4, p. 355; my italics.
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which are "the birth pangs of the new aeon". "A good hunter, honourable
butcher and conscientious vivisectionist will differ from the bad"
because they have heard these cries arid exercise "an intensified,
sharpened and deepened diffidence, reserve and carefulness". However,
beyond rightful care of animals (which all should enjoin) it is proper
that there should be a "radical protest" against this whole possibility.
Nevertheless, " it may well be objected against a vegetarianism which
presses in this direction that it represents a wanton anticipation
(eigenmächtige Vorwegnahme) of ... the new aeon for which we hope" 21
The Inadequacy of Barth's Treatment
We isolate four major areas of difficulty.
Ci) The first concerns Barth's handling of the notion of "respect", or
possibly more accurately, "reverence" for life. 22 Of course Barth cannot
accept the "mystical" 3 basis which Schweitzer seemingly propounds .for it.
Barth opposes the concept as "doctrine, principle or precept" •24 But the
question is, did Schweitzer ever intend it to be understood that way?
Many commentators, Barth included, have simply reacted against a position
interpreted as inalienable moral law and rightly pointed to its practical
impossibility. 25
 But the evidence from Schweitzer's own life is over-
whe].iningly against this. He was not, for example, a consistent vegetarian
or even a vegan, he accepted the necessity of some experimentation on
21. CD, III, 4, n. pp. 355-6.
22. Ehrfurcht from Furcht (fear and Ehre (honour, praise, dignity); "rever-
ence" maintains the element of awe present in the German.
23. CD, III, 4, n. p. 324.
24. CD, III, 4, n. p. 350.
25. E.g. F.R. Barry, Christian Ethics in a Secular Society (London: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1966), p. 246; cf. George Seaver, "Schweitzer's com-
passionate concern for all the lowly orders of creation has been care-
lessly misconstrued as a claim for the absolute inviolability of life
of every kind under any circumstances", Albert Schweitzer: Christian
Revolutionary (London: A and C Black, 1955) p. 90.
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animals and even went to some lengths to dispose of poisonous insects.26
When confronted by these facts, many of Schweitzer's critics simpiy write
him of f as inevitably inconsistent. But the truth of the matter appears
to be that reverence for Schweitzer meant primarily: attitude, disposition,
effort of the will and thankfulness. 27 What Schweitzer meant by describing
all life as "holy", or more accurately "sacred", turns vitally on the
beholder's attitude to that which is apprehended. 28 More directly the
actual moral position advocated by Schweitzer is undeniably close to that
of Barth. For Barth only rigorous necessity justifies animal slaughter.
How different is that from the approach advocated by Schweitzer? "Whenever
I injure life of any sort, I must be quite clear whether it is necessary.
Beyond the unavoidable, I must never go, not even with what seems
insignificant."29
The basic cleavage, however, is that even accepting a similarity in this
respect between the two writers, Barth cannot in the end accept respect as
extending to animal life without heavy qualification. His discussion of
animals marks off a digression from the primary purpose of his section.
Non-human sentient beings lie only at the "boundary" of that respect which
is obligatory in relation to human beings. This is made more extraordinary
still by Barth's previous insistence that the "animal impulses" of man
(menschlich-animalische Impulse) 30 "should be given their rights (zu
seinem Recht kommen lassen) within their essential limitations", that is
26. See, e.g., James Brabazon, Albert Schweitzer: A Biography (London:
Gollancz, 1976) pp. 255f.
27. Schweitzer, Reverence for Life, ET by R.H. Fuller, foreword by D.E.
Trueblood (London, SPCK, 1970) esp. pp. 89-100; 118-126; 127-142.
28. cD, III, 4, n. p. 349; Civilization and Ethics, op. cit., p. 214; even
"sacred" may be too much in context, the question issues on the move-
ment of feeling rather than the claim of the object, as Schweitzer's
illustrations show, pp. 214-5.
29. Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, op. cit., p. 221.
30. Literally: "human animal(istic) impu1ses"
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that human bodily desires should be given their proper due.31 Accepting
the terminology of modified mind/body dualism within which Barth appears
to work here, are we then to suppose that human bodies (as differentiated
from human souls or personalities) can make proper moral claims upon us
whereas the bodies of probably soulful animal individuals cannot?
(ii) The second difficulty lies in Barth's refusal to acknowledge any
kind of man-animal fellowship or unity. Perhaps he is simply side-tracked
by his aversion for the Idealists with their prediliction for speaking of
"life forces" and the like. 32 Perhaps Barth is conscious of the potentially
competing evolutionary evidence at this point. At one level it appears
entirely reasonable to affirm that "the Word of God is addressed to man"
(das Wort Gottes richtet sich an den Menschen)	 and thereby to point to
the singularity and centrality of man 's place in the cosmos. Once again
as positive exposition there is little to argue with. But further on,
in a method now only too familiar, this positive insight is coupled with
negative implication:
Be who in the biblical message is called God is obviously not
interested in (offenkundig ... nicht interessiert) the totality
of things and beings created by Eim,. nor in specific beings
within this totality, but in man . - .
Such a judgement, as we have seen, can only be made at the expense of a
full Christological understanding. It severs the Word as the content of
God's self-communication to the world from the world which is the continual
expression of God's creative Word.
(iii) Thirdly, it is not surprising that Barth typifies man's relationship
31. co, III, 4, p. 347. Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer on 'The Right to Bodily Life',
Ethics, ed. by E. Bethge, ET by N.E. Smith (London: SCM Press, 1955)
pp. 131-141.
32. See CD, III, 4, n. p. 326.
33. CD, III, 4, n. p. 332.
34. CD, III, 4, p. 337; my italics.
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with the non-human as a "marginal problem" of ethics. He wants on one
hand to acknowledge "a serious problem" but on the other to see it only
in "secondary" terms. He thus brushes aside those various intimations
frçm Genesis of something more fundamental. The responsibility implicit
in the giving of dominion over creation is not to be seen as primary.
The twin determinations of man described in the second saga pointing to
both mutual human fellowship and concern and care for the whole earth
are left to one side. More fundamentally, we see in ethical. terms the
practical outworking of Barth's refusal to admit the non-human into the
covenant fellowship. The question is: Is our relationship with the non-
human properly marginal to theological ethics or has Barth in fact
marginalised it?
(iv) The fourth difficulty lies in Barth's treatment of 'dominion'.
Earlier Barth had been careful to warn against any exaggerated interpretation
of this notion. As a consequence of the divine image, man is placed in a
superior position "by a higher dignity and might". But crucially "CM) ore
than this must not be read into man's dominion oier the beasts". Moreover
I'	 .	 .	 .	 35CM) an's lordship over the animals has internal and external limitations".
He is to represent God to them and to see himself as a primus inter pares
In this section, however, dominion becomes almost by sleight of hand,
dominance. It's "primary meaning" is now described in terms of "requisi-
tioning, disciplining, taming, harnessing, exploiting and making profitable
use of the surplus forces of nature". 36
 It is now claimed that this mean-
ing is the one intended by Genesis 1:28. Our major difficulty here is not
the total change of emphasis, however, but the underlying contrast now
proposed between lordship and dominion on one hand and responsibility and
35. 2. ' III 1, p. 187.
36. CD, III, 4, p. 349 and see n. p. 349.
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service on the other. Lordship becomes a. means of qualifying respon-
sibility, thus "(R)esponsibility within the limits of lordship".37
By picking up the often traditional (yet biblically erroneous) notion of
dominance rather than dominion, Barth is liberated from the need to ask
what man's superiority involves morally. He assumes that superiority can
be equated primarily with subjugation, control, use of power, and of course
there may indeed be some right use of all these things. But in presenting
the issue this way, the underlying question, what it means to actualise
and represent God's power in creation is conveniently put to one side.
A Failure in Method
If therefore what Barth writes has the nature of a sympathetic yet ad hoc
judgement when it comes to animals, the simple answer is that his chosen
theological framework does not allow much room for manoeuvre. If "in
practice" as well as in theory "the doctrine of creation means anthropology"38
the implications ethically can hardly be wide-ranging. If God is "obviously
not interested" in the totality of other beings apart from man in the uni-
verse, an obvious corollary is invited, "Why should we be?" 2nd yet, it
is altogether telling of Barth's own perspicacity that he senses in this
area, as in others, the root of some potentially significant issue. He
will not move from human-to-human relations as the primary field of ethical
endeavour and yet he cannot laugh Schweitzer of f as revealing nothing about
the nature of the moral matrix. Schweitzer writes of how a person with
reverence for life will sometimes go to extraordinary means to save or
rescue life. "When working by lamplight on a summer night, he would
rather keep the windows closed and breathe stuffy air than see insect
after insect fall on the table with wings that are singed", or, "If he
comes upon an insect that has fallen into a puddle, he takes time to
37. CD, III, 4, p. 352; my italics.
38. CD, III, 2, p. 3; my italics.
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extend a leaf or a reed to save it". "He is not afraid of being smiled
at as a. sentimentalist" argues Schweitzer. And Barth's response does not
fail to show the essential ethical seriousness which Schweitzer's thought
elicits. "Those who can only smile at this point", he writes, "are them-
selves subjects for tears". 39
 And yet despite Barth's undoubted moral
probity and seriousness, it is not just the rationality of animals which
is revealed as "an enigma" at this point but the whole status and theologi-
cal purpose of these beings. What are we to do with them all? How are
they to relate to any fundamental theological scheme which takes the sub-
stance of traditional trinitarian faith seriously?
A Trinitarian Reconstruction
These questions challenge us to provide some trinitarian account of the
status of animals which allows for the fullest possible statement of
their purpose and being. If the witness of scripture is true that animals
form part of a covenant relationship with man and God, what meaning does
this have and what precisely are the ethical ramifications?
1. The Divine Giving
The Trinity is the source of all life. Barth will not compromise on this
point and nor should we. He will not allow any other creative force res-
ponsible for the world as it now is. Rather than surrender the insight
that God's creation is good, he will speak of the nature of evil as
paradoxical, even mysterious beyond the point of theological expianation.40
But with like-minded rigour we must begin with the sheer givenness of
created reality and insist upon its value and significance. That it exists
at all, is a fact of overwhelming theological importance. It is so easy
39. CD, III, 4, n. p. 349; Civilization and Ethics, op. cit., pp. 214-5.
40. E.g., "In order to be true to the facts, Dogmatics has here ... to be
logically inconsequent", Credo, op. cit., p. 36; see also my p. 223.
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when reading Barth to move almost unconsciously from the fact of existence
to its theological explanation in the Son, that we have little chance to
ponder, reflect and appreciate the whole realm of created givenness. God
the Father gives birth to the differentiated unity of Father, Son and
Holy Spirit. The Trinity is therefore the source of all differentiated
created being. All difference as well as complementariness and unity have
their source in this being which is itself differentiated being.
If the question be asked: What is this created being for? the only satis-
factory answer that can be given is that it is for God. It exists for life
with the triune source of all things. This answer is the very measure of
the significance of the question. Barth frequently locates the raison
d'être of being in the incarnation of the Logos. All things, he maintains,
exist to be serviceable to the purpose of God's self-disclosure in history.
This position cannot by itself, however, adequately account for the totality
of God's mysterious activity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It supposes
that one form or "mode" of the activity or the Trinity can bear the whole
significance of the giveness of being. Rather the dynamic possibility
opened up by trinitarian theology is that all created being serves the
existence of every possibility of God as he is in his triune being. It
is the Father's love for creation which is shown in the sheer variety and
complexity of different kinds of being. It is a mysterious love which
delights and rejoices in the gift of difference. It is the Father who with
the Son expresses this love and thereby "gives light to all the world, to
everyone who wants to be warmed by itit 	 It is the Son who makes real,
actual and manifest this saving love through the incarnation thereby
ensuring its reconciliation to the Father. It is the Holy Spirit immanent
41. St. Catherine of Siena, The Dialogue, ET and introduction by S. Noffke,
preface by G. Cavallini, The Classics of Western Spirituality (London:
SPCK, 1980) p. 206. This is one of the ways in which St. Catherine
figuratively expresses the love God has for "all creatures" (p. 205).
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in creation which gives life through breath to all breathing beings and
which acts to complete and fulfil the work of reconciliation forward to
the redemption of all things. "(T)here is indeed not one single gift
which reaches creation without the Holy Spirit 42 writes St. Basil the
Great. It is the very imnianence of the Spirit which enlivens the world.
In this three-fold way God establishes, ensures and enfolds the cosmos.
Nothing which is truly created being can be without this radical vulner-
ability to the operation of the Trinity. No being can be just of itself,
for itself or by itself. The 'for-ness t of all beings in this God-ward
direction is inexorable and immutable. Of course it can and does take
different forms but always only pointing in the same direction. What is
disclosed in the notion of the covenant relationship with created beings
is not some special relationship on God's part but rather the one special
relationship which underlies all other possibilities. The openness of
creation to God is, as Jenson observes, its "insurpassable futurity". The
the possibility of creation is the possibility of God-with-creation. God
is the "Future, Past and Present" of all things.43
This trinitarian account needs to be underpinned by two distinct, yet
complementary, insights. The first is that all creation is blessed. Barth,
as we have seen, understands "blessing" as authorisation to be. All created
being is essentially right as it is; it is inherently valuable to its
Creator. It does not require human affirmation or justification. It
must follow from trinitarian theology that what is given is good. D.W. Hardy
arid D.F. Ford speak of how the activity of creaturely praise infolds "an
ecology of blessing ... since God's blessing is given by letting each
creature, animate or not, be itself, and by enabling it, with infinite
42. St. Basil the Great, De Spiritu Sanctu (24.55) cited and discussed
in T.F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 222.
43. Jenson, God after God, op. cit., pp. 190 and 191.
- 284 -
respect for its nature, to participate in the drama of the universe, then
creation's response is primarily in its very existence". 44
 Thebeing of each
and every creature glorifies God. By being what it is, and has the capacity
to be, it renders honour to God. "Are not you also creatures created by my
God? ", asks St. Catherine of Genoa of living creatures in her garden.
45
" Are not you, too, obedient to Him?". 	 Barth at least in his surer
moments, sees this vital point, though in qualifying the capacity of crea-
tion for self-evident praise of its Creator, he inevitably calls into
question the theological justification of non-human existence. 46 We need
to remember that it is 'the Lord's Song' which is sung throughout creation,
and whilst undoubtedly man stands at the centre, it is his task to facilitate
and give voice to the offering of the rest. "This is the role of human
beings in creation, articulating its praise in fresh ways".47
The second point which needs to be held together with the first is that
creation is necessarily an unfinished business. If there is on one hand
the danger of failing to see the goodness proper to creation, there is
equally the danger of judging God too prematurely on the other. Barth, as
is well known, dreamt of a new Spirit theology that would some day claim
the attention of future generations of theologians. 48
 Whatever the precise
likelihood of this possibility, we can only mourn the absence of more
explicit consideration of pneumatology throughout the Dogmatics. The
49
point is not new, of course. It is possible that if only Barth had
44. Hardy and Ford, Jubilate: Theology in Praise (London: Darton, Longman
and Todd, 1984) p. 82; my italics.
45. St. Catherine of Genoa cited from her biography, Vita, p. 72b,
in Friedrich von Hiael, The Mystical Element of Religion as Studied in
St. Catherine of Genoa and her Friends, 2 Vols. (London: J.M. Dent,
1858) Vol. I, p. 164.
46. See earlier discussion, CD, III, 2, pp. 171-175.
47. Hardy and Ford, op. cit., p. 82.
48. See the moving account in Busch, op. cit., p. 494.
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reached his final projected volume on redemption we should now be in a
position to view his work in an entirely different light. We need
always to remember that as defined by trinitarian formulae, God is
Creator and Reconciler and Redeemer. The world as we now see it is not
the only possible world. The limitations, constraints and difficulties
which press upon us at this moment in time must not be elevated to the
status of eternal, determinations. We have always to wrestle with the
possibility that the world may become, through the agency of the Holy
Spirit, a very different place. Eschatological thinking, including some
apocaiyptic,50 which has frequently been disregarded, needs to feed. our
theological imagination.
The Response of Reverence
What then is the most appropriate human response to the fact of divine
giving? It is the attitude of reverence for life. Barth defines this as
"astonishment, humility, awe, modesty, circumspection and carefulness" but
goes on to differentiate this attitude proper to humans from a weaker kind
appropriate to animals. Barth sees reverence as "an adoption of the
distance proper in face of a mystery". 51 But how much more appropriate
is this attitude to beings even the rudimentary ethology of which we have
in. many cases yet to master? The one thing of which we can be certain
theologically, itself the most mysterious thing of all, is that other
creatures, like us, have the same origin in the creative Word of God.
"Surely we ought to show kindness and gentleness to animals for many
49. See, e.g. Gunton, Becoming and Being, op. cit., p. 218.
50. "Carl Braaten ... outlines some categories of apocalyptic thought
that can be significant for systematic theology. Its dualism, with a
radical disjunction between present and future, may provide support for
a real. theology of liberation, rather than development or evolution,
and for a hope of freedom expanded to cosmic dimensions. Its vision
of a new heaven and earth may awaken a much-needed theology of nature
in the present ecological crisis ...", S.S. Laws, 'Can Apocalyptic be
Relevant?' in M.D. HookerandC.J.A. Hickling (eds.), What About the
New Testament? (London: SCM Press, 1975) pp. 901. The reference is to
Carl Braaten, 'The Significance of Apocalypticism for Systematic
Theology', Interpretation, 25 (October 1971) pp. 480-99.
51. CD, III, 4, p. 340.
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reasons", writes St. Chrysostom,"and chiefly because they are of the same
origin as ourselves". 52 A view similar to that of St. Bonaventure who
says of St. Francis that when "he considered the primordial source of all
things, he was filled with even more abundant piety calling creatures no
matter how small by the name of brother or sister because he knew they had
the same source as himself".
These expressions of fellow feeling should not be despised. Of course it
is possible to show excessive affection for animals as it is possible for
one human being to be struck with quite inordinate love for another. It
is also possible, even usual, for people to love another for the benefits
that the other may bring rather than for the true good of the beloved.
But sensitivityto and love for other creaturely inhabitants of God's good
earth can be a sign of having grasped the profourLd inner unity that pervades
created life. Of course St. Athanasius and others were right to rail against
those who "applied the divine and transcendental title of God to stone or
wood, and ... irrational wild beasts, paying them full divine honours and
rejecting the true and real God, the Father of Christ". 54 Cases of idol
making (human or non-human) threaten the vital distinction between Creator
and creature and also, though this is seldom noticed, distort our relations
with and responsibility for them. But the recognition of the need for
reverence does not belong to this realm. We honour life because of the
52. St. Chrysostom cited in Donald Attwater, St. John Chrysostom (London:
Catholic Book Club, 1960) pp. 59-60.
53. St. Sonaventure, The Life of St. Francis, ET by E. Cousins, the Classics
of Western Spirituality (London: SPK, 1978) pp. 254-5.. "(L)ike so
many fools of East and West, his wildness gave him a profound rapport
with all living things: he preached to the birds, converted a wolf, and
sang the praises of the wonders of creation. If St. Bernard of
Clairvaux is God's jester, then St. Francis is his minstrel and
troubadour", John Saward, Perfect Fools: Folly for Christ's Sake in
Catholic and Orthodox Spirituality (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1980) p. 84. For further examples of wildness and folly see The Little
Flowers of St. Francis, ET by Raphael Brown (Garden City, New York:
Image Books, 1958) esp. pp. 76f.
54. St. Athanasius, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
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Lord of Life. "I could not but feel with a sympathy full of regret
all the pain that I saw around me, not only that of men but that of the
whole creation", writes Schweitzer in a moving passage from his auto-
biography. "From this community of suffering I have never tried to
withdraw myself. It seemed to me to be a matter of course that we
should all take our share of the burden of pain which lies upon the
55
world."
The need for reverence is further emphasised by two other implications
derived from our trinitarian outline. The first is the necessary distinc-
tion that must be drawn between God's good or purpose and our estimation
of our own. To say that other forms of life exist for God is not to posit
that they exist for us. "If one's basic theological perception is of a
Deity who rules all creation, and one's basic perception of life in history
and nature one of patterns of inter-dependence, then the good that God
values must be more inclusive than one's normal perceptions of what is
good for me, what is good for my community, and even what is good for the
human species". Such thought opens up the possibility of "some uncomfort-
able conclusions" as J.M. Gusta±son describes them. "If God is "for man",
he may not be for man as the chief end of creation. The chief end of God
may not be the salvation of man" 56 How far we would want to go in
embracing these possibilities is another matter, but the general direction
of the argument strikes me as entirely sound. What cannot be gleaned from
a specifically trthitarian theology is what Barth wants, some times pre-
dominantly to press, namely that God is "obviously not interested in the
totality of beings" which make up the divine creation. The
fact that other creatures too have a share or a breath of the divine self-
giving means that we have to wrestle with a God who is infinitely more
55. Schweitzer, My Life and Thought: An Autobiography, ET by C.T. Canipion
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1933) pp. 279-280.
56. Gustafson, Theology and Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) p. 96.
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varied and infinitely more creative than we often suppose. We cannot
assume that an exclusively human-favoured interpretation of the incarna-
tion is necessarily the right or only one. This is not to deny that
incarnation involves real human benefit. "To claim that the purposes of
the divine governance can be good for the whole creation, and not exclu-
sively for human beings, is not to deny that God is 'the source of human
good". 57 But the danger in Barth's work as a whole is his consistent
assumption that divine activity revolves primarily, often exclusively,
around the divine-human covenant and its possibilities for the human
species alone.
The second point ãoncerns the distinction between divine and human utility.
When Barth writes of animals as "provided for his (man's) use" 58
 he tumbles
into a very serious error. Man's estimation of his own utility is not the
only or chief basis on which he can judge the relative worth of other
living beings. They are not made "for" man but for God. The whole
created universe does not simply exist for man's own use or pleasure but
for the purposes of God disclosed in Jesus Christ. Once again we dare not
deny that incarnation is truly of benefit to man but also we dare not
suppose that the ousia assumed in this way (as traditional doctrine has
always asserted) is solely human ousia unrelated to the rest of creaturely
life. The divine utility which encompasses all created life includes, as
Job found out, all kinds of beings apparently otiose from the human point
of view. 59 What we have to reckon with in trinitarian theology is a God
infinitely more open, creative and purposeful in relation to all that is,
57. Gustafson, op. cit., pp. 271-2. The reference is to H.N. Wieman,
The Source of Human Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).
58. CD, III, 4, p. 351.
59. Job 39: 13-18 and 38: 26-7 cited and discussed in J.A. Baker,
'Biblical Attitudes to Nature' in Man and Nature, op. cit., pp. 97
and 99.
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than is usually our preference so to do.60
In Contrast to Scholastic Dualism
The position we have outlined should be seen in major contrast to the
classical writings of scholastic dualism. These people, not unfairly
described by Alec Whitehouse as "aristocrats of the mind", are "unwilling
to be comfortably or uncomfortably at home along with the world' s minerals,
vegetables and animals". 61 Their primary impulse is to know. Physicality,
and all that goes with it, is a threat to rationality or at the very least
an incuinbrance. Consummation or redemption is construed primarily in
terms of deliverance from the messy world of flesh, physicality and
substance. According to this view real existence consists in intelligent
existence which is also soulful existence. The pursuit of God and salva-
tion become inexorably linked to the recognition of souls, the cultivation
of souls and the .salvation of souls. The basic circle which makes spiri-
tual awareness and communion possible is the possession of incorporeal
souls.
This position, as we have seen held in varying forms by Aristotle, Augus-
tine, Aauinas, Descartes and other luminaries of the Greek and Christian
tradition, does not escape Barth either. Whilst, on one hand, he utterly
repudiates the notion of a disembodied soul, it becomes vitally clear that
the absence of rationality, or rather the unproved rationality of animals,
is an insuperable obstacle to their possession of full soulfulness and
proper moral status on the other. In one other respect too Barth entirely
60. It is surprising to learn that even the usually cautious Karl Rahner
offers a homily on Rom. 8: 18-23 under the title 'A Universe Made to
our Measure' in which he claims that "all God' s creation was arranged
from the first to suit this poor man, this sinful man", Biblical
Homilies, ET by D. Forristal and R. Strachan (Dublin: Herder and Herder,
London: Burns and Oates, 1967) pp. 91 and 93; my italics.
61. Whitehouse, 'New Heavens and a New Earth' in The Authority of Grace,
op. cit., p. 210; originally published in The Christian Hope, Theo-
logical Collections 13 (London: SPCK, 1970). I am indebted to
Whitehouse for many perceptive points.
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stands within this tradition. Genesis is interpreted not in terms of
Hebrew monarchy but created hierarchy. Accordingly spiritual status
determines moral status. Our worth before God becomes wedded to our
rational capacity. Needless to say, the effects of this tradition on
the moral standing of animals has been deleterious without exception.62
Even today theologians- who have formally thrown off much of this tradition,
can still write of how "nothing is of value unless it is experienced by
some conscious being, who would choose it for its own sake". 63 In conse-
quence orthodox Catholic teaching, as represented not only by its classical
exponents but also by generations of moral textbooks, has formally denied
the existence of moral duties to animals, except indirectly as human
property, 64 and insisted upon their complete utilitarian subordination to
man. Pope Pius IX, for example, forbade the opening of an animal protec-
tion office in Rome on the grounds that whilst humans had duties to fellow
humans, they had none to animals. 65 Modern textbooks show just as little
compassion:
Zoophilists often lose sight of the end for which animals,
irrational creatures, were created by God, viz., the service
and use of man. In fact, Catholic moral doctrine teaches that
animals have no rights on the part of man •66
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the triumph of scholastic
dualism and its decisive continuance in many parts of the Christian church
62. For some gruesome historical examples see especially Keith Thomas,
op. cit., pp. 30 - 36 and 41 - 51.
63. Keith Ward, The Living God (London: SPCK, 1984) p. 27; my italics.
To which Ward may reply that God does consciously value the non-human,
but if this is his meaning, it is far from clear.
64. See H. Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology, 5 vols (London: Sheed and
Ward, 1946) , Vol. II (1950) p. 258.
65. Cited by E.S. Turner, All Heaven in a Rage (London: Michael Joseph,
1964) p. 163.
66. Dictionary of Moral Theology, ed. by P. Palazzini, comp. by F. Roberti,
ET by H.J. Yannone (London: Burns and Oates, 1962) p. 73.
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has inhibited proper acceptance of the moral status of the non-human.
But the major weakness of this tradition consists in its trinitarian
constriction. God is not truly free to relate to creation in all its
fullness. Matter is only matter, pace de Chardin, 67
 the whole realm
of the non-rational or irrational is fundamentally extrinsic to the work
of the Creator. God,presented as the CodofAbraham, Isaac, JacobandAquinas deals
exclusively with human persons, so that whatever ousia God has reconciled
to himself in his Son must be defined largely or entirely in terms of the
personal. 68 The more this scheme is pressed, the more redundant the work
of God the Creator becomes. Again the wide and unfathomable work of God
the Spirit energising and sustaining creation becomes telescoped into the
operation of fusing individual human souls. Home's protest deserves a
hearing:
if there is to be a halt to the destruction of our environment
and a restoration of the world of nature, then a change must
begin in the Church at a fundamental level. Quite simply, the
Church should be less concerned about the salvation of soul-s and
more concerned about the sanctification of life, or, to be more
precisely theological, less concerned about 'justification by
faith' and more concerned about 're-creation by grace'; and the
re-creation will extend to the whole of the natural order.
67. See, e.g., Teilhard de Chardin's 'Hymn to Matter', tI acclaim you
as the divine milieu, charged with creative power, as the ocean
stirred by the Spirit, as the clay moulded and infused with life by
the Incarnate Word", in Hymn of the Universe, ET by Gerald Vann,
introduction by N.M. Wildiers, Fontana Books (London: Collins, 1974)
p. 65; also Man's Place in Nature: The Human Zoological Group, ET by
R. Hague, Fontana Books (London: Collins, 1966) pp. 19f and passim.
De Chardin apparently wanted a "new Nicea" to determine the relation-
ship of Christ to the cosmos, see Lyons, op. cit., p. 215.
68. Pn approach which repeatedly emerges in the hands of twentieth-century
theologians, e.g. J.A.T. Robinson proposes a paraphrase of John's
Prologue: "The clue to the universe as personal was present from the begin-
ning ... At that depth of reality the element of the persoual was
there from the start ... It came to its own in the evolution of the
personal . . .", Exploration into God (London: SCM Press, 1967) pp. 98-9;
my italics. Clearly the personal is an important theme, but must so
much be claimed for it? Can the whole being of the Trinity be encap-
sulated in the notion of the personal? Can the work of the Logos be
solely defined in this way?
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We are not souls to be plucked from matter on the day of our
salvation, we are part of a universe which along with us
waits for the consummation that has been promised by God
in Christ.
2. The Divine Rejoicing
There is one moment in Part One of the Dogmatics where Barth's thought hovers,
appearing to make a significant change of direction. The "yes" of God the
Creator "challenges us not to evade the sighing of the created world" he
writes. "It challenges us not to evade the sighing of the creature".7°
Man is called to share both the misery and joy of existing alongside all
other creatures. These contradictory aspects are answered because God the
Creator "so closely binds the life which He has created with the covenant"
But the meaning of this covenant, as we have seen so often in Barth, is
given an entirely anthropocentric interpretation:
God created man to lift him in his own Son into fellowship
with Himself. This is the positive meaning of human existence
and all existence. But this elevation presupposes a wretchedness
of human and all existence which his own Son will share and bear.72
So paradoxically enough non-human creatures live for the elevation of mart
and as a consequence or corollary share his necessary wretchedness as well. -
And yet even this minimalist interpretation is enough to state the problem
directly for us and to elicit a more positive response. The problem or
point is this: the significance of the incarnation cannot be contained in
human terms alone. As a model of divine involvement it redefines our
existing categories of God, man, and also the nature of created existence.
God rejoices in what he has made. I mean by rejoicing that unique capacity
69. Home, op. cit., p. 53; my italics.
70. III, 1, p. 373.
71. 2.' III 1, p. 375.
72. CD, III, 1, p. 376; my italics.
- 293 -
of God, as defined through the incarnation, truly to enter the condition
of the creature so that whilst on one hand its nature is infinitely
respected, its being is permeated by infinitely greater possibilities for
existence on the other. It means-no less than that God bears the reality
of pain and disorder in the universe and takes them to himself transforming
them by the power of his love.
But why is it that we can be so confident, unlike Barth, that this recon-
ciling movement whilst centred on man moves outwards to include the whole
of created reality? There are two primary considerations which Barth
neglects.
The first concerns the interdependence of human life in creation. Whilst
Barth frequently proceeds on the assumption of a human nature absolutely
differentiated from all other created nature, he does not deny the funda-
mental closeness especially between animal and human life. Moreover, he
speaks of man as God's representative to the animal and vegetable worlds
in a way that makes man's position clearly related to them. In the end
even in Barth's own iminimalist picture of events, animals especially are
inextricably involved with men. We have seen that he formally rejects the
Eastern view that man forms a microcosm of creation. But there seems little
substantial difference between his position and that held, for example,
by Lossky: "(Man) is not only a part of the whole, but potentially includes
the whole, having in himself the whole of the earthly cosmos, of which he
is the hypostasis."73
The second consideration relates to the reality of misery in the animal
73. Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. by J.H. Erickson and
T.E. Bird, introduction by J. Meyendorff (New York: St. Vladimir's
Seminary Press, 1974) p. 107; for a concise discussion see John
Neyendorff's Christ in Eastern christian Thought (New York: St.
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1975) esp. 'The Cosmic Dimension of
Salvation: Maimus The Confessor', pp. 131 - 152.
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world. Whatever the solution offered, the problem should not be avoided.
Barth appears to avoid it by his insistence that godlessness and therefore
evil cannot arise in the animal sphere and by doubting whether animal
pain is truly analogous to human pain. 74 But supposing for one moment
that Barth is right here, what kind of pain could it be that they do suffer
if they suffer at all? Barth's answer is surely revealing: animals suffer
the pain and misery for which man alone is responsible. They are blessed
with his blessingsand cursed by his curses. In this sense, the problem of
theodicy extends in precisely the same terms to animals and humans, except
actually more so to animals who are the recipients of undeserved or un-
merited pain. All that needs to be maintained in order to safeguard the
inclusive work of the Word in this respect is to hold that all painid
disorder caused by human sin is the object of God's reconciling love.
But is it possible to posit that human sin is the cause of disorder in the
very nature of the created world? Are not decomposition, death and para-
sitical existence inherent in the very structure of God's creation? The
questions are not new, of course, and have generally received few satis-
factory answers. 75 Torrance's recent work may be an exception. Is the
"predator-prey syndrome" and with it the animal pain involved "only ingre-
dients in the functioning of animal survival-mechanisms and of orderly
development, or do they contain elements which we cannot but regard as
evil?" he asks. "What of the fact that creatures exist by devouring one
another, and of the endless waste of life in the universe at all levels of
sentient and organic life? What of needless arbitrary suffering like
cruelty which shocks our sense of righthess and goodness?" "It is difficult
74. The doubt arises because we do not know "these forms of life from
within", CD, III, 4, pp. 34sf.
75. William Temple makes the point this way: "Shelve the responsibility
for human evil on to Satan if you will ... We still have to ask, Why
is the devil wicked?", Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan and
Co., 1935), p. 503.
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not to think", he argues, "that somehow nature has been infiltrated by an
extrinsic evil, affecting entropy for ill, corrupting natural processes,
and introducing irrational kinks into their order, so that it is hardly
surprising that even the ablest scientists can be overwhelmed by the
pointlessness of it all".76
Torrance's answer is that sin leads inevitably to corruption, indeed that
sin and corruption are "ultimately inseparable". If this is true, it
enables us to see animal corruption (decay, decomposition and death) as
fundamentally similar to human corruption (decay, decomposition and death),
indeed in both the same kind of reality is being manifest. "In view of this
human experience it would be difficult not to believe that God is also
opposed to evil in animal existence and all the suffering and pain it
brings in its train, and that God in his universal purposes of creation
and redemption will not allow his non-human creation to be wasted" . 	 The
Creator's will, therefore, should be seen as that which upholds, maintains
and enlivens creation despite the dead hand of evil which at every level of
being threatens its destruction. Corrupting negation and divine purpose
meet at every point in creation where there is pain, suffering and dis-
order. "We must surely believe", argues Torrance, "that God does not let
his creation break free from his control only to plunge down some slope of
degeneration too steep for it to be reclaimed". Rather the wisdom and
power of God combine to "direct it from a higher level of order in such
a way that he makes any obstruction or evil misdirection imminent in nature
serve a fuller and richer end than might have been otherwise possible".78
The "yes" of God, argued Barth, challenges us not to evade the sighing of
76. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981), pp. 122-3.
77. Torrance, op. cit., p. 124.
78. Torrance, op. cit., p. 125.
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the creature. If only he had seen how far, how profound and how manifold
is the sighing of the creature and how likewise is the "yes" of the
Creator. Barth desists from this path because he is convinced that the
election of Jesus into the Godhead means the election of man, specifically
and concretely. 79 In holding so fast to this, he misses the vital point
that what happens in Jesus is what happens in time, space and therefore
creaturely history. "If space and time are not separate from the events
that happen in them", argue Hardy and Ford, "Jesus' crucifixion and
resurrection mean a new patterning of the spatio-temporal environment and
its possibilities". 80 In the end, the election of man, the creature, is
conceived at the expense of man with other creatures.
The Response of Responsibility
What then is the most appropriate human response to the fact of divine
rejoicing? It is human responsibility. Barth, as we have seen frequently
fails to articulate this possibility in his doctrine of man and even when
he confronts it as part of his ethical discussion in Part Four can only
view it in secondary and marginal terms. Of course it would be entirely
disproportionate to locate responsibility for the non-human alone as the
primary human responsibility. But there are good reasons for regarding
it as far more important than Barth will admit.
Ci) In the first place, man is actually placed in this awesome position.
We do not desist here from Barth's repeated stress that man is central to
creation, even "the higher necessity of his life, and his right to that
lordship and control" •81 But all man's prerogatives, powers, and opportun-
ities must in turn be subordinate to the will of God. Much confusion, and
79. By putting the issue this way, we see how Barth assumes that the incar-
nation means the election of not just man but man and woman. In the
light of recent church debates we see that even this is an assumption
which not all Christians share, see EL. Mascall, Whatever Happened to
the Human Mind? (London: SPCK, 1980) discussing the role of 'masculin-
ity' in God, pp. l5Of.
80. Hardy and Ford, op. cit., p. 81.
81. CD, III, 4, p. 351.
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undoubtedly much suffering to the animal world, has been caused by
Christian writers failing to grasp the necessarily dependent and derived
82
authority of man over creation. 	 Man has no rights over the natural
world. The point needs to be put in this stark, propositional form to
ensure comprehension. Whatever man claims for himself and his own power
may only be claimed within the overall sovereignty of God. But the
proper criticism of Barth at this point is not moral but trinitarian.
"Why ... does the Holy Spirit seem so remote from the anguish of world-
occurrence in the Church Dogmatics?" asks Philip Rosato. "The interaction
83
of God's Spirit and man's nature is missing in Barth's theology.' 	 But
if this is true, it is true not only of the realm of the personal, but of
the whole of created nature. Man's responsibility for animals is a world of
untheological speculation for Barth because he has not seen that it is the
Spirit which gives voice to the sighing of the creature, and which elicits
from man co-operation in his work of fulfilment and redemption. It is the
lordship especially of the Spirit under which man must work in this area.
The Pneuma awaits the coming of the sons of God who will help to make free
the oppressed creation from their "bondage to decay" (Rom. 8: 2lf). Barth,
of course, will have none of this because he wants at all costs to preserve
the sovereignty of God in his acts of Creation, Reconciliation and Redemp-
tion. But this sovereignty can be recognised in openness: "This openness
is due precisely to the fact that God is open in Himself" writes Rosato.
"God is not a closed monad, but a community of loving interaction who
chooses to energize creation with grace, and through that energy make all
S2. E.g. Lynn White Jr.'s paper, 'The Historical Roots of our Ecological
Crisis', Science, 155, 37 (10 March, 1967) 1203 - 7, which held that
the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation was responsible for environ-
mental crises because of its stress on the unqualified rights of human
domination. Also, Peter Singer appears to regard any acknowledgement
that man has authority over the beasts as "tyranny", even herb-eating
dominion in the first creation saga is "benevolent despotism", Animal
Liberation: A New Ethic for our Treatment of Animals (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1976) pp. 202 - 234. See Robin Attfield, op. cit., pp. 20 - 34,
for a discussion and critique.
83. Rosato, op. cit., pp. 136 and 139.
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things ready - specifically through man - to co-operate with. God's Spirit
and thereby reach their promised fulfilment".84
The second reason is that man is himself actually responsible for much pain
and suffering and death, especially in the animal world. We do not deny
that man's lordship is a difficult and demanding thing, requiring the
facing of awkward choices, discrimination and much perspicacity. Given the
structural nature of evil in creation, it is not possible for him to live
wholly at peace with other creatures. It is hardly possible to live with-
out utilising some products or by-products of the slaughter house. It is
not always possible to live free of injury to life. Schweitzer in his own
terms wrote perceptively of the world "as a ghastly drama of the will-to-
live divided against itself" and even more perceptively of the "good cons-
cience as an invention of the devil". 85
 That granted, it is very difficult
to justify the increasing of the burden on animals specifically when we are
free to do otherwise, We grant necessity's necessity, but Schweitzer and
Clark must be right in insisting that it "must be wrong to be the cause
of avoidable ill". 86 More specifically still, the scholastic notion that
animals have no claim upon us either "of justice nor charity" 87 must be
jettisoned once and for all. Responsibility must go beyond reverence for
all creation in insisting upon the claims of animals in particular. A
point, incidentally, well made even by Calvin who saw that "a just man
cares well for his beasts" (Prov. 12: 10) and hence "we are to do what is
right voluntarily and freely, and each of us is responsible for doing his
84. Rosato, op. cit., p. 141; see also W.A. Whitehouse, 'The Holy Spirit
and the Created Order', King's Theological Review, 4, 2 (Winter, 1981)
pp. 63 - 68.
85. Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, op. cit., pp. 216 and 221.
86. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, op. cit., p. ii; my italics.
87. J. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy (London: Longmarxs, 1889) p. 248; cf.
J.C. McCarthy, "they (animals) can claim nothing at our hands; into our
hands they are absolutely delivered", Problems of Theology 2 Vols.
(Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1960) Vol. II, The Commandments (1960) p. 158.
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duty". 88
 If responsibility means anything it must involve the curbing
of our appetites, the restraining of our greed and the protection of
innocent life.
The third and obvious consideration is that man is the being actually
capable of this responsibility. The scholastic perception that since
animals can have no duties towards other animals, we can have none to
them, arguably threatens the position of some humans as well as animals.89
In all this man's theological perception of himself is important. It
vitally matters that he should see himself as exercising lordship as
God's vice-gerent over God's good creation. When he slips from this under-
standing man clearly exercises "tyranny" over animals
	 Since from the
standpoint of theology man "is clearly made the focal point in the inter-
relations between God and the universe" as Torrance observes, he himself
"needs to be put in the right both with God and creation". 91 Man's proper
and primary response to the rejoicing of God is always to lay before him-
self his need for repentance, for the change of heart to ensure that the
	 -
Spirit can work within him. Torrance writes of man's "task to save the
natural order through remedial and integrative activity, bringing back
order where there is disorder and restoring peace where there is dis-
harmony". 92 Finding the measure of this daunting task will soon concern us.
In Contrast to Humanist Utilitarians
Our exposition of divine rejoicing and human responsibility should be
88. Calvin, Commentaries, ed. and ET by J. Haroutunian with L.P. Smith,
The Library of Christian Classics (London: SCM Press, 1958) Vol. XXIII,
p. 329; my italics in second quote. In context Calvin is considering
the prohibition concerning muzzling oxen in Deut. 25: 4.
89. See Tom Regan, 'An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning
Animal Rights', Inquiry, 22, 1 - 2 (Summer, 1979) esp. pp. 204 - 212
concerning the claims of comatose humans.
90. earth recognises this and uses the word, Ethics, op. cit., p. 143.
91. Thrrance, Divine and Contingent Order, p. 129.
92. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, p. 130; my italics.
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seen in contrast to the arguments of some 'humanist' utilitarians. 93 The
first and by far the most common judges the worth and value of a being or
commodity solely in relation to its utility to human beings. "Man is
accustomed to value things to the extent that they are useful to him",
protests Goethe, "and since he is disposed by temperament and situation to
consider himself the crowning creation of nature, why should he not believe.
that he represents also her final purpose?" 94 Why not, indeed? For there
can be little doubt that misinterpretations of the Genesis text, heavily
stressing the utility of all creation for man, have provided strong encour-
agement for this view. There is only a small but decisive step from
Barth's view that animals exist "for our benefit" to the view that man's
benefit is the raison d'être of animals. That indeed Barth can even speak
in these terms at all evidences a strong tradition of utilitarianism in
moral theology. 95 Even Christian apologists like Charles Davis proclaim a
93. I use the terra 'humanist' with caution if only because some of the
early Christian humanists, Erasmus and More especially, had particular
concern for animals.
94. Goethe, 'An Attempt to Evolve a General Comparative Theory' in Goethe's
Botanical Writings, ET by B. Muella (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1952), p. 81. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, "I doubt whether the most
devout theologian would dare here in these mountains to attribute to
nature in any way the aim of utility to man; man who has laboriously
to rob nature of those skimpy things he can use ... but they would
hardly have come up with that part of physico-theology which proves,
much to man's pride, that nature arranged everything for his enjoyment
and well-being; a pride that also characterises our age ...", 'Diary
of a trip to the Berner Oberalpen' in Friihe Schriften (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1971) Vol. I, pp. 616 - 7 ET by David Farrell Krell, 'The
Oldest Programme towards a System in German Idealism', forthcoming in
Owl of Mineva. For a recent discussion of the relationship between
Barth and Hegel, see L. During, 'Hegel, Barth and the Rationality of
the Trinity', King's Theological Review, 2, 2 (Autumn 1979) pp. 69-81.
95. C.S. Lewis held that the development of animal experimentation marked
"a great advance in the triumph of ruthless, non-moral utilitarianism
over the old world of ethical law; a triumph in which we, as well as
animals, are already the victims, and of which Dachau and Hiroshima
mark the more recent achievements", 'Vivisection' in Undeceptions:
Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. by Walter Hooper (London: Geoffrey
Bles, 1954) p. 186.
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"desacralized" view of nature which makes technology possible and rightly
opens nature to "man's exploitation". 96 And yet the modern use of animals
has outgrown the metaphysical constructs that were once used to defend it.
Now, human interests pure and simple justify almost any abuse of animals.
David Ehrenfeld writes as a biologist of the unchecked assumptions of
humanism especially as they operate in the context of conservation: "Thus
the conservation dilemma is exposed: humanists will not normally be interested
in saving any non-resource, any fragment of Nature that is not manifestly
useful to mankind".. 97 The only way out of this conflict is that which
holds that all creation has intrinsic value because of its divine creation.
What E.F. Schumacher calls the "meta-economic" value of living creatures.
No form of life can be for us solely a means-to-an-end, a factor of produc-
tion, or, a laboratory tool. "They are, of course, factors of production,
that is to say means-to-ends, but this is their secondary, not their
98
primary nature".
A second but related argument isolates some characteristic of creaturely life usua1l
related to ourselves and choosesthis as the basis of value. Peter Singer
may be taken as an example of this procedure. For him "the life of a being
that has no conscious experiences is of no intrinsic value". Despite
Singer 's obvious concern for the right treatment of animals, his criterion
leads us to the complete devaluing of plants and to the acceptance of all
abortion, even infanticide. 99
 Now I do not want to deny the existence of
96. Davis, God's Grace in History, Fontana Books (London: Collins, 1966)
p. 21. There is a great deal of difference, of course, between regard-
ing nature as sacred on one hand and solely as the object of exploita-
tion on the other.
97. Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1978) p. 192.
98. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People
Mattered (London: Abacus Books, 1974) p. 88.
99. Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
p. 92; my italics; on abortion esp. pp. 119 - 122 and infanticide
esp. p. 126.
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especially valuable entities within God's good creation and consciousness
and sentiency are two of these (which in turn make the existence of animal
life of especial value). But it seems to me that Singer here, and theolo-
gians who argue in an arguably analogous way,lO0 fail to perceive the general
claim that all life has intrinsic value. Clearly the status of stones,
vegetables and animals needs to be distinguished and such criteria can be
useful in so doing. But the danger is always that these ready-to-hand
criteria prevent us from entering into the fullness of God's joy in the
totality of his work. Singer in this regard is far more indebted to past
scholastic tradition (which he derides) than he thinks. If Descartes or
Aquinas really thought animals were consciously perceiving minds, they would
as little treat animals as automata as Singer so desires to treat plants.
To reiterate; I am not denying the conceptual value of distinctions that
can be made between different kinds of being but that such distinctions need
to be made with much greater caution especially by those who actually believe
we behold nothing less than God's creation. Schweitzer's refusal to "lay
down universally valid distinctions between different kinds of life"
because we end up "judging then by the greater or lesser distance at which
they seem to stand to us human beings - as we ourselves judge" is, despite
101
all its inconsistencies and difficulties, a warning that should be heeded.
3. The Divine Generosity
The relationship between the crucified Lord and those who freely follow him
100. Ward argues that "person-hood is the highest value", The Divine Image:
The Foundations of Christian Morality (London: SPCK, 1976) p. 41. The
analogy, of pourse, is only in the fact of selection rather than in
agreement about the factor or quality selected. Is it obvious that
"persorihood" is the "highest value"? For Ward (if I understand him
aright) the element of the personal is the highest value because it is
the fullest form of response to God. But is not God free to value
equally	 the differing responses that can be made by the realm of
creation to the Creator's beneficence?
101. Schweitzer, My Life and Thought, op. cit., p. 271; my italics.
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is not a master-slave relationship. Probably for many decades, if not
centuries, it has been conceived so, however. "The idea of the divine
order, almost a hierarchy of things in the universe, is central to
Thomas Aquinas's understanding of creation. Each thing in the universe
occupies its proper place and exists to serve those things which are
ranged above- it." 02 Man is subject to God as animals are subject to
man. "(I) t is in keeping with the order of nature", writes Aquinas, "that
man should be master over animals" 103 nd yet such a picture of God
tigl±ly regulating and ordering creation through the use of intelligent
beings, so that one level of existence is rightly subject to the rational
control of another has always stood in contrast to those New Testament
strands which speak of the power of God in Christ exercised in condecensiori
(katabasis). Jesus Christ "did not count equality with God a thing to be
grasped" rather he "emptied himself taking the form of a servant" humbling
-J
himself becoming "obedient unto death, even death on a cross" (Philip 2:
5 - 8). This suffering lordship compels us to picture God's relationship
with creation differently. God does not demand order, though he certainly
wills it. He does not require obedience, though he certainly elicits it.
In the end he is prepared to enter into the world's condition, to suffer it,
and to transform it from within, rather than impose the end he has
destined for creation. Such a view presupposes an infinitely more fragile
creation on one hand and an infinitely more loving, self-costly loving God
on the other. What God wants for his creatures is not possible without
God bearing the cost in himself. In all this the very nature of the lordship
102. Home, op. cit., p. 45; his italics.
103. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ET by the Fathers of the English Dominican
Province, 2nd revised ed. (London: Burns, 	 Oates and Washborne,
1922) Part 1, QQ. LXXV - CII, p. 327. A similar but qualified rela-
tionship of order also charactemises the relationship between man and
woman. "(I)n a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and
not in woman; for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the
beginning and end of every creature", Q . 93 Art. 4., op. cit., p. 289.
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of God is redefined. Power, might, majesty and dominion are his, rightly
his, but this lordship is expressed in free, generous, self-costly loving.
Many writers have grasped how this redefinition "sets the standard of
disinterested love for others" which means in particular "hope for the
hopeless, opportunity for the underprivileged, care for the weak, and every
positive good for mankind.l04 But very few contemporary writers have even
begun to explore its relevance for the non-human creation. Jiirgen Moltinann
is perhaps an exception. Be specifically links the theology of the cross
with "the groaning of the enslaved creation, the apocalyptic sorrow of the
godless world)0S Thus the "liberation of mankind" must in turn involve
a replacement of the model of the "master-servant' t
 relationship with nature.
Domination over nature must give way to "a sympathetic relationship of
parthership with the natural world" 106 Much in Moltmann' s thesis is per-
ceptive and provocative, but he stops short of seeing the vital corres-
pondence between divine and human lordship.
The Response of Generosity
If man is really given lordship over creation, it is necessarily a lordship
derived from God himself. He does not own creation, of course; he is not,
unlike God, their absolute Lord. But the nature of this lordship can be
none other than the same kind of lordship which God exercises. It is
lordship to an end, to a final goal, and the nature of this lordship, as
defined in Jesus Christ, requires humility, self-sacrifice, and personal
cost. If we ask, therefore, what is to be the human response to the
generosity of God, we can only reply the generosity of man. Man who can
104. Vincent Taylor, Forgiveness and Reconciliation: A Study in New Testament
Theology (London: Macmillan and Co., 1941) p. 216; my italics.
105. Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and
Criticism of Christian Theology, ET by R.A. Wilson and J. Bowden
(London: SCM Press, 1974) p. 65.
106. Moltmann, op. cit., p. 334.
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take power for himself, effectively and really exercise dominance, is
enjoined to exercise the loving lordship of the crucified. Our distinctive
contribution therefore to the creation that God has made is to be the
living image of that lordship revealed in his Son, Jesus Christ. Barth
was almost right in viewing the image of God in man as something essential
to what he is and something reflected in what he does. But so much more,
theologically and Christologically, could have been opened up for him if
only he had seen that the commission to man to rule the earth, is a staggering
confirmation of his line of interpretation. If the moral exemplar of Jesus
reaching out to the despised, rejected, outcast and captive is the model of
divine self-giving, it is difficult to know why it should not be extended
to the least among us and especially the suffering non-human creatures of
God's creation.
Some writers have undoubtedly grasped the general force of this when they
speak, as for example Torrance, of "Man's priestly and redemptive role in
the world" 107 in a phrase possibly borrowed from George Herbert:
Man is the world's high Priest: he doth present
The sacrifice for all: while they below
Unto the service mutter an assent,	 108
Such as springs use that fall, and windes that blow.
Even Barth himself speaks of priesthood in a way that the killing of animals
"when performed with the permission of God is a priestly act of eschatologi-
cal character)09 In this respect three further points of elaboration
need to be made.
107. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order, op. cit., p. 128.
108. Herbert, 'Providence' in The Works of George Herbert, ed. with comm. by
F.E. Hutchinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) p. 117, and discussed
in Michael Paternoster, Man: The World's High Priest; An Ecological
Approach (Oxford; SLG Press, 1976) pp. 8 - 10.
109. CD, III, 4, p. 355; my italics.
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(i) The first is that the sacrifice of Christ is that of the higher for the
lower; not the reverse. Barth is on very weak ground in claiming that the
dispension for sacrifice, making use of "an alien and innocent victim and
claiming its life for ours", can justify present killing. Whatever the
precise merits or otherwise of vegetarianism, he is surely wrong in locating
the spirit of Christian sacrifice for such a commission. Whatever may have
been the right justification for animal sacrifice under the Old Covenant,
we cannot avoid the fact that "all the animal sacrifices of the Temple were
abolished for the Church" and that in so doing it "repudiated a part of the inheri-
tance of Judaism". 11° The revelation of God in Christ wasto set the seal on a
significantly developed conception of sacrifice - one, whatever the
ambiguities of the old, which consisted in the free offering of life and love
and not the required shedding of blood.
(ii) The second point is that sacrifice is costly. The lordship of man over
creation is not a free ride. Generosity redefines our relations with
creation, and especially animals, beyond those which may be claimed by
the notions of the 'rights' or 'interests' of animals. Frequently the
purpose of these debates is to establish moral limits beyond which man
cannot reasonably pass in the exercise of his dominion and hence ensure
the protection of animals from unnecessary abuse. Much in these debates is
important and we should attend to them carefully)
	 But the concept of
generosity by its very nature involves transcending the strict limits of
110. Rowley, The Biblical Doctrine of Election, op. cit., p. 163.
111. The major works are: S.R.L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, op. cit.;
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, op. cit., and (ed.) In Defence of
Animals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Mary Midgley, Animals and Why
They Matter: A Journey Around the Species Barrier (Earmonsworth:
Penguin, 1983); Tom Regan, All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal
Rights and Environmental Ethics (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984) and The Case for Animal Rights, op. cit.; H. Miller and
W. Williams (eds.) Ethics and Animals (New Jersey: Huxnaiia Press, 1983);
R.G. Frey, Interests and Rights; The Case Against Animals (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1980) and Rights, Suffering and Vegetarianism (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1983).
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justice, that is, what can or cannot be reasonably claimed on behalf of
other creatures. The 'generosity-view' does not begin by asking what rights
should be accepted but how far man will bear for himself the cost of a
properly generous response. If, as we have indicated, animal liberation is
intimately bound up with human liberation, it matters whether man is truly
sensitised to the natural world; it matters whether he can recognise the
intrinsic value of other creatures; it matters how far he can exercise the
fullness of his humanity in the actualising of his responsibility. The
'generosity-view' then asks searching questions of our current use of nature
and animals in particular: Are there not certain ills which man should bear
for himself rather than inflict upon animals in, for example, animal
experimentation? Especially we might add when the good proposed amounts
to little more than the addition to the market of one more soap-powder,
detergent, weedkiller, lip-stick, hair shampoo or hair tonic? Since our
need for food does not always strictly depend upon killing animals, is not
vegetarianism a way of reducing -our dependence on primary products and
thereby lessening the burden on animal life? At the very least since the
enormous range and variety of food especially in the West goes beyond any-
- thing like a reasonable interpretation of need, should we not find alterna-
tive methods to those employed in intensive farming? Since human pleasure
can be had in so many different ways, can generous individuals justify the
pleasure of sport if it involves the death of sentient creatures? 112
 The
questions are not exhaustive and are not meant to be. They merely highlight
those possible moral responses which can properly characterise generosity
to other life forms. Doubtless this view is not sufficient for a complete
ethical theory of man's interaction with animals, much more would need to
112. Significantly enough, St. Francis de Sales listed the hunting of animals
among those "innocent recreations" which we "may always make good use
of", Introduction to the Devout Life, ET by Michael Day (London: Burns
and Oates, 1956) p. 173.
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be said and particular questions discussed more thoroughly, but the
'generosity-view' at least encapsulates one frequently overlooked dimension
of our lordship over nature, namely costliness.
(ii) The third point is that the concept of generosity together with that
of responsibility, enables us to re-establish the notion of animals and
man forming one moral community under God. As we have seen, Barth derides
this possibility. For him it poses a threat to the uniqueness of humanity.113
The reverse is surely the case: it enables human beings to see in the
mutuality of life with other species how profoundly important is their
divinely appointed role of priest and redeemer. It gives scope for the work
of humanisation. Man "is to commit himself to the divine task of lifting
up creation, redeeming those orders of which he forms part, and directing
them towards their end" 114 Scholastic theology, as we have seen, denied
this moral community because beasts, they argued, can have no duties, res-
ponsibilities and therefore cannot possess rights. But the absence of
duties does not make fellowship impossible. We need to reject the legacy
of scholasticism represented by Bernard Earing when he argues that "nothing
irrational can be the object of the Christian virtue of neighbourly love,
charity". "Nothing irrational", he declares, "is capable of the beautifying
friendship with God" 115 In opposition, we need to posit the appropriateness
and spiritual significance of God's all-embracing covenant. We have no
reason for denying that other creatures can, in their own way, relate to
and praise God. An understanding of the mystery of God's love which
excludes in principle all other life forms is profoundly impoverished.
113. CD , III, 4, pp. 332-3.
114. Edward Carpenter, 'Christian Faith and the Moral Aspect of Hunting'
in Against Hunting: A Symposium, ed. by P. Moore (London: Gollancz,
1965) p. 136.
115. Earing, The Law of christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity, 2 vols
(London: Mercier Press, 1963) vol II (1963) pp. 361 - 2.
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Father Zossima's advice in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov is a
good antidote:
Love all God's creation, the whole of it and every grain
of sand. Love every leaf, every ray of God's light. Love
the animals, love the lants, love everything. If you love
everything you will perceive the divine mystery in things.
And once you have perceived it, you will begin to comprehend
it ceaselessly more and more every day. And you will come to
love the whole world with an abiding, universal love.116
The question may be asked, however, whether we have sufficiently detailed
the moral limits involved in the moral, sacrificial lordship of man over
creation. Part of the answer, as already indicated, is that the complexity
of man's interaction with animals and the difficulty of establishing a
comprehensive ethical theory requires much further work than this one
study can provide. But it should also be clear that the major thrust of
this concluding section insists that the moral dimension of our relation-
ship with animals cannot simply consist in the prescribing of limits, the
detailing of rules and the establishing of prohibitions. Certainly this is
one side, and a vital one if we are to have checks and markers on the road
to a developing sense of stewardship. But it is only one side, and
arguably the less important. Moral theology can never be satisfied with
an understanding of moral response defined wholiy in terms of the prevention
of the worst rather than the promotion of the good. The issue is not how
can we desist from the worst, but how can we live the best. The danger
inherent in all moral prescribing is that the minimum we can muster so often
becomes the standard of charity. It matters in this area, perhaps more than
most, that man offers a free response of generosity to that freely given
116. Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 2 vols., ET by David Magarshack
(Earmonsworth: Penguin, 1958) Vol. 1 (1958) p. 375. Cf. the insights of
many poets, e.g. S.T. Coleridge in 'his conclusion to 'The Rime of the
Ancient Mariner'; D.H. Lawrence on man's "connection with the living cos-
mos" in 'Fatality'; Edith Sitwell on how Christ "bears in his heart all
wounds ... of the baited bear ... of the hunted hare" in 'Still Falls the
Rain', or Tennyson's conviction that "nothing walks with aimless feet; that
not one life shall be destroyed, or cast as rubbish to the void, when God
hath made the pile complete" in 'In Memorlaiti', all in Peter Levi (ed.) The
Pe2guin Book of English Christian Verse (Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1984)
pp. 215; 286; 294 and 232.
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generous love of the Trinity. 117
 The agenda is how can we maximise by
co-.operating with the Spirit the fullest human responses of reverence,
responsibility and generosity.
In Contrast to Naturalistic Theodicy
Finally our exposition must be opposed to the views of various exponents
of naturalistic theodicy. According to Andrew Elphinstone "pain, in itself,
is neutral". It is simply raw material for our growth as persons in an
evolutionary process. 118 According to Peter Geach, the Creator is
characterised by "mere indifference to the pain that the elaborate
interlocking teleologies of life involve". He cannot share with
non-human creatures "the virtue of sympathy with physical suffering" 119
According to John Hick, the existence of animals and all the pain they
suffer can be justified because "they represent possible forms of being,
and therefore of goodness, and because their existence is accordingly
necessary to the fullness of the created world", or even because "sentient
nature supports and serves its human apex* l2o Such "explanations" of animal
pain are surely deficient. They have mainly one thing in common: a despair
of God's redemptive capacity in christ through the work of the Holy Spirit.
117. The need for generosity was firmly grasped by the Christian founders
of the S.P.C.A. in their first 'Prospectus' published in 1824. "Is
the moral circle perfect so long as any power of doing good remains?
Or can the infliction of cruelty on any being which the Almighty has
endued with feelings of pain and pleasure, consist with genuine and
true benevolence?", RSPCA Records, Vol. 11 (1823-26) p. 198. This
first appeal on behalf of the newly-formed society was signed by
various well-known Christian philanthropists including William
Wilberforce, Richard Martin and Arthur Broome (an Anglican clergyman
who became the first secretary of the Society and landed up in prison
because of the society's debts). For two pioneering Christian works,
see Henry Crowe, Zoophilos; or Considerations on the Moral Treatment
of Inferior Animals (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1820)
and esp. Humphry Primatt, The Duty of Mercy and the Sin of Cruelty to
Brute Animals (Edinburgh: T. Constable, 1834).
118. Elphinstone, Freedom, Suffering and Love (London: SCM Press, 1976)
p. 106.
119. Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977) pp. 77 and 79.
120. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, Fontana Library of Philosophy and
Theology (London: Collins, 1968) pp. 250 and 251.
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"(I)t does not seem that an eschatological new heaven and new earth, with
a new animal creation, could relieve the problem of earthly animal pain."
"For, unless we postulate a heaven for the millions of millions of indivi-
dual animals that have perished ... no future state of the universe will be
relevant to the pains that these creatures have undergone. ,,121 And even
more directly, can any eschatological hope recompense suffering humans,
we may ask? In different ways 	 these theodicies converge at this basic
point: God does not reconcile the world; he must be reconciled to the world
as we know it. And if this world as we know it exhibits structural evil in
the form of pain for millions of its inhabitants, that pain must either be
accepted as the way God wants the universe to be or it simply cannot be
pain as we know it to be. Kingston's firm conclusion that "British theo-
dicy, although not formally denying animal suffering, has often virtually
done so by reducing its intensity to zero" is difficult to dispute)22
Barth, alas, does not fare much better. He does not deny that creation
"in its own way" participates in redemption. But "consistent apostles
of the protection of animals" are charged with not facing the world as it is
and as God intended it to be: "in virtue of which the big fish does not
greet the little fish but eats
	 Those who opt for vegetarianism in
order to relieve animal suffering represent "a wanton anticipation of
the new aeon for which we hope". 124
 Is all conscientious striving therefore
for the world we hope for, through the power of the Holy Spirit, only wanton,
that is, empty activity? Barth here is hardly consistent. His own work for
international peace was actually based on a full declaration of the peace
already achieved for us through the reconciliation of the world by Jesus
121. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, op. cit., p. 252.
122. Kingston in op. cit., p. 487.
123. Barth, Ethics, op. cit., p. 142.
124. CD, III, 4, n. pp. 255-6.
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Christ, and its full realisation in the world to come. There is no
"wanton anticipation" here. We have a "responsibility to witness to that
peace and find ourselves called to do it")25
The major point at issue here, as throughout, is theological. It is wholly
un-trinitarian to suppose that the world as we now see it (with all its
attendant waste, frustration, misery arid evil) is the only kind of world
possible in the future. Only a theology that is ruthless in its determina-
tion to hold fast to God as Creator and Reconciler and Redeemer can begin
to give full expression to the hope of the world to come. All this of
course invites the charge of utopianism. Pnd so be it. The Utopians of
More's imagining conceived themselves not as "masters" but "stewards" of
God's creation, especially generous in their care of animals. "They do not
believe that the divine clemency delights in bloodshed and slaughter, seeing
that it has imparted life to animate creatures that they might enjoy
life."126
125. Barth, Letter to Hiderobu Kwada of Tokyo, 22 September, 1964, Karl
Barth: Letters 1961-1968, op. cit., pp. 88 - 91.
126. More, The Complete Works, ed. by E. Surtz and J.H. Hexter,
The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas Moore, 4 Vols.,
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965) Vol. 4, Utopia,
(1965); on farming p. 115 and comm. pp. 388 - 9; on desisting from
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